Starting Ireland on the Road to Industry: Henry Ford in Cork by Grimes, Thomas
 i 
STARTING IRELAND ON THE ROAD 
TO INDUSTRY:   
HENRY FORD IN CORK.  
VOLUME 1. 
 
 
 
THOMAS GRIMES 
 
 
 
Ph.D 
 
 
 
2008 
 
 
 
 ii 
  
 
 
 
 
STARTING IRELAND ON THE ROAD TO 
INDUSTRY: HENRY FORD IN CORK  
IN TWO VOLUMES 
 
By 
 
THOMAS GRIMES 
 
 
 
THESIS FOR THE DEGREE OF Ph. D 
 DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY  
NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF IRELAND  
MAYNOOTH  
 
 
 
 
Supervisor of Research: Professor R. V. Comerford 
 
 
 
2008  
 
 
 
VOLUME ONE 
 
 i 
CONTENTS 
 
 
 
Volume 1 
 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
 
 iii 
Abbreviations 
 
 
 iv 
Introduction 
 
 
 1 
CHAPTER ONE:  
  
Development of the Fordson tractors: Ford as an 
international firm up to World War I (1903-1916)  
  
                                  
13 
CHAPTER TWO:   The decision to choose Cork: Ford and Ireland as a 
location for tractor production (1916-1918)   
  
                          
58 
CHAPTER THREE:   Production start up: Struggles with construction, 
sales and prices (1917-1920) 
 
 
98 
CHAPTER FOUR:   Political issues and sales collapse: Industrial relations 
in a war zone and the search for sales (1919-1921)   
 
                  
162 
CHAPTER FIVE:   Sabotage and threats: Problems with local powers 
(1921 -1923) 
202 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ii 
CONTENTS 
 
 
 
Volume 2 
 
 
Abbreviations  
  
 ii 
CHAPTER SIX: Tariffs: McKenna’s revenge and Cumann na 
nGaedheal inertia  (1922-1926)     
                 
1 
CHAPTER SEVEN: Ford, supplier of parts: Cork’s fate in the balance 
(1923-1928)   
                                                                        
50 
CHAPTER EIGHT:   World-wide supplier of Fordson tractors: Tractor 
production thwarted a second time (1928-1932)   
                                          
104 
CHAPTER NINE: Ford as assembler: Tariffs and quotas bring frugal 
stability (1932-1984)  
  
                                               
171 
Conclusion 
 
 238 
Appendices   
  
 254 
Bibliography   
  
 269 
 
 
 iii 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
I am grateful to all those who helped me in the preparation of this thesis.  My first 
debt is to the staff of the Department of Modern History at National University of Ireland, 
Maynooth, especially to my supervisor, Professor R. V. Comerford, for his assistance and 
support, his many helpful suggestions and, not least, for his unfailing patience and 
confidence in the successful outcome of the project. 
I also want to express my appreciation to the staff of the archives and libraries 
who helped locate the research materials for this work: The National Library of Ireland, 
the National Archives of Ireland and of the United Kingdom, University College Dublin 
Archives, the British Library, the libraries of NUI, Maynooth, Trinity College Dublin, 
Boole library in University College Cork, as well as the Cork City and County Archives, 
the Ulster Folk and Transport Museum and Bob Montgomery of the Royal Irish 
Automobile Club Archive. I would like particularly to thank the friendly, efficient and 
cheerful staff of the Benson Ford Research Center in Dearborn, Michigan, who 
responded to my demands so promptly and courteously on my visits there. Particular 
mention goes to Peter Kalinski for his many helpful suggestions.    
I want to thank my family, particularly my children, Rachel and Emma, and their 
respective husbands, Kevin and Barry, for their support through the process. I must also 
mention my grandchildren, Louis, who opted to arrive while I was on a research trip to 
Detroit, and of course Freddie. Also, Sheila and her boys who provided lots of 
intellectual stimulation; friends Noel, Carmel, Judith and particularly Gerry Mac for his 
many years of cheerful and  pragmatic counsel. Finally, my loving thanks goes to Elise 
for her constant love and support over the last four years. 
 iv 
ABBREVIATIONS 
 
 
 
AIFTA              Anglo-Irish Free Trade Agreement 1965. 
 
AMB                 Agricultural Machinery Branch. 
 
BFRC                Benson Ford Research Center, Dearborn, Michigan. 
 
CIDA                 Cork Industrial Development Association. 
 
CIO                    Committee on Industrial Organisation. 
 
EEC                   European Economic Community. 
 
FIC                     Fiscal Inquiry Committee. 
 
FPD                    Food Production Department.   
 
IDA                    Industrial Development Authority.  
 
ITGWU             Irish Transport and General Workers Union (SIPTU).   
 
MOM                Ministry of Munitions.  
 
NAI                    National Archives of Ireland.  
 
NH, vol. I          A. Nevins, (With F. E. Hill), Ford: the times, the man, the company. 
NH, vol. II        A. Nevins and F. E. Hill, Ford: Expansion and Challenge 1915-33. 
NH, vol. III       A. Nevins, and F. E. Hill, Ford: Decline and rebirth 1933-62. 
NLI                    National Library of Ireland.   
 
NPC                   National Prices Commission. 
 
WH                    M. Wilkins, and F. E. Hill, American business abroad: Ford on six 
 
                             continents.   
 
 
 
 
 
Summary  
 
 
Henry Ford’s innovations revolutionised personal transport and manufacturing 
processes in the early twentieth century. Following his accomplishments in the United 
States, Ford, the son of an immigrant Irishman, conscious of Ireland’s backwardness, was 
keen to assist with the industrial development of the land of his ancestors. This thesis 
examines the outcome of that aspiration, the origins and history of Ford production 
operations in Cork from Henry Ford’s visit in 1912 to the plant’s closure in 1984.  
Ford’s Cork factory, though originally designed to manufacture tractors in support 
of Britain’s war-time food needs, did not commence production until mid-1919, by which 
time the required tractors had been supplied from the United States. Subsequently, Ford 
of Cork produced tractors for Britain and Europe until 1922 when market downturns 
forced the company to convert the plant into a supplier of Model T parts for Ford’s 
Manchester car factory. In 1929, tractor production was reinstated and Cork became the 
company’s sole tractor facility, supplying its global requirements. With the final removal 
of tractor production in 1932, tariffs forced Ford to assemble motor cars for the Irish 
market. The relative stability provided by this protection ensured that for the following 
half century Ford remained a major employer in Cork city and of significant importance 
to the economy of the city and its hinterland.  
This thesis investigates the decision-making that led to Ford’s choice of Cork, as 
well as his continued support for the operation of the plant despite the considerable 
difficulties and significant financial losses incurred. It examines internal company 
operations, the effectiveness of local management in controlling production costs and 
quality against the background of a changing Irish political and economic scene.  
 1 
STARTING IRELAND ON THE ROAD TO INDUSTRY:  
HENRY FORD IN CORK  
Introduction  
 
The development of the first motor cars at the end of the nineteenth century led to 
an explosion of motor manufacturing enterprises in Europe and America. Of the hundreds 
of companies that started, comparatively few survived. For example, in the United States, 
of 502 motor manufacturing companies formed between 1900 and 1908 more than three 
hundred dropped out in the same period.
1
 The early development of motoring in Britain 
and Ireland lagged behind the rest of Europe until 1896 when the so-called ‘emancipation 
act’ was passed allowing speed limits to be raised to 14 miles per hour and progress to 
commence. Within a few years, wealthy Irish individuals were importing a variety of 
models and services began to emerge to support these pioneering motorists. A handful of 
small Irish carmakers also appeared, some were originally coach makers, while others 
came from an engineering background. Of the handful of attempts at producing an Irish 
car, only one was even modestly successful. For a decade before World War I, Chambers 
& Company manufactured motor cars in their Belfast motor works.  They produced and 
sold a variety of models, proudly advertising their vehicles as the ‘All Irish Car’.2  The 
company went into decline after World War I and disappeared a decade later. 
In contrast, the company that Henry Ford founded in 1903 was so successful that 
in the years following the 1908 introduction of the Model T in the United States, Ford’s 
innovative engineering, production systems, and social ideas, revolutionised personal 
transport and manufacturing methods there. This led to reduced car prices, improved 
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Robert Lacey, Ford:The men and the machine (London, 1986), p.
 
62.  
2 John 
 
S. Moore, Chambers Motors, 1904-1929 (Garristown, 2000), p. 7. 
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reliability and simplified design, transforming the motor car from a rich man’s toy, into 
an accessible and affordable transportation for the masses. Ford, the son of an immigrant 
Irishman from County Cork, following his remarkable success, and with his company 
already exporting cars into Britain and Ireland, visited Europe in 1912 to investigate the 
state of the motor business there. During the trip, conscious of his Irish ancestry, he made 
a brief tour of Ireland. Having seen the backward plight of the region, he determined to 
kick-start its industrial development and subsequently went on to introduce what was to 
become the country’s most substantial motor manufacturing facility.  
Following the purchase of the Marina site in Cork, Henry Ford & Son, Ltd. was 
formed and work began in 1917 on a large-scale manufacturing plant from which, by 
1919, tractors were being exported to many parts of Europe.  During the subsequent six 
and half decades, the firm’s focus changed a number of times.  Recession in the wake of 
World War I led to a decline in tractor sales which forced Ford to convert the plant to 
Model T parts production for their British motor car factory in Manchester. Tariff barriers 
introduced between Britain and Ireland following Irish independence undermined the 
competitiveness of this parts business and threatened the Irish company’s survival. Henry 
Ford’s restoration of tractor manufacturing in 1929, expanded to meet the company’s 
global requirements, seemed to offer salvation, but within two years this project also had 
failed. The depression of the early 1930s decimated demand for the Fordson tractor, 
forcing Ford, in 1932, to make the decision to discontinue manufacturing in Cork and 
turn the Marina into a distribution centre. Before the decision could be implemented the 
recently formed Fianna Fáil government introduced tariffs which forced Ford not to 
terminate manufacturing operations completely, but instead to assemble cars for the Irish 
 3 
market. This smaller, protected car assembly industry proved a more stable and enduring 
business and provided the city of Cork with substantial employment while supplying the 
Irish market with home-assembled motor cars up to the time of its final closure in 1984. 
Thus, the history of Ford in Ireland is the chronicle of Henry Ford’s attempt to bring 
engineering industry to the country. It is an account of two separate failed attempts, about 
a decade apart, to produce tractors for export to international markets. In both cases, the 
attempts were frustrated by international factors and economic depressions. Despite these 
failures, Ford’s assembly plant was the largest employer in Cork and of significant 
importance to the economy of the city and its hinterland. 
Henry Ford and his enterprise, the Ford Motor Company, both hold a fascination 
for writers and much has been written about them, mainly in the United States. Henry 
Ford & Son Ltd., Cork represents a tiny part of the operations of the company and as 
such has received little attention. For example, even Charles E. Sorensen, who directed 
Irish operations for over twenty years and was in constant communication with the local 
management and made regular visits to the plant, never mentioned Cork in his memoirs.
3
 
The three-volume history of Henry Ford and his company written by Allan Nevins and 
Frank Hill is arguably the most respected history of the company, while the subsequent 
work of Mira Wilkins and Frank Hill on the development of Ford as a multinational 
enterprise, is also highly regarded.
4
 Nevins and Wilkins relied principally on the 
documents available in the Ford archives, at the Benson Ford Research Center (BFRC) in 
                                                 
3 C. E. Sorensen
 
(with Samuel T. Williamson), Forty years with Ford (London, 1957).  
4 Allan Nevins (with F. E. Hill), vol. I, Ford:The times, the man, the company (New York, 1954); vol. II, Expansion and challenge 
1915-33 (New York, 1957) and vol. III, Ford: Decline and rebirth 1933-62 (New York, 1963), (henceforth abbreviated as NH, vol. I; 
NH, vol.
 
II and NH, vol. III) and Mira Wilkins and F. E. Hill,
 
American business abroad: Ford on six continents (Detroit, 1964), 
(Henceforth abbreviated as WH). 
 4 
Dearborn, Michigan, as primary source materials. Both, particularly Wilkins, devote 
some of their investigation to the Cork operation. Inevitably, given the breadth of their 
work, their coverage is far from comprehensive. Most other works available pay scant 
attention to the Irish operation. Typical are two recent works: firstly, a broad-ranging 
history of Ford in Europe entitled: Ford, 1903–2003: The European history.5 It consists 
of twenty-nine papers delivered at a conference in Bordeaux to commemorate the 
centenary of the Ford Motor Company and includes papers by Steven Tolliday which 
deal with the development of Ford in Britain.
6
  Tolliday’s work touches briefly on some 
aspects of the Cork plant, mainly where it impinges on the British operation. A second 
book produced for the Ford centenary, Wheels for the world, is a comprehensive retelling 
of the story of Henry Ford and his company but contains little on the Irish plant.
7
 
In Ireland, Henry Ford’s contribution to industrial Ireland has been largely 
overlooked by general works of history, while only a handful of documents have 
appeared devoted to events at Ford’s Marina plant. Bob Montgomery, curator of the 
Royal Irish Automobile Club archive, has produced a series of monographs on aspects of 
motoring history, including one on the history of Ford.
8
 This document in turn draws 
much of its content from Ford in Ireland: the first sixty years, published by the Ford’s 
public relations department.
9
 The Ford document offers a succinct but uncritical overview 
of the company up to 1977. Both are short documents, hardly more than pamphlets. Two 
other works have been identified which attempt, in different ways, to record the history 
                                                 
5 Hubert Bonin, Yannick Lung, and Steven Tolliday (eds) Ford, 1903–2003:The European history (2 vols, Paris, 2003). 
6 Steven Tolliday, ‘The rise of Ford in Britain: From sales agency to market leader, 1904-1980’
 
in Bonin, Lung and Tolliday (eds), 
Ford, 1903–2003, ii,
 
7-72.
 
(http://beagle.u-bordeaux4.fr/ifrede/Ford/Content.htm ) (  22 Mar. 2007). 
7 Douglas Brinkley, Wheels for the world: Henry Ford, his company,
 
and a century of progress,1903-2003 (New York, 2003).   
8 Bob Montgomery, Ford manufacture & assembly at Cork 1919-1984 (Garristown, 2000).  
9 Henry Ford & Son, Ford in Ireland: the first sixty years,1917-1977 (Cork, 1977).  
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and development of the motor industry in Ireland and which deal with Ford to a greater or 
lesser degree. Published in the early 1980s they are John O’Donovan’s book Wheels and 
deals, which was written at the request of the Society of the Irish Motor Industry, and 
John Moore’s book Motor makers in Ireland which originated as an M.A. thesis.10  
O’Donovan’s book, which is subtitled ‘People and places in Irish motoring’, concentrates 
mainly on events in the Republic of Ireland and deals with the personalities involved in 
the motor trade. O’Donovan also looked at the evolution and early history of motor 
organisations and motor racing as well as trade issues and the emergence of trade 
representative bodies. His brief section on Henry Ford appears to rely on Ford in Ireland: 
the first sixty years and draws little from primary source material.  Moore, on the other 
hand, concentrates on the motor industry located in Northern Ireland, particularly around 
Belfast, so, while Chambers, Fergus and more recently, De Lorean are well covered, 
there is little about Henry Ford & Son of Cork.  Moore’s book is written largely from an 
engineering perspective and includes a wealth of technical information on the cars 
discussed, going so far as to provide detailed technical drawings of parts and functions.  
In an unpublished thesis completed in 1981, David S. Jacobson investigated the 
motoring industry, particularly Ford’s manufacturing operations and the effects of 
protectionism and tariffs, from an economist’s point of view.11 He covered the origins of 
the Irish motor industry as well as issues relating to coach building and the evolution of 
protectionism. His section on Ford dealt with the company’s early moves towards 
internationalism, the decision to build at Cork and the financial issues relating to that 
decision. Issues which may have played a part in attracting Ford to Cork, such as 
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 6 
comparative wage rates between Cork and Britain, were also examined. Jacobson 
analysed the use of tariffs and the reaction of Henry Ford & Son to them. He considered 
the financial issues which underpinned Fords attempts at producing tractors. Finally he 
examined the changes in trading regulations affecting motor assembly and considered the 
company’s future in the light of free trade. Written shortly before Ford closed Cork in 
1984, in fact, Jacobson’s thesis is the most significant work on Henry Ford & Son up to 
that time. His thesis concentrated on the economic aspects, but is limited insofar as he did 
not examine documents in the BFRC, relying on Wilkins and Nevins as his main source 
of information on Ford. As the foregoing literature review shows, the history of the motor 
industry in Ireland, while not totally neglected, has had scant scholarly treatment and no 
comprehensive historical analysis. When Moore and O’Donovan’s books, were reviewed 
by Jacobson he expressed his disappointment that ‘both books…leave much ground to be 
covered’.12 Writing of the motor industry in 1985, Jacobson stated that ‘there has been no 
full-length publication on any aspect of its history, development or structure’.13  
More recently, Miriam Nyhan has produced an M. Phil. thesis on Henry Ford & 
Son, Ltd., Cork which has been published under the title Are you still below? The Ford 
Marina plant, Cork, 1917-1984.
14
 Nyhan’s thesis sets out to examine Ford’s role in 
changing the economic landscape of Cork and bringing prosperity to its citizens. While 
part of the work documents operational and political issues, the main thrust of Nyhan’s 
thesis draws on oral testimony based on the recollections of Ford workers. The thesis 
paints a picture of life in the plant in the latter years of its existence, covering the 
                                                 
12 David Jacobson, ‘The motor industry in Ireland’ in Irish Economic and Social History, xii (1985), pp 109/15. 
13 Ibid., p. 109. 
14 Miriam  Nyhan, ‘Henry Ford & Son Limited: A history of the Cork plant, 1917-1984’
 
(M.Phil. Thesis, University College Cork, 
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Nyhan, Are you still below? The Ford Marina plant,Cork, 1917-1984 (Cork, 2007). 
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migration of Cork workers to Dagenham as well as their recollections of conditions in the 
Cork plant. The opening chapter, under the title ‘Why Cork?’ deals with Ford’s decision 
to locate in Cork and examines the state of the city at that time as well as speculating on 
Ford’s motivation for his action. Entitled ‘From a green field to a great factory’, the 
second chapter examines events in the early years of Ford’s presence in Cork as the 
company became established. It briefly outlines events from the end of World War I to 
the 1930s. Nyhan describes the conditions imposed on Ford in the purchase documents 
and the subsequent conflict with Cork Corporation over the Marina lease. She examines 
aspects of the development of the factory against the background of the War of 
Independence and the Civil War. The death of Tomás MacCurtain, the walkout of Ford 
employees to attend masses for the dying hunger striker, Terence MacSwiney, and the 
burning of Cork by the Black and Tans are included. On a lighter note the success of the 
Fordson football team is covered.  
The following two chapters use oral interviews with Ford workers to provide an 
insight into the workings of Henry Ford & Son as seen by a section of their employees. 
Chapter three, entitled ‘The nearest place that was not Cork’ depicts the migratory 
patterns of Ford workers between Cork and Ford’s British operations.15 Employees’ 
memories of their working lives, work and the operations of the company are described 
in chapter four, ‘Are you still below’.16 The last chapter, under the title ‘The final epoch’, 
recounts the economic circumstances which lead to the closure of the assembly plant in 
                                                 
15 In Nyhan’s work, Are you
 
still below?, this chapter is entitled
 
‘The Dagenham Yanks’,
 
p.
 
65. 
16 In  Nyhan’s
 
Are you still below?, it is entitled ‘ Memories of the Marina’, p. 76. 
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1984, as well as the emotional impact on the people of Cork at the loss of such a long 
standing and crucial industry. 
In my thesis I intend to explore the decision-making and management actions of 
Ford, one of the earliest multinational enterprises to locate in Ireland, as they dealt with 
politics and economics on both sides of the Irish Sea, while being directed and controlled, 
often irrationally, from its headquarters in Detroit. Within a chronological framework I 
propose to record and to re-examine the traditionally fulsome view of Henry Ford and his 
Cork subsidiary from the time of his visit in 1912, up to the plant’s closure in 1984.  
Where appropriate, issues will be dealt with thematically. I will utilise mainly research 
materials examined personally in the BFRC in Dearborn. As the main repository of 
Ford’s archive material, the BFRC holds a substantial number of records covering all 
aspects of Ford’s business. While, according to BFRC archivist Peter Kalinski, some 
British and Irish records were lost during shipment from Britain to Dearborn, nonetheless 
the records available in BFRC offer a wealth of material providing many new insights 
into Ford manufacturing operations in Ireland. In addition to written documents the 
archive holds reminiscences of persons involved in the company business. These records 
form part of a Ford oral history project as well as records of interviews by both Allan 
Nevins and Mira Wilkins. The interviews were carried out in the period from the mid-
1950s to the early 1960s, many years after the actual events, and consequently must be 
treated carefully as they often contain inaccuracies as well as telescoping of events. For 
example, B. R. Brown in his reminiscences reported being first sent from the United 
States to England in October 1916, but later states that: ‘I was in Ireland during the Easter 
 9 
Rebellion.’17 Whereas access to all BFRC records in Dearborn was generously permitted, 
Henry Ford & Son Cork, who retain a small number of production records, were reluctant 
to permit access to these. Other sources consulted include government papers in the 
National Archives, records in the Cork City and County Archive and the National 
Archives of the United Kingdom in Kew as well as local and national newspapers.  
*  *  * 
Even as the first tractor emerged from Ford’s partially completed plant, in July 
1919, the War of Independence was already underway. Ford management found 
themselves at the centre of conflicts on a number of occasions. This thesis will document 
and analyse the company’s internal operations, politics and issues against the background 
of changing Irish political and economic circumstances. The role played by Percival 
Perry and his Dearborn superior, Charlie Sorensen, as well as local managers Edward 
Grace and E. L. Clarke, all key figures in the development and management of the 
Marina plant, will be documented.  Ford’s production activities during the period will be 
examined and this work will address more fully some of the issues discussed by Nyhan in 
chapters one, two and five of her thesis. It will expand on her account of issues such as 
Ford’s dealings with local organisations in the purchase of the Marina site, the 
disagreements which occurred when Ford prevented its workers from attending a mass 
for the hunger striker, Terence McSwiney, and the later confrontation between the 
company and Cork Corporation when they threatened to eject Ford because of the 
company’s failure to comply with the labour stipulations laid down in the lease. It will 
examine the roots of the decision to locate the business in Cork as well as Henry Ford’s 
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continued support of the operation, despite the considerable difficulties and significant 
financial losses incurred, and will examine whether this was an altruistic gesture or a 
shrewd business move on Henry Ford’s part. While these issues have been considered by 
both Nyhan and Jacobson, I will introduce new information gleaned from BFRC. For 
example, in her first chapter Nyhan reiterates the question ‘why Cork?’ originally posed 
by David Jacobson in his thesis. Both acknowledge Ford’s sentiment for the land of his 
forebears, suggesting that the difficulties of war hastened the decision to locate in Cork 
and asserting that the decision was based primarily on economic factors, such as the 
relatively cheap land, lower wages, less contentious labour relations than in Manchester 
and the absence of tariffs due to Ireland’s location within the British Empire.  Documents 
consulted in BFRC, particularly a survey and report in 1913 by Ford’s English manager 
Percival Perry, cast additional light on Ford’s attitude and his decision to locate in Cork. 
Thus, while he was not unaffected by the economic factors and quite prepared to 
conclude his Irish experiment when economics dictated, this thesis will argue that Ford’s 
sentimental, desire to bring industry to Cork largely outweighed the economic factors.  
In addition to expanding on existing works, I will address a range of other issues 
not discussed elsewhere, for example, Cork’s relationship with the Manchester plant. 
Throughout its existence, the Cork plant’s fate was intertwined with, and affected by 
events in the Ford Motor Company of England. Cork’s role as a parts supplier to 
Manchester and the effectiveness of its local management in controlling production 
efficiency, costs and product quality were significant factors in that relationship. The 
introduction of import tariffs by Britain soon after Irish independence, increased costs on 
parts shipped by Cork to Manchester, threatened the viability of the Cork plant, and 
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created unforeseen and insoluble difficulties for the Cumann na nGaedheal government. 
At all stages, Ford’s managers fought to get the best deal possible from the British and 
Irish governments, but were wary of getting involved in politics and particularly careful 
not to make long-term commitments or promises. These issues, as well as relations with 
the Cumann na nGaedheal government and the attempts to woo Henry Ford, will be 
explored, as will the production and quality problems created by the thousands of 
untrained, ‘green’ workers employed in the late 1920s. This thesis will also examine both 
Ford’s decision to abandon production in Cork in 1932 and the Fianna Fáil government’s 
introduction of an aggressive tariff regime which caused Ford to pull back from 
converting the site into a distribution centre and instead led to the plant being adapted to 
motor car assembly. 
Other issues which will be looked at include the threats from the Irregulars during 
the Civil War and Grace’s use of a firearm to protect himself from striking dockers; the 
involvement by Ford’s local management in housing projects and their attempts to find 
replacement work in times of slackness. Grace, and later Clarke’s, struggles to cope with 
the myriad of challenges encountered will be analysed as will the events which 
culminated in their being forced out of the company. I will examine the restrictions 
caused by World War II on Ford’s operations and their assembly operations from then 
until the factory closed in 1984.  
Finally, an extensive range of appendices has been included. These form an 
important part of the thesis providing a statistical context to the main work, illustrating 
the scale and rapid expansion of the Ford company both in the United States and overseas 
during the pre-World War II period. Other appendices record production output, exports 
 12 
of tractors and parts, employment figures and wage rates. Appendix 8, for example, 
records the number of workers employed by Ford at its peak and shows the company’s 
significance as an employer in Cork during 1929/1930, while appendices of early wage 
rates also reveal the range of skills employed in the Cork plant from the outset. Data 
derived from Irish government statistics has been extracted and collated to document the 
scale of Ford’s export business and the effect of government tariffs and quotas. 
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CHAPTER ONE  
Development of the Fordson tractors: 
Ford as an international firm up to World War I (1903-1916) 
Within a short number of years after the appearance of the first motor car, the 
motor industry changed from being a backyard business to a mass production system. In 
April 1901, the Royal Dublin Society invited all of the motorists of Ireland to take part in 
a parade of motor cars to be held as part of their annual cattle show. Twenty seven cars 
took part in the display. This turnout represented the majority of the cars in the country at 
that time. Anti-motoring legislation had retarded the development of motor 
manufacturing in Britain, which left France as the major car-producing nation up to 1906, 
when the United States of America overtook them. In France, the number of private 
vehicles in use had risen from 1438 in 1899 to 17,358 by 1906.
1
 In the same year, an 
estimated 20,000 vehicles were manufactured in the United States. Much of this increase 
was down to the genius of one man, Henry Ford, who in 1906 produced 8,729 cars.
2
    
From childhood, Ford had been interested in engineering and inventing. He had 
built his first car in 1895 and started a second in 1896. By August 1899, he was ready to 
quit his job with the Edison Company to go into the business of building motor cars full-
time. Since he had no capital, he was obliged to turn to speculators to finance him, but 
after three years he resigned, determined, as he said, „never again to put myself under 
orders‟.3 His financiers had proved to be interested only in extracting the most money 
possible from each car sold, but not in Ford‟s idea of making better cars for the public at 
                                                 
1 Encyclopaedia Britannica (11th ed., 29 vols, London, 1911), xviii,
 
p. 920. 
2 WH, p. 436. 
3 Henry Ford (in collaboration with Samuel Crowther), My life and work
 
(London, 1922), p. 36. 
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large. The company, originally named the Henry Ford Company, after his departure, was 
renamed the Cadillac Automobile Company and continued in business, later becoming 
part of the General Motors Corporation.
4
   
Before long, Ford was talking to Alex Y. Malcomson, an enterprising coal 
merchant he had met during his days in Edisons, and on 20 August 1902 they signed a 
partnership agreement under the name Ford & Malcomson Ltd., with the aim of 
producing a passenger car.
5
 Ford needed publicity and was swayed into entering a 
specially built car in a race at Grosse Point, near Detroit, in 1903, despite his reservations 
about motor racing, „the manufacturers had the notion that winning a race on a track told 
the public something about the merits of an automobile-although I can hardly imagine 
any test that would tell less‟.6  The car won the race by a half mile and according to Ford 
„advertised the fact that I could build a fast motor. A week after the race I formed the 
Ford Motor Company‟.7  Ford went ahead to design his new car and put his innovative 
ideas into operation. According to himself, Henry Ford‟s scheme was to produce „a small, 
strong, simple automobile, to make it cheaply and pay high wages in its making‟.8  The 
car, called the Model A, went into production in mid-1903. The first example was sold to 
a Chicago dentist, Dr Ernst Pfenning, on 15 July 1903.  Within months the demand for 
the car was outstripping Ford‟s capacity to build it and even an extension to the factory 
proved inadequate. Early the following year, plans were drawn up to build a new factory 
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at Piquette Avenue. By the beginning of 1905 it was producing 25 cars a day.
9
 Thus, the 
concept of simplicity and reliability proved to be a successful formula for Ford. 
Even while the business was still in its infancy, Ford was prepared to expand 
manufacturing outside the United States. The first step in the internationalisation of the 
company, logically, was into Canada. In 1903, Gordon McGregor, the director of a 
declining Ontario coach-building firm, founded the Ford Motor Company of Canada. 
Fifty one per cent owned by Ford-U.S., McGregor gained the exclusive rights to 
manufacture and sell Ford cars in Canada and other British dominions. By February 1905 
the first Ford had emerged from his factory on the Canadian side of the Detroit River. 
About the same time, Percival L. D. Perry, who was to become the pivotal figure in the 
development of the Ford business in Britain and Ireland, made his first visit to Henry 
Ford, seeking Ford‟s support for his nascent Ford dealership.10 Until 1911, when the 
British assembly plant in Manchester came into operation assembling Fords, cars were 
imported from the United States.  
In the years that followed, the Ford empire expanded inexorably, with production 
or assembly facilities located close to their markets in order to avoid trade tariffs and to 
minimise transportation costs. By 1920, Ford vehicles were being manufactured in nine 
countries, including Ireland. By 1930 there were manufacturing operations in twenty 
countries.
11
  
When Ford launched the Model T, his car for the masses, in 1908, it introduced 
motoring to a totally new market and on a scale unforeseen up till then. The sales figures 
                                                 
9 
 
Lacey, Ford,
 
p. 74. Note: In 1927 Ford also used the title „Model A‟ on its new car.  
10
 
NH, vol. I, pp 357/8.
 
11 David S.
 
Jacobson, „The political economy of industrial location: the Ford motor company in Cork 1912-26‟, in Irish Economic 
and Social History, iv, pp 36-55 (1977), p. 38,
 
see Appendix 7.
 
 16 
were staggering. To quote Ford himself: on „1 October 1908 we made the first of our 
present type small cars. On 4 June 1924 we made our ten millionth. Now in 1926, we are 
in our thirteen millionth‟.12   From its launch, Ford was inundated with orders for the new 
car. To meet the demand a huge new factory was built at Highland Park. It opened in 
early 1910. Yearly production output doubled from 32,054 in 1910 to 69,762 cars the 
following year and then to 170,068 in 1912.
13
  The ever-increasing sales demand 
necessitated speeding up of output, increased efficiency and above all manufacturing 
innovation. By 1913, the motor car was no longer an experimental novelty.  While in the 
area of brakes, tyres and other ancillaries there were considerable improvements to be 
made, and also refinements to the motor car itself, yet the main features of the motor car 
were well developed and accepted.
14
 Now the focus of innovation switched to production. 
The public‟s seemingly insatiable demand for personal transport and Ford‟s response to it 
was about to transform the motor industry.  
As well as building a larger factory, a totally new system of production was 
required to meet sales demand. On 1 April 1913, Ford began his first tentative steps at a 
mass production assembly line. According to Ford: „the idea came in a general way from 
the overhead trolley that the Chicago packers used in dressing beef‟, he took this idea and 
applied it to building flywheel magnetos.
15
 Once that line established the efficiency of the 
method it was applied to the rest of the operations. „The assembling of the motor, 
formerly done by one man, is now divided into eighty–four operations-those men do the 
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work that three times their number formerly did.‟16 Allied to this was the process of 
analysing operations to improve costs and efficiency by identifying and removing waste 
labour and materials. Ford‟s other weapon in the drive for efficiency was the concept of 
standardisation of parts and components, so that interchangeablity and setting out of work 
to sub-contractors was facilitated. These processes succeeded in improving productivity 
to hitherto unrealisable levels.  As the efficiencies cut costs, Ford reduced the price of his 
Model T, thus ensuring that the greatest number of people could benefit from his vision 
of cheap personal transportation.  
The new method of manufacturing made it possible to cope with the huge 
increases in demand by dividing the process of making cars into its most elementary 
steps, and as each task was in itself quite simple, new recruits could be introduced 
directly into the assembly system and begin work immediately and efficiently with 
minimal training. Ford said later that: „As the necessity for production increased it 
became apparent not only that enough machinists were not to be had, but also that skilled 
men were not necessary in production.‟17 In effect, skilled mechanics were employed to 
develop the machines and the systems, simplifying tasks and making it possible for 
ordinary unskilled operators to carry out the work. With the majority of the physical 
effort removed from the process, Ford hired men regardless of their physical size or 
background, as there were jobs for all types and talents, or none at all, in his words: „The 
rank and file came to us unskilled; they learn their jobs within a few hours or a few days. 
If they do not learn within that time they will never be of any use to us.‟18 Ford‟s success 
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in supplying the demands of the marketplace eliminated the need for skilled craftsmen in 
the making of the car and replaced them with automatons performing the same 
monotonous tasks endlessly. 
 Ford had the foresight, not alone to develop and design a successful motor car, 
one which satisfied the man in the street in terms of simplicity of use and ease of repair, 
but also to create the manufacturing system necessary to reduce costs to a point which 
could make it possible for him to buy it. The revolutionary idea that the workers could 
afford a car that came from their plant was at the heart of Ford‟s thinking. The 
significance of the Ford Motor Company in defining modern manufacturing systems is 
immense; Ford played a decisive role in shaping the organisational systems which 
underpin much of modern mass production. Ford’s revolutionary process gave rise to the 
term ‘Fordism’ defined as the „the progressive development of specialised machinery 
operated by closely supervised, deskilled labour to mass produce a standardised product, 
to stable homogenous mass markets‟.19 Ford was responsible for introducing an 
environment where continual cost cutting ruled and the conveyor belt was tantamount to 
a deity. Initially the Ford system was a source of awe and wonder, but inevitably, as the 
plight of the masses of workers became clear, Ford‟s methods drew criticism from many 
quarters. Instead of the formerly skilled jobs, where men had some degree of control over 
their actions and could take professional pride in their work, they were replaced by 
harassed operators, endlessly performing anonymous, monotonous tasks. The workers 
truly were cogs in the huge machine. According to Winfried Wolf:  
With Ford‟s car plant, capitalism had reached that reversal of the relationship between the 
worker and the machine already analysed by Marx. In previous social formations, as in 
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the early capitalist period, the machine was „an extension of the human hand‟; now the 
worker became an extension of the machine.  The maximum exploitation of labour was 
now possible.
20
   
While the new mass production system allowed the Ford Motor Company to cope with 
the increasing demand for motor cars, it could also be adapted to the manufacture of any 
complex product, improving efficiency and facilitating the transfer of the process to a 
new location. It changed the nature of manufacturing industry generally. In Europe, 
motor car manufacture did not benefit from this new system until the 1920s and motor 
cars continued to be produced by skilled craftsman, with all the limitations that that 
implied. Chief amongst these was the shortage of skills to perform the work, variability 
of quality and of course, higher cost, which kept the car as a toy for the rich. The 
outbreak of World War I interrupted the development of cars in Europe, while in the 
United States, Ford continued to increase his outputs and refine his systems with few 
interruptions. By war‟s end, America‟s motor industry was thriving and well placed to 
dominate world markets.  
The Ford Motor Company expanded its distribution systems very rapidly in its 
first decade. To minimise transport costs, assembly plants were opened at strategic points 
throughout the United States followed by Canada, then across the Atlantic to Britain. 
Ford‟s Model N appeared in Ireland at the Irish Motor Show in 1907, and though Ford 
was the biggest car manufacturer in the United States, in Ireland sales were slow. R. J. 
Mecredy, the editor of the Motor News, was an enthusiast from the start, impressed by the 
quality of engineering and design which belied the Ford‟s apparent simplicity.21 At the 
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same time, Ford‟s Model N, was the subject of ridicule from the agents of the more 
sophisticated European marques, who were „misled by the simplicity and 
unconventionality of the car‟s design, condemned it as “spidery”, “sprawny”, “too light 
for Irish roads” adding as a scathing afterthought “it won‟t fit the ruts on byroads”‟.22  
This last point was a significant issue in an era of poor roads, dominated by horse-drawn 
carts and it was to exercise R. W. Archer, who signed up as a Ford dealer at the motor 
show. Archer said that:  
This last fallacy proved one of the hardest of the lot to scotch. It was absolutely untrue, 
but nine out of ten enquirers persisted in this idea in spite of denial and offers to prove by 
demonstration that the car did fit the ruts made by country carts. They were too fixed in 
their prejudices.
23
  
Even when the car demonstrated its capability at a number of Irish Automobile 
Club Reliability Trials and other events, sales were still sluggish. All this changed 
dramatically with the arrival of the Model T in 1909. When Archer was introduced to the 
car, newly imported from America, and invited to take a run in it, he stated that: „I 
quickly realised that my prophecies were fulfilled to the uttermost and that the good time 
had come‟.24  As in the United States, the Model T was an immediate success and quickly 
became market leader in both Britain and Ireland, doubling and redoubling sales so that 
in 1913, some 600 were sold throughout Ireland.
25
  
The success of the Model T in Europe was due not alone to its engineering 
innovations and competitive price, but also to the enthusiasm and drive of Ford‟s English 
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manager, Percival Perry. Perry followed Ford‟s American practice of curtailing transport 
costs by establishing local plants to assemble cars from Detroit-produced engine and 
chassis kits. He found a suitable site for his English assembly operation at Trafford Park, 
to the south of Manchester. The site, a disused tramcar factory, had direct access to the 
sea by the Manchester Ship Canal and rail access to the rest of Britain. Local manufacture 
also had the advantage of avoiding or minimising tariffs, as according to Tolliday, „tariffs 
were in the air, even though Britain remained a free trade country at this time‟.26 The 
Ford Motor Company (England) Ltd. was established on 29 March 1911. Six months 
later, on Monday, 23 October in Trafford Park, Manchester, the first of many British-
built Fords was assembled. According to Burgess-Wise:  
Chassis were built up on trestles until the wheels were fitted, then pushed into the final 
assembly shop for the coachwork to be added. Manchester started building its own 
bodies–more suited to British taste-in 1912, when a local coachbuilder was taken over by 
the company.
27
  
*  *  * 
Combining business with pleasure and accompanied by his wife Clara, his only 
son Edsel, and Clara‟s brother Marvin Bryant, Henry Ford paid an extended visit to 
Europe in 1912. The party was met at Plymouth on 20 July by Percival Perry, who took 
them on a tour of England in a Rolls Royce. As well as visiting the new Ford assembly 
plant in Manchester, they visited Clara‟s mother‟s home in Warwick. Henry and Edsel 
inspected Ford dealers and a number of car factories in the English Midlands, including 
                                                 
26 Tolliday, „Ford in Britain‟, p.10. 
27 David Burgess-Wise, Ford at Dagenham:The rise and fall of Detroit in Europe (Derby, 2001), p. 14. 
 22 
Rolls Royce and Ford‟s main competitor at the time, Wolseley.28 Later, they made a brief 
trip to Ireland, ostensibly to visit Ford‟s ancestral home in Cork.29 Ford‟s forebears on 
both sides of his family came from Ireland. His paternal grandfather, John Ford, had left 
Cork in 1847 during the Great Famine, travelling with his family to join his brothers who 
had already emigrated in 1832 and had settled in Dearborn, near Detroit, Michigan. 
John‟s eldest son, William, born in 1826, worked for a period on the Michigan Central 
Railway before he found employment on a farm owned by another Cork immigrant, 
Patrick Ahern.
30
 The youngest of Ahern‟s family was a young adoptee named Mary 
Litogot. Soon after William and Mary met they were married and moved onto a farm of 
their own in Dearborn. Henry Ford, the eldest of their children was born to them on 30 
July 1863.
31
 
By the time of Henry Ford visited Ireland he was already wealthy and well-known 
in the United States, but less so in Europe, consequently his visit to Ireland provoked 
little attention and he made his Irish tour practically unnoticed. His reputation in the 
United States was enhanced by matters other than motor car production. For instance, his 
campaign against the notorious Selden patent which had forced motor manufacturers to 
pay a royalty of 1.25 per cent on all cars produced was publicised as a David and Goliath 
struggle with Ford in the role of the underdog. Ford had obstinately resisted this payment 
and fought a long court battle to have it overthrown. When, on 9 January 1911, the courts 
ruled in his favour the victory inspired an avalanche of public acclaim not just amongst 
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the ordinary public, but also amongst the other manufacturers who were happy to be 
relieved of the financial burden. The positive effects of the victory lasted for years. Even 
as late as 1935 W. J. Cameron Ford‟s spokesman at the time was to say that Ford had 
liberated the entire industry to the benefit of the American people. The victory raised his 
profile and status and combined with the increasing success of his Model T elevated him 
to the status of folk hero.
32
  Ford‟s later announcement of the „five dollar day‟ in January 
1914 would astonish the American public and add further to his reputation.
33
  
Though Ford attracted huge publicity and attention he was a shy man not keen on 
public speaking. With two or three people he spoke freely, but with more than this he fell 
silent. He disliked large gatherings and, for example, when asked to say a few words at 
the dinner to celebrate the millionth Model T he reluctantly stood up and said: 
„Gentlemen, a million of anything is a great many‟ and immediately sat down leaving his 
audience bewildered.
34
 Despite limited formal education he possessed great vision in 
mechanical engineering design and development, but according to Sorensen, who worked 
with him for almost forty years, Ford was incapable of making a sketch or reading a 
blueprint and his ability to read and write were poor. Sorensen claimed never to have 
seen him write or dictate a letter.
35
 Ford himself said „I don‟t like to read books…they 
muss up my mind‟.36 His lack of general education was publicly revealed when he sued 
the Chicago Tribune who had labelled him an „anarchist‟ and an „ignorant idealist‟.37 The 
libel trial began on 12 May 1919, and while he won his case, his lack of knowledge on 
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issues such as history and semantics was exposed during cross examination when he was 
forced to admit that it was difficult for him to read.
38
 His secretary, Ernest G. Liebold 
looked after his mail and prepared replies which Ford rarely read and only infrequently 
signed.
39
 Apart from occasional interviews with reporters, often when displeased or angry 
with events, Henry Ford‟s ideas and instructions and were usually articulated by Liebold 
or Sorensen.  
*   *   * 
Arriving in Cork from Fishguard aboard the Inniscarra on 9 August 1912, Henry 
Ford paid a brief visit to the city as well as to his old family home in Ballinascarty.
40
  
Edsel recorded in his diary: „We arrived in Cork at 9.30, had breakfast at Metropole 
Hotel. Walked about town. Father walked off alone. Waited for him till 11 then drove out 
to Blarney Castle.‟41  Edsel may have been uninterested in his surroundings, but Henry 
was keen to find information about his ancestors.  It seems that during this walk, he met 
and spoke with „Reverend O‟Connor of St Mary‟s Cathedral and left a gift for the Sisters 
of the Assumption‟.42 He asked Rev. O‟Connor to search for information on his foster-
grandfather Patrick Ahern. In a follow-up letter on his return to the United States Ford 
explained: 
My grandfather Patrick Ahern, lived here in Dearborn Mich. in 1841, but sometime prior 
to that resided at Fair Lane, and it would appear to me if your clerk would institute a 
search among the Ahern families who resided there during earlier years, some trace of 
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them might be found.
43
  
O‟Connor replied: „I shall certainly endeavour to do all I can to trace any members of the 
Ahern family that may be still living in or about Cork. Fair Lane is quite near the 
cathedral so there will be no difficulty‟.44 Subsequently, an advertisement was placed in 
the Cork papers which produced a flood of replies, but which when screened added little 
information.
45
     
Following his interview with Rev. O‟Connor, Ford would have made a tour of the 
area; no doubt, he visited Fair Lane (since renamed Wolfe Tone Street) and the adjoining 
streets. His grandfather, John and family, were believed to have lodged in the home of his 
in-laws who lived there, prior to sailing for America.
46
 In his brief excursion, Ford no 
doubt saw the poverty, squalor and deprivation which existed in the area and may have 
been moved to do something about it. He was also influenced by the street name, Fair 
Lane, as he later named his own residence after it, while in 1955, the name Fairlane 
appeared on a glamorous new car model.
47
 Over the next couple of days Ford‟s party 
toured the south, visiting Blarney, Clonakilty, Bantry and Killarney. Just outside 
Clonakilty, they stopped in Ballinascarty. According to Edsel they „found Aunt Ann‟s 
house‟ and took some pictures.48 Henry wanted to buy the family homestead and ship it 
back to America and rebuild it near his home, but apparently the asking price was too 
high. „Eventually Mr Ford bought the hearthstones, which were incorporated in his 
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house, Fair Lane, at Dearborn.‟49 Following their overnight stay in Killarney, they set out 
on the morning of 11 August to drive to Dublin where they stayed overnight in the 
Shelbourne. The Ford party sailed for Holyhead at midday on the following day. 
Despite the fleeting nature of the visit, the origins of his later actions are rooted in 
this, his only trip to Ireland. Ford seems to have come to a decision to assist the people of 
Cork. It is arguable whether he envisaged a viable business opportunity or whether his 
reasons were purely his oft stated nostalgic reasons, but for Ford the idea of building a 
factory in Cork became a significant objective. On his return to America, Ford instructed 
Perry to carry out an investigation into conditions for setting up a motor car factory in 
Ireland. Perry, who preferred to locate in Southampton, did not reject the suggestion 
outright but sought to steer Ford towards his choice.
50
 Perry was not convinced that Cork 
was a viable option, due to its remoteness from the British market, its lack of skilled 
labour and relatively poor infrastructural facilities. Perry was an ambitious, dynamic man 
who had seen the growth of the motor car, particularly in the United States and was clear 
that this growth would soon be replicated in Europe. He dismissed the Manchester site as 
a temporary location, limited in its scope for expansion, remote from the European 
market and saddled with militant trades unions and related industrial relations difficulties. 
His ambition was that the company should be based on a large site, with a suitably 
imposing plant, capable of manufacturing for all of Europe. While Henry Ford agreed 
with his opinion of Manchester, they differed on the preferred alternative location, with 
Ford keen on Cork, while Perry clung to his choice of Southampton.
51
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*  *  * 
Percival Perry was a car enthusiast, involved in the British motor industry from its 
beginnings. For almost half a century he was to play an important role in Ford of Britain, 
as well as in Ford‟s business in Ireland. Born in 1878, he joined Harry J. Lawson‟s firm 
at eighteen years of age. Lawson was a notorious promoter who operated the Great 
Horseless Carriage Company and had aspirations to control the British motor industry by 
acquiring all available „master patents‟. With some useful experience gained, „Perry left 
the already crumbling Lawson empire in 1898 to set up as a motor accessory dealer‟.52  
Within a year of the foundation of the Ford Motor Company in Detroit, Ford‟s cars were 
exhibited at the Cordingley Automobile Show in London, in March 1904. They were 
seen there by Aubrey Blakiston, who promptly ordered a dozen Model A‟s and set up as 
the British sales agent for Ford cars, based at Long Acre, London, already a centre for the 
motor trade. Blakiston attracted a number of wealthy associates into the business and 
expanded it under a new name, the Central Motor Car Company. Perry, as a result of his 
earlier motor experience acquired with Lawson, was regarded as something of an expert 
and was invited by Blakiston and his colleagues to make a technical report on the 
American Ford, which had not been selling well. Perry went on to join them in the new 
dealership and when Blakiston resigned from the firm in the summer of 1906 Perry 
became managing director.
53
   
Demonstrating initiative and a pro-active approach, Perry, soon after his 
appointment, travelled with his wife to Detroit. His aim was to meet Henry Ford and seek 
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his assistance for the dealership. While Ford was not prepared to help financially, Perry 
gained something which, in the long run, would prove just as valuable. He and his wife 
were invited to stay as guests at the Ford family home in Harper Avenue for the 
remainder of their trip.
54
 Ford was impressed with Perry and the two struck up a rapport 
and became good friends. With the exception of a period from 1919 to 1928, Perry was to 
maintain a personal relationship with Henry Ford, such that Ford‟s wife, Clara 
commented in her diary on arrival at Plymouth, on having being met by „Mr Perry, our 
friend from Manchester‟.55 According to Sorensen, Perry was one of only two Ford staff 
members who ever spent a night with the Fords, Sorensen himself being the other.
56
  This 
intimacy was to benefit the conduct of business over the coming years. On occasions, 
Percy addressed important letters to Mrs Clara Ford, thus ensuring that they got Henry‟s 
attention. Despite this relationship, Ford dismissed Perry in 1919 and again in 1943.
57
  
The other significant achievement of the visit was that Gordon McGregor, head of Ford 
of Canada, who held the exclusive rights to make and market Ford motor cars within the 
British Dominion and Colonies relinquished his claim to the United Kingdom market.
58
  
Over the next few years, difficulties and disagreements continued at the British 
Ford dealership. In early 1907, the company was restructured, with two new backers, 
forming a new company, Perry, Thornton and Schreiber. In October 1908, the new Ford 
Model T went into production in Detroit and eight of the first batch were shipped to 
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Britain to be displayed at Perry, Thornton and Schreiber‟s stand at the London Olympic 
Motor Exhibition. Further disagreements eventually led to Perry‟s departure in early 
1909. Again Perry travelled to Detroit.
59
 By now, the Model T was selling in ever 
increasing numbers in the United States and its potential in Britain was obvious to both 
Ford and Perry.  Perry had corresponded with Henry Ford, continuing to promote himself 
as the man to sell Ford motor cars in Britain.
60
 Ford, impressed by Perry‟s enthusiasm 
and lacking confidence in the existing agency, despatched James Couzens, Ford company 
secretary, to examine the situation in Britain and to develop marketing there. Arising 
from Couzen‟s findings, the Ford agency was removed from Thornton and Schreiber and 
in October 1909 Perry was asked to head up a new British branch of the Ford Motor 
Company with offices at 55-59 Shaftesbury Avenue. Perry had his wish, control of the 
new branch with solid support from Henry Ford and clear title to operate in the British 
and Irish markets, without interference from Ford of Canada. While the salary of $3,000 
per annum agreed in his contract was relatively small, it was augmented by a bonus 
structure which ensured that for annual sales of over $175,000 value he was paid a bonus 
of two and half per cent. A stipulation of the contract was that he „devote his entire time 
and attention to the interests of the company‟.61 
The English Ford company was so successful that by the time Henry Ford visited 
in 1912, Perry was struggling to keep up supplies and was critical of the parts supply 
from Detroit. He sought a contact in Detroit to assist with Manchester‟s difficulties. 
Subsequently, Charles Sorensen was appointed by Henry Ford to oversee operations. For 
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the next thirty years Ford production operations in Britain and Ireland were to be 
controlled directly by Sorensen. His role as overseer and mediator would be crucial for 
the British operation and also for Henry Ford & Son Ltd. of Cork.  Sorensen‟s first 
challenge came in early 1913 when labour problems became an issue. With output at full 
speed, Perry started to encounter resistance from the unionised workforce. The 
Manchester area was largely organised into trades unions and Ford‟s methods and 
pressure led to a series of strikes, which cut production. Perry was particularly upset by 
these actions and wrote to Detroit for assistance:  
Ever since September last we have at the present works been subjected to a series of 
small strikes and have been in continuous labour troubles…at the present moment we 
have our sheet metal workers on strike and the sheet metal workers on the body works are 
also on strike.…I personally hate the place and would be glad to get out of it and recent 
labour disputes have almost broken my heart.
62
 
 This plea led to Charlie Sorensen‟s first visit to Britain in July 1913.63 A former trade 
unionist himself, he lived up to his name as „Cast-Iron Charlie‟ when he ended the 
dispute and broke the power of the unions in the plant „by assuring strategically placed 
workers of both job security and high wages‟.64 He bought out the offending body-plant 
and on his next visit in April 1914 boasted that it had developed into „the best building 
plant that I have seen yet‟.65 Labour problems too had disappeared and he claimed that 
„we are the only company in the vicinity who are absolutely free and independent‟.66 
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Standards of quality and output had also improved significantly.
67
 Ford had no time for 
trades unions and, as in America, resisted pressure to unionise his plants. He believed that 
by paying top wages and implementing good working conditions, he could prevent 
unionisation. However, the pressured environment and the monotonous repetitive work, 
together with rigid supervisory discipline led to increasing dissatisfaction on the part of 
workers. Ford was eventually forced to concede union recognition in Britain during 
World War II.
68
  
Percival Perry worked tirelessly to promote and develop the Ford Motor 
Company in Britain.  In order to achieve sales a well organised and motivated dealer 
network was crucial. As A. P. Sloane acknowledged: „Dealer salesmen and service 
representatives are normally the only “public face” of a car company and, as such, carry a 
large share of responsibility for the image and reputation of the manufacturer and his 
product‟.69  Perry, explaining how he built up the Ford agency stated: „There was a time 
when I knew everybody in the country who had a motor car. Being enthusiastic, I tried to 
keep in touch with all the people who were interested‟.70 He identified that motor dealers 
came from two groups of tradesmen, namely, coach builders and cycle dealers. Knowing 
his geography he would pick out the best situated coach builder or cycle trader in any 
town and offer him the Ford dealership. He ensured that Ford motorists were provided 
with the best possible service for the time, as well as a ready availability of spare parts. 
To this end, he encouraged dealers to carry a comprehensive range of spare parts  
which we divided into three different categories. That would be like a cylinder casting 
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which you rarely wanted, and a radiator which was more often wanted, and a piston ring, 
valve or bearing, which you would be likely to want more frequently.
71
  
He encouraged dealers to carry ample stock at all times, in the knowledge that they were 
not carrying any financial risk, as they had an undertaking from Ford that the parts could 
be returned at any time.
72
  After-sales service was virtually unknown before World War I 
and Perry claimed to have introduced the concept to help build up Ford sales, however 
the word „service‟ apparently got him into trouble, as the understanding of the word 
related only to „use of the male animal with the female animal to carry on the species‟. 
Nobody thought of service in any other context, but Perry persisted with „Ford service‟ 
until it became a household word.
73
 
Ford‟s British output soon overshadowed all other manufacturers. By 1913 
Manchester, producing 6,138 cars, was the largest car-producing factory in Europe while 
Peugeot and Renault, producing about five thousand cars apiece, were the largest on the 
continent. The nearest British competitor was Wolseley producing some three thousand 
cars per annum.
74
  The following year Ford dominated the British market to the extent 
that annual production was 8,300 cars and the Model T outsold the next five biggest 
British marques combined.
75
   
Like Ford‟s American branch plants, Manchester received complete engine and 
chassis kits from Detroit while the bodies were built locally. Other parts too, were 
sourced locally if the quality and cost conformed to Ford‟s standard. To cope with the 
demand, Manchester installed the powered chassis assembly line shortly after the 
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installation of the assembly line in Detroit, giving it an advantage over Ford‟s other 
plants, which were designed for static assembly and thus limited in output.
76
 In 1914, the 
moving assembly line improved the efficiency of operations in Manchester increasing 
both output and profits. Later, in 1915, local manufacture would become even more 
attractive, avoiding the tariffs imposed under the McKenna duties.
77
 As a result of Ford‟s 
escalating sales demand the Manchester plant, with a capacity of about 15,000 cars per 
annum, was becoming increasingly inadequate, particularly when compared to the 
American plants where the Canadian plant‟s capacity was 25,000 cars a year, and 
Detroit‟s was about a quarter of a million.78  Manchester‟s lack of development potential 
meant that it would soon be unable to satisfy the expanding British market, not to 
mention continental Europe and perhaps part of the British Empire. This impending 
capacity problem would have been clear to Ford when he visited it in its first year of 
operation. Perry‟s solution, a site in Southampton, geographically central to both Britain 
and the continent, was a promising answer, but did not satisfy Ford‟s wish to bring 
industry to Cork.
79
 
On Ford‟s return to Dearborn after his 1912 European trip, according to Sorensen, 
he was singing Percival Perry‟s praises.80 Perry had used his position as the American 
party‟s tour guide to impress Ford with his ideas. Later, when Ford, in reaction to the 
squalid living conditions he encountered in Cork, felt moved to help the city acquire a 
manufacturing business, he delegated the investigation to Perry. Although there is no 
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written record of what Ford encountered on his stroll, the census figures for 1911 showed 
that there were 4,653 houses of 2 rooms or less in the city, while 1,511 families, 
comprising 3,646 persons, occupied one room tenements.
81
 The poor condition of the 
housing stock and the level of overcrowding indicated a degree of poverty and squalor 
which would have been very evident to Ford.  
Ford instructed Perry to investigate conditions for the erection of a motor car 
factory along the lines of the Canadian plant, under the headings of labour, location and 
water power. To compile the report Perry travelled extensively and consulted with the 
officials of „certain Irish Industrial Development Associations, with large employers and 
others‟.82 One of the most active of these associations was the Cork Industrial 
Development Association (CIDA), which had been established in 1903 and had later 
been copied by associations in Limerick, Dublin and Belfast.
83
 Implicit in Perry‟s report 
was the view that the proposed factory would replace Manchester as the primary 
producer of motor cars for Britain and Ireland.  
Though Perry was at pains to summarise the information, his final report to Ford 
was quite extensive. In its content and approach it resembles a modern evaluation by a 
multinational company and suggests that while Henry Ford was keen to assist Ireland, the 
project was to be carried out in a business-like manner. Perry devoted considerable time 
and attention to investigating labour conditions in Ireland. He discussed the issue with a 
range of people including Mr Cleaver of Robinson and Cleaver who employed six 
thousand people producing Irish linen; John Redmond leader of the Irish Parliamentary 
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Party and George Crosbie, proprietor of the Cork Examiner. There was unanimous 
agreement amongst the people he spoke to that Irish labour compared favourably with 
British, but as there were no large industrial developments outside Ulster, comparisons 
were difficult. However, the Guinness brewery which he described as „probably the most 
financially successful in the United Kingdom‟, employed four to five thousand workers 
and Guinness management declared their labour to be „eminently satisfactory‟.84 Perry 
discovered that skilled labour was very scarce, which meant it would be necessary to 
import trained men from England and while wages were about the same as in 
Manchester, the trade union influence was not as strong. Unskilled labour, on the other 
hand, was plentiful, but with lower wages and a lower standard of living than in England, 
he suggested that it would be necessary to improve their standard of living to get the best 
out of workers. He was concerned that if the Irish workers were paid well they would be 
wasteful due to their lack of inexperience in handling money. He suggested that workers 
should be paid only the rate they had been used to, while the company should „devote the 
difference between such wages and adequate wages to providing facilities for raising the 
standards of living‟.85  
It is not clear what he had in mind with this comment, but around that time John 
R. Lee was examining the causes of worker dissatisfaction in Ford‟s Dearborn factory, in 
an attempt to reduce the company‟s problem with labour turnover.86 Amongst the more 
obvious causes of discontent, such as low wages and long hours, he identified „bad 
housing conditions, wrong home influences, domestic trouble, etc.‟ as sources of 
                                                 
84
 
P. Perry to Henry Ford, 25 Feb. 1913 (BFRC,
 
Acc. 62, Box 59 ), pp 6/7. 
85
 
Ibid., pp 5/6. 
86 Lee established the sociological department in 1914 to administer the new „five dollar day‟ wage; see Stephen Meyer III, The five 
dollar day (New York,
 
1981), pp 108 and 114. 
 36 
workers‟ inefficiency.87 These ideas were later incorporated into the „five dollar day‟ 
scheme which came into operation in January 1914.
88
 During the Ford party‟s stopover in 
Fishguard en route to Ireland, Perry had exchanged views with Henry Ford on their 
respective attitudes to workers‟ remuneration.89 Presumably therefore, Perry was aware 
of the American thinking and Lee‟s work, and his wages proposal reflected this.  
In this investigation of Irish labour, Perry also considered the conventional view 
which charged Irish labourers with drunkenness, laziness, lack of application or 
discipline and subservience to the Roman Catholic clergy. He was informed that Irish 
labour was maligned by these accusations, that:  
It is probably true that low-grade Irish labourers drink more than they should. The cause 
of this, however, is attributed to lack of regular employment, with its accompanying evils 
of loss of ambition, enterprise and industry. I found it generally conceded that when an 
Irish working man has regular work, a decent home and something of an object in life, he 
is sober and temperate as the average man.
90
  
This observation mirrored Henry Ford‟s own views. Vehemently against alcohol, he 
believed that steady work would allow workers to improve their habits and behaviour.
91
 
Remarking on worker‟s attitude and behaviour, Perry said: „from superficial observation 
and casual acquaintance there would seem to be no doubt that Irish labourers generally 
are more than ordinarily lazy and lacking in power of concentration and application‟.92  
He attributed some of the blame for this situation to the social, political and educational 
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history of Ireland over the previous century. He accepted the explanation given to him 
that self-government, home rule, would completely change the situation „by increasing 
the self-respect and independence of the people and by removing many undoubted 
hardships‟.93 He accepted that irregular or casual work undermined men‟s discipline as 
well as their powers of application and concentration. Whereas, when men were in 
regular work employers had no such complaints, however, he had some misgivings and 
wondered if Irish employers accepted lower standards from their employees since their 
factories, on superficial inspection, compared unfavourably with American or even 
British standards. Dismissing another shibboleth that the „damp, heavy humid climate 
induces laziness‟ he instead attributed the cause to a „change of social environment rather 
than climatic conditions‟ and concluded that there was „no reason why in factory 
employing some thousands of workers, if the standard of efficiency is set high, it could 
not be maintained‟.94  
His most serious concern with Irish labour was the charge that since most of the 
population was Roman Catholic they were „subservient to the influence‟ of the clergy.  
He dismissed this view as being „greatly exaggerated‟ and suggested that the influence of 
the priests was the same the world over and that Ford himself must have encountered the 
issue in Detroit and formed an opinion on the extent of the problem. Without specifying 
the problem, Perry said he had been informed that priests do not interfere or exert 
influence in the „temporal domain‟ between employers and employees and that the source 
of such views was „the frequent and notorious labour riots and troubles in north 
                                                 
93 P. Perry to Henry Ford, 25 Feb. 1913 (BFRC,
 
Acc. 62, Box 59 ), p. 6. 
94 Ibid., p. 7. 
 38 
Ireland‟.95 In dealing with the issue of religion Perry was being very guarded, in effect 
referring the issue back to Henry Ford whose views on formal religion were open-minded 
and unbiased. Dean Marquis stated that Ford was „not an orthodox believer according to 
the standards of any church I happen to know. His religious ideas as he states them are 
somewhat vague‟.96 So Perry was being careful to highlight the issue but not keen to offer 
a clear opinion. However, later in his life he was more forthright when he claimed that 
„the difficulty there in the Southern Ireland was that they were Roman Catholics and very 
much priest-ridden. They were inclined to ask the priests whether they should come to 
work‟.97  
In his evaluation of Irish labour conditions Perry‟s greatest concern was for the 
calibre, competence and diligence of the available workers while wage rates were clearly 
of less concern. He noted that existing unskilled wage rates might be lower than 
Manchester, but there is a clear suggestion that Ford would be paying higher rates, in 
some form. Overall, the issue of wages as a cost factor was not emphasised by Perry and 
he made no comment on either additional costs or benefits which would accrue to the 
company, which suggests that labour costs were not a significant factor in either his or 
Ford‟s thinking.   
Aside from labour issues, the decision as to where any potential plant should be 
located was central to the decision-making process. In appraising sites for a car factory 
Perry had obtained estimates from shipping companies which suggested that sea 
transportation would cost $15 for every car, so in order to confine freight expense to 
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„bare ocean transportation‟ Perry had completely ignored any site that could not ship the 
materials and cars from „the very factory itself‟. He summed up his conclusions:   
I am of [the] opinion from present information that the most desirable location for a big 
automobile factory having a sales output as we have, is in the city of immediate 
neighbourhood, on the River Lee, of Cork. The reason why I have come to this 
conclusion is that the facilities for transportation of goods both inwards and outwards 
must be the governing factor in the choice of a location for a factory in Ireland.
98
 
Later Perry got Sorensen‟s approval for his choice of site. According to 
Sorensen‟s recollection he and Perry travelled through the west of Ireland, along the 
Shannon and down to Killarney, finally arriving in Cork. Sorensen claimed to be sold on 
the Cork location as soon as he saw the site recommended by Perry. He also deemed it 
the ideal location due to its excellent deep water channel and shipping facilities.
99
 In this 
they were at one with Henry Ford who insisted that his factories be located close to deep 
water.
100
 
Perry‟s report claimed that in arriving at his decision he had investigated factory 
sites, locations and transport facilities in Dublin, he said, „without troubling you with 
these details ask you to accept my statement that in my opinion Cork has got Dublin 
beaten from almost every standpoint‟.101 To dismiss Dublin, the country‟s main port, so 
perfunctorily despite its excellent port facilities and relative proximity to Britain seems 
implausible, but even stranger was that he also overlooked Belfast, which in that period 
had one of the largest shipyards in the world, employing tens of thousands of men and 
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had recently produced some of the largest vessels in the world, namely, the RMS 
Olympic, launched on 20 October 1910, and its sister ship, the ill-fated RMS Titanic, 
which began its maiden voyage on 10 April 1912.
102
  
In contrast, Perry claimed that Cork offered plenty of potential factory sites along 
the River Lee. Dismissing rural areas he preferred the city as it provided „electric light, 
gas, drains, water and housing facilities‟.103 He proceeded to promote the benefits of the 
Cork City Park site and particularly an area of about one hundred acres which „is let on 
short lease to a syndicate which is running [it] as a race course‟.104 Highlighting the site‟s 
easy access to ship and rail as well as its established steamship lines to British ports, he 
estimated that rent for the site, which would have to be negotiated, would nonetheless be 
a lot cheaper than Trafford Park.
105
 The existence of efficient transportation facilities was 
crucial since ninety per cent of Ford sales were in Britain and because there were few 
local suppliers of either raw materials or finished products, these too would have to be 
shipped in. Another potential advantage of the Cork port was its established link with the 
continent of Europe, with existing services to Antwerp and Rotterdam, and the possibility 
of opening up services to Treport (France) and Hamburg.
106
  
In order to obtain the information that he required Perry had taken officials of the 
city of Cork and the CIDA into his confidence, however, he made it clear to them that he 
was „conducting merely an abstract investigation‟ and since it was unlikely anything 
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would come of it he requested that everything he said be treated in strict confidence.
107
 
When he discovered that the corporation was about to agree a thirty five year lease with 
the race course syndicate, he pressured the city solicitor and Sir Edward Fitzgerald, a 
member of the corporation, to have the land let subject to a „short termination notice‟.108 
By preventing a long-term leasing of the site he ensured that it would be available to the 
Ford Motor Company at a reasonable cost. No doubt this action also alerted members of 
the authority to the seriousness of his enquiries, despite his earlier comments.  
While Perry conducted his labour investigations meticulously, his evaluation of 
potential locations in Dublin or Belfast seems scant and inadequate. No doubt the Cork 
City Park was an excellent site, but it seems unlikely that no other site in the country 
could match it.  Perry claimed to have investigated a large number of locations, but 
provided no information on them, because he said: „it would be a very lengthy matter to 
intelligently report the pros and cons of each situation‟.109 He seemed very confident of 
his choice and went on to say that „this particular location is so outstanding…that I 
cannot imagine any other location which would be more suitable‟.110 His confident 
assertion suggests that he was confirming Cork as a choice rather than proposing it as an 
option. Undoubtedly, Perry was aware of Ford‟s wishes from their earlier conversations, 
so the preference for Cork was more than likely a foregone conclusion, particularly since 
Perry would hardly have made so many commitments in Cork if he did not have at least 
Ford‟s tacit agreement.  
Perry‟s investigation of sources of water power which was required for generating 
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electrical current for the factory led him to the conclusion that there was no water power 
available worth considering for his purposes. Strangely, he claimed that the only water 
source capable of producing about 2,500 horsepower, was to be found adjacent to 
Killarney, but this was out of the question as it was dependant on rainfall and also was 
too far from any port.
111
 Perry envisaged that any factory would have to be self-
supporting, probably for years to come, as no reliance could be placed on the stagnant 
Irish commercial sector and its poor labour conditions.
112
 For example, the unavailability 
of local supplies posed problems which required that the company carry adequate 
emergency stocks of any materials which it was likely to require, while coal, a key 
material, would have to be imported, though he thought that the cost could be held to 
Manchester prices.
113
 Communications infrastructure, such as telephone and telegrams, 
presented problems. Since ninety per cent of Ford‟s combined British and Irish car sales 
went to Britain, an adequate long-distance telephone service was indispensable. 
Unfortunately the existing service was expensive and so poor as to be practically 
unserviceable, with the result he claimed, that no one used the system. Even as he 
reported this, Perry had already written to the British government demanding they 
improve the service. The telegraphic service, on the other hand, he said was good, but 
slow, taking two or three hours longer to transmit a message from Cork to London than 
from London to Manchester.
114
  
Since the object of the report was to investigate the setting up of a factory to 
manufacture at least 15,000 motor cars per annum, Perry took for granted that service 
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operations would also be located in Cork.
115
 This increased the distance between Ford 
servicemen and the vast majority of Ford owner‟s, consequently the company‟s renowned 
service was likely to suffer. Postal delays as well as slower parts delivery would 
downgrade the traditional service, while the practice of sending an expert to carry out 
repairs and overhauls at car owner‟s residences would be almost unworkable.  
Summarising his findings, Perry listed the serious points of difficulty which 
would arise if manufacturing operations were transferred from Manchester to Cork. He 
had mentioned in the report that wages costs and land purchase costs were likely to be 
cheaper in Cork than Trafford Park, but in his summary he makes no comment on any 
benefits which might arise. Nor is there any comment about the issue of tariffs, 
suggesting that while Perry was aware of the possibility of home rule he did not 
anticipate tariffs as potential risks to the business.  The following are the problems and 
costs which he foresaw:  
   1. Additional freight costs of $20 per car would be incurred.
116
 
   2. The company would lose $85,000 on its investment in Manchester. 
   3. Expenses and delays would be involved in moving, while there was a probability that 
Manchester trained staff might refuse to move to Cork. 
   4. There were possible difficulties in recruiting sufficient local labour and of such   
labour „being inefficient or unstable‟. 
   5. There was a likelihood that the company would have to assume a social role, thus 
incurring responsibility for housing and improved living conditions.  
   6. It would be difficult to maintain Ford‟s high standard of service. 
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   7. The large investment in a big factory in Cork might „never be realised upon or 
disposed of‟.117 
Perry reminded Ford, that in moving car manufacture and distribution to a remote 
location such as Cork „it must be recognised that the motive is primarily a philanthropic 
one and the object is to achieve true philanthropy, viz. to help others to help 
themselves‟.118 He declared that future profits were likely to be less, while the risks and 
difficulties in all departments would be greater. Despite the catalogue of difficulties 
which he had identified, he nevertheless encouraged Ford to go ahead with the project 
and closed: „I sincerely hope that, having counted the cost, you will decide to erect a 
factory in Ireland.‟119  
While Perry‟s report had all the appearances of an independent evaluation it was 
also written with its intended reader very much in mind. He demonstrated great 
astuteness in dealing with his boss, incorporating Ford‟s preferred theories and ensuring 
that his conclusions satisfied Ford‟s opinions. Since Ford had sent Perry to carry out the 
survey, clearly, he was keen on helping Ireland, most particularly Cork and no doubt they 
had discussed this extensively during their travels in Ireland. Perry‟s evaluations of 
potential sites and his conclusion emphasised the superiority of Cork over all other sites 
confirming Ford‟s own sentimental attitude. Perry dismissed Dublin and ignored Belfast, 
both likely alternative locations, without offering any explanation. In his extensive 
evaluation of labour, he broadly supported the Irish workers despite the contemporary 
stereotypically negative views of them. Where they had faults he reported that regular, 
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well-paid work would improve their behaviour. This is a theme of Ford‟s which Perry fed 
back to him. Ford wished to help his fellow-man and believed firmly that the way to do 
this was „to provide opportunity for them to help themselves.‟ In the United States he 
followed this policy, hiring disabled people and devising work for them and even 
accepting drunkards and ex-criminals to work in his plants.
120
 In his letter, Perry‟s use of 
the word „philanthropy‟ is modified by a definition, „to help others to help themselves‟, 
which he knew would appeal to Ford. Ford believed that the best way to spread wealth 
was to create well-paid jobs and produce useful goods; he said that: „industry organised 
for service removes the need for philanthropy‟.121  
Having endorsed Cork as a site and confirmed that Irish labour was generally 
acceptable, he proceeded to list all the potential costs and risks which would be 
encountered by moving there. The strategy of supporting Henry Ford‟s schemes and 
policies, while at the same time highlighting the range of risks and financial costs meant 
that Ford, who despised wasteful business practices and unnecessary costs, would be 
unlikely to proceed with the Cork project. In effect, Perry‟s inventory of the project‟s 
difficulties made an overwhelming financial case against Cork as a manufacturing site for 
the Britain Isles, despite his apparent support for the scheme.  
The day after sending the foregoing report, Perry sent another, apparently 
unsolicited report, which opened: „I think that probably in considering the matter you 
would desire to have certain information concerning possible suitable locations for a 
factory in England‟.122 The latter report dealt with sites in England, distinguishing 
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between sites with sea access, such as Manchester, Hull, Bristol and Southampton, and 
other, inland, sites. Although he considered Manchester to be the most central location 
for distributing throughout Britain, he disliked it because of the high cost of land and 
because it was, in his opinion, „the very worst, being the hot-bed of trade unionism and 
agitation‟.123 His suggested location was Southampton, which enjoyed good access to the 
United States and Europe with lower land prices and fewer labour problems. He 
commented on inland sites: „First and foremost I would place Letchworth, the garden 
city, particulars of which were furnished to you by an acquaintance of yours in America 
and also concerning which I have obtained particulars and left them with Mr Liebold‟.124 
Before Ford had departed for Europe in 1912, E. A. Rumely had sent him a copy of 
Garden cities of tomorrow by the revolutionary British urban planner, Ebenezer Howard, 
as well as a list of suggested philanthropic ventures for him to consider.
125
 However, Ford 
was not interested in the kind of philanthropy practised by the likes of Rockefeller and 
Carnegie but „regarded charity with positive hostility‟.126 On the other hand, he may have 
been interested in the concept of garden cities espoused by Howard and while he 
apparently discussed these ideas with Perry during their travels nothing came of it. 
Perry‟s second report contrasts possible British sites with the existing Manchester site 
and suggests profitable alternatives to the Cork option. Although the Cork site fulfilled 
Ford‟s sentimental need, its remoteness and costs were unacceptable for producing motor 
cars. Perry‟s supplementary report would have redirected Ford to more cost-effective 
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solutions and while Ford may have retained his goal of building in Cork, Perry became 
somewhat obsessive in his aim of building a plant at Southampton, suggesting that 
perhaps there was some self-interest involved.  
Despite Ford‟s dissatisfaction with the Manchester site and his respect and 
admiration for Perry, for the time being he made no decision on the location of the new 
factory. Clearly, any cost benefits gained by lower wages or land price were more than 
outweighed by the negatives articulated by Perry. Most particularly, the fact that only ten 
per cent of Ford‟s British cars sales were in Ireland, meant that the vast majority would 
have to be transported by sea and over long distances incurring an additional penalty of 
$20 per car, making the idea unsustainable.
127
 Perry‟s report had undermined Henry 
Ford‟s initial enthusiasm to locate his car plant in Cork, thus depriving the city of an 
immediate industrial development. Ford did not permanently dismiss Cork as a potential 
plant location, but for the time being the decision was postponed.  
*   *   * 
Charlie Sorensen sailed from New York aboard the S. S. Mauretania and arrived 
in Liverpool on Easter Monday, 13 April 1914. His assignment was to carry out a 
thorough inspection of the Manchester plant and to ensure that the changes introduced six 
months earlier were being carried out efficiently. In addition, he had to assist Perry with 
implementing the new profit-sharing plan, the English equivalent of the „five dollar day‟ 
scheme which had been introduced in Dearborn in January and to ensure that it operated 
on the same basis as at the home plant.
128
 Before leaving Detroit, he had discussed the 
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question of purchasing a site in England with Henry Ford. Sorensen was concerned about 
the amount of money being spent on improvements to the rented Manchester plant which 
would never become permanent assets of the company.  Perry introduced him to a site in 
Southampton which was available at a nominal price of $25,000. Covering about 27 acres 
and with 800 feet of water frontage in what was described by Sorensen as the „best 
harbour in England‟, Perry considered the site ideal for the new Ford factory and 
consequently had secured a short-term option on it.
129
 Sorensen, concurring with his 
view, suggested that it was not only a suitable location from which to supply England, 
but also a potential supplier of axles and engines to future European plants. He sought 
instructions from Ford so that Perry might „know how to proceed within the next sixty 
days‟.130 Sorensen was keen that construction of the plant start as soon as possible.131 He 
returned to Detroit in mid-May, but when Perry received no instructions from Detroit, on 
21 July 1914 he extended the option.
132
 Two weeks later, on 4 August 1914, Britain went 
to war.  
In late September Perry reminded Henry Ford that the latest option on the 
Southampton site expired at Christmas. By that time the production situation in 
Manchester had become acute as further investment was needed there to meet increasing 
demand.
133
 Finally, Perry‟s persistence paid off and in February 1915 he got authorisation 
to buy the Ridgeway Estate in Southampton for £5,000.
134
 During the last quarter of 1916 
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design plans were prepared for the Southampton plant.
135
 B. R. Brown, Ford‟s 
construction manager, accompanied Perry from New York in early October 1916 with 
plans for a $2.5 million plant to turn out 50,000 cars annually.
136
 Sent by Henry Ford to 
oversee the building of the new plant, when Brown inspected the site he discovered „that 
because of faulty surveys, the plans didn‟t fit the site very well‟ and he recommended to 
Perry that they should not go ahead.
137
 Unfazed, Perry found an alternative site, named 
the Millbrook Estate, which he got approval to purchase for £20,000 in late 1916.
138
 
However, the decision to build in England was postponed due to wartime difficulties and 
was not taken for another decade. Eventually, when the Ford Motor Company finally did 
arrive at a decision, Perry was no longer with the company, so his ambition for a plant at 
Southampton was superseded by the choice of Dagenham.
139
     
*  *  * 
Charles E. Sorensen‟s role was central in British and Irish operations from 1913 
when Henry Ford had nominated him to oversee British operations. A firm friend of 
Perry‟s he controlled the Irish operation from its inception up to World War II. Sorensen 
was a Dane who had arrived in the United States in 1885, aged 4 years. He first met 
Henry Ford in 1902 and joined the company as a patternmaker under P. E. Martin in 
1905. Later, with his ability to interpret Ford‟s ideas and his willingness to carry out, 
without question, his bosses‟ instructions, he became Ford‟s right-hand man and played a 
key role in the development and management of the vast River Rouge plant. He was also 
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responsible for the work on tractor production. Despite his considerable power and 
responsibilities, his titles were ambiguous, in line with Ford‟s whimsical approach to 
management. In April 1908, soon after the public announcement of the plans for the new 
Ford Model T, Henry Ford instructed Martin and Sorensen to „go out and run the plant 
and don‟t worry about titles‟.140 Martin became plant superintendent while Sorensen 
acted as assistant plant superintendent in charge of production development. In this role, 
he demonstrated his creativity and inventiveness and was primarily responsible for the 
detailed development of the assembly line. „For many years I had acted in official 
capacities though without title,‟ he said, and in the absence of Henry and Edsel he 
claimed that he exercised „absolute freedom of action over Ford Motor Company‟s 
production‟.141   
Sorensen was part of the team which had secretly developed the Model T, where 
his knowledge and enthusiasm for cast metals, instead of forgings, earned him the 
nickname of „Cast-Iron Charlie‟ from Henry Ford.142 While his nickname might refer to 
his preference in metals, it could also be applied to his domineering, hard-driving and 
explosive personality.
143
 In a company where able and loyal managers were routinely 
dismissed with little or no notice, that Sorensen survived for almost forty years was a 
testament to his skill in handling both Henry Ford and the Ford company politics. 
*   *   * 
In the early 1880s, even before he began producing motor cars, Henry Ford 
experimented with developing a rudimentary „farm locomotive‟ on his father‟s farm. 
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From his youth he had disliked the drudgery involved in farming and was determined to 
eliminate it.
144
 While this initial attempt was unsuccessful, in 1905, Ford again applied 
his efforts to the design and development of an agricultural tractor. In a rented barn 
nearby the Piquette Street plant, he put together a team under Joe Galamb, a young 
Hungarian engineer, to design and build such a machine.  In order to minimise costs he 
used parts from the 1905 Model B car. Dubbed the „automobile plow‟, the prototype 
tractor was developed and improved over the next two years.
145
 According to Sorensen, 
three of the vehicles were built and trialled extensively on Ford‟s farm, however, as 
Model T design and production took priority in the following years, substantial 
development on tractors was dropped.
146
 It was not until World War I when Britain‟s 
food shortage problems arose that Fords long-developing tractor finally became a reality. 
When the Ford Motor Company moved to its new factory in Highland Park in 
1910, Henry Ford apparently tried to introduce tractor production, but failed to sell his 
ideas to the other directors.
147
 Instead Ford set up a plant to manufacture tractors in 
Dearborn not far from Henry‟s new home, Fair Lane. It was his intention that tractors be 
produced separately from motor cars. With Sorensen and a team of engineers he again set 
about designing a workable tractor. Building on the previous tractor development 
experiments, Ford applied the same concept to the tractor as he had to his cars. The new 
tractor had to be inexpensive enough to be accessible to all farmers while at the same 
time being light, strong and simple enough that they could operate and repair it 
themselves; parts had to be strong and as few as possible and the machine had to be 
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capable of benefiting from mass production techniques. The trials with Model T engines 
had convinced him that the tractor required a radically different engine design.
148
  
According to Sorensen, a good, workable design was produced in about ninety days and 
he then gave instructions to the machine shop to set up and produce fifty prototypes. 
Early in 1916 the first experimental tractor was produced.
149
 Known at the time as the X-
series, the production model would become the Fordson, which would later be built in 
Cork. Throughout 1916 these prototypes were rigorously tested by being kept in 
continuous operation on Ford‟s farm. Practical improvements were made while the 
engineers worked to iron out the teething problems which emerged.
150
  As the testing 
proceeded, the work being carried on received a lot of attention from the press, as well as 
visitors from all over the world. Among those who took a keen interest was Lord 
Northcliffe, the British newspaper publisher who was later to become head of the British 
War Mission to the United States. Northcliffe was impressed with the machine and spent 
some time driving and inspecting it.
151
 Perry too, was aware of the work being done to 
develop the new tractor. During two visits in late 1916 he found Ford preoccupied with 
the new machine. Alert to a business opportunity and fully aware of the problems of the 
war, Perry, who was later appointed to the Agricultural Machinery Branch of Britain‟s 
Food Production Department, saw the machine as a solution to Britain‟s food problem. 
Cheap and easy to operate, it could increase food output by cultivating unused land.
152
 As 
1916 ended, the group had made considerable progress in the development of the Ford 
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tractor, but Henry Ford was still not satisfied that it was ready for production. However, 
events in Britain were about to force his hand.
153
  
Ford was very much against the European war, which he saw as a conspiracy of 
moneylenders and munitions dealers for their own sinister ends. He spoke out in the press 
about the evils of war. As his international business grew he was conscious of his 
international influence, relishing the adulation that this larger stage gave him. In June 
1915, he had called a press conference to publicise his progress, after years of 
experiments, at devising a practicable tractor which he could sell to farmers. He believed 
that it would improve farmer‟s productivity and keep small farmers working their land. 
„If we keep people working,‟ he said, „America will never be dragged into the war‟.154   
While America remained uninvolved in the War, Ford continued to promote his pacifist 
ideas. In late 1915 he got drawn into a scheme to hire a ship to take him and other 
pacifists to visit the capitals of Europe and to convince heads of government to desist 
from entering the war. „Henry Ford‟s Peace Ship‟ achieved little and instead of assisting 
the cause of peace subjected him to widespread ridicule. After the peace ship debacle in 
December 1915, according to Collier and Horowitz, he continued to „excoriate Wall 
Street and arms dealers for profiteering off the mass deaths in the trenches. But his anti-
war passion cooled as the United States government got closer to involvement‟. He later 
contracted to produce military boats and armoured Model Ts‟.155  
In Britain Ford‟s pacifist pronouncements and activities had provoked a negative 
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reaction, including a boycott against Ford products by leading newspapers.
156
 For 
example, the Pall Mall Gazette wrote to Perry seeking information on the Ford Motor 
Company‟s position, as they said they could not publish advertisements promoting any 
firm which displayed „anti-British tendencies‟. Perry attempted to minimise the damage 
to Ford in Britain without incurring Henry‟s wrath. In his reply Perry confirmed that the 
company and all its branches were controlled by the Ministry of Munitions and suggested 
that the statements attributed to Ford were taken out of context and had created an 
„erroneous impression‟ and that it was a „malicious slander‟ to describe Henry Ford as 
pro-German. Instead, Perry pointed to the company‟s role in Britain as a taxpaying 
corporation employing 2,000 workmen who owed their livelihoods to Ford and who 
would now be threatened, while no damage would be caused to Henry Ford, who had 
„wealth beyond the dreams of avarice‟.157  
Perry‟s strategy was to use his political contacts and the government positions 
which he held, to promote Ford‟s business. Perry‟s contacts and influence proved 
invaluable. Later, when the United States entered the war, Henry Ford relented in his 
attitude. The company produced Model T‟s modified for use as ambulances as well as for 
military purposes. Despite the initial anti-Ford attitudes, the company‟s role as a 
government supplier proved very profitable, particularly during the latter years of the 
war. Perry succeeded in converting Ford of England into a good patriotic citizen while at 
the same time making the company prosper.
158
  Looking back, Percival Perry concluded, 
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„I have been more successful than could have been expected or hoped‟.159   
While the war kept the Manchester plant busy, procuring parts was an ongoing 
challenge. Before the war, local manufacturers had been encouraged to become suppliers 
to Ford if they could match Detroit‟s quality and price. Now with the problem of German 
attacks on British shipping, the process was accelerated. The Ford strategy of maximising 
local manufacture was vindicated, when in 1915, the British government abandoned its 
former free trade policy and introduced import tariffs. Instigated by the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, Reginald McKenna, the duties were intended to bring in revenue while 
limiting the shipment of luxury and bulky goods, as well as protecting British industry.
160
 
Meanwhile, in the United States, in July 1915, Ford had purchased 2,000 acres of 
swampy land beside the River Rouge in Dearborn, Michigan to build a new 
manufacturing complex. Allegedly for the production of tractors, on 2 February 1916, 
Henry Ford had the board of directors of the Ford Motor Company pass a resolution, 
relinquishing all rights to the tractor business, for the sum of $46,810.76. This amount 
was based on a valuation of the costs of the experimental work done on the tractor up to 
that point. Under the agreement, while the Ford Motor Company retained the right to 
enter the tractor business and to use the name „Ford‟ if it wished, the contract stipulated 
that Henry Ford‟s „newly acquired‟ tractor business, could only use the name „Ford‟ in 
conjunction with his first name „Henry‟.161 Hence, Ford‟s tractor business became Henry 
Ford & Son Incorporated.
162
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The tractor that Henry Ford and his team had designed and which would later be 
named the Fordson Model F, was unique amongst its competitors. Contemporary wisdom 
held that tractors needed to be heavy to achieve grip on damp ground; Ford held the view 
that power, as with the car, was a better solution. Based on this premise, he built the four-
wheeled Fordson to be light and compact, in contrast with the heavy-weight, three-
wheeled monsters of the day.  It was designed with a stressed cast-iron frame which 
contained all of the moving parts in dustproof and oil-tight units, thus eliminating many 
of the weaknesses of other makes.
163
  Despite the improvements introduced by Ford and 
his team the Fordson was not without flaws. In operation, it was difficult to start, 
particularly in cold weather, when hand-cranking required considerable effort, often with 
a number of men taking turns. The solution adopted by many farmers was to light a fire 
under the crankcase and gearbox to thin out the oil and make starting easier. Once 
running and until the engine warmed up fully, gear-changing and clutch operation 
remained difficult. The absence of a separate frame meant that the whole tractor acted as 
a single large piece of metal, which when running for some time caused the heat from the 
motor to be conducted to all parts, making the footrests and the iron seat extremely 
uncomfortable for the driver.
164
 As well as being difficult to start and uncomfortable to 
drive and unlike the Model T, the Fordson proved unreliable from its introduction, 
requiring regular repairs. Collier and Horowitz claimed that: 
It was also dangerous because of a tendency to rear up and flip over backwards if a 
sudden resistance created extra torque in the transmission. Pipps Weekly, in a story with 
the headline „Fordsons are the Huns of the Field‟, claimed the tractor had been 
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responsible for 136 deaths by August 1922.
165
  
Despite the reports of the dangers, the Ford Motor Company was slow to 
introduce modifications to prevent accidents or to minimise injuries.
166
 While the tractors 
might be cumbersome, unreliable and unsafe, the Fordson, proved popular with the 
public and was bought in large numbers by the farmers of America. Detroit turned out the 
first of the Fordson tractors in 1917, by the year end 254 had been produced. In June of 
that year, the first sod was turned on Ford‟s new tractor factory in Cork. In the three years 
that followed 158,483 tractors were produced in the United States, the Fordson proving, 
in its own way, to be almost as popular as the Model T.
167
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CHAPTER TWO  
 
The decision to choose Cork  
 
Ford and Ireland as a location for tractor production (1916-1918) 
 
 At the outbreak of World War I, the idea that the city of Cork would become a 
major motor manufacturing centre seemed extremely unlikely. With the exception of 
Chambers in Belfast, there was little sign of any indigenous motor manufacturer 
emerging in Ireland. The absence of an engineering infrastructure, the small size of the 
market, the lack of entrepreneurial inspiration, and perhaps the shortage of capital, all 
worked against the emergence of a local industry. There were few motor companies in 
the world at that time with the resources or technological expertise to establish such a 
large-scale industry. Henry Ford alone was capable and more importantly was motivated 
to do just that. In 1926 he had declared that: 
My ancestors came from near Cork, and that city, with its wonderful harbour, has an 
abundance of fine industrial sites. We chose Ireland for a plant because we wanted to 
start Ireland along the road to industry. There was, it is true, some personal sentiment in 
it.
1
  
Having seen the conditions in Cork during his visit in 1912, Ford undoubtedly wanted to 
help the city and liked the idea of a great factory rising in the land of his ancestors acting 
as permanent monument to his achievements.
2
 While he may have decided in principle to 
build there, Perry‟s report, however, clearly highlighted the irrationality of locating a 
large car manufacturing plant in Cork, away from major industrial centres, distant from 
markets and without adequate skilled engineering labour. Perry apparently succeeded in 
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converting Ford to the logic of locating in Southampton and Ford, by authorising the 
purchase of the site, was accepting Perry‟s rationale that Cork was the wrong place for 
his car plant, but he retained his ambition to bring industry to Cork. In the short-term, 
Perry got his way, retaining car production in Britain, but the changing circumstances of 
war generated a need for agricultural tractors and created an opportunity for them to be 
produced in Cork. 
Notwithstanding Cork‟s relatively remote location, the city did have advantages 
too. Never a major industrial centre, the city of Cork had enjoyed some industrial 
development in the early part of the nineteenth century, but this industrial base 
diminished and most industries declined in the years from 1840 to 1900.
3
  Shipbuilding, 
which had prospered up to the 1860s, declined with the reduction of trans-Atlantic trade 
and Cork‟s iron and engineering industry stagnated.4 High unemployment suggested a 
large pool of available workers, probably willing to work at low wage rates and less 
militant than their counterparts in the large industrialised British cities. The experience in 
Manchester may have led Ford to believe that an acquiescent, unindustrialised, non-
unionised workforce in Cork would be grateful for the work and be more amenable to the 
Ford way of working, more open to being moulded to the Ford manufacturing system.  
Jacobson and Nyhan have argued that cost factors such as wage rates and land 
prices may have favourably influenced Ford‟s choice of Cork as a suitable industrial 
location. Jacobson states that wages were less than British rates, though not significantly 
so. For example, he calculates that skilled wages in coach-building in Ireland were 
around ninety per cent of British rates, though labourers were less at only about eighty 
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percent. Ultimately, most of those employed in Ford‟s factory were former agricultural 
labourers, where rates were even less.
5
  Perry‟s report broadly concurs with this view, 
however, as we have seen Perry was more concerned with the quality and availability of 
workers rather than the wage levels.
6
 Given Ford‟s anti-trade union views and 
willingness to pay high rates to retain management freedom and flexibility, it seems 
unlikely that wages were a major factor.
7
 
Likewise, Jacobson points out that land at Cork was relatively inexpensive.
8
 Perry 
echoes this saying that, on the whole, while land price varied by location it was cheaper 
than in Great Britain or United States. However, he suggested that it is extremely difficult 
to purchase land freehold and that the legal complications and proceedings lead to long 
delays, instead he suggests a very long lease such as 999 years, as being the best option. 
While he was satisfied that the Cork site would be considerably cheaper than Manchester 
his endorsement of the site was based more on the quality of its harbour and its 
accessibility for seagoing vessels as well as its rail and shipping connections rather than 
land price considerations.    
Central to any decision, of course, was Ireland‟s place in the British tariff union. 
Ford probably wished to establish a manufacturing presence in Britain to avoid any 
potential additional tariffs. The McKenna duties which were introduced in 1915 
reinforced the union, treating Britain and Ireland as a single entity. The Home Rule Act 
of 1914 which had promised a degree of self-government, but was suspended for the 
period of the war, did not provide for fiscal autonomy. Instead it envisaged that 
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Westminster would retain control of Irish financial affairs including taxation, customs 
and excise and monetary policy, and it explicitly precluded the imposition of protective 
duties on goods traded between Britain and Ireland.
9
  Jacobson argues that Ford‟s 
decision to invest in the city of Cork was influenced by this arrangement and assumed it 
would remain unchanged permitting free and flexible movement to exist between the two 
plants.
10
 Sorensen was broadly aware of the home rule debate and presumably reported 
on it to Henry Ford who may or may not have considered the possibility of tariffs being 
introduced.
11
 Perry in his 1913 report did not mention tariffs amongst his list of potential 
threats, nor is there any reference to tariffs in any of the correspondence for the period, 
suggesting that it was not an issue or at least not actively considered. While Nyhan 
contends that tariffs represented the most significant factor in the decision to locate in 
Cork, Jacobson suggested, more plausibly, that Cork was chosen on the assumption that 
no tariffs barrier would be introduced.
12
 
Finally, Cork‟s public representatives proved helpful and diligent in their desire to 
improve the industrial base of the city. The enthusiastic assistance and wholehearted 
support given by local bodies such as Cork Corporation, the Harbour Commissioners and 
the CIDA, helped Perry with his initial investigations as well as with the purchase and 
development of the site, by smoothing a pathway through the legal, administrative and 
practical issues.  
In answering the question „Why did Ford choose Cork?‟ I suggest that Ford‟s 
overriding motivation was philanthropic and a desire to assist Cork and its citizens. This 
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was attested to by a number of his key people. For example, John O‟Neill who became 
managing director of the Cork plant 1932, said „no other organisation in the world could 
have undertaken that project with the generosity and determination of Mr. Ford‟, while 
Ernest Liebold, his secretary, believed that „it was more or less a matter of sentiment that 
prompted him to have our tractor plant built in Cork, he thought that by bringing industry 
into Cork he would give the people an opportunity to show what they could do‟.13 Perry 
writing to Sorensen, said that „the principal reason why Mr. Ford started the institution at 
Cork was social and political rather than commercial and economic‟.14 However, Ford 
was not prepared simply to ignore commercial and economic factors completely. In his 
desire to help he was prepared to disregard some of the problems highlighted by Perry 
and take a limited commercial risk on the assumption that no major cost impediment 
existed. As we have seen, a potential additional transport cost of $20 per vehicle was 
sufficient disincentive to discourage him from locating in Cork before the war. Equally, 
in 1916, any hint of expensive tariffs would undoubtedly have deterred him from locating 
there, but despite the talk of home rule there was no inkling of the tariff issues which 
would emerge later. 
When Perry visited Detroit in August 1916 Henry Ford was enthusiastically 
demonstrating his newly-developed tractor. Having seen the machine in operation Perry, 
no doubt, spotted its potential to assist in feeding wartime Britain.
15
 However, no 
decisions seem to have been taken at this point. H. Bambrook noted that the design work 
for the proposed Southampton plant commenced shortly after, in October 1916, so 
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presumably the emphasis at this meeting was on the plans for the new Southampton 
factory.
16
 As we have seen, B. R. Brown was then instructed to travel to England to 
oversee construction of the plant. Brown later claimed to have identified a problem with 
lack of space on the site and to have recommended that the project not go ahead. In the 
1950s Brown recalled without any explanation: „With this situation, it was decided that 
we would build in Ireland instead‟.17  
Brown‟s account differs from the British war cabinet records; at a cabinet meeting 
on 14 February 1917 it was stated that the Minister of Munitions had earlier informed 
Ford „that though his proposal to start a motor car industry at Southampton could not be 
approved, there was no objection to one being created in Ireland.‟18 No date or 
explanation was given for this decision, though it probably occurred sometime in mid-
November 1916. The purpose of the plant was described as being to supply continental 
assembly depots with parts for „motor cars and motor traction generally‟.19 The 
government were keen to retain the proposed plant within the United Kingdom, as the 
cabinet minutes record their concern that if Ford was refused permission he would build 
his factory on the continent „to the detriment of Irish industry and of the employment of 
Irish labour‟.20  
Henry Ford‟s earlier aim of locating a car plant in Cork had been shelved in 1913, 
but now the British government‟s rejection of the Southampton plan reopened the issue. 
While Perry may have been disappointed at the loss of his Southampton plant, the change 
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also presented opportunities. For example, if the proposed Cork plant was to supply the 
continental assembly plants with parts, then another plant would still be required to 
supply the British market, so Perry might yet see his Southampton project become a 
reality.  
Perry acted promptly, and, no doubt, with Henry Ford‟s enthusiastic approval, he 
travelled to Cork to conclude a deal with the corporation. By the time of Perry‟s next visit 
to America in late November, he could report that he had been to Cork and, on 22 
November 1916, had obtained the corporation‟s permission to purchase the Marina site 
for industrial purposes.
21
 Around the time of Perry‟s visit to Cork the decision seems to 
have been taken to switch production to agricultural machinery; the Examiner announced 
that the function of the plant was to produce „motor traction and agricultural 
machinery‟.22 Thus, the scheme to produce motor parts for continental assembly plants 
seems to have disappeared at this point. The newspaper also suggested that the project 
had government backing since Richard Woodhead, Perry‟s negotiator, had remarked to 
the Harbour Board that he could get the necessary parliamentary permission to authorise 
the transfer of rights, even without their consent.
23
  
The view that Ford wished to locate a car factory in Cork is repeated in Lloyd 
George‟s memoirs where he stated that Ford „was anxious to establish a motor factory in 
Ireland, and offered, if granted permission for this to use the factory during the war for 
the purpose of making agricultural tractors.‟24 There is no direct evidence as to who 
suggested the change from car production to tractors. While it is possible that the 
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decision came from Ford, since he was very keen on locating in Ireland and was also 
preoccupied with his tractor development, according to Ford‟s managers, it was the 
British prime minister who suggested the idea. Brown states that Lloyd George, a 
personal friend of Perry‟s, „got Sir Percival to contact Mr Ford and see if it would be 
possible to build a plant in Ireland instead of England‟.25 Perry, also attributed the idea to 
Lloyd George, he said: „When Mr Lloyd George had the brain wave he could make 
tractors in Ireland, he thought “they were not munitions of war”. We certainly got Mr 
Ford 100 per cent helping us. What he would not have done of course was build a factory 
for war materials.‟26 America was still not in the war and Ford was very anti-war and 
unwilling to support the war directly. Ireland, with limited engineering facilities, was not 
expected to provide major industrial support, and the rise of Sinn Fein suggested that 
there were risks in locating there.
27
 Perry said later that munitions could not have been 
produced in Ireland „because they were afraid it might be [that] the Sinn Fein movement 
would succeed, and they would be making guns to shoot against us‟.28 However, Perry‟s 
information appears to be mistaken as munitions were already being produced in Ireland; 
according to F. G. Kellaway, parliamentary secretary to the Ministry of Munitions 
speaking in the house of commons in April 1917, approximately 35,000 persons were 
engaged in government and controlled establishments in Ireland.
29
 Sorensen‟s view was 
that the decision was promoted by Lloyd George as a political gesture to the Irish and that 
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he „was continually trying to help along the Irish‟. He claimed that Lloyd George‟s 
suggestion was „to help Ireland to help Perry with some of the war production 
requirements‟ which he noted „was gratefully accepted by the Irish‟.30 These recollections 
came many years after the events and are therefore liable to error, however, the fact that 
all three of the main participants are in agreement suggests that the idea did come from 
Lloyd George.  
Lloyd George‟s desire to have tractors made in Ireland probably arose from his 
concern over Britain‟s diminishing food supplies. A poor harvest in 1916, exacerbated by 
shipping losses and poor prospects for the 1917 harvest, heightened Lloyd George‟s fears 
that food shortages represented a serious threat.
31
 In his memoirs he suggested that the 
food issue was so significant that it „ultimately decided the war‟.32 Believing that a 
fundamental mistake had been made in not treating food as munitions of war and farms 
as munitions factories, his suggestion was to increase the food yield from the land by 
implementing a food production programme incorporating scientific fertilisation and 
mechanical equipment, with a food controller to supervise distribution.
33
 Late in 
November 1916, in an effort to address the shortage of agricultural implements, Lloyd 
George and others had lobbied to raise £350,000 from the Treasury for the purchase of 
1,000 International Harvester tractors.
34
 Funding was not forthcoming until the end of 
December 1916, after Lloyd George had become prime minister, however, at this stage, 
there is no suggestion of purchasing tractors from Ford, nor is there any mention of 
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Ford‟s land purchase in Cork, which had occurred two days earlier.35 
Soon after Lloyd George had formed his new government, the war cabinet met in 
special session, on 13 December 1916, to consider the food question.
36
 The cabinet 
appointed a food controller, who, in conjunction with the president of the Board of 
Agriculture and Fisheries was given the job of defining policies and restructuring the 
relevant departments.
37
 On 1 January 1917 the government instituted the Food Production 
Department (FPD) and gave it direct responsibility for increasing agricultural output.
38
 
The following day S. F. Edge was appointed a director of the Agriculture Machinery 
Branch (AMB), a subsidiary of the FPD, with the task of placing purchasing contracts on 
its behalf.
39
 Perry, demonstrating his connections in British political circles, sometime in 
January, was also appointed to the AMB.
40
 No doubt his position in the AMB brought 
valuable expertise to the government war effort, but this position also meant that he was 
well placed to look after Ford‟s interests and to identify business opportunities for the 
Ford Motor Company.  
Once agreement had been reached with Cork Corporation Ford commenced 
factory and site planning in December 1916.
41
 Rumours of Ford‟s Irish project together 
with suggestions of government involvement were aired from the end of November 1916, 
but it was not until the cabinet meeting of 14 February 1917 that formal government 
permission was given. Without commenting on any of the earlier negotiations which may 
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have taken place, Lloyd George stated that it was at this stage that Henry Ford „came to 
our aid‟.42 According to the cabinet minutes, the war cabinet approved Ford‟s offer to 
erect a factory in Cork with the stipulation that Ford be limited to the production of 
agricultural machinery for the duration of the war. It was also decided that if any British 
company wished to produce similar agricultural machinery that they would be facilitated 
by the government.
43
  
The decision to locate Ford‟s tractor production in Ireland offered benefits to all 
of those involved: Additional tractors could increase Britain‟s food output while 
satisfying Henry Ford‟s industrial ambitions for Ireland. It also allowed Ford to assist the 
war effort indirectly, without compromising his peace principles, and permitted Perry to 
retain his ambition of constructing a major motor car manufacturing complex in 
Southampton.
44
 The suggestion that Lloyd George was behind the idea to locate tractor in 
Cork is not evident from the government records, however Lloyd George‟s concerns with 
food shortages and his conviction that modern mechanical equipment was part of the 
solution, suggests that in this context, for him to have come up with the idea of producing 
tractors in Cork is plausible. Lloyd George‟s own motivations in relation to Ireland may, 
as Sorensen said, be an attempt to appease Irish public opinion in the aftermath of the 
1916 Rising, while simultaneously harnessing Irish labour into the war effort.
45
 
Despite Henry Ford‟s promise that Irish production could be expected to 
commence towards the end of 1917 it was to be mid-1919 before the first tractor was 
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produced at the Marina.
46
 Meanwhile, in the United States, Ford was in full scale 
production by late 1917 and was able to supply tractors to Britain for the 1918 ploughing 
season. Even though Ford was free to switch to car production immediately after the war, 
the Marina factory continued as a tractor producer. Tractor production differed from 
motor car production in that no single market outside the United States was likely to have 
the sales demand to support a large scale production operation and therefore a tractor 
factory was likely to supply a number of markets. This suggested that, once the war was 
over, the majority of the plant‟s output would be exported and shipped over long 
distances, making the issue of location less crucial, in which case, Cork would be an ideal 
site for this particular product.  However, market conditions in the post–war period 
proved difficult and tractor production in Cork came to a halt in 1922. 
*   *   * 
 
As mentioned above Perry travelled to Cork and obtained an option for the 
purchase or lease of a 136 acre parcel of land on the south bank of the River Lee. This 
beautiful riverside site, extending 1,642 feet along the Lee was an urban park as well as 
the location of the Cork Park Racecourse, whose loss represented a major loss of amenity 
to the citizens of Cork.
47
  The lands purchased were to be used „for the purpose of 
erecting commercial, shipping and manufacturing premises and offices, and generally in 
connection with industry or the housing of industrial workers‟.48 The decision to allow 
Ford to convert a major amenity into an industrial site had a negative effect on the open 
space provision for the city. A civic survey carried out in 1922 by the Cork Town 
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Planning Association analysed the level of open space provision in twenty-four cities and 
reported that while Dublin had 5.7 acres per thousand persons, in contrast, following the 
loss of the racecourse, Cork was reduced to 0.54 acres per thousand inhabitants.
49
 
The agreement with Ford required the support of the Cork city authorities, the 
Cork Park Race Committee and the Harbour Commissioners. The deal had several 
conditions, which were to have a bearing later on.
50
 Perry later described his visit to Cork 
in mid-November 1916: 
I had an interview with the War Cabinet on Monday. I left the island on Monday night 
and got to Cork on Tuesday morning. Before the end of the week I made an arrangement 
by which I„d been appointed a Cork Harbour Commissioner…I had acquired also the 
river race course….51   
This abbreviated and undated version of events is somewhat less than accurate, as, for 
example, the register of the Cork Harbour Commissioners, records his membership from 
June 1917.
52
 On his previous visit to Cork in 1913, when he had first identified the site, 
Perry had dealt with a number of key officials including the city solicitor, „certain 
officials of the CIDA‟, Sir Edward Fitzgerald of the city council, as well as Thomas 
Butterfield, who was lord mayor of Cork from 1916 to 1918.
53
  At that time Perry had 
emphasised that he was conducting „merely an abstract investigation‟, but now these 
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contacts stood him in good stead.
54
 In negotiating the deal he sought to do so as 
anonymously as possible in order to avoid paying an inflated price or stirring up political 
animosity in Britain or Ireland.
55
  Accompanying Perry in the negotiations was Richard 
Woodhead of 91 Low Street, Southport who had been signed up by Perry as a Ford agent 
in 1909 and who now acted as front-man to disguise Ford‟s involvement in the land 
purchase.
56
 In the initial deal Woodhead obtained an option to purchase or lease the site 
from Cork Corporation.
57
 Later, at a board of directors meeting on 24 August 1918 Henry 
Ford & Son took over Woodhead‟s obligations and resolved that he be given „an 
indemnity regarding all liabilities for entering into agreements with the Cork Corporation 
and Cork Harbour Commissioners at the request of the company‟.58 Despite his efforts on 
Ford‟s behalf, Woodhead‟s dealership contract was cancelled in August 1921, on the 
grounds that he had refused to operate as a Ford-only dealership and was not prepared to 
handle Fordson tractors.
59
 
Shortly after his arrival in Cork on 15 November, Perry met with George Crosbie, 
J. L. Fawsitt, Thomas Butterfield and the corporation solicitor, Barry Galvin.
60
 Broad 
agreement was reached by 17 November and special meetings of the Harbour Board and 
Cork Corporation were convened for the following week.
61
 The Cork Constitution 
writing about the forthcoming corporation meeting seemed to be well informed on the 
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issues. Under a headline „The “Ford” project‟ it reported the rumour that the Ford Motor 
Company were acquiring a large area of land „on either side of the Lee‟ to set up a motor 
factory. While they acknowledged that Henry Ford‟s name was not mentioned, it was 
generally assumed that Woodhead‟s undisclosed principals was none other than the 
famous motor manufacturer.
62
 Clearly, little heed had been paid to Perry‟s request for 
secrecy. Later, reports of the Harbour Board‟s meeting, held on Monday 20 November 
stated that „these two gentlemen (Mr Parry [sic] and Mr Woodhead)‟ said they were not 
free to reveal the name of the company they represented, but wished to purchase land to 
build a works for the manufacture of „motor traction and agricultural machinery‟.63 The 
proposed project directly benefitted the Harbour Board as it involved importing raw 
material and exporting manufactured goods which would result in fees payable on the 
additional traffic, consequently, the members of the board were happy to approve the 
project.
64
 
On Wednesday 22 November, prior to the corporation meeting, the Examiner 
revealed the „official details‟ of the negotiations for the „Great motor factory‟ which had 
been negotiated over the previous days. It was claimed that the Trafford Engineering 
Company Limited (TECL) of  Trafford Park, Manchester were to set up a factory to 
produce „30 cwt. worm-driven Trafford electric motor trucks‟ as their Manchester factory 
was already overcapacity and a large extension was necessary. The deal involved the 
purchase of the freehold of the racecourse, a building site on the Marina and part of the 
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public road way on Victoria Quay for a price of £10,000. The company committed to 
employ 2,000 adult males and to expend £200,000 on buildings over three years, while a 
fair wage clause of one shilling per hour was to be inserted in all building contracts.
65
 
Despite Perry‟s ruse of using the TECL pseudonym, its links with Manchester and the 
Ford factory there seem to have been transparent locally, but its use may have been to 
conceal the company‟s identity from the British media and public. However if this was 
the plan, it was a failure, because even in the United States the New York World reported 
on 23 November that Ford were interested in building in Cork and had an agent on the 
ground investigating potential sites for the operation.
66
 
The Examiner’s leading article of 22 November 1916 described the project as the 
biggest the corporation ever had to consider, while they believed that the investment of 
£200,000 would create „permanent employment for a colony of workers on a scale 
hitherto unknown in the south of Ireland‟. The projected development was expected to 
revolutionise the city of Cork, turning it into one of the most prosperous and progressive 
centres in Ireland. With wages calculated to amount to £4,800 per week the factory was 
expected to introduce an era of prosperity and put an end to poverty and slum-living. 
Though the trades and shopkeepers were best placed to benefit, it was expected that all 
classes would have their standard of living improved. The article also suggested that there 
had been competition from other city municipalities who had been willing to provide 
suitable sites to Mr Woodhead‟s principals and who were willing to agree not to impose 
rates on the factory when built.
67
 Other members of the community reacted promptly and 
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positively to the news of the potential development. A public meeting of the Cork branch 
of the Irish Transport & Workers Union (ITGWU) had taken place and had passed a 
resolution calling „on the corporation, Harbour Board and the public generally to do 
everything possible to facilitate and encourage this worthy project which would be bound 
to give much needed employment…‟.68 More warily, S. L. Maguire, honorary secretary 
of the U.C.C. Engineering Society, reminded the corporation that similar proposals had, 
on two previous occasions, been rejected by them for trivial reasons and the firms had 
subsequently gone to the north of Ireland, where they had been greeted with open arms. 
He continued that despite being keen to work in their native Cork, ninety per cent of 
engineering students were forced to leave the city to find employment and consequently 
they were following the corporation‟s actions with great interest.69  
As might be expected with so much at stake and plenty of publicity, the 
corporation meeting held on 22 November 1916 was well attended. Forty five of the 
aldermen and councillors, as well as a large number of the public including 
representatives of the CIDA, commercial interests and trade societies were present.
70
 A 
number of speakers spoke welcoming the scheme and praising the efforts of those who 
had been instrumental in securing the agreement. Sir Henry O‟Shea, director of the race 
course also spoke welcoming the scheme, however he pointed out that they „expected to 
be treated fairly as they had invested a very large amount in improving the park‟.71 The 
motion was passed unanimously.  In its leading article next day the Examiner said:  
The unanimity of the corporation in agreeing to the draft scheme may be regarded as a 
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happy augury for the future success of the undertaking....But there were some who were 
incredulous and seemed to imagine that such a vista of prosperity was too good to be 
true.
72
  
On the other hand, the Cork Constitution, though apparently well-informed, 
despite not having the advantages of the Examiner, whose owner George Crosbie, had 
been involved in negotiations from the beginning, criticised the „cloud of mystery and 
secrecy in which it has been wrapped for more than a week‟.73 Apparently, the project 
was being discussed openly in the city, but as the full facts were not being published, 
rumours were rife. These ranged from rumours that the government was behind a project 
for the manufacture of munitions to others which included „the cloven foot of the 
American Clan-na–Gael…‟.74 The Cork Constitution pointed out that while the lord 
mayor denied that they were negotiating with Henry Ford, it was clear that this was false, 
as Ford‟s agent had examined the site even before the war began and the TECL managed 
Ford‟s English branch. Despite their suspicions the Constitution accepted that the most 
important thing was that the scheme was now on the way to being implemented.
75
 Later, 
they reported erroneously that as well as the industrial buildings, a „model village for the 
workers in the park‟ was being planned.76 Meanwhile, the corporation agreed to sell an 
additional plot of ground extending 500 feet in an easterly direction which was sought by 
Woodhead and for which £1,000 was paid. A condition of this purchase was that if the 
Shandon Boat Club and G.A.A had to be removed as a consequence, that the transfer 
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should be carried out at the expense of the TECL.
77
 
While many of Cork‟s citizens and authorities might expect to benefit from the 
building of the new factory, the Cork Park Racecourse committee stood to lose their very 
desirable amenity. Despite this, in a show of civic unselfishness, on the last day of 1916, 
they unanimously passed a motion to hand over the racecourse.
78
 A week later they met 
with the TECL who agreed terms which their solicitor, P. W. Bass, presented at the 
corporation meeting on 12 January 1917.
79
 The directors agreed to surrender possession 
of the racecourse for the sum of £500, in lieu of the two years notice to which they were 
entitled under their lease of 30 April 1913. Waiving their claim to the buildings on the 
course, they requested that the corporation ask the Irish Turf Club not to grant any 
application to hold a race meeting in Cork city or county without giving them an 
opportunity to obtain a licence.
80
 Three months later, on 10 April 1917, the last race 
meeting was held at the Cork venue.
81
 Thus, the city said farewell to its racecourse 
hoping to replace it with an industry which would bring employment and even wealth to 
the city. Writing soon after the closure D. L. Kelleher probably evoked the mixed 
emotions of locals when he wrote: 
But farewell steeds, all farewell! For behold, the wealth of Ind is upon us and the 
mechanic magic of Detroit U.S.A. Pass for ever then horses, and men who come to see! 
All of us trampled down ourselves now in the hooves of steel, cheers, laughter and the 
rest of our human holiday drowned in the roar of the blast furnace by the riverside.
82
  
                                                 
77
 
Minutes of council meetings, 8 Dec. 1916 (Cork City and County Archives). 
78 CC, 13 Jan. 1917.  
79 Meeting  on Saturday 6 January, Cork Constitution, 13 Jan.
 
1917.  
80
 
Minutes of council meetings, 12 Jan. 1917 (Cork City and County Archives). 
81 Irish Times (IT), 10 Apr. 1917.  
82 D.
 
L. Kelleher, The glamour of Cork  (Dublin, 1919), pp 64/5.  
 77 
With the closure of the city race course, horse racing disappeared from the area, but was 
revived in 1924 at Mallow by a Lieutenant Colonel F. F. MacCabe.
83
  
The plot of land being purchased at the Marina was part of two hundred acres of 
slob-lands reclaimed and enclosed by an embankment in the 1840s. Work had originally 
begun on the embankment in 1763 after the Irish Parliament had granted £4,000 towards 
its construction.
84
 Since the land was public property, transfer of ownership required the 
permission of parliament. Notices were placed in the local papers by Barry Galvin on 
behalf of the corporation informing the public of their intention to apply to parliament for 
a bill „to repeal, alter or amend the Cork Improvement Act 1868, the Municipal 
Corporations (Ireland) Act 1840, and the Cork Harbours Act 1820-1903‟ in order to 
permit the Cork Corporation and Harbour Commissioners „to sell, lease or otherwise 
dispose of the land‟.85 The corporation met on 26 January 1917 and passed the necessary 
resolution.
86
  
Notwithstanding Woodhouse‟s optimism about obtaining permission, the 
authorities in Cork were taking no chances and even as the corporation was meeting, a 
deputation from Cork was already in London lobbying to have a bill introduced in the 
next session of parliament.
87
 The delegation, including Barry Galvin, Maurice Healy MP 
and T. P. O‟Connor MP, acting on behalf of John Redmond who was unavailable due to 
illness, met a number of key figures in Westminster and was granted leave to introduce a 
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private member‟s bill.88  On 1 March, Captain Donelan, MP reported that the bill „had 
passed through Standing Orders Committee‟ and three weeks later it had its first reading 
in the House of Commons.
89
 By May, Perry was able to inform Edsel Ford that the Cork 
Improvement Act, 1917 had been passed by parliament and on 10 July 1917 it received 
the royal assent.
90
 Finally, a lease was entered into between Cork Corporation and Henry 
Ford & Son Limited on 27 February 1918 „for a term of 999 years from 9 June 1917 in 
consideration of a sum of £11,500 and a rent of one penny a year‟.91  
Once the negotiations were successfully concluded plaudits were extended to 
those involved. Thomas Butterfield, was later complimented as having done more „than a 
man‟s part in bringing Ford to Cork‟, while the Harbour Board‟s chairman, D. J. Lucy, 
was presented with a memorial watch and an illuminated address in recognition of his 
services in promoting the passage of the bill.
92
 The Ford Company expressed their 
appreciation of CIDA‟s efforts in furthering the interests of Henry Ford & Son by making 
a contribution of £250 to the association‟s funds.93 If the project was greeted warmly in 
Cork, it did not find favour with the British motor industry. As rumours of the Cork 
factory circulated, newspaper articles began to appear protesting the incursion of foreign 
firms while British industry was occupied with the war effort; they demanded an 
opportunity to recuperate and rebuild their business after the war had ended. One such 
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report emanated from The Motor and its demand that a halt be called to such projects was 
interpreted by the Cork Constitution as another „injustice to Ireland‟. Claiming, 
incorrectly, that the TECL had a factory near Manchester and was in the process of 
„establishing another branch of their business in Southampton‟, but that it was not until it 
came to establish a presence in Ireland that protests were heard.
94
 „The protest was, the 
newspaper continued, „an exhibition of trade jealousy which should not seriously perturb 
anyone connected with the Cork project‟.95 The British motor manufacturer‟s complaint 
was that a foreign company was being set up and being permitted to manufacture 
products which they were prevented from doing, rather than the fact that the factory 
being set up in Ireland. Irish nationalist sensitivity saw the comments as designed to 
undermine their desire to see Ireland industrialised.  So far, Ford had not been identified 
as being behind the project, though some newspapers had hinted at the connection, while 
others, such as the London Evening Mail emphasised that there was no connection 
between the proposed scheme and the Ford company. They could not see how Ford 
would require another large factory in Cork, in fact, their journalist, Mr Gerald Biss, was 
confident that it was „a British corporation, managed by British directors and owned 
entirely by British shareholders‟. He pointed out Ford‟s plans for Southampton as well as 
another plant, apparently being built at Brook Green, and came to the conclusion that it 
was the name „Trafford‟ together with the enormous size of the project  which „lent 
colour to the idea that it was an offshoot of the multi-millionaire American firm‟.96  
The public speculation ended in March 1917 when F. G. Kellaway, the 
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parliamentary secretary to the Ministry of Munitions, confirmed in the House of 
Commons that, in view of the United Kingdom‟s urgent need for additional tractors, Ford 
had been issued with a licence to build a tractor factory in Cork, on the conditions laid 
down by the cabinet. To offset any disadvantage to British industry the government 
invited motor manufacturers to organise an enterprise equivalent to the Ford project.
97
  
A subsequent edition of The Motor bemoaned the short notice given to the British 
motor industry. „Is it to be anticipated that British manufacturers can at the eleventh hour 
get together for the purpose of co-operating with a view to competing in this field of 
industry?‟ it asked. Suggesting that this last-minute approach gave the advantage to Ford 
who, they believed, had a head-start, having already spent some considerable time 
developing his tractor. Clearly fearful, not alone of the competitive challenge of Ford‟s 
tractor factory in their midst, but also of Ford‟s future developments, they asked: „who 
can tell in what other direction beyond?‟98  
While the government‟s invitation to set up a British tractor factory was perhaps a 
distraction, it did little to assuage tempers. The president of the Association of British 
Motor and Allied Manufacturers, E. Manville, wrote to The Times protesting against Ford 
being granted a licence. Since the planned factory was unlikely to come on stream before 
war‟s end, he suggested that a better solution would be to purchase finished tractors from 
overseas. He condemned the government for supporting foreign firms, particularly Ford, 
during the war, when these companies were likely to monopolise markets „employing 
mainly foreign labour‟, to the disadvantage of returning soldiers of their demobilised 
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army.
99
 
Henry Ford might have aroused fear and suspicion amongst the British motor 
manufacturers, but in Ireland he had taken on iconic status. Described by the Cork 
Constitution as a native of West Cork and a „man of high patriotism‟ who was prepared 
to alleviate Britain‟s food shortage by producing 50,000 tractors per annum in the new 
Cork factory.
100
 While Thomas O‟Donnell an Irish nationalist MP, defended the 
government‟s decision saying that:  
Mr Ford is an Irishman, who, by the most scientific methods of business and by the most 
humane treatment of his employees, has established in America one of the most successful 
and certainly the most ideal business concerns in that great country. He is now coming to 
his native land to give much-needed employment there.  
He continued somewhat sinisterly: „The Motor Association will find, if they persist in 
their opposition that they will have to meet forces not alone in Ireland, but even in 
England, whose existence they never dreamed of.
101
 He concluded that the licence for the 
factory was being opposed by British manufacturers due to it being located in Ireland and 
to the fear that Ford‟s wages and conditions would force them to compete.102 The 
following day, the Industries Committee of the Irish Parliamentary Party, also wrote to 
The Times challenging the details of Manville‟s assertions. They too, claimed that the 
factory was being opposed because it was to be built in Ireland, pointing out that there 
had been no opposition to the Ford factory in Manchester.
103
 
While the nationalist response to Manville‟s letter was along predicable anti-
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British capitalist lines, with Ford as the white knight, Manville‟s use of the word 
„foreigners‟ appears to reveal an anti–Irish mindset. His fears of losing jobs rightfully due 
to the returning soldiers, contrasts with the „foreigners‟ who presumably did not take up 
arms for their country. These expressed attitudes, no doubt raised the ire of the above 
mentioned writers to The Times. However, Manville‟s main arguments were not against 
the Ford factory being located in Cork, but against permission being granted to build a 
competing factory. Since the prohibition on Ford producing motor cars ended with the 
war, Manville estimated that Ford would be ready by then to begin mass production of 
cars, before British manufacturers had time to reorganise their production and change 
from war work, leaving them at an unfair disadvantage.
104
  Manville‟s criticism of the 
government‟s arrangement suggests that though he may have had a jaundiced view of 
foreign labour, to quote Jacobson: „it was not Ireland, but Ford that was being 
opposed.‟105    
Clearly, building a new factory in Britain would give Ford an advantage in 
manufacturing either tractors or cars within the British zone protected by the McKenna 
tariffs. For the British motor manufacturers the proposed factory meant additional 
competition from a very efficient American producer free of the import tariffs which 
would apply to imported vehicles. In addition, there were suspicions that the licence had 
been granted due to Ford‟s influence with the government, without regard for the national 
interest or the urgent need for tractors. Jacobson argues that implicit in Manville‟s letter 
is a guarded condemnation of government policy.
106
 However, if Manville was being 
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circumspect about his allegations, Country Life was more explicit, they stated: 
British manufacturers are not altogether happy about the selection of the representative of 
a well known American motor manufacturer to handle this scheme as an official of the 
Board of Agriculture. Any remarks we make are not intended to be in any way personal: 
the gentleman in question is undoubtedly a good business man and organiser. Criticism is 
levelled at him not as an individual, but at the fact that he happens to be the British 
representative of the Ford Motor Company.
107
  
Henry Ford‟s earlier outspoken pacifist comments and activities had made him persona 
non grata in Britain, views which Percival Perry had worked hard to correct. To restore 
Ford‟s prestige and that of his company, Perry had established relations with senior 
members of the government, but Perry‟s efforts in defending and promoting Henry Ford 
and his products left him open to criticism by those who felt that he was able to exert 
undue influence on the government‟s decision making.108  As we have seen, Perry in his 
role as a director of the AMB, was ideally placed to ensure that Ford benefited from the 
needs of the British government.
109
 Following the exchanges of March 1917 and against a 
background of industrial unrest and engineering strikes in May 1917 the government 
went ahead and ordered tractors from Ford.
110
  Little criticism of Ford was aired in the 
period, but in July remarks about Perry‟s activities were again raised in parliament. Sir J. 
H. Danziel, questioning the government‟s actions in refusing to consider alternative 
tractors, asked if their action was „dominated by consideration for the Ford interest?‟111 
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He went on to express farmer‟s dissatisfaction that these decisions should be in the hands 
of the representative of the Ford Motor Company.
112
 His remarks were supported by 
James Rowland who asked more specifically: „Is it a fact that he was an adviser to the 
Board of Agriculture at the time the question was brought before the board some months 
ago?‟113 No satisfactory answers were provided to these questions, but the government‟s 
choice remained unchanged. Thus, while Perry was successful in achieving Ford‟s aims, 
clearly suspicions of his scheming and influence were still widespread.  
Meanwhile the Cork Examiner continued to eulogize about the benefits of the 
project. In an editorial they anticipated „the true industrial development of Cork city and 
port, and indeed of the whole south of Ireland generally.‟ In an accompanying article 
headed „Magnitude of Ford Organisation‟ the writer got carried away with his own 
eloquence and enthusiasm: „When you study the Ford Company you have before you a 
great state, perfect in every particular–the nearest that anything on the face of this earth 
has got to Utopia.‟ Acting almost as a recruiting agent for Ford the writer stated that the 
Ford worker „is carefree, his work interests him, and should he possess any ability his 
avocation, and the happy conditions of his employment allow him to develop his talents 
to their full extent, for he knows that the company pays a high price for brains‟.114   
*  *  * 
On 27 January 1917, at Perry‟s request, Ford had shipped two of his X-series 
Fordson prototype tractors to Britain. They arrived at the Trafford Park factory, with 
Henry Ford‟s slogan „Peace, Industry, Prosperity‟ painted on the fuel tank, to be 
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evaluated by the Ministry of Munitions.
115
 Shortly after, on 1 February Germany 
announced that „she would wage unrestricted submarine warfare‟.116 This led to increased 
shipping losses in the Atlantic; up from 51,000 tons a month in 1914 to 310,868 tons in 
March 1917 and reaching 526,447 tons in April 1917. Since Britain had depended on 
imports for a significant proportion of her food, the deteriorating shipping situation put 
increasing demands on home production. Earlier steps taken to remedy the situation, such 
as releasing three million acres of grass over to tillage, were hampered by the shortage of 
men and horses and mechanisation was required urgently to carry out the work. Despite 
their earlier protests British motor manufacturers were unable to provide sufficient 
tractors, forcing the government to act.
117
   
While preliminary drawings and site plans were being made for the Cork plant, it 
was clear that with no sod yet turned and with the difficulty of getting materials, that 
Cork would not be ready to produce tractors in time for the spring of 1918, less than a 
year away.
118
 The alternative was to have Ford produce the tractors in an existing facility 
such as the Trafford Park plant in Manchester. On 6 April 1917, the United States 
declared war on Germany. Perry immediately cabled Edsel Ford with the British 
government‟s request for Ford‟s assistance, stressing the urgent need for increased food 
production in England and asking that a large quantity of tractors be made available to 
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break up existing grassland and plough for autumn wheat.
119
 He appealed for a team 
headed by Sorensen to be sent with the necessary blueprints, so that parts could be 
manufactured locally and assembled in a British government factory under Sorensen‟s 
supervision.
120
 Henry Ford‟s anti–war stance had mellowed and with America now in the 
war he agreed to Perry‟s request, cabling him enthusiastically „in full accord with 
principle, will work night and day‟.121 Sorensen assembled his team and all the necessary 
information and arrived in England on the 15 May ready and eager to produce Fordson 
tractors, known in government parlance as Ministry of Munitions (MOM) tractors.
122
 
Perry arranged for the Royal Agricultural Society to carry out trials to 
demonstrate the capability of the prototype Fordson tractors. On March 23, his colleague 
H. A. Bate, reported to Sorensen that the machines were working round the clock on the 
government‟s ploughing scheme, generating great interest.123 Henry Ford himself, in My 
life and work, also recorded that the society had reported a satisfactory performance for 
the two Ford tractors and recommended that construction of the tractors should begin 
immediately.
124
 
A more comprehensive series of tractor trials were conducted by the Ministry of 
Munitions early in May. Supervised by Selwyn Edge who reported to Sir Laming 
Worthington-Evans, Secretary of State for War, the Ford trial took place on 3-4 May on 
an eight acre hillside farm site near Birmingham. It was attended by representatives from 
the Ministry of Munitions as well as the Austin, Ford, and Wolseley motor companies. 
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The report detailed operating time, area covered and listed the problems encountered, but 
did not suggest any conclusion. It noted some problems with control of steering on greasy 
parts and also raised questions about the Fordson‟s fuel consumption, suggesting that 
„owing to the disappearance of a quantity of petrol and the number of cans on the ground 
there is some suspicion that petrol had been inserted in the full tank‟.125 When a check 
was carried out on the gravity of petrol drawn from the tractor tank, it was found to be 
similar to that of the supply barrel. It is not clear if this result confirms their suspicions or 
not, but another suspicion was raised regarding the start-up. Ford employees were on site 
and had the tractor running before the observers arrived and before the agreed start-up 
time.
126
 In the light of difficulties encountered later with starting the Fordson tractor, it 
would seem possible that Ford employees were resorting to questionable tactics to ensure 
that the Fordson tractor was seen in the best possible light. However, the editor of The 
Times, writing to his chief, Lord Northcliffe, suggested that Edge, had been biased and 
had staged unfair tests in an attempt to undermine the Ford machines.
127
 Later the 
Fordson tractor was stripped and found not to conform to the drawings supplied.
128
 No 
doubt this was due to Henry Ford‟s habit of continually changing and improving details. 
The purpose of the trials is not clear from the documents, as by this time the 
decision to manufacture Fordson tractors in Britain  was already agreed and the American 
technicians were preparing to depart from the United States, the various trials, therefore, 
seem more like a public relations exercise to reinforce that decision and advertise Ford‟s 
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latest product.  
Shortly before Sorensen‟s arrival from the United States, whether in response to 
the criticism or to his anticipated workload, Perry wrote to Edsel Ford saying he had 
resigned his government position to devote his time to overseeing the manufacture of 
government tractors.
129
 In his letter to Ford, Perry enclosed a brochure which he had 
produced and circulated amongst the members of parliament.
130
 The tone and content of 
document was very supportive of Ford‟s works and ideas and suggests that Perry was 
offended by the recent comments made against him and that his resignation was 
encouraged by these remarks. The document praised the Model T as the „as the car of the 
people‟. He suggested that British manufacturers were more concerned with supplying 
the upper and middle classes and had left it to Ford to produce for the remainder of the 
market. He believed that British manufacturers were not prepared to produce tractors, 
instead, they acted like „dogs in the manger‟, making no attempt to compete or to 
organise themselves efficiently, „a splendid example of the impotence and inefficiency of 
the British manufacturer. You can be sorry for him; but in the national interest you cannot 
defend him‟.131 
Sorensen and five Dearborn tractor experts arrived in England with an express car 
containing tractor parts, patterns and farming implements. Perry introduced Sorensen to 
heads of government departments and to senior representatives of the motor 
manufacturing industry in preparation for the local manufacture of tractor parts. Despite 
the previous suspicions of the motor industry, Sorensen felt that the meetings went well 
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and that the manufacturers seemed well-disposed towards the project.
132
 Sorensen also 
met members of the Irish Party, including John Redmond, and was invited to the House 
of Commons on 21 May 1917.
133
 There he heard Lloyd George introduce the Irish 
Convention which was to be set up to consider the enactment of a system of self-
government in Ireland. Sorensen was impressed with the speeches and his interpretation 
of events was that Lloyd George proposed „that Ireland now take her own problem in 
hand and work out her own plan of government‟.134 Meanwhile, Sorensen was also 
preparing to set up tractor manufacturing in Cork. He spent the following day with B. R. 
Brown discussing plans for the Cork foundry operation which he was keen should be 
built as quickly as possible.
135
 Subsequently, when Sorensen met Lloyd George he told 
him that he was going to investigate the Cork situation thoroughly. Assuring him of 
Henry Ford‟s full support for the programme, as he too wanted to do something for 
Ireland, Sorensen showed him his plan and got his approval for it.
136
 At this point 
Sorensen‟s aim seemed to have been to set up the Cork foundry to produce the larger 
castings while smaller tractor parts were to be produced by British manufacturers.  
Having had positive support from the government officials and potential British 
tractor part manufacturers, Sorensen and his team set out with their blueprints and 
specifications to talk to suppliers and to arrange contracts. By mid-June he was back in 
London with, in his words, „things lined up for early production of parts‟.137 However, 
Gibbard suggests that the best price he could get for building the tractor in Britain was a 
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very expensive $1,500 per unit.
138
 At the same time, according to Wilkins and Hill, 
arrangements to find part suppliers had not been proceeding as well as Sorensen had 
suggested. At a minimum, technical problems arose with the specification of parts. 
Sorensen had cabled to Dearborn for „nuts, bolts, and screws, because “the English 
concerns were not fitted up with taps ands dies for handling our threads”‟.139  During his 
stay in London, on 13 June 1917, Sorensen witnessed the first large scale daylight 
bombing raid by German aeroplanes.
140
 The unanticipated attack caused 162 fatalities as 
well as injuring 432 and marked a departure from previous night-time raids by 
dirigibles.
141
 It forced the government to change its air policy putting greater emphasis on 
the development and production of aeroplanes. At a cabinet meeting on the day after the 
raid it was decided to have Lord Northcliffe, who was in New York, investigate 
transferring the manufacture of standardised machinery, such as tractors and motor cars, 
to the United States allowing British firms to specialise in building aeroplane engines.
142
  
In this context, Ford was asked to switch plans and instead of producing the tractors in 
Britain to fabricate them in Dearborn.
143
 C. A. Addison, Minister of Munitions, wrote to 
Perry on 28 June asking him to arrange with Henry Ford to supply 6,000 tractors and 
spares to be ready for the 1918 food production programme. He apologised that the 
original plan had fallen through and claimed that while British manufacturers were 
willing to cooperate with manufacturing parts, all of their capacity was absorbed by aero 
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engine work.
144
 Sir Arthur Lee, Director General of the Food Production Department, 
was a little more forthcoming when he declared that if Ford had „received loyal support‟ 
from British manufacturers the tractors could have been delivered, instead they were 
forced to again call upon „the patience and generosity of Mr. Ford and look to him to save 
the situation‟.145 
From Lee‟s remarks it appears that despite the British government‟s urgent need 
for extra tractors to prevent a potential famine in 1918, local manufacturers were not 
cooperating with Ford‟s efforts to set up production. Their reluctance presumably lay in 
their previously stated opposition to the building of a Ford factory which would compete 
with them after the war. They were unwilling or incapable of providing an alternative 
tractor. Importation of complete tractors was the best solution for them. However, the 
requirement to produce extra aeroplane engines added to the production burden and 
created additional problems for British industry which justified transferring the tractor 
work to the United States and probably provided a convenient cover for the 
manufacturer‟s refusal to cooperate with Ford. Meanwhile on the banks of the River Lee 
in Cork, site excavations for the new foundry site was already underway.
146
 
Once the decision was made to produce the tractors in the United States, 
Sorensen, with Ford‟s approval, was able to agree a deal with the British government to 
supply the 6,000 tractors at cost price plus $50 per unit.
147
  With firm British orders on 
hand, Henry Ford & Son Inc. was set up in July 1917 to manufacture the tractors in the 
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United States.
148
 In Cork, the Irish affiliate, Henry Ford & Son Limited, was already in 
existence from April of that year.
149
 Both companies were personal ventures of Henry 
Ford and wholly owned by the Ford family.
150
 The tractors were to be designated 
Fordsons to differentiate them from Ford motor cars. A contract was signed immediately 
and Henry Ford & Son, Ltd., (Cork) undertook to supply to the Minister of Munitions all 
the necessary component parts to complete six thousand „MOM Agricultural tractors‟. 
The tractors would be manufactured in Dearborn and then shipped part-assembled to 
Manchester. Later, some would be shipped in knocked-down condition. The government 
agreed to hand over to Ford a factory adjoining their plant in Trafford Park in which to 
complete the assembly of the tractors shipped from United States, while Ford were also 
responsible for supplying spare parts.
151
  
Perry and Sorensen sailed to the United States with the order for 6,000 units. By 
11 July Sorensen was back in Dearborn. Apart from the fifty prototypes produced in 1915 
no significant tractor production had taken place up to that time. Sorensen prepared a 
factory in Dearborn for tractor production; he lined up suppliers and borrowed tools and 
equipment from the Highland Park factory.
152
 Despite his earlier optimism, production 
was slow in getting started as design changes added to the manufacturing problems.  The 
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British government sent Lord Northcliffe to speed up the process, but typically, Henry 
Ford was still trying to improve the design.
153
 When Ford demonstrated his machine, 
Northcliffe was impressed, but protested: „we can‟t wait for the perfect tractor.‟154 
However J. Lee Thompson, in his biography of Northcliffe, suggests a different scenario, 
that Henry Ford felt insulted by the British handling of his offer to supply 6,000 tractors 
and that Northcliffe was asked to appease the angry motor-maker.  Northcliffe told 
Winston Churchill, who became Minister for Munitions in July, that Ford had twice put 
him off, but that he would gladly go to Detroit and „eat humble pie‟. In October a 
meeting was arranged through Ford‟s friend Thomas Edison at which the 
misunderstanding was put to rest.
155
 Finally, production began on 8 October and 254 
units were produced by the year‟s end.156 Following the slow start in 1917 Dearborn 
produced 34,167 tractors in 1918.
157
  
In Britain, the protests continued at the decision to give the order to the Ford 
company.  R. E. Prothero, an influential agricultural reformer who had been appointed to 
head the Board of Agriculture, wrote to Winston Churchill, demanding a change in the 
policy regarding tractor purchase, insisting that they should be „home produced, at low 
cost and of simple construction. They should be made in England not imported from the 
United States‟.158 While Henry Sturmey, writing in The Motor, questioned the suitability 
of the Fordson, suggesting that while it was a good machine for operating on small 
private farms, it was neither sturdy enough nor large enough to comply with government 
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requirements, as it was only capable of ploughing two furrows in comparison with larger 
tractors which could plough four.
159
  
In late February 1918, with Fordson production beginning to take off and tractors 
being shipped to Britain on a regular basis, Henry Ford had cause to write to Northcliffe, 
complaining that the British bureaucracy was holding up the shipment of tractors after 
Ford had gone to such lengths to produce them. Demanding that his tractors have 
precedence over food supplies due to their capability to produce additional food, Ford 
threatened that if they were not moved promptly they would be sold to farmers in Canada 
and United States who were begging for them.
160
 Northcliffe cabled Ford to assure him 
that the matter would be put right.
161
  
None of the American tractors carried badges or names and were known only as 
Ministry of Munitions or MOM. tractors. Originally they were leased out to British 
farmers, though later some were sold instead.
162
 April 1918 saw the completion of the 
order, with 3,000 built up and 3,000 knocked-down vehicles shipped.
163
 Despite all of the 
political controversy surrounding the production of Ford‟s tractors, they had minimal 
effect on food production. They came into effect in the last year of the war when other 
solutions to increase production were already being implemented. According to Wilkins 
and Hill, steam-driven tractors ploughed 1,200,000 acres in 1918, while, from October 
1917 to the end of the war the new petrol driven tractors ploughed only 480,000.
164
 
Michael Williams suggests that before 1914 there had been fewer than 500 tractors 
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operating on British farms, hence, the war-time importation of 6,000 tractors into the 
British market would have satisfied, if not saturated, the market for a some time and since 
Britain was expected to be Cork‟s main market for tractors, the impact of these imports 
no doubt reduced sales demand in the post-war years and deprived the new Cork plant of 
badly needed business.
165
    
Henry Ford‟s first priority had been to supply Britain‟s food needs, but the home 
market in the United States was also waiting for his tractor. Such was the American 
farmers‟ confidence in Ford‟s products that they were clamouring for the Fordson, 
impatiently waiting until the British contract was filled. A typical example was C. G. 
Phillips, a farmer in Cortland, Ohio who sent a cheque for $500 to Henry Ford as part-
payment for a Fordson tractor. He received the response that „we are working on a 
contract to furnish several thousand tractors for the English Government…I cannot 
advise you just at what time we can furnish you with a tractor‟.166 Shortly after, when the 
Fordson tractor was finally released to the American farmers, it proved extremely popular 
and Dearborn production rose steadily from the 34,167 achieved in 1918 to 101,898 units 
in 1923, accounting for the vast majority of all United States tractor sales.
167
 Later 
competition became fierce, so that by 1928 Ford production had declined to only 8,001 
units and International Harvester had the lead in sales with 47 per cent of the market 
total.
168
 
By the time the British order had been completed, building work was well under 
way on the new Marina factory. With the various bureaucratic requirements completed, 
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Henry Ford and the citizens of Cork might look forward to the substantial benefits that 
this industrial complex could bring to all. Percival Perry could expect to add another 
production unit to his empire while he continued to promote his ideas for the 
development of a motor car plant in Southampton. However, in 1918, long before the 
Cork factory was ready, as we have seen, Dearborn was turning out thousands of tractors 
per month, suggesting that Cork was probably superfluous from the beginning. Like 
many of Ford‟s decisions, the selection of Cork was not based on firm market 
intelligence, but was decided upon hastily following the British government‟s rejection of 
Southampton. No coherent analysis was applied to the British and European tractor 
markets. Instead the tractor factory came about as a result of Ford‟s sentimental desire to 
locate an industrial plant in Ireland, supported by Lloyd George‟s wish to mechanise 
Britain‟s food production. The building at Cork was originally planned to produce 
tractors for the 1918 food planting season in the United Kingdom, but the time required 
to build the factory was too long and though Perry had worked hard at procuring the site, 
by the time construction work started in June 1917, it was already too late. The only 
factory with the resources capable of building the number of machines required was 
Dearborn and even they, despite using existing facilities, were hard pressed to meet the 
deadline. In effect, the decision to build the Cork plant, taken in late 1916, was meant to 
solve a short-term agricultural need in Britain, but instead, circumstances forced Ford to 
solve it by building the 6,000 tractors in Dearborn. Ford‟s large investment in the Marina 
factory and foundry created a facility whose capacity was far in excess of its potential 
sales. Like European car sales which were a small fraction of American sales, tractors 
sales were also likely to be small. The excess production capacity would create 
 97 
operational problems and instability in the plant for the following decade.   
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CHAPTER THREE      
Production start up: 
Struggles with construction, sales and prices (1917-1920) 
Henry Ford & Son began construction of their new Irish tractor factory in June 
1917. The plant was to be the first custom-built Ford manufacturing plant outside of 
Dearborn and was designed to supply tractors, identical to the Fordsons manufactured in 
the United States, to Britain, Ireland, Europe and parts of the Middle East. It took two 
years before the first Fordson tractor came off the line and even longer to finish the 
factory. The factory was a huge state-of-the-art building covering a floor area of 330,000 
square feet (slightly over 7.5 acres) with all the facilities required to manufacture and 
ship tractors. Facilities included a machine shop, a power house, an assembly unit, 
wharves to ship the vehicles, and most significantly an iron foundry to pour and cast 
parts.
1
  The plant, though only partially completed, turned out the first tractor on 3 July 
1919, production continued until the end of 1922, by which time 7,605 units had been 
produced.
2
 Even as the first tractor was coming off the line, the excitement of getting the 
plant running dimmed as the political landscape changed and the company found itself in 
the middle of the War of Independence. The tractor market faltered almost immediately 
after the plant opened, and as management and workers struggled to commission and 
develop the factory, costs were high and uncompetitive in comparison with Detroit 
tractors. Though the military activities of the British forces as well as the IRA, and later 
the Civil War protagonists had remarkably little effect on operations, the developing 
business‟s problems were many, including the difficulty of achieving sales, problems 
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with raw material and finished product quality, availability of supplies and interruptions 
to transport and power.  
In a country where manufacturing was backward and largely undeveloped, the 
Ford factory was extremely modern. John O‟Neill, who joined Ford in 1919 and was 
appointed manager director of Cork in 1932, later declared: „From the point of view of 
layout and equipment, it was ahead of anything else in Europe‟.3 As one of the largest 
engineering employers in the southern part of the country, employing almost 2,000 
workers, it was unmatched for scale and size by anything other than the Belfast 
shipyards. While Ford had a number of assembly plants in the United States and 
elsewhere, Cork was not just an assembly plant, but a genuine manufacturing operation, 
making parts from raw materials. The foundry and machine shop were the heart of the 
operation, moulding, casting and machining all the major components of the tractor.  
Ford‟s new factory building at the Marina was typical of the plants designed by 
the noted architect Albert Kahn, who was responsible for most of Ford‟s buildings, 
beginning with the Highland Park plant in 1908.
4
 Later he designed the massive River 
Rouge plant, as well as assembly plants in the United States and abroad. According to 
Lacey, Kahn‟s „factory buildings were strictly functional, employing pre-stressed 
concrete and glass to create stark and unashamedly utilitarian structures which won him 
deserved international renown‟.5 Albert and his brother Julius Kahn had pioneered the 
use of reinforced concrete industrial buildings which was more flexible than conventional 
building systems.  The designs were space-efficient, fireproof, and incorporated increased 
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window space which enhanced the day-lighting of the buildings.
6
  
In charge of the project was Ford‟s manager of construction, B. R. Brown, who 
like many of Ford‟s senior managers of the time had little formal education, having 
gained his knowledge of the building business by practical experience. Nonetheless, 
during his 21 years with Ford, he was responsible for the construction of thirteen million 
square feet of building space. The method used to design Ford factories was, first to 
decide the layout of the machinery, as the assembly process had priority over all other 
considerations. Kahn, another who had risen in his profession without much formal 
education, then designed the building to enclose the layout. Setting aside contemporary 
aesthetic conventions he allowed the functional requirements of the plant to determine the 
overall form and shape.
7
 Brown‟s responsibility, as he put it, was to construct: „the 
buildings around their layouts rather [than] building the buildings and then putting the 
equipment in‟.8 While Ford had plenty of construction experience in the United States, 
building in Europe during wartime was to pose a challenge.  
Following Ford‟s decision to change location preliminary drawings and site plans 
for the Cork location were drawn up during December and January and passed to ABC 
about 1 February 1917.
9
  Site excavations commenced there in June 1917.
10
 B. R. Brown 
spent most of 1917 and 1918
 
in Cork organising materials and manpower, but shortage of 
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materials, particularly steel, led to design changes which hindered progress.
11
  
The proposed Cork factory buildings comprised of a four storey unit, described in 
his report by Bambrook as: „417 feet wide by 464 feet long with two high craneways and 
one low craneway, a forge building, heat-treat building, tumbler building and foundry‟.12 
By August 1917 the detailed design drawings for all buildings had been completed and 
the necessary materials ordered, but no sooner was this work finished than word came 
from Henry Ford & Son for a change in the design. Brown returned to Dearborn in late-
October to discover that, with wartime restrictions, shipping space could not be found for 
the large amount of steel needed for the planned building.
13
 So, no doubt in consultation 
with Henry Ford, the four storey design was abandoned. On 21 November 1917 materials 
already on order were cancelled and the building redesigned as a single storey steel-
framed building requiring considerably less steel in its construction. The new building 
retained the original external dimensions but had three one-storey craneways. Other 
changes included extending the craneway girders to the wharf with a one storey 
reinforced concrete machine shop adjoining on each side.
14
  
Meanwhile, on the Marina site, levelling work and pile-driving had been carried 
out and by mid-August 1917 the structural steel skeleton of the foundry, based on the 
preliminary drawings, was rising on the Cork skyline.
15
 Despite the numerous and 
substantial design changes, by June 1918, the form of the new single storey factory, with 
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its reinforced concrete encased in wooden shuttering, was evident alongside the foundry. 
By late October 1918 the shuttering had been removed revealing the free-standing 
reinforced concrete framework.
16
 
Even after the design of the factory was settled, further changes to the steel work 
were authorised. The extended wharf craneway was abandoned and about 1 February 
1918 work on the foundry craneway was also cancelled. Subsequently, in another volte-
face, the ABC was ordered to complete the craneway steel and a final design of 12 April 
1918 was fabricated and stored at Elmira, New York.
17
 Presumably this equipment was 
shipped to Ireland sometime in 1919 when shipping difficulties eased. The report by 
Bambrook, which quantifies the costs of the many design changes, as well as the 
expenditure for fabricating steel to meet these changes, clearly shows that the company 
did purchase steel in the United States for use in Cork. It is not clear how much, if any, 
was able to avoid the wartime shipping constraints. In his reminiscences Brown claimed 
they could not get building materials, that Henry Ford had insisted that nothing would be 
supplied from the United States as he „was against the war and didn‟t want to be party to 
sending anything over there which might further the war or help the shortages‟.18 The 
number of changes and the costs incurred suggest that Henry Ford himself was involved. 
Brown‟s recollections colourfully relate, probably inaccurately, how he dealt with the 
shortage of materials and how the difficulties encountered were managed:  
The plans for the Cork plant were more or less makeshift. I hired a local engineer. I 
could get no structural steel or any thing of that kind on the regular market. While 
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passing through on a train one day, I saw an old steel structure sticking up in the air. I 
ascertained the town it was near and sent a man down there to see if it could be bought. 
That was all the structural steel we used in the building. The rest was all concrete. I 
secured reinforcing steel from Belgium and used the old race track grandstand for form 
lumber….
19
 
Despite the design changes and the shortage of materials, work on the Marina 
factory went ahead, but the construction proved to be more expensive than the original 
estimate, mainly due to the necessity for extensive levelling and pile-driving. The wharf 
was built first, to facilitate shipping-in of materials and equipment, followed by the 
foundry and machine shop.
20
 Altogether the building of the Cork factory took more than 
two years to complete, which, even allowing for the difficulties of wartime, seems 
excessive. At a board meeting held in Dearborn on 22 October 1918 and attended by 
Henry and Edsel Ford, as well as Perry and Sorensen, Brown presented plans and 
photographs showing the progress of the project.
21
 Following his presentation, he was 
ordered to return to Ireland to oversee completion of the building work and to hand over 
management of the site to John Crawford, who had recently been appointed manager.
22
   
On this, Brown‟s final trip back to Europe, he was nominated to act as a 
messenger for Perry, who was still connected to the Ministry of Munitions as a director of 
the Mechanical Warfare department. Perry apparently had some secret papers which he 
wanted hand-delivered to Lloyd George and Brown was appointed as a special officer 
                                                 
19 Ibid, also cited in Nyhan, „A history of the Cork plant‟, p. 28 
20 Ford & Son, Ford in Ireland, p. 12. 
21 B.
 
R. Brown had arrived on 11 Sept. 1918,
 
B.
 
R. Brown to Mrs Brown, 11 Sept.1918 (BFRC, Acc. 541 Box 10), and returned c. 
28 Oct. 1918,  P. Perry to B.
 
R.
 
Brown, 22 Oct. (BFRC, Acc.541 Box 10). 
22
 
Minutes of  directors‟ meetings, 22 Oct. 1918 (BFRC, Acc. 328, Box 1). At this meeting B.
 
R.
 
Brown was given a special bonus 
of $2,000 for his work, while John Crawford was appointed manager at a salary of £756. 
 104 
attached to the British war mission in Washington for this purpose.
23
 In a covering letter 
Perry wrote: „He is the bearer of important papers and is carrying with him certain 
munitions of war‟.24 During his trip to Britain, Brown as a „special officer‟, had a 
sustenance allowance „at the usual scale rate‟ and could claim any other out-of-pocket 
expenses from the British war mission on his return to Washington.
25
 Brown himself said 
that he „sailed as a British subject so I could pass through customs without any 
inspection, because I was also taking over seven trunks filled with bacons, hams, etc from 
Mr Ford to England‟.26 While Perry‟s contacts were essential in securing passage for 
Ford employees travelling to and from the United States in wartime, despite the 
restrictions which applied, however, it seems he was also capable of using the system for 
his own personal advantage.  
Brown finally left Ireland on 21 December 1918 with his work largely completed 
and the building ready for occupation.
27
 John Crawford took over the task of managing 
the installation of equipment and the setting up of tractor production. In June 1919, 
Sorensen, who was in charge of tractor production at Dearborn, selected a team of 
technicians from his plant and despatched them to Cork to assist with the commissioning 
phase, to train the factory workers and to get the plant running efficiently.
28
 All of those 
selected had considerable experience of manufacturing. The team included works 
manager, Peter MacGregor; shop superintendent, Ben Mulligan; C. Waldron, foreman 
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responsible for tool design and shop layout; and the man who would later manage the 
Irish business, Edward Grace.
29
 
*  *  * 
Even before building work had commenced the administrative side of the 
business had been dealt with.  Henry Ford & Son Limited was officially incorporated as a 
limited company in April 1917.
30
  Three days later P. L. D. Perry and R. J. White were 
appointed directors.
31
 On 20 September the full board of directors was elected, it 
comprised, Henry Ford and his wife, Clara, and their son Edsel with Perry as managing 
director, Eugene L. Clarke, 5 Friar‟s Walk, company secretary and R. J. White as 
company solicitor.  With the recent commencement of work on the factory, the directors 
changed the registered address to „The Marina, Cork, Ireland‟.32  At a subsequent meeting 
Mr Alfred Dugdale was appointed to act as temporary secretary of the company and 
given the responsibility for setting up a sales network, specifically „for the purpose of 
witnessing the execution of certain agreements with dealers, retail sub-dealers and traders 
for the supply of tractors‟.33 In order to maintain continuity, following the supply of the 
6,000 MOM tractors, Perry, was instructed to make the necessary commercial 
arrangements for Henry Ford & Son, Cork to act a supplier of tractors, importing them 
from Dearborn „until such time as Cork is in a position to manufacture‟. Demonstrating 
the high regard in which Perry was still held by Henry Ford, in addition to his role as 
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managing director of Cork, he remained „Henry Ford‟s personal representative in Europe, 
managing director of Ford Motor Company (England) Ltd and Director of the Firestone 
Tyre and Rubber Company‟.34    
Under the terms of the lease with Cork Corporation, Perry had agreed a minimum 
rate of one shilling per hour for building work, but as the building work eased off the and 
the company began to hire factory workers a suitable wage structure needed to be 
formalised. Earlier, in August 1912 when Ford and Perry had been delayed in Fishguard 
en route to Cork, they had exchanged views on worker‟s wage payment systems.35 
Perry‟s attitude was that a good weekly wage was better than piece rates, as the men 
knew what they were getting at the end of each week and had adequate wages to cover 
„the cost of living at a modest scale‟. He claimed Ford was impressed with his ideas and 
seemed to be inferring that his ideas had a bearing on the decision to implement the five-
dollar-day, which was introduced some 16 months later.
36
 
In the United States, to meet the rising demand for his Model T, between 1910 
and 1914, Ford had developed the mass production system and created a huge industrial 
complex. Yet despite the company‟s remarkable technological capability, what Ford 
managers characterized as the „human element of production‟ continued to create 
problems. High levels of labour turnover, absenteeism, poor punctuality as well as 
malingering, all constrained output. In 1913 John R. Lee was assigned by Ford to find 
remedies to these problems, but when his reforms failed to solve the problems, the 
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company conceived the five-dollar-day.
37
 Introduced to an astonished public on 5 January 
1914, it effectively doubled the previous wage rate. However, the scheme was devised 
not as a wage increase, but as a profit sharing scheme with the extra payment contingent 
on the continued profitability of the company, as well as the behaviour of individual 
workers, both at work and at home. The new rate was meant to change the attitudes of the 
workers, motivating them to improve their behaviour and performance thus increasing the 
overall efficiency of Ford‟s business.38 A new sociological department was created to 
evaluate and control the worker‟s industrial and domestic conduct and to persuade them 
to convert to Ford‟s preconceived idea of the American way of life.39  
The plan received huge worldwide publicity and so great was its impact that it 
confounded even the hard-nosed Sorensen.
40
 Ford‟s apparently enlightened decision to 
share his profits was perceived as a charitable gift by supporters and critics alike.
41
 His 
actions transformed him into man of mythical proportions, and moved his status to the 
level of folk hero. The „rags to riches‟ story followed by his emergence as a humanitarian 
philanthropist, led to a deluge of „begging letters‟, appeals for hand-outs from people 
with all types of causes, schemes and problems who believed Ford would relieve their 
burdens with his generosity. Some came from Ireland, including one in June 1920 from 
Oliver St. John Gogarty, who requested that Ford purchase and develop the Arigna coal 
mines. To support his scheme Gogarty sent samples of coal from the mines together with 
an analysis of its quality carried out by the University of Birmingham. Apart from a 
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polite acknowledgment no action was taken by Ford.
42
 In 1915 Ford was receiving two 
hundred requests a day forcing his personal secretary, Liebold, to hire three secretaries to 
deal with the avalanche. By 1924 the figure had reached half a million a year. Up to 1925 
all the letters were acknowledged, but few were rewarded and most were never seen by 
Henry Ford, since the decision as to what got to him was in Liebold‟s hands.43 Ford, who 
detested charity, said „endowment is an opiate to imagination, a drug to initiative‟.44 He 
did not consider himself a philanthropist, but espoused what William Greenleaf called the 
„gospel of work‟, his idea being „to aid men to help themselves‟.45  
Ford‟s idealism as expressed by the five-dollar-day was followed, in 1915, by the 
impractical episode of the Peace Ship, which instead of gaining general support led to 
Ford being ridiculed by the newspapers for his pacifism and naiveté. Afterwards he 
cooled towards social reform and reformers, and the humanitarian idealism he had shown 
declined so that by 1922 he was openly deriding reformers for their „sentimental 
idealism‟.46 According to Greenleaf, „while his deep sympathy for mankind had not been 
entirely eroded, it was mixed by contempt for most people “because of their general 
incapacity”‟.47 Ford‟s industrial experiment was short-lived. In the recession of 1920-21 
the profit sharing plan was ended and the sociological department closed down. In order 
to correct the company‟s debt problems the Highland Park plant was closed for the month 
of January 1921, but when the plant reopened only about two thirds of the workers were 
rehired. Those who returned faced what became known as the „the six dollar speed-up‟, 
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they were subjected to ruthless discipline and pressure so that by year end, despite the 
smaller numbers, production output had doubled.
48
 The departure, on 25 January 1921, of 
Dean Marquis, the man who had been hired to run the sociology department and to 
improve the moral and social conditions of the workers, marked the end of Ford‟s 
humanitarian experiment and left control of the plant to the hard-nosed production man, 
„Cast-iron Charlie‟ Sorensen.49 
Soon after the American announcement of the five-dollar-day in January 1914 an 
equivalent system was introduced in Manchester. Since Sorensen was familiar with the 
Dearborn operation, part of his assignment in April 1914 was to oversee the setting up of 
the new British profit-sharing plan. He brought Harry Scott, who had worked under John 
Lee in Dearborn‟s sociological department, to carry out the task of duplicating the 
American system. Everyone connected with the scheme, including department heads, 
were briefed and a five person committee was set up to meet daily and to monitor 
progress and settle any questions which arose. By the time he left for Europe, Sorensen 
was satisfied that the scheme was on a sound footing and the implementation was not 
being rushed. He reported that only a small number of men had been put onto the scheme 
as the care being taken „required necessarily more than one visit with the man and his 
family‟. Only those who met the company‟s requirements were allowed to participate in 
the profit sharing.
50
  In Detroit, the sociological department‟s role had been to keep check 
on employees and to ensure that they were prudent and sensible with their new found 
wealth, not squandering the money on alcohol or gambling; Henry Ford was a lifelong 
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non-smoking, teetotaller and abhorred both activities. Inspectors called to the employees‟ 
homes and interviewed wives and neighbours to verify home conditions. As well as 
industrial restructuring, Ford was attempting to carry out „human restructuring‟. He 
declared: „We want to make men in this factory as well as automobiles‟.51 Ford‟s higher 
wages in both the United States and Britain came with a requirement for workers to act as 
exemplary workers and citizens and to accept flexibility and discipline. 
As the building of the Marina plant and the installation of machinery proceeded, 
Perry wrote to Sorensen seeking directions on factory workers‟ wage rates and the 
introduction of a welfare department along the lines of that in place in the Highland Park 
factory. Keen to reflect what was being done in Dearborn he continued:  
There are, however, many social and economic differences, and I would ask you to bear 
in mind that the principal reason why Mr. Ford started the institution at Cork was social 
and political rather than commercial and economic, and I therefore feel that whatever you 
do in Dearborn it is possible that Mr Ford may desire that we shall pay careful regard to 
social and welfare matters.
52
  
Perry was fully aware of the company‟s policies on „social and welfare matters‟, but 
since Cork was a pet project of Henry‟s, he was keen to satisfy Ford‟s every requirement 
in relation to it.  He continued: 
It is true that the best way to make an industrious man is to give him work to do, and 
watch over him in the factory and see that he does it. At the same time the man‟s home 
conditions reflect considerably on his work, and I feel that we should have a policy here 
which will take cognizance of the home conditions of our workers.
53
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Tentatively, Perry was suggesting that Ford‟s policy in Cork should be to follow the 
Dearborn example, where John Lee and the sociological department had endeavoured to 
alter worker‟s behaviour, teaching those in receipt of the five-dollar-day wage to spend it 
sensibly, as Perry put it: „instead of going to the saloon or buying a piano he couldn‟t 
play and keeping clothes in the bathtub‟.54 At this time living conditions in Cork were 
very bad, unemployment and poverty widespread, and no doubt many families suffered 
problems with alcoholism and gambling. Perry needed to know from Henry Ford what 
level of control should apply to the Cork employees.  
Whatever philosophical exchanges followed, eventually, working conditions, 
including rates of pay and hours of work for both factory and office staff were laid down 
by a board of directors meeting on 8 July 1919.
55
 Conditions were generally favourable, 
though not dramatically so. All employees worked a five and half-day, forty-four hour 
week, from 8.00 a.m. to 4.30 p.m. with 30 minutes for lunch for factory workers and 8.30 
to 5.30 p.m. with an hour for lunch for office workers. In the original lease the company 
had committed to pay a minimum rate of one shilling per hour [£2. 4s. 0d.per week] but 
these rates had been improved. Factory men over 18 years started at 1s.8d. per hour 
[£3.13s.4d. per week], while women over 18 started at 1s.3d. per hour [£2.15s.0d.].
56
 
Office workers were paid a minimum of £288 per annum for men and £250 for women. 
Amongst the American experts, Peter MacGregor was paid £80 per month, while 
Mulligan and Waldron were each paid £50 per month.
57
 Since the factory was already in 
production by this time, the board meeting was confirming the rates already being paid.  
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Earlier The Times had published details of Ford‟s conditions, pointing out that a share of 
the profits, amounting to 3d. per hour [11s.0d. per week], was paid to adult workers with 
at least six months service. This payment was considered a gratuity which was 
conditional on the employees‟ good conduct and could be withdrawn at any time at the 
company‟s discretion.58 No comment was made about setting up an American style 
sociological or welfare department which suggests that the idea was dropped. 
The wages and working conditions offered by Henry Ford & Son were very 
desirable in an area of high unemployment and poor wages and conditions. For example, 
in 1917 there had been calls on the government to introduce a weekly minimum wage of 
£1.5s.0d. for agricultural labourers.
59
 While a survey of 1,010 Cork working class 
families found that thirty five per cent survived on less than 19s. per week, while the 
income of another fourteen per cent did not exceed 21s.
60
 Inevitably, these families lived 
on the edge of starvation with little cash available for food and clothing. Ford starting 
wage, even for an 18 year old employee, offered comparative luxury. A major outgoing 
for all families was the cost of rent, in a city where housing was scarce, frequently 
squalid and relatively expensive. 
With the introduction of an enterprise expected to employ 2,000 workers the issue 
of housing, in an already overcrowded city, was critical. As we have seen, the 1911 
census revealed large numbers of substandard houses and extensive overcrowding. 
Shortly after the original agreement with Woodhead in November 1916, the issue of Ford 
housing was first mentioned in a local newspaper. The Cork Constitution ventured that as 
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well as the as the industrial buildings, a „model village for the workers in the Park‟ was 
being planned.
61
  This impression was later refuted, but early in 1917 the subject of 
housing was raised more formally by J. L. Fawsitt, secretary of CIDA, who submitted a 
report on the issue. He noted that „the housing problem in Cork which is at present fairly 
acute will become greatly aggravated when the industries are set afoot‟.62 He identified 
two problems, firstly, the immediate requirement for additional temporary 
accommodation for the large numbers involved in the building. Secondly, the need for 
suitable housing for the thousands of permanent employees expected. Reporting on a 
meeting between George Crosbie, president of the CIDA and the promoters of the Cork 
park project, Fawsitt stated that it was not the promoter‟s intention to build houses. 
Consequently, there was a need for immediate action either by the state, the municipality 
or preferably by private effort. Pointing out the potential he said: „Capitalists would do 
well to bear in mind that under the promised minimum wage of one shilling per hour for 
adult males…[workers would] be in a position to pay larger rentals for more suitable 
habitation than had been the rule in Cork up to now‟. In addition, there would be a 
demand for a better class of house for heads of departments and better-paid staff. He 
called on the corporation to raise the issue publicly „in the hope that local efforts will be 
forthcoming in the immediate future to provide the additional housing accommodation 
that will be urgently required after buildings have begun‟.63 
Coincidentally, in the same issue of the Cork Constitution, details were published 
of a plan for a proposed new town. It reported the purchase by the promoter of Trafford 
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Engineering Company of Manchester „of an immense tract at the east end of Blackrock 
known as Lakelands…[to be] used as a site of a small town of some thousands of 
dwellings…‟64 Three weeks later this news was repeated. „Representatives of Mr Ford 
have acquired large tracts of land at Blackrock, which will make suitable and very 
healthy sites for a model village.‟ While they made it clear that:  
the Ford Company are not at present to build these villages themselves…and it is now up 
to the municipality, either in its own corporate capacity or to the citizens generally, to 
provide the capital for the erection of the houses upon the sites acquired by the 
promoters, upon exceptionally generous terms as to the matter of ground rent.
65
 
Though Ford‟s representatives are not named, it seems that the purchasers may have 
involved Perry, as the senior executive, perhaps, working through Woodhead. Comments 
made by Sorensen in 1922, during the confrontation with Cork Corporation over Ford‟s 
failure to reach the employment numbers stipulated in their lease, suggested that the 
venture was a private speculation on the part of the „Ford representatives‟.66 Sorensen 
appeared to point the finger at Perry, who by that time was no longer with the company, 
when he declared that:  
Our representative, who originally put this matter before the city council, was able to 
shape this up to his own personal benefit and to the benefit of others who were 
corroborating [sic] with him, and who had the same idea in mind. These people made big 
purchases of land around the city limits, as well as business blocks within the city and 
options were secured on as much property as they could get their hands on, as they felt 
that since Mr Ford had secured this property, Cork would naturally boom and they would, 
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therefore, benefit in this very selfish manner. However, in these ventures they were 
unfortunate, much to the benefit of Cork in general, because if they had been successful, 
they would have taken a good deal of money from the Cork people.
67
 
Where Sorensen got this information is not evident, nor whether there was any 
truth in the allegations. Also, unclear is what prevented the group from going ahead with 
its housing construction scheme. Sorensen‟s suggestion that Percival Perry had made 
arrangements to purchase property for his own and some locals‟ benefit, could explain 
why the deal purchasing the racecourse was concluded so quickly and easily and why 
cooperation was so readily forthcoming. The guarantee of 2,000 new jobs, many of which 
would be filled by workers attracted from outside the city, would give a tremendous 
boost to businesses in the city, but also offered ample opportunities for property 
speculators to benefit from increased property prices and rents.   
Perry‟s original contract with Ford stipulated that he devote his time and effort to 
the interests of the Ford company „to the exclusion of all other business‟, yet, despite this, 
he was often involved in schemes outside his job.
68
 Whether he was purchasing sites in 
Southampton, or involving his cronies in deals, or using his contacts in the government, 
he was constantly wheeling and dealing. For example, William Knudsen‟s report in 1919 
stated that „an enormous amount of business radiates directly from the office on 
Shaftsbury Avenue where business, politics, personal matters and policies are being 
worked at with feverish haste and in a hopeless tangle‟.69 This type of activity would 
seem to have been part of business as it operated in Britain at the time. The Americans, 
on the other hand, did not like employees to have outside interests or businesses. For 
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instance, when Grace became involved in another scheme to purchase property in 1921, 
Sorensen was adamant that he sever his connection with the scheme (see below). Perry‟s 
external business activities may have contributed to his disagreement with the company 
in 1919 and may account for later comments by local politicians.
70
   
On the other hand, it might have been just an excuse concocted by Sorensen, to 
get over the lease issue. Perry was no longer around to defend himself from these 
allegations and would have made a convenient scapegoat for anything that happened in 
the early years. Sorensen wanted Perry‟s part in setting up these agreements exposed, 
writing to Grace, he stated that „we want this point of view made public and the case put 
squarely before everyone‟.71 Either way, it‟s a measure of Sorensen‟s ruthlessness that he 
was prepared to publicly damage Perry‟s character over the housing issue, despite 
keeping in contact and apparently remaining friendly with him during his nine year 
absence from the company. 
In the early 1920s Edward Grace became involved in another speculative property 
venture which had the potential for scandal and displeased the Dearborn management. In 
America, during the later years of what Nevins and Hill described as „the brief golden 
age‟ of the company when the Ford company went through „an era of social conscience‟ 
and was imbued with a progressive social spirit, Ford had built 250 houses for its 
employees.
72
 Originally conceived as a method of mass producing cheap concrete houses 
for the workers, the Dearborn Realty and Construction Company (DRCC) was 
incorporated to build houses on land purchased by Ford in January 1919 and was headed 
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and promoted by Ford‟s secretary, Ernest G. Liebold.73 When Ford‟s tractor operations 
were transferred from Dearborn to the Rouge plant five miles away in late 1921 the 
houses became difficult to sell, and with the 1921 general recession the project was 
abandoned.
74
 Across the Atlantic in Cork, in early 1920, a group of promoters became 
aware of a site for sale and set up the Cork Building Sites and Construction Company 
Limited (CBSCC) to take advantage of the situation.
75
 The aim seems to have been to 
provide houses for Ford workers based on the Dearborn model, but while the Ford 
operation was eighty per cent owned by Clara and Edsel Ford the Cork project was in the 
hands of outside promoters.
76
 It is not clear who all of the promoters were, but the group 
included Grace, H. A. Pelly, A. J. Magennis and J. C. Dowdall.
77
 
Before the new company had been registered, Henry Ford & Son‟s solicitor, J. J. 
Horgan, apparently acting for Grace privately, wrote to Pelly, manager of the Hibernian 
Bank which looked after Ford‟s financial affairs in Cork, stating that the deal was to be 
done in Grace‟s name: „we are preparing an assignment in the name of Mr Grace and 
adding a declaration of trust on behalf of the new company‟.78 The property concerned 
was owned by a Mr John Reese and a week later Grace wrote: „I have purchased Mr 
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Reese‟s house, premises and lands at Ballincurrig, County Cork as trustee and on behalf 
of Cork Building Sites and Construction Company which is being formed by the 
promoters‟.79 The address given on this letter is Clanloughlin, Grace‟s home address, 
suggesting that he was acting in a private capacity.  
When Barry Galvin, the solicitor representing Reese, wrote to Horgan agreeing 
this arrangement, he suggested an additional building option. He said that „we should be 
glad if your clients would consider seriously the question of acquiring the Beaumont 
estate in connection with their scheme. It is the ideal housing site in the vicinity of the 
city and must be considerably more healthy locality than the lands of Ballincurrig‟.80 The 
following day, Horgan informed Pelly that Galvin was sending details of the title and 
price being sought for the Beaumont property.
81
 The CBSCC took up the idea of 
purchasing the property in due course and when Grace wrote to Sorensen in August 1920 
he said:  
In connection with the housing scheme which I instigated here some months ago, we are 
now going to erect 50 small cottages of wood construction to meet the terrible demand 
for this type of dwelling. It is practically impossible to get a small five or six room house 
that it would be possible to rent for £5 or £6 a month. After these are completed we will 
see what can be done to go further in building either more of the small type or whatever 
is required.
82
  
The problem of poor housing in the city of Cork was one which had been 
recognised by Perry in his original survey in 1913. He identified the „necessity…of 
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careful organisation and assumption of responsibilities in respect of housing and 
improving conditions of living of employees‟.83 Later, Sorensen also appears to have 
been conscious of the housing need when on a visit to Cork in December 1919, soon after 
factory start-up, he cabled Henry Ford to say that „housing is one of the big problems 
here and am endeavouring to stimulate interest locally. [It is] possible that we will have 
to give them a lift on this…‟.84  Sorensen cabled H. H. Fisher the following day to „send 
Grace [a] good group of Dearborn realty pictures‟.85 Construction had begun on the 
American houses in May 1919 and presumably the photographs were to show Grace the 
new houses being built in Dearborn, perhaps as an example of what needed to be done in 
Cork.
86
   
Within months, as we have seen, Grace had acted on Sorensen‟s suggestion and 
through the CBSCC was in the process of acquiring a number of suitable sites to build 
houses. The start of Grace‟s involvement with these purchases, in March 1920, coincides 
with Dearborn‟s era of enthusiasm for such social projects. Grace clearly states that he 
believed he was carrying out Sorensen‟s wishes in the best interests of the employees. 
There is also evidence of an attempt to justify and communicate the project to 
headquarters. In the Benson Ford Research Center (BFRC) an album of photographs 
exists which highlights the housing issue in Cork, comparing the Dearborn model houses 
with the decrepit slum cottages in Cork. The caption under one photograph of a typical 
slum dwelling reads: „The house which consists of the doorway and window on the left is 
occupied by one of our employees who is earning a minimum of £4.11s.0d. per week. 
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This man has a wife, 2 children and a mother to share the house‟.87 The album is undated, 
but based on dates quoted in its introduction, was produced in early or mid-1920. While 
its specific purpose is unstated, the introduction to the photographs is entitled „Housing in 
Cork‟ and opens: „For years past the housing problem in Cork has been attracting the 
attention of social reformers; but in spite of the cumulative effect of statistics, 
propaganda, lecture and appeal, the problem remains‟.88  The album contains extracts 
from „a Report of Medical Officer of Health‟ and from „a Report of Local Government 
Board‟s Architect‟, the latter dated October 2, 1919. It states that:  
4,000 houses are required at once. The photos in this album are a representative 
collection of the commonest type of dwelling in the city. Examples of extreme 
dilapidation have not been included. The case for housing in Cork needs no special 
pleading. The average of squalor speaks for itself.
89
  
Contrasted with the slum cottages of Cork, are three photographs of the housing built by 
the DRCC in Dearborn with Ford Model T‟s parked outside, while the caption reads, 
„This picture and the two following need no comment.‟  The final two photographs are 
captioned „Ideal housing sites,‟ representing two sites overlooking the city of Cork with 
the commentary that: „The slums of Cork, and Cork is mostly slums, are a blot on the 
face of a beautiful county. This picture and the following one show two beautiful sites 
which could be used for housing the working people‟. This album links the issue of Cork 
housing to the project under way in Dearborn and clearly suggests the need for a similar 
scheme to alleviate the housing problems of the city as well as for Ford employees.
90
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In November 1920 the CBSCC, registered at 55 South Mall, announced in the 
Fordson Worker that they had:  
purchased the Beaumont estate and hope to have thirty to forty houses erected there and 
ready for occupation before the end of the present year. Purchase of those houses, with 
the conditions under which applicants may purchase them outright or become tenants of 
the above company will be duly posted in the works.
91
  
While Edward Grace was confidently promising to provide housing for Cork, in America,   
by December 1920 the Ford Motor Company was in severe financial difficulty and 
arguably, on the brink of bankruptcy.
92
 The ensuing corrective action included plant 
closures, cut-backs and lay-offs as well as the abandonment of the 1914 social welfare 
programme and the departure of the head of the sociology department. Sorensen was now 
in the ascendancy and since his main aim was production, he was no longer sympathetic 
to welfare programmes in America or in Cork.
93
 Sometime in June he questioned E. L. 
Clarke about „Pelly‟s housing scheme‟. Clarke replied cautiously:  
…I will write you soon with reference to Pelly‟s housing scheme, but there are a few 
enquiries I wish to make first, so that I can put the whole matter clearly as I see and find 
it. But without dealing with the scheme as it stands today, I am sure that if those men who 
are in it tackled the job in an energetic fashion, it would be a complete success. They 
have suitable property, and plenty of tenants eagerly awaiting transfer from the slums.
94
 
Sorensen followed up with a letter to Grace: „Now against my advice you got mixed up in 
some real estate matter, which has caused a lot of embarrassment over here and will, no 
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doubt, continue to be a source of embarrassment to you‟.95 Later, Grace pleaded with 
Sorensen to reconsider taking over the Ballincurrig property, Grace said: „The property is 
the most valuable in the vicinity of Cork for building purposes and can be subdivided into 
lots and sold at a considerable profit‟. It also offered advantages to Henry Ford & Son as 
the land had a limestone quarry which could be used as a source of revenue for the 
company „because of the large quantities of limestone used both in our building 
extensions, making of roads, and in our cupola as flux‟. Grace continued that the 
company was „purchasing about eight tons of moulding sand per day from a pit in the 
property‟.96 Despite the excellent prospects outlined by Grace, Sorensen refused to permit 
Ford to be involved. Grace eventually conceded that the scheme might have been a 
mistake, but said that it:  
was worked out from what was thought to be your wish and with the desire for the 
furtherance of the best interests of our employees; and if we had peace here instead of all 
the trouble since its organization the scheme would have been a successful one, and now 
we have a prospect of it undoubtedly will be successful. If you could see your way to 
allow us to take over the responsibility of the property without being hampered by 
outside directors, who do not understand modern building schemes, I am sure it will be a 
success.
97
  
Meanwhile Pelly had travelled to Detroit to explain his case to Sorensen, but had 
apparently been rejected by him.
98
 Now, despite being fully aware of Sorensen‟s 
viewpoint, Grace was appealing to Sorensen again to take over the project. He was also 
pleading a humanitarian case for Pelly, who was at risk of losing his position in the 
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Hibernian bank, with no prospect of getting into another bank.
99
 But Sorensen was not 
interested. Later Pelly threatened legal proceedings against Ford arising out of their 
failure to go ahead with the project. He subsequently changed his position and claimed 
that his threat was not against Henry Ford & Son, but against Grace.
100
 Horgan, acting for 
Ford, met the directors of the Hibernian Bank who agreed that „the whole matter arose 
through Pelly taking upon himself to do things without any authority from Henry Ford & 
Son Ltd., and stated that they desired to let the whole may matter drop‟. They hoped that 
Ford would do the same. Horgan assured them that Ford „had no desire for anything but 
friendly relations with the Bank, but that owing to Pelly‟s conduct and language…had to 
get the matter cleared up‟.101 Writing to Sorensen, Horgan stated that he was certain that 
the bank did „not intend to proceed against Mr Grace or the other guarantors either, as 
having regard to Pelly‟s misrepresentation, they would have no case‟.102 On receipt of 
Horgan‟s letter and just as the problem with the corporation lease was emerging, 
Sorensen wrote to Grace demanding „an advise‟ from him „that the affair has been 
entirely cleaned up, and that you are not connected any further with this building 
corporation‟.103 Grace promptly replied that he had „severed any connection‟ he had with 
them.
104
 
From the evidence it appears that Grace interpreted Dearborn‟s short-lived 
enthusiasm for providing housing as a direction to do something similar. He presented his 
case graphically, using the aforementioned photographs, he investigated available sites 
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and set about purchasing suitable land. But Dearborn‟s enthusiasm had waned and 
financial constraints undermined such liberal schemes before they reached a conclusion. 
Never one for unnecessary social work, Sorensen no doubt disowned the project, leaving 
Grace, and particularly Pelly, in the lurch. When Pelly discovered his position and 
threatened Ford with proceedings, Horgan was delegated to get the bank to drop the 
issue. Pelly was left as the scapegoat for presumably making the purchase at Grace‟s 
behest but without any authority from Henry Ford & Son. Grace was also off the hook as 
the bank were not about to proceed against him or the other guarantors. However, the 
whole incident had the potential for embarrassment to Henry Ford & Son, with the issue 
of the employment numbers being discussed in the media and Sorensen inferring land 
speculation by Perry, he did not need allegations of speculation against Grace or Henry 
Ford & Son.  
In the event the problem of slum housing fell back on local authorities to deal 
with. The Cork Town Planning Association, founded in 1922, carried out an exhaustive 
civic survey to identify the magnitude of the problem. Published in 1926, the survey 
reported that poor housing was a major consideration with 16,000, or one fifth of the 
city‟s population, living in unhealthy conditions. The need for a long-term housing 
programme was recognised by the survey and it recommended that the slum areas be 
cleared and residents re-housed on the outskirts of the city.
105
 Despite a shortage of 
money the problem of slum houses was made a priority and the corporation carried out a 
number of schemes during the late 1920s and 1930s.
106
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By the summer of 1919 much of the work on the wharves, foundry and machine 
shop had been completed, but the factory as a whole was far from ready. Despite the 
building limitations the first tractor, assembled from Dearborn parts, came off the line on 
3 July and by the end of the year 303 Fordson Model F tractors had been produced. 
Throughout 1920, production continued to increase, manufacturing as well as assembly 
commenced, and hopes for the future ran high as Dearborn invested the funds necessary 
to build a business which could create a farming revolution in Europe.
107
 Within a short 
period almost 1,800 workers were employed and they produced a total of 3,626 tractors 
in 1920. During that year a number of changes took place at Ford. On 21 April, the Ford 
family transferred the shares in Henry Ford & Son of Cork to the Ford Motor Company 
in Detroit, and in the hope of improving sales, responsibility for selling Fordson tractors 
was shifted from the specialised tractor dealers to the ordinary car and truck dealers.
108
 
When works manager, Peter MacGregor, wrote to Sorensen announcing the 
assembly of the first tractor at Cork in July 1919, he had parts on hand for a further 
twelve tractors and he ordered „everything for two hundred‟.109 The jubilant report of this 
first milestone was accompanied by a list of quality problems affecting the tractor parts 
sent from Detroit, the long sea journey having taken its toll. He said: 
On account of so much handling, parts are in a very bad condition, such as fuel tanks 
dented, transmission housings broken, pistons very rusty, magnets will all have to be re-
charged, about 75 per cent of coil units are no good and most of assemblies will have to 
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be re-built.
110
   
The problems with parts caused by excessive handling and exposure to sea air would 
plague Cork as long as supplies were sourced in Dearborn. More generally, MacGregor 
spoke positively of the general workforce though, not unexpectedly he complained that 
„mechanics are hard to find‟. Having so far failed to find a home for himself, he described 
housing in the city as „deplorable‟.111 
With building work still in progress, the conditions under which they were 
working were both difficult and discouraging. MacGregor describes „rain coming through 
building everywhere, yards covered with thousand of tons of concrete, reinforcing iron, 
and other building material (over supply) and no tools to work with. It takes from two to 
three weeks to get anything from England‟.  However, he was expecting to turn out „two 
or more tractors a day from now on‟. Commenting again on the productivity of the 
workers he said they „take a roundabout way of doing things, but we are introducing such 
things as using a 3” paint brush, where one (inch) had been the custom‟.112  
* * * 
Working conditions in the „state of the art‟ factory were typical „Fordist‟. The 
repetitive, monotonous work was to some extent compensated by high pay rates. The 
assembly line might have been a wonder to outsiders who saw it in operation, but for 
workers who had to keep up with its pace, it could be soul destroying. In the past, teams 
working together might be paid at piece rates and be free to determine their own pace; 
now the conveyor belt dictated the pace and this was controlled by Ford. Moreover, in the 
older regime, work had a degree of interest and variability. The key to achieving 
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maximum output with conveyor belt systems is that the conveyor dictates the pace, 
thereby putting continuous pressure on the workers to perform the routine, simple tasks 
within the time allotted. Workers were also kept under close supervision to ensure no 
stoppages. Henry Ford was being less than honest when he claimed in 1926, „We have 
never had a complaint about the repetitive work. The only complaints we ever had were 
during the first few months, when the men found it hard to do without smoking while at 
work‟.113   
Due to the nature of the product and its smaller volume, the factory in Cork 
produced at a lower speed and with less rigid discipline than the high-speed systems in 
Dearborn. Yet the patterns of monotony on the assembly line were similar. In other 
departments, such as the foundry, conditions were reminiscent of the „satanic mills‟. 
Despite the Marina facility being the most modern of its type, deafening noise, intense 
heat and heavy work were the norm, a horrific environment described in a local ballad as 
„only one step from hell‟.114  Layoffs were common, most notably at times of model 
change-over when the majority of staff would be let go. Occasionally work would be 
provided in Manchester or later Dagenham giving rise to the term „Dagenham Yanks‟. 
Trade union representation was not permitted until after World War II, but from the 
earliest days local factory negotiations and problems were dealt with through an elected 
worker‟s representative committee.115 
Henry Ford later painted an almost idyllic picture of the effects of his industry on 
the workers of Cork. „We have no labour turnover whatever, and always have a long 
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waiting list.‟ He went on: „the men no longer spend their evenings hanging around grog 
shops in old clothes and kerchiefs…you will see them in the evening strolling out to see 
the pictures with their wives, and they are wearing collars and swinging canes‟.116 While 
undoubtedly the relative stability that regular, well-paying jobs brings to a community 
would be obvious in Cork, Ford‟s sentimental view ignores the mental and physical strain 
endured by employees working in his plant.   
As with many of his other ideas, Ford had a progressive attitude to the running of 
factories and he attempted to improve the working conditions and environment as far as 
was possible. Ford in Ireland operated much as they did in United States where Kahn‟s 
reinforced concrete buildings, while cheaper and more flexible than traditional buildings, 
created wide open factory areas with bright airy spaces, lit from vast expanses of window 
panes, which according to Lacey „turned every other factory into a prison workshop by 
comparison‟.117 Ford was obsessive about cleanliness and order and his factories reflected 
his views. In Cork the local view was: „we had Dunlop and Ford where you could eat 
your dinner off the floor‟.118 There was also a strong emphasis on safety. The company 
safety programme was based on a few common sense principles which were implemented 
conscientiously. First, keep the workplace place clean; second, ensure that the worker is 
comfortable and third, engineer each machine to be as accident-proof as possible.
119
 Ford 
employed the latest equipment and techniques to ensure that factory and safety conditions 
were to the highest contemporary standard. Safety equipment was installed and 
maintained, while dedicated crews worked to keep the factory clean and fresh by a rigid 
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schedule of cleaning and painting. As a reminder to all management and staff, his 
department communication notepaper had the statement „Make Ford plants safe‟ 
prominently displayed.
120
  
As the Marina factory was being commissioned, MacGregor, in his report on 
building and manufacturing details, stated that a „first aid man and medicine cabinet [had 
been] installed for minor injuries, and an understanding with the South Infirmary for 
more serious cases, had been arranged‟.121 Further evidence of the company‟s attitude to 
safety is apparent from Grace‟s requisition for a modern sand blast outfit when he 
comments: „I know that formerly the attitude of the Company towards sand blasting was 
that it was unhealthy to the man. However, since the new type of sand blasts has been 
brought out I understand that your attitude has changed‟.122 Later, a safety department 
was in operation and safety education was used, together with factory posters 
highlighting potential accident risks and promoting safe working practices.
123
   
Ford‟s revolutionary attitude of paying good wages and providing a good, clean 
and safe working environment all contributed to the efficient running of the plant. Ford 
was concerned about the welfare of the men and safety was treated seriously. But he was 
also concerned with production, he said „production without safety is inefficient‟.124 
Accidents interrupted the running of the conveyor. Just as each work station was 
designed to minimise the physical efforts of the employee, thus maximising the output, 
for the same reason, they were designed to minimise the risk of accidents. 
                                                 
120 For example, Memo to Mr Longley of Legal, 2 Apr. 1926 (BFRC, Acc.329 , Box 1). Prominent also was the statement „Verbal 
orders don‟t go.‟  
121 P. MacGregor  to C. E. Sorensen, 20 Aug. 1919 (BFRC, Acc.
 
38, Box 46).    
122 Edward Grace to C. E. Sorensen, 13 Sept. 1920 (BFRC, Acc. 38, Box 46 ). 
123 R. Howcraft to Russell, Safety posters, 13 Sept. 1929 (BFRC, Acc. 38, Box 1). 
124
 
National safety news, vol. 2 , No. 11, 13 Sept. 1920 (BFRC, Acc.572, Box 27)
 
p.1.
 
 130 
In contrast to the physical environment, the atmosphere amongst the employees 
was tense and pressured. They were expected to concentrate on keeping the conveyor 
going smoothly, without interruption. Anything which distracted the employee from his 
task was frowned upon. Working in Ford in Detroit was a serious business with no 
concessions given to frivolity.  Henry Ford kept top management pressured and off 
balance and the pressure fed all the way down to the workers.
125
 In Cork, demand to 
produce was also strong. Sorensen exerted continuous pressure on Grace and later on 
Clarke. The stress felt by the workers was lessened by the smaller scale, less stringent 
discipline imposed and the naturally gregarious nature of the employees.  
To the thousands of workmen seeking jobs in the new plant rising on the Lee, 
these considerations would no doubt be secondary to the good wages and conditions on 
offer. With jobs scarce and well-paid jobs impossible to find, Ford offered an attractive 
proposition to workers in Cork city and hinterland. Later when the company settled into 
the motor car assembly business, leaving behind the fluctuations of the tractor era, and 
workers began to enjoy some degree of security, their dissatisfactions would find 
expression in collective bargaining and unionisation.   
Just as Ford management in Detroit tried to educate the workers to be prudent 
with their wages, so Edward Grace introduced parallel schemes to assist Marina 
employees to develop good financial habits. Amongst a number of Ford schemes, Grace 
introduced a life assurance scheme for employees. The scheme meant that „a man can 
insure his life for two hundred pounds for £2.4s.0d. per annum‟. Grace had discovered 
that the workers had not been in the habit of providing for themselves with life insurance. 
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About seventy percent had no insurance at all while most were insured for only small 
amounts with as few as 11 employees carrying £200 or more.
126
  
The company also introduced a saving scheme. Based on the Dearborn 
Investment Certificates scheme it was universal in Ford plants and was so popular with 
workers that about eighty percent of employees participated, enjoying a high rate of 
interest similar to that paid by Ford‟s in Detroit. Investment was limited to one third of an 
employee‟s wages and the savings represented a buffer against the all too frequent 
layoffs.
127
  After about a year in operation, Clarke reported „that since the payment of the 
interest on the Investment Certificates the scheme has appealed very much more to the 
men.…The amount standing towards the purchase of certificates amounts to 
£2,799.10s.10d. making a grand total of £7,599.10s.10d. Of this amount, £7,500 stands in 
a deposit account with the Hibernian Bank, earning a maximum interest but, of course, 
available for use in the course of our business, when required’.128 Thus, the saving 
scheme benefited the employees, but also served the needs of Henry Ford & Son.  
Grace was keen to help in practical ways as the company had done for workers in 
United States. Firstly, in August 1920 he opened a small lunch room where food was sold 
at cost, two shillings for a good meal, which he hoped later to reduce to 1s.6d. Alongside 
the restaurant, Grace started a small scale cooperative store where shoes and socks were 
sold in an effort to eliminate foot injuries caused by sharp objects piercing of the men‟s 
poor quality shoes. Bulk purchase from the local boot factory permitted the company to 
sell shoes at 10s. to 12s. per pair, cheaper than the retail price, with the result that in the 
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first week they sold about 60 pairs of shoes. Grace‟s ambition was to assist the workers 
by starting „a real store like that at the Ford Motor Company‟ as well as „a nice clean 
meat market and grocery store with, perhaps, a general counter. The cost of food is 
extremely high here as well as all other commodities‟. He believed that the retail dealers 
in Cork were taking advantage of those who worked for Ford and were charging them 
inflated prices.
129
 In Dearborn during 1919 Ford had seen his workers‟ salaries eroded by 
post-war inflation and had responded by selling fish and later meat to his employees. 
Soon the range of goods had been expanded providing a range of high quality 
merchandise at cost price.
130
 As well as advertised brand products, Ford sold many 
products under their own „Ford‟ name.131 Operating on very modern, almost supermarket 
lines, by 1926, Liebold claimed that the Ford store was the largest of its kind in the 
United States, with total sales of twelve million dollars annually and a profit of just over 
three per cent.  Originally the stores were open only to Ford employees who had to show 
their company badges, but by 1926, they were frequented by the general public.
132
  
However, trouble was brewing as retailing organisations began to object, accusing Ford 
of selling below cost. The National Association of Retail Meat Dealers wrote to Henry 
Ford claiming that he was selling „merchandise to the public at ridiculously low 
prices…your prices to the general public are unfair to yourself as well as to the Detroit 
meat dealers in general‟.133 Liebold robustly defended Ford‟s position, suggesting that 
they had applied their modern manufacturing methods to the retail business, turning over 
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large sales volumes and thus reducing the price to the customers.
134
 In effect, the Ford 
stores, by applying the mass production manufacturing systems, were creating the 
supermarkets systems which would evolve later. Predictably, local merchants fought back 
and on 4 April 1927 a thousand members of the Detroit Retail Merchants Association 
gathered to demonstrate their objection to Ford‟s practices, forcing the company to 
restrict access to their stores to Ford employees, on the pretence that the business had 
grown too big for the Ford company to handle.
135
 
In Cork, the store was expanded and later in 1922 when Ford was in conflict with 
Cork Corporation one of the workers wrote anonymously to the Cork Examiner, praising 
the employee benefits which the company provided:   
The workers in the Ford firm are provided with a cooperative store for the sale of food, 
clothing, etc. Everything is sold at cost price, thereby eliminating middlemen‟s profit. 
Every worker can become a partner in the firm by investing his spare cash, and the 
interest allowed on these investments so far has been excelled only by Munster and 
Leinster bank.
136
  
These perquisites were part of the standardised systems which Ford operated in all its 
plants, domestic and foreign. The same generalised letters of instructions were sent to 
each of them ensuring standardised accounting, sales, and production and purchasing 
procedures. „Each company had binders into which these missives went, their rules and 
policies to be followed implicitly. These came to be known among employees abroad as 
the “Ford Bible”.‟137 While the schemes introduced by Fords were beneficial to the 
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employees, training them to act prudently and providing for times of difficulty, these 
schemes never went as far as the interference practised by the sociological department in 
Detroit.  
*   *   * 
By late August 1919 MacGregor had the capacity to assemble 10 tractors a day. 
Each department was still operating with great difficulty, several were partly fitted out 
with machinery erected and benches in place, but still awaiting conveyors, while building 
work was still in progress. Training of manpower continued, mainly in the assembly area. 
MacGregor reported his efforts at „organising and breaking-in men on all sub-assemblies, 
including radiators, gear shifters, clutches, front axles and dashes. Parts are poorly 
machined and need a lot of reworking before assembly can be done‟.138 As the 
management and workers struggled to deal with the problems, some newspapers 
expressed doubts about the viability of the operation. The Detroit News reported from the 
Cork factory on the state of play, quoting the British view of Irish workers that „the Celt 
is racially and temperamentally unsuited‟ for factory work. Naturally, the Irish view was 
the direct opposite saying that „Ireland is as well-suited to manufacturing as England‟.139 
An Egyptian writer who visited the works in November, described: 
a fine modern factory…where agricultural motor tractors were made on a large scale. The 
foundry and machine shops were not in full swing as the as the place was still unfinished 
but everything was being arranged in the usual American businesslike manner.  Almost 
all the workers and mechanics were Irish while the few heads were from across the 
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Atlantic.
140
  
With production operations at the Marina plant steadily improving, the man responsible 
for much of the original organisation of the company departed the scene. On 30 
September 1919, Percival Perry resigned his post as managing director of Henry Ford & 
Son and on 29 November 1919 Edward Grace was appointed to replace him.
141 
The 
circumstances of Perry‟s resignation from the Ford Motor Company will be dealt with in 
chapter eight
 
. 
Following Perry‟s departure, Ford of England enjoyed a very successful year in 
1920, after which it settled into a period of steady decline under a succession of imported 
American managers.
142
 Percival Perry was rehired by Henry Ford in 1928, but in the 
interval, the plants at Cork and Manchester were managed separately, the two continually 
pulling against each other with little support from the British management for either the 
Cork plant or the tractor business. The absence of Perry was a significant loss to Ford‟s 
business in Europe, but especially to Ford of Cork. His business skill, drive and contacts 
and particularly his relationship with dealers, could have generated sales, creating more 
demand for Cork‟s tractors. In addition, his overarching control of the business in Britain 
and Ireland might have yielded better results by coordinating sales and improving 
relationships between the two plants, while ensuring that rational inter-company pricing 
structures applied. His personal relationship and contacts with both Henry Ford and 
Charlie Sorensen were assets which he could have used to the advantage of both 
businesses.  In a key period when local and international problems were legion, the single 
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strong man who might have brought success was gone. 
Perry‟s departure triggered a number of changes at board level. Sorensen, Grace, 
Clarke, Warren Anderson as well as Henry Ford‟s secretary Ernest Liebold were 
appointed directors. Grace was appointed to succeed Perry as managing director of Henry 
Fords & Son on 29 November 1919 and together with Clarke and Anderson, formed a 
committee for the general management of Ford‟s of Cork, while Sorensen, Liebhold and 
Edsel Ford were to deal with matters of „organisation and policy and to control as they 
see fit the before mentioned committee of Messrs Anderson, Grace and Clark‟.143 Thus, 
in Perry‟s place, a triumvirate was appointed which, almost from the beginning, 
demonstrated divergent attitudes to the British and Irish businesses. 
Warren G. Anderson, appointed to take charge of Ford in Britain, had previously 
been head of Ford‟s assembly branch in Saint-Louis, Missouri. Anderson‟s attitude, 
according to Tolliday, was that „anything Perry had done was wrong and to undo 
anything that Perry had done was right‟.144 He implemented Ford‟s American standards 
to the point of absurdity. For example, „the right-hand drive version of the Model T that 
Perry had introduced before the war was withdrawn and Manchester had to produce only 
left-hand drive cars (which then had to be converted by their buyers)‟.145 His insistence 
on exclusive dealerships, prohibiting dealers from selling other makes of cars, resulted in 
the defection of some 800 dealers. Discussing these issues much later, Perry said: „It is no 
use burying one‟s head in the sand and going ahead applying policies over here, no 
matter how successful they may have been in America, because conditions here are 
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different‟.146 
Grace, as managing director of Henry Ford & Son‟s Cork factory appeared 
enthusiastic and hard-working from the start. No doubt he was keen to use his overseas 
experience to achieve recognition and enhance his promotion prospects on his return to 
Detroit. Described by the Detroit News in 1919 as „a very youthful appearing product of 
Detroit industry‟ he had previously been employed as a superintendent at the Dearborn 
Fordson tractor factory. He was a Ford man through and through, his training and 
experience had all been gained with the company. Born sometime in the 1880s in the 
neighbourhood of the Ford plant on Lafayette Boulevard, Grace went to Ford directly 
from school. Together with MacGregor, Mulligan and Waldron, all former 
superintendents from the Dearborn plant, he provided the management skills to run the 
new plant.
147
 Other key managers included company secretary, Eugene L. Clarke, and the 
uniquely named Port Stewart who was responsible for purchasing.  
Clarke, who was born in Easkey, County Sligo in January 1891, emigrated to 
London where he attended evening classes studying commerce and accountancy. 
Homesick, he returned to Ireland and taught in Dublin until Easter 1916 when, while 
visiting his girlfriend in Bantry, he was stranded in Cork city due to the rail disruption 
which followed the 1916 Rising. Offered a temporary teaching job, Clarke stayed in 
Cork. Later he worked as an accountant, but upon hearing rumours of Ford‟s purchase of 
the race course site, he applied for work with the company and was accepted. Working 
out of a room in the Imperial Hotel and reporting to Ford‟s construction manager B. R. 
Brown, in the early months of 1917 Grace set up Henry Ford & Son‟s accounting and 
                                                 
146 Tolliday,„Ford in Britain‟,
 
pp 13/14.  
147 Detroit News, 5 Oct. 1919 (BFRC, Acc.
 
44, Box 14). 
 138 
purchasing system. As building work progressed, Clarke organised the payroll for some 
300 building workers.
148
 On 10 September 1917 he was appointed company secretary.
149
 
Asked, in 1919, for his impressions of his employees Edward Grace replied: „The 
raw labour we get here is highly superior to that which we are now getting in Detroit, and 
there is an unlimited number of men to choose from…. The men have to be taught the 
American way of working, but learn well‟. He claimed, somewhat optimistically, that 
they had to teach the men that they didn‟t need to make the work last, to stretch it out, as 
there would always be more. „We go on the theory that, if we can wear a machine out in 
one month, so much the better. We get our money out of it just that much more quickly 
and make way for a more modern machine which may do the work faster and better‟.150 
His optimistic view of an ever-increasing market demand, calling for constantly 
increasing output was based on his experience in Dearborn, where sales and production 
of the Model T had burgeoned year after year. Even the Fordson tractor, which had 
recently been introduced in the United States, followed the pattern, with 1919 production 
rising by almost seventy per cent over the previous year‟s output, but Europe was a 
smaller, more conservative market and post-war economic circumstances were unlikely 
to support American sales levels.
151
 His optimistic view would be severely tested in the 
years ahead. 
After a token start in 1919, the building work, installation and commissioning of 
plant and equipment and of course training workers continued through 1920. The Cork 
management group were grappling with the range of problems associated with any large 
                                                 
148
 
Interview with E. L. Clarke, I remember Henry Ford, 22 November 1982
 
(RTE Libraries and Archives).
   
149 Minutes of  director‟s meetings, 20 Sept. 1917 (BFRC, Acc. 328, Box 1). 
150
 
Detroit News, 5 Oct. 1919 (BFRC, Acc.
 
44, Box 14). 
151 See Appendix 2. 
 139 
scale industrial start-up, as well as others more specifically related to the untrained 
workforce and the need to provide training for an ever-expanding group. In Dearborn 
expansions, the original workforce acted as a core group who could assist with training 
new workers, but in Cork no such core group existed, so that the degree of responsibility 
and pressure on the management team was greater. Additionally, the post-war situation 
exacerbated the difficulties of obtaining supplies, while Sorensen‟s constant demands for 
action and information added to the problem. Inevitably these pressures lead to strain and 
errors. Outside the factory, in Cork and its surrounding area, the country was in turmoil, a 
guerrilla war was being waged by the IRA. Daily shootings and ambushes meant that life 
was very disturbed and about to deteriorate. On 20 March 1920 Tomás MacCurtain, Lord 
Mayor of Cork was shot in his home. A few days later, the British government introduced 
its response to the raids and ambushes being carried out by the IRA: on 25 March 1920 
the Black and Tans, arrived in Ireland.  
Undoubtedly the Ford management team were too preoccupied with their 
problems to focus for long on the political issues of the country. The building and 
production difficulties were being addressed and gradually eliminated, so that output 
increased and a steady flow of tractors started to emerge from the factory. On the 
administrative side, systems, such as costing systems, stores accounts and accounts 
classifications were being brought into line with those in operation in Dearborn.
152
  Even 
as the factory began commissioning, evidence of sales difficulties were apparent.  In 
March 1920, J. N. Byrne, the commercial manager, wrote to Sorensen signalling the 
problems that lay ahead. He reported that  
owing to the unsettled state of our sales organisation in the British Isles at present, due to 
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the change in our sales policy and to the fact that the ploughing season here is over and 
consequently the demand for tractors has dropped considerably we are faced with the 
situation where our production is in danger of overtaking British demands.
153
 
Sorensen wrote to Grace a week later to tell him that W. A. Ryan, head of sales and 
advertising in Dearborn, was in Europe and that he should consult him about his sales 
problems.
154 
The archives give no details of any subsequent meeting and there is no 
evidence of any beneficial change. Instead, the company made an organisational change 
which adversely affected tractor sales. The plan, mentioned earlier, to transfer sales of 
Fordson tractors to Ford car and truck dealers came about when Edsel Ford proposed, in 
September 1919, that since the Ford Motor Company had a more extensive sales and 
distribution organisation for cars, that this organisation should be utilised to improve the 
distribution of Fordson tractors.
155
  In April 1920, once Detroit had acquired the shares of 
Henry Ford & Son Ltd from the Ford family, Edsel‟s suggestion was implemented. 
Unfortunately, while the motor agents were familiar with cars and trucks they were 
neither familiar with, nor interested in tractors. In Britain, following Anderson‟s changes, 
dealer‟s morale was low and there was little enthusiasm to promote agricultural 
equipment.
156
  Grace sought to have the sales policy reversed to permit him to deal with 
British sales agents directly. He claimed that it would give the tractor business a better 
service, while eliminating the additional Manchester overhead costs.
157
  
The problem with the dealers, together with the deteriorating economic conditions 
in Britain and on the continent of Europe did not bode well for sales. Sluggish sales 
                                                 
153 J. Byrne to C. E. Sorensen, 25 Mar. 1920 (BFRC, Acc. 880, Box 7, Wilkins Papers, re:
 
Acc. 38, Box 42). 
154 C. E. Sorensen to Edward Grace, 2 Apr. 1920 (BFRC, Acc. 880, Box 7, Wilkins Papers, re:
 
Acc. 38, Box 42). 
155 Board of directors‟ minutes, 22 Sept. 1919 (BFRC, Acc. 329, Box 1). 
156 WH, p. 103.  
157 E. L. Clarke to C. E. Sorensen, 2 Apr. 1920 (BFRC, Acc.38, Box
 
42 ). 
 141 
revealed other dilemmas and questions.  One such was the sales price. Grace wished to 
raise the price to get a greater contribution towards his costs, but Ford‟s motor business 
had been built on reducing prices and Henry Ford‟s response to any sales problem was to 
lower prices and thereby increase sales.
158
 Going against Ford policy, Grace sought to 
increase the retail price of his tractors from £280 to £300. His total costs per tractor 
amounted to £224.1s.1d., while the wholesale price to distributors was £225.  This 
arrangement left him with almost no contribution to his overheads.
159
 Sometime 
afterwards and without the assent of head office, Grace notified Manchester and the other 
Ford motor branches of a price increase. This action elicited an abrupt cable from Edsel 
Ford, warning him not to change prices unless advised by Dearborn and to recall the 
revised price notices issued. Edsel pointed out that „Anderson is the authority on [the] 
commercial end of tractor business in Europe‟.160  Sorensen‟s reply was equally blunt: 
„we must not raise the price‟, however, he promised that Bate would bring figures with 
him to try and arrive at a lower price. He warned Grace: „It is imperative that you work 
with him‟.161  
Throughout this period Sorensen directed Irish operations from his office in the 
Rouge. Wilkins described him as: „Like a general at staff headquarters in touch with his 
divisions in the fields, Sorensen despatched queries and directives to and received reports 
from, three men on the ground at Cork‟.162  His anger and impatience is very evident in 
the exchanges with the managers in Ireland, however, he always seemed willing to 
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develop and defend the Cork plant, but had no patience with bureaucracy or delay. His 
desire to be kept informed of all details, including local news stories of the day, was 
almost insatiable. He sent an endless stream of letters to Grace and later to E. L. Clarke. 
In these letters, he directed and demanded, threatened and ranted. He delivered 
contradictory comments and demands; he berated Grace for leaving the plant while at 
other times he demanded that he get out into the field and sell tractors. He interfered and 
made suggestions which when people acted upon, often led to problems which were in 
turn rejected. On his visits, he made unworkable agreements and left Grace to unravel the 
mess.
163
 Sorensen kept Henry and Edsel Ford fully informed of events in the Cork factory 
while implementing Henry‟s wishes to the letter.  It is safe to assume that all significant 
decisions taken by Sorensen in relation to the factory had Henry Ford‟s approval. 
In mid-June 1920, tractors were still being assembled with parts shipped from 
Detroit, but with Cork‟s machine shop and foundry both practically complete, Grace 
wrote on 12 June, promising to cast the first cylinder in the coming week. While Ford had 
many assembly plants at that time, what distinguished Cork from other assembly plants 
was the existence of the foundry and machine shop, key facilities for making castings and 
machining parts to be used in the finished product. The foundry process consisted of 
pouring molten metal from the furnace into pre-formed moulds and then allowing the 
metal to cool and harden. Following cooling, the rough-cast part was extracted from the 
mould and delivered to the machine shop where the part was finely and accurately 
machined, leaving it ready for use in assembly.  
Sorensen waited impatiently for Cork‟s foundry to be commissioned, finally, on 
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26 June 1920, Grace reported: „Made first good cylinder casting today‟.164 Meanwhile, 
assembly operations too were beginning to show promise. On 3 July, exactly one year 
after the first tractor had been assembled, Grace reported his best week so far, with a total 
output of 173 tractors.
165
   In the weeks that followed the output declined again to 80 and 
then to 21. This was a disappointing outcome as Grace had earlier informed Sorensen that 
the planned output for July was 200 tractors per week. During the month of July, 538 
tractors were shipped from Cork.
166 
 
Sales of the Fordson tractors were not reaching expected levels, while costs, 
exacerbated by the start-up problems and delays, were very high, resulting in a high cost 
per unit. In an early and ominous warning, Sorensen warned Grace that „as it stands today 
European distributors are able to buy a tractor in New York and ship the same into their 
territory, cheaper than they can through the Cork transaction‟. He urged Grace and his 
assistant, Clarke to study the problem, but for the moment decided that Europe should 
nevertheless continue to buy tractors from Cork.
167
 Thus, it was clear, even before the 
first full year of manufacturing operations had elapsed, that sales were on the decline and 
as the world-wide depression deepened a new approach was necessary to justify the 
existence of the Cork factory. Additional product lines were required to absorb the cost of 
factory and staff overheads.  
Wilkins and Hill suggest that it was soon after this, in August 1920, that Grace 
recognised that the plant needed additional volume and informed Sorensen: „We are 
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starting to erect machinery on the Model T work‟.168  However, activity on the Model T 
had started earlier. In July 1920, Grace had written to Sorensen reporting that: „the new 
foundry is completed for four bays and we have moved in and are moulding tractor 
cylinder heads and cylinders in two bays. In the third bay we intend to put the Model T 
cylinder and head, and Model T transmission cases in the fourth bay‟.169 In fact, plans to 
manufacture Model T parts appear to go back to the early days of Cork‟s operations. As 
early as December 1919, Grace had written to Sorensen, asking would the Ford Motor 
Company „supply complete equipment for the manufacture of various Model T parts‟.170 
Following a three months delay, Grace informed Anderson: „I have today received a 
cable from Mr Sorensen stating that we are to build the complete Model T at Cork‟.171  
Presumably Cork was to act as a manufacturing support to the Manchester factory and 
while the shortage of sales made the logic of this action very clear by mid-1920, it is also 
obvious from these comments that this approach had been discussed, if not decided upon, 
soon after the Cork start-up. It would appear that the Ford management may have taken 
into account that, just as the demand for motor cars was much smaller in Europe than in 
the United States, so too was the market for tractors likely to be less. Since Manchester 
had no foundry, it made sound business sense to use surplus foundry capacity in Cork to 
supply parts to them. The decision to produce a combination of tractors and Model T 
parts, not solely tractors as was publicised, may have been part of the thinking when the 
original decision was made to change from cars to tractors in late 1916.  Given the 
reaction of the British motor industry to Ford‟s plan to build tractors, it may have been 
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deemed prudent to refrain from announcing the extra facilities, as this would have 
directly affected motor manufacturing producers in Britain.   
During the spring of 1920, building work continued as rapidly as materials could 
be purchased. Machinery for producing Model T parts continued to arrive in Cork. In 
July, Grace wrote to Sorensen with a list of all the Model T tools and equipment already 
received on the steamer Delavan. However, he complained that things were not being 
done in the most efficient manner. „The trouble with the Model T machinery shipments 
was that instead of sending us the moulding equipment first they sent us the bulk of the 
machining equipment.
172
 With parts production for Manchester imminent, Grace raised 
the question of pricing of the finished articles. He suggested that „the proper way to 
charge Manchester would be to make our charges to them as high as possible in order that 
the profits of the company would be more with Henry Ford & Son, Limited than with the 
Ford Motor Company (England) Limited‟.173 His plan was for Cork to take most of the 
profits, because Cork was likely to be much less profitable than Manchester. This was 
hardly a business basis for a pricing structure. The issue of inter-company pricing was to 
recur and to present many difficulties in subsequent years.  
By late August, the new machine shop was almost completed and machinery was 
being set up for the production of Model T parts.  The foundry was pouring more than ten 
tons of metal a day, which was sufficient for the small tractor output, but the quality of 
the castings was still problematic.
174
  To assist William Jackson, who was in charge of 
the foundry, John Woestenburg, an experienced foundry-man, was sent from Highland 
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Park.
175
 The additional expertise improved things somewhat, but the quality of the 
castings coming from the foundry continued to cause problems and despite the American 
foundry-man‟s efforts, costs remained high due to inexperienced labour and lack of 
handling  equipment.
176
  
*  *  * 
Events in Ireland were not happening in a vacuum. In the months immediately 
after World War I, American motor manufacturers discontinued war production and 
retooled to supply the huge demand for new cars. In 1919, Ford sold more than ever 
before, but the sales boom halted abruptly in the summer of 1920.
177
 The sudden 
downturn in sales caught Ford, the largest motor manufacturer with a market share 
exceeding forty per cent, totally unprepared.
178
 Henry Ford had embarked on a number of 
ambitious and expensive projects which had drained money from the company. He was 
determined to have total control of his company and in order to do so, during 1919, he 
had bought out all of the stockholders at a cost of over $105 million.
179
  The combined 
costs of buying out the shareholders, together with the investment in the huge Rouge 
complex and the purchase of mines to supply coal and iron to the huge new blast 
furnaces, left Ford with a $60 million debt to service. As sales diminished in the summer 
of 1920, Ford‟s cash flow declined dangerously.180  Ford‟s usual solution to such 
problems was to cut prices, this time was no exception. Despite introducing the largest 
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cuts the industry had ever seen, sales only improved marginally and then slumped in line 
with the rest of the industry. With Ford losing twenty dollars on each car sold, drastic 
action was required. At year end the Highland Park plant was closed, staff cuts took place 
at all levels, services were cut and inventory reduced.  Inventory on hand was valued at 
$88 million and a scheme was developed to sell it off, thus releasing cash to solve the 
company‟s debt. The plan necessitated that spare parts be shipped as compulsory 
additions with all new cars and since the cars and parts had to be paid for cash on 
delivery, dealers were left with a choice of losing their valuable franchise or borrowing 
from their banks. The plan worked, Ford dealers were effectively forced to borrow to 
support the Ford Motor Company so that by early 1921 Henry Ford had cleared his 
debts.
181
  
While in the United States the crisis had passed by early 1921, nonetheless for 
three or four months, the situation was precarious.  The problem did not go unnoticed in 
the Irish press. The Cork Examiner carried a report on the 25 January 1921 that the 
„company was trying to raise a loan of between £15,000,000 and £17,000,000 to meet the 
maturing obligations of the Ford Motor Company.‟ It also identified the problem that 
„one of the main causes of Mr Ford‟s difficulties is the fact that he has over £7,000,000 
worth of unsold cars on his hands‟.182 
Against this background it was perhaps understandable that Sorensen was 
exasperated with his Cork plant.  He demanded regular updates of events from Clarke 
and Grace, but they had little good news for him. At the end of 1920 production was poor 
and sales even worse. In Detroit there must have been considerable disappointment at the 
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fact that the Cork plant was performing so poorly. Needless to say, Grace had plenty of 
excuses to justify the failure: power problems, shortages of material, untrained labour, 
external labour troubles and the effects of the IRA war. While it may have angered and 
frustrated Sorensen, Cork‟s difficulties paled into insignificance compared with the 
problems faced by him at home in Detroit. Yet despite his problems Sorensen found time 
to keep continuous pressure on Grace, who must have felt very isolated as none of his 
proposed solutions were acceptable. His pleadings for the company to revert to dedicated 
tractor outlets or to increase prices were ignored or rejected by Sorensen. The Cork plant 
was far too elaborate and expensive for the market it was now serving. With little tractor 
output and only the manufacture of Model T parts to pay the bills, its future appeared 
bleak. Anderson‟s activities in Britain were of little help to the Cork plant. Both he and 
Bate failed to exploit the opportunities for selling Fordson tractors. Their main concern 
was the assembly and sale of Ford cars, which was a much bigger business, one which 
had, in 1920, yielded an almost fourfold production increase over the previous year, 
despite the recession.
183
 Tractors had become „poor relations‟ for the sales people in 
London as well as for the dealers. On the other hand, increased sales of the Model T in 
Britain meant additional work for Cork which, if they could overcome their difficulties, 
would go some way to paying the overheads and providing work for Irish employees.  
At some point in early 1920, Anderson was given responsibility for the 
continental tractor business, but seems to have shown little interest in it.  Sales to Europe 
were poor, partly due to the fact that there was considerable confusion over the territories 
covered by the various sales offices. Territories were not clearly or coherently delineated, 
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so that in some areas there was no Ford representative to generate sales and to take 
advantage of sales opportunities when they arose. For instance, the Ford Motor Company 
of Copenhagen had been allocated part of Germany. Grace stated: „I presume it will be 
the northern portion, and the southern [will go] to Bordeaux‟. Meanwhile, Grace had an 
enquiry from Czechoslovakia for 700 tractors per annum, but he said that 
Czechoslovakia, had „not been allotted to any of the Ford branches, at least not with their 
knowledge‟.184 In desperation, Grace suggested to Sorensen that „if all this territory were 
settled and agents appointed it would greatly service to get rid of our surplus, as well as 
allowing us to increase our production‟.185  
By autumn 1920, Grace was reporting to Sorensen that he had shipped only 311 
tractors in September of which 261 went to Manchester and 50 to Cadiz. Grace blamed 
the sales organisation for the slow movement of the product. Protesting at their half-
hearted efforts and scarcity of spontaneous orders he claimed that the lack of cooperation 
was undermining his efforts to improve factory efficiency. He appealed to Sorensen that 
„anything you could do from your end to rouse those responsible to the importance of the 
situation will be appreciated‟.186 Despite his pleas, sales in the following month dropped 
further. Of 337 tractors produced at the Marina only 225 were shipped.
187
 A summary of 
continental sales showed that for the previous three months, Bordeaux had taken four 
tractors, Copenhagen had taken nothing and fifty had gone to the Cadiz. Naturally with 
this situation the company was losing money, Grace reported disbursements of about 
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£109,200 against receipts of about £98,000, a deficit of over eleven thousand pounds.
188
 
Around this time the politics of the War of Independence intruded into the 
problems of the tractor world. The Lord Mayor of Cork, Terence MacSwiney, went on 
hunger strike in mid-August following his imprisonment in Brixton Prison. His 74 day 
hunger strike attracted world-wide attention. In Cork, emotions were high and when 
masses were said for him the vast majority of the population of the city attended, closing 
businesses for the duration. The Ford factory was closed on two occasions, but on the 
third, Grace intervened and threatened to sack anyone who left his post. His action 
brought him into the public eye, face to face with the politics of the day. This issue will 
be dealt with at length in chapter four. 
Locally, Grace tried to motivate Anderson, pointing out to him that for the 
profitable operation of the Cork plant, at least 200 tractors needed to be shipped weekly. 
Along with the high overhead and small demand there was now the cost of installing the 
new plant. He complained of losses on parts (about £7,500 in August and £6,000 in 
September).
189
  To add to his woes Dearborn has raised its prices on almost all parts 
supplied to Cork, while the situation was further exacerbated by the decline in the 
exchange rate which had dropped from $4.75 to the pound down to $3.36.
190
 During this 
period with a surplus of production capacity Grace became extremely frustrated with the 
paucity of sales and lashes out at his colleagues. Despite having been warned by Edsel 
Ford not to increase prices and reminded by him that Anderson had sole responsibility for 
commercial decisions, Grace wrote to Sorensen ambitiously seeking to take over control 
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of pricing, demanding that information on cost prices should be sent to him instead of to 
the sales department in London. He argued that they knew nothing about the cost of 
production, „they are concerned only with the selling of the tractor…if they do not put a 
little more effort forward into selling the tractor we certainly cannot operate a plant of 
this size at our selling output‟.  He was scathing and sarcastic about the efforts of 
Anderson‟s salesmen:  
We have over 500 agents in Great Britain, we are only receiving orders for 50 a week 
from this territory, which means, approximately, 5 tractors per agent, which is not a very 
large year‟s work. If the selling end does not get busy we will have to send a few boys 
out from here to do the job.
191
 
Impetuously Grace issued a command directly to the Bordeaux branch, bypassing 
Anderson, demanding they accept a minimum of 50 tractors and stating that: „we must 
insist that you take steps to procure orders without further delay, as, up to the present, we 
have not received a single order from you‟.192 Later, when Anderson became aware of the 
letter, he criticised Grace‟s interference in his area of responsibility, pointing out that 
matters pertaining to the commercial side should be handled through Anderson‟s office 
and not through underlings.
193
 Pleading for understanding of his position, Grace replied:  
You must….understand that we are not getting orders at the present time fast enough to 
warrant or maintain a plant of our size. We are at an exceptionally bad point in our 
existence at the present time because we are preparing for such a large programme in the 
manufacture of Model T. All of the necessary expense in connection with this work has 
had to be borne by the sale of tractors. This department, however, within the next two or 
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three months, will be a productive source, and not an expense.
194
 
Grace backed down on his demands and promised that in all future commercial dealings 
involving the European branches he would work through Anderson‟s office. Reporting to 
Dearborn, Grace enclosed copies of the correspondence with Anderson, but used the 
opportunity to get Sorensen to push the sales people. Grace suggested a „good strong 
letter‟ from Sorensen to the sales department, to buck them up so that they might be 
prodded into disposing of perhaps 200 tractors a week. In closing, he gloomily confessed: 
„Less than this production does not warrant our maintaining a works of our present 
size‟.195 
It is not clear what output would have been required to achieve profitability or 
even to reach break-even point. The plant was large and elaborate and required a high 
production throughput to absorb its considerable overheads. Figures of 20,000 tractors a 
year were mentioned in the early days and later Grace had suggested that production of 
200 tractors a week was necessary to show a profit. With the major difficulties facing the 
Ford Motor Company in Detroit, Sorensen was writing more frequently and more angrily. 
He reminded Grace of the American situation where Highland Park had been closed for 
the previous six weeks due to the drop in sales and was likely to remain so for at least 
another six.
196
 Demanding a full report of Cork‟s financial situation he reminded them 
„that you will soon be yelling for funds, and I assure you that there will be none 
available‟.197 In the same his letter he pointed out that the plant, with total workforce of 
1,429 men, had produced only 82 tractors in a single week, which worked out at „a 
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fearful cost‟ of 788 man hours for each tractor. Put like that, the Cork plant was grossly 
inefficient, but what Sorensen was ignoring was that at that time, the Cork plant had 326 
men working on Model T parts production, 236 on construction work and only 420 men 
on tractor production. Grace needed to get his construction work finished if he was to 
have a building in which to produce parts for Manchester and thus to keep the Cork 
business afloat.
198
  
A few days later Sorensen was again ranting about Cork‟s position. He expressed 
the view that Cork was in a perilous situation, that even if they liquidated all their 
materials and accounts receivable they would not have enough to meet their 
commitments. „How do you propose to carry out your obligations?….The company 
intends that you make prompt payments on all materials that are shipped to you in the 
future‟.199 Yet two days later Sorensen queried why production up to end of October had 
only reached 3,037 against the schedule of 4,339. ‟Give me some idea why you have not 
reached anywhere near the figure of your allotment since July last‟.200  At this stage 
Grace seems to have been playing a very risky game; with income at a trickle and very 
clear statements from Charlie Sorensen that no support would be forthcoming from 
Detroit, yet he somehow had to get the building work finished, to give the plant a future. 
As discussed earlier, the winter of 1920 found the Ford Company in deep financial 
trouble, described by Lacey as „shadowed by the prospect of bankruptcy‟.201 It was at this 
time that many of Ford‟s enlightened innovations were reined in. Savage economies were 
implemented. In the Dearborn office staff numbers were reduced by fifty per cent, 
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equipment sold off and facilities cut back.  Payments to suppliers were delayed from 
sixty to ninety days and parts‟ inventory was reduced by forcing dealers to carry 
additional stock.
202
 Cork‟s lack of profitability and continuing capital expenditures, while 
criticised by Sorensen, did not really seem to disturb the home office unduly until late in 
1920, when the problems in Detroit reached crisis point and cutbacks were being 
implemented. Now Cork was also called on to make a contribution. J. L. Grant, of the 
Treasury office in Dearborn, wrote to Clarke requesting that he immediately cable to a 
New York bank all surplus funds. Clarke replied that „it would not be wise to reduce his 
bank balance at this time, because of heavy commitments, chiefly the building of a power 
house that „is a very heavy drain on our slender resources‟.203 Simultaneously, he wrote 
to Sorensen explaining his reasons for declining to send „excess‟ funds. Quoting the 
ongoing building programme and the difficulties of financing it with the proceeds of such 
small production, he added: „At present our position is that we are tied on to the heels of 
the sales chariot and are waiting for it to break into a gallop‟.204 Despite all the rebuffs 
from Sorensen and the clear instruction from Edsel Ford, Clarke wrote to Sorensen 
reiterating Grace‟s opinion that selling prices should be revised every three months to 
take account of the decline in the exchange rate and the increase in the dealers‟ discount 
from 33.33 per cent to 40 per cent.
205
  
The Cork plant had spent £206,378 on machinery and equipment between 1 
January 1920 and 30 October 1920, this represented an increase of about 500% over the 
value of assets on 1 January 1920. In addition, a total of £120,900 was spent on a new 
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machine shop, foundry extension and wharf extension‟.206 Earlier Grace had been given 
to understand by Sorensen himself that „if there is any need of finance for Cork, we still 
have the half-million dollars on Mr Ford‟s account which we can make use of. As I see it, 
however, you have enough to cover the building operations that are going on at the 
present time‟.207 No doubt Grace had the reassurance that the half-million dollars, 
equivalent to about £100,000, was available for the plant extension, however, he found 
on his return from the United States, that the money had been withdrawn by headquarters 
in Detroit. Thus, as the year end approached, the Cork plant was still in debt to the home 
office with little resources and no reserves. Finally, after many reminders by Sorensen, 
Grace wrote on 4 December 1920 to say that „for the time being they had decided to call 
a halt to all construction work with the exception to the power house‟.208  
The need to reduce costs drew others, apart from Grace, into Sorensen‟s sights 
and with the inventory problems in the United States, Port Stewart found himself in 
Sorensen‟s bad books for committing to hold extra inventory. Stewart had been assigned 
to handle steel supplies and related metallurgical problems. In September 1920, with the 
signs of the recession apparent, Grace raised a question with Sorensen regarding an 
option to purchase steel. Sorensen warned him that the market was dropping and that 
Grace should buy the minimum necessary for his immediate needs.
209
 Henry Ford & Son   
already had a contract with Thomas Firth & Son of Sheffield who were being paid by 
Ford to hold up to 300 tons of steel in stock and on-call for them. Grace claimed that 
Sorensen had verbally agreed the deal early in 1920 and had not commented later when 
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he was made aware of the contractual arrangement. Now, when reminded of the issue he 
wrote angrily to Grace: „This is ridiculous, and I cannot understand why anybody would 
tie up funds in this way. We have never yet made any arrangements with an outside 
concern on any such a basis‟.210 Having written to Grace, Sorensen then attacked Stewart, 
reiterating „that carrying available steel was Firth‟s own affair and that the company had 
no intention of putting up with it‟. Demanding that the cost of all such investments be 
reduced, Sorensen also slated Stewart for committing the cardinal sin of not keeping 
headquarters „thoroughly posted on everything you are doing‟.211 Sorensen, having 
ignored his own involvement in the issue, pushed the problem back to Grace and Stewart. 
In turn, he received a communication from Clarke reassuring him that: „We are tightening 
up and reducing our stocks as much as it is possible for us under present conditions‟. 212 
At the end of November, Grace visited Anderson and Bate, who claimed that 
sales of sixty to seventy five tractors per week was the most he could expect. Of this 
figure, fifty were being scheduled by Manchester, who did not always achieve their 
target, while the remainder were to be sold on the continent and this figure was even less 
reliable. Anderson explained that while he could get orders on the continent, the problem 
was one of getting import licences or, in other cases, getting the money out of the 
country.
213
  With no sales improvement likely, all Grace could do was cut back on 
production and minimise costs, concentrating instead on increasing production of his 
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„only salvation‟, the Model T parts.214 Fortunately this business had promise, as Ford car 
sales in Britain were buoyant with high attendant demand for assembly parts. Putting 
forward his financial projections for 1921, Grace anticipated generating a profit of 
£97,500 on parts. To achieve this figure he needed to have an ongoing production 
demand of 1,000 units per week.
215
 He also needed to be paid a price which covered his 
expenses with a margin of profit to pay for direct overheads and make a contribution to 
overall costs. When Cork had started up in 1919, the factory had operated as an assembly 
plant, producing tractors with parts shipped from Detroit. Later, when the foundry and 
machine shop came into operation, they began to substitute Cork-made parts for the 
American ones, now the additional buildings and equipment added during 1920 meant 
they were about to launch into high volume production of a wide range of parts for the 
Model T motor cars, including cylinder heads, brake shoes, pistons and piston rings, as 
well as a variety of other lesser parts. This change demanded a clear answer on the issue 
of pricing, it required unambiguous and equitable arrangements in relation to inter-
company pricing structures. Even as parts production was under way at the end of 1920, 
this issue had still not been resolved. Clarke tried to establish what pricing structures 
would apply. What was at issue was the split in profit between Manchester and Cork. 
Clarke asked both Sorensen and Grant whether the parts should be priced using the cost 
of material and labour, with a percentage added for overheads and a further percentage 
added for profit, or alternatively should they invoice Manchester at a price somewhere 
between Cork costs and the wholesale price.
216
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When Manchester had supplied radiator cores and other parts to Cork for the 
Fordson tractors, substituting for Dearborn supplies, they had charged them using a 
formula of cost of materials and labour, plus actual overheads, with ten percent profit 
added to the total. More recently, Detroit had changed the system to a formula based on 
cost of material and labour with twenty five percent overhead added and a further ten 
percent on the total. This method was unsatisfactory from Cork‟s perspective as the final 
price was very close to the wholesale price giving the greater part of the profit to the 
producer, in this case Manchester. As the dominant partner in the arrangement 
Manchester demanded a formula that worked to their advantage and improved their 
profitability. Relations between Cork and Manchester were often difficult, particularly 
where costs and quality were concerned, so Clarke‟s view of setting down an equitable 
formula for inter-company transactions was important at this time of difficulty for 
Cork.
217
 
The management in Detroit may have hoped that for the emergence of some type 
of mutually beneficial industrial relationship, but relations between the Fordson plant and 
the Ford Motor Company at Manchester were never good and the absence of clear and 
decisive leadership meant that issues such as pricing caused friction and placed the Cork 
plant at a disadvantage. Cork was also unhappy about the quality of the aforementioned 
radiator cores and despite assurances from W. E. Davis, the problem continued.
218
 On a 
visit to Manchester, Grace „had a very heated argument with Mr Bate‟ which he felt 
would improve matters. However, he hinted that „there seems to be antagonism on the 
part of the management at Manchester regarding the manufacture of parts for us‟. He 
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conceded that this may have been a factor of their overcrowding, but if this was the case 
and he had been made aware of it, he could have provided the materials himself.
219
   
Clarke also complained to Sorensen of the combined effect of excessive charges 
and poor quality, adding that: „785 out of 1,163 cores—about 75 per cent--had to be sent 
back for rectification because of sloppy workmanship‟. Yet even on the defective parts, 
Manchester charged the full overhead and profit margins. While all of the proceeds 
belonged to the Ford organisation, „the money is only moving from one pocket to 
another‟, in effect it enhanced Manchester‟s manufacturing account at Cork‟s expense, 
exacerbating their already poor showing. Clarke was seeking the introduction of a system 
which permitted a fair distribution of the profits, where neither party should „have the 
chance to run riot in heaping up charges of this kind but, instead, be confined to make a 
charge which allows one firm or the other a fixed profit and no more‟.220 
What was lacking was someone with authority over both plants to arbitrate 
between the two. A clear leader in charge of all European operations and particularly the 
British and Irish, could have ensured that a single coherent approach to issues like 
costing, quality and responsibility for European territories, was implemented. Grace, 
supported by Clarke, vainly tried to fill this role but since he had neither the authority nor 
the cooperation of the parties, he was bound to fail.      
Even as Cork‟s emphasis was changing to the production of parts, Grace was still 
trying to get his tractor price increased. Relentlessly he raised the issue again with 
Sorensen, pointing out that Fordson tractors were now much cheaper than others on the 
market, but that selling to very conservative farmers required a different approach to 
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selling cars, that it was necessary to persuade them of the benefits arising from the 
labour-saving tractor. Explaining why he had been unable to make payments to the head 
office in Detroit, he complained that his cash-flow situation was being undermined by 
British and continental Ford branches, who were refusing to pay until the tractors and 
parts had been sold on and paid for.
221
 
Perhaps in reply to Grace‟s continued carping and demands on price, an auditor 
was sent from the Detroit office to look into the Cork method of applying charges and 
costs.  Unhappily for Grace, the auditor came to the conclusion that the price of the 
tractor could be reduced by £25, down to £235. After all their efforts to achieve the 
contrary, this must have been a blow to the Cork management, as it reduced their revenue 
dramatically without necessarily generating additional sales.
222
 In December, Grace 
found himself reporting at length on the Irish political situation, specifically the details of 
the various British military groups and their role in the burning of Cork city on the night 
of 11 /12 December. As well as reporting fully on the matter, he included copies of the 
local papers. In closing he offered the reassurance that „as far as the works are concerned 
we are in no danger‟.223 
By the end of 1920, the Ford‟s Irish tractor project which had started out with 
such great optimism now looked decidedly gloomy. The disappointing start up, together 
with poor tractor sales and difficulties in almost all areas of the business must have 
disappointed Grace. He and his Marina management team had endured much censure and 
pressure from head office. Yet despite all the words written by Sorensen, no concrete 
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action was taken against the company and no definite edict was given to close the plant. 
This is in stark contrast with Detroit where plants were closed and Henry Ford imposed 
cutbacks, which were carried out ruthlessly.
224
 To have closed the Cork plant and shipped 
tractors from Detroit would have been more cost effective, yet despite all the threats Cork 
was not interfered with. It could have been that Henry Ford was prepared to absorb the 
losses in order to keep his promise to bring industry to Cork. On the other hand, Cork 
may have been too small in output and financial terms to warrant severe action. 
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CHAPTER FOUR   
Political issues & sales collapse:  
 
Industrial relations in a war zone and the search for sales (1919-1921)    
 
The early years of production operations at the Fordson plant in Cork coincided 
with an era of political instability and turmoil in Ireland. The decision to build the plant 
was made soon after the 1916 Rising though no record of any consideration of the likely 
political ramifications seems to exist. The first shots in the War of Independence were 
fired on 21 January 1919 in County Tipperary, marking the  beginning of four years of 
bloody warfare and one of the most turbulent periods in Irish history  The south, and in 
particular Cork, was the most disturbed part of a disturbed country. The year 1920 saw 
the struggle between the British forces and the Irish Republican Army reach a very 
vicious and bloodthirsty phase. Cork newspapers of the period reported a continuous list 
of shootings and reprisals, trains hold-ups and post office robberies. Cars and other 
vehicles were commandeered and near anarchy reigned. Strikes and industrial relations 
interruptions were also part of the prevailing chaos.  
At the outbreak of the War of Independence, Ford’s building work was well 
advanced. Despite regular communications between the Cork factory and headquarters in 
Dearborn, political events received scant mention, unless particularly dramatic incidents 
were highlighted by American newspapers. The management and staff of Henry Ford & 
Son were preoccupied with the task on hand, coping with the numerous problems 
associated with the commissioning and developing of the Fordson tractor plant. While the 
battles stayed mainly outside the plant, they were often close at hand. The political 
struggles, the reprisals, burnings, hunger strikes and killings did at times interfere with 
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the factory operations. This chapter will deal with a number of occasions when local 
politics and external struggles affected Ford’s operations.  
The Ford technical experts, brought in to help with setting up the plant were 
affected by the events in the country. The demands and stress of the work, together with 
the external and domestic pressures weighed heavily on some. While Edward Grace 
seemed to take the problems in his stride, William Jackson, who was in charge of the 
foundry, was less comfortable. He cabled Sorensen, behind Grace’s back, threatening 
resignation.
1
 Ostensibly, the reason for his unhappiness was to do with finding a suitable 
house.  Grace’s strenuous attempts to resolve this issue were undermined by Jackson’s 
wife. Grace concluded: ‘He does not want to buy a house because of it being here in 
Ireland, and I think the chief trouble is due to the fact that his wife is discontented here 
and perhaps a little frightened because of the political unrest’. Grace convinced Jackson  
not to leave, as his ‘wife is going to England for the summer, after which time I have no 
doubt that she will return to Ireland contented’.2 His colleague, Port Stewart was more 
sanguine, he reported that:  
Conditions in Ireland seem to be getting worse instead of better….a raid on the city hall 
last night…the lord mayor and ten of his associates were arrested. It is a nightly 
occurrence to see armoured cars running around the street and to hear machine guns fire 
all night; the next morning the show windows in the main street can be seen full of bullet 
holes. My wife and children and myself were held up the other evening whilst we were 
out for a drive; we were placed under arrest and made [to] drive to the barracks between 
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two truck loads of soldiers, with guns pointing all round us; but we got off all right 
without any serious mishap.
3
 
With all the turmoil going on, Grace realised that he needed to keep a low profile and 
avoid taking sides or getting into public controversy. When, in the autumn of 1920, Grace 
heard that Sorensen had decided not to make his regular visit to Cork, he presumably 
breathed a sigh of relief. Tactfully, he confirmed this approach to ‘Cast-Iron Charlie’. He 
suggested that the visit should be postponed, as the blunt and outspoken Sorensen was 
very likely to upset one or other sides of the conflict. Grace said: ‘It would be much 
harder for a man in your position to keep out of the press than it is for me, and, I am sure, 
you would be quoted or misquoted in such a way as to cause unjust comment from one 
side or another’.4 
*  *  * 
Shortly before Percival Perry’s departure from Henry Ford & Son in September 
1919, J. L. Fawsitt, who had supported Ford in setting up their factory, was nominated by 
the CIDA to go to the United States and investigate the development of trade between the 
two countries. Born in Bandon in 1884, Fawsitt had acted as secretary of the organisation 
from 1902 to 1919 and was viewed as having a wide knowledge of Irish industrial 
conditions, making him the ideal person for the task.
5
  Éamon de Valera was also keen on 
promoting the industrial development of Ireland amongst wealthy Americans of Irish 
extraction and in July 1919 he wrote to Arthur Griffith, acting-president and Minister for 
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Home Affairs, asking him to get Fawsitt for the job.
6
 By late August, when de Valera 
raised the issue once more with Griffith, Fawsitt had been to Dublin and met Griffith who 
had appointed him consul-general to the United States.
7
 Fawsitt announced his trade 
mission to the press and subsequently received hundreds of enquiries from businesses 
throughout the country, all interested in importing or exporting to the United States.
8
  The 
consulate had no official recognition from the United States government, but during his 
two years in New York, Fawsitt worked hard establishing contacts with shipping agents, 
exporters and importers as well as protecting the interests of the Irish in America.
9
  
Part of Fawsitt’s brief was to visit Dearborn and pass on the CIDA’s gratitude to 
Henry Ford for having built his tractor works in Cork.
10
 Fawsitt, obtained a letter of 
introduction from Percival Perry, but this proved unnecessary as reports of his mission 
had already come to Ford’s attention and he cabled Fawsitt inviting him to visit 
Dearborn.
11
 Ford was contemplating the introduction of a line of steamers for carrying 
materials to Ireland and offered not only to carry back-loads of goods to America, but 
also to assist with the disposal of the Irish goods in the United States.
12
 The issue of 
shipping was an important one for Henry Ford & Son because many of their parts were 
shipped from Dearborn and since there was no direct route to Cork it meant that they had 
to be shipped to other ports such as Dublin, Belfast or Liverpool resulting in delays and 
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handling damage. Ford’s offer was typical of the generous and impulsive statements 
made by him, but often the ideas were dropped or left to subordinates to implement in a 
more business-like manner. While this was the case here, Fawsitt’s enthusiasm ensured 
that the offer was not let lie. On 25 September 1919, he notified Henry Ford that he was 
leaving for United States the next day.
13
 Upon arrival in New York City he set up as both 
Irish consul and Irish trade commissioner.
14
 
When Perry and his fellow Ford directors became aware of Henry Ford’s offer to 
Fawsitt, they cabled Ford suggesting that he ‘exercise caution in making statements or 
commitments to Fawsitt’. Pointing out to their American counterparts ‘the extreme 
delicacy of the political and industrial situation in Ireland, and the absolute necessity for 
carefully considering action so as to prevent misunderstanding and a set-back in the 
position of the company’s goodwill’.15 At this, Perry’s last official board meeting, and 
with the War of Independence already in progress in Ireland, he was attempting to 
prevent Ford from becoming associated with the Republican side of the war which he felt 
could be to the detriment of Ford’s motor business in Britain and Ireland. Despite Perry’s 
warning, Ford met with and discussed the shipping issue with Fawsitt.  
Perry’s suspicions and his warning to Ford were well-founded. Fawsitt, was a 
member of the Gaelic League, Sinn Fein and the Irish Volunteers and while Perry was 
hardly aware of Fawsitt’s clandestine affiliations, he probably knew of his political 
connections through Edward Grace or through his own dealings with him; either way he 
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suspected that Fawsitt was up to no good.
16
  Harry Boland, who was involved in every 
aspect of revolutionary activity in Ireland since 1916, had already travelled to the United 
States in May of 1919 and was campaigning to gain support for the Irish cause, while 
secretly organising arms shipments.
17
 Like Ford, he too needed a secure method of 
shipping his cargo to Ireland. Fawsitt’s unique position offered the possibility of 
combining the two activities.   
Not long after his arrival in the United States, Fawsitt introduced Harry Boland 
and Éamon de Valera to Henry Ford. De Valera, recently elected president of the first 
Dáil, had arrived in America in June 1919, and was travelling and lecturing, seeking 
American recognition of an independent Ireland, as well as funds and support for the 
Irish cause. On arrival in Detroit, in October 1919, de Valera’s group had received a 
warm welcome from the civic and religious authorities.
18
 They then made the short trip to 
Dearborn where they apparently arrived at the Ford complex unannounced, but got to 
meet Henry Ford in Sorensen’s office. Sorensen subsequently sought Fawsitt’s views as 
to how de Valera enjoyed his visit.
19
 Fawsitt said that de Valera was pleased to meet 
Henry Ford and held him in high regard ‘and this regard has…been in no sense lessened 
by the clash of active and truth seeking minds…’ Fawsitt’s eloquent language refers to 
the two men’s differences over the League of Nations. Boland recorded the discussion 
more candidly: ‘Wonderful interview with Henry Ford, extraordinary man. DeV. and 
Ford hot and heavy on League of Nations. Ford fanatic….argued 3 hours’.20 Ford was an 
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ardent supporter of the League, while de Valera’s wish that Ireland be represented there 
coloured his view.
21
  According to Fawsitt:   
Both are in agreement as to its utility and necessity; but they view it from different 
angles. Mr Ford acknowledges that the present scheme is not perfect, but that, good or 
bad, it will serve a useful purpose in the world. Mr de Valera, on the contrary, is not yet 
satisfied in his own mind, that an imperfect League of Nations is better for humanity at 
large than no League of Nations, and that can become apparent, one way or the other, 
only after the actual operation of the proposed league.
22
  
De Valera had recently spoken out against the League.
23
 Earlier, on the day after the 
signing of the Treaty of Versailles he had appealed to the United States ‘to frame a new 
covenant for a League of Nations which would give Ireland a place among the nations of 
the world’.24  While de Valera was outspoken in his desire to see Ireland represented at 
the League of Nations, Fawsitt made no reference to this in his letter. Nor did he mention 
Ford’s attitude to Irish independence. No doubt Ford’s knowledge of the detail was 
limited and his anti-war views would not have supported the violent actions being taken 
by the IRA in Ireland. Additionally, for Ford to be confronted in his support for the 
League as a vehicle for peace would have irritated him. It seems likely that de Valera’s 
visit, while establishing a link with the great industrialist, did little to improve relations.   
In early October the New York Times reported the news that Henry Ford was 
considering establishing a steamship line to Ireland. This was corroborated by Sorensen 
who said that a representative of the CIDA, no doubt Fawsitt, had met Henry Ford, 
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seeking that he and other American industrial concerns with Irish branches, provide a 
means of shipping directly to and from Ireland.
25
 Despite Ford’s offer to Fawsitt and the 
published reports, he was apparently making no attempt to set up a shipping line, so 
Fawsitt approached the Moore & McCormack Shipping Company, who managed ships 
owned by the United States government as one of three ‘managing operators’ of 
shipping.
26
  Fawsitt convinced them to make Cork a port of call and then strongly urged 
the Ford firm to take advantage of the connection and to arrange to ship materials on the 
next outward journey.
27
 A week later Sorensen wrote to Fawsitt saying they had offered 
100 tons of freight but Moore & McCormack were only prepared to have their steamer, 
the Lady Gretna, call to Cork if given 400 tons of cargo. Sorensen suggested that Fawsitt 
‘have another chat with them’.28 Fawsitt met Moore & McCormack again on 27 October 
and convinced them to reduce their tonnage requirement. He cabled Sorensen to say that 
while they needed 200 tons to make it a paying proposition, they were prepared to accept 
a load of 100 tons.
29
 Meanwhile in Cork, the CIDA called a meeting of Cork businesses 
to provide return cargo for the Lady Gretna.
30
 While a strike in New York delayed the 
Ford shipment for almost a month, no doubt, Fawsitt was happy to learn that his 
persistence had paid off and that Ford were shipping a trial consignment of between 250 
and 300 tons of materials on the Lady Gretna during the week-ending 21 November 
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1919.
31
 This shipment was expected to be the forerunner of further large consignments 
over the coming months.
32
 Ford’s original promise to set up a shipping line had failed to 
materialise and it had fallen to Fawsitt to negotiate the direct line to Cork, but this direct 
link to Ireland gave the cover and the opportunity to assist Harry Boland’s arms 
smuggling operation. With the Cork destination established and Ford’s materials 
travelling directly to the Marina factory, Fawsitt continued to work at improving the trade 
links between the United States and Ireland. 
Fawsitt remained in regular contact with Ford and later informed him that he had 
concluded negotiations with Moore & McCormack for the formation of a new shipping 
agency in Cork. The company had been initiated by J. C. Dowdall, president of CIDA, 
with capital of $25,000, half of which was subscribed by Moore & McCormack. The new 
agency was to have offices at Cork, Dublin and Belfast and was designed to circumvent 
existing agencies, as Fawsitt claimed that they were too intimately involved with English 
shipping and might interfere with the development of direct trade between Ireland and the 
United States. Closing his letter Fawsitt said: ‘In the event of your company going into 
the business yourselves, as promised, this new shipping agency at Cork would be in a 
position to handle your business, and to give you every assistance in finding return 
cargoes for your boats’.33   
   In addition to his dealings with the Ford Motor Company and Moore & 
McCormack Shipping, in October 1919, Fawsitt had conferred with the United States 
Shipping Board, who regulated and controlled shipping, to get government authorisation 
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for his plans.
34
 Fawsitt’s efforts were going well and he expected to have a ‘mercantile 
fleet’ of ten vessels calling to Ireland on their way to Europe. These routes offered Irish 
producers the additional possibility of opening up European trade by enabling them to 
ship foodstuffs to the continent. However, until the Shipping Board allotted the ships it 
was deemed necessary that nothing be announced publicly.
35
 
Fawsitt continued to pressure the Board and at a meeting in early January 1920, 
he obtained a commitment that the New York to Hamburg and the New York to 
Scandinavia lines would call to Cork.
36
 Previously, of four trans-Atlantic routes to 
Europe, only one, the New York to Antwerp route, had stopped off in Ireland.
37
 
Reporting to the cabinet in Dublin in March 1920, de Valera brought up Fawsitt’s 
shipping scheme. He stated that Moore & McCormack had proposed an arrangement 
which would have given the Irish government ‘a one half-interest in four ships for trade 
between Ireland and the continent’.38 To clarify matters, de Valera asked Fawsitt to 
prepare a comprehensive memo for the cabinet, since presumably this meant that the 
government would have to invest in the project. De Valera urged the cabinet: ‘When you 
receive it we would like you to take action on it at once’.39  According to Fitzpatrick this 
ambitious plan was ‘never fully realised’.40                                           
While the various discussions were taking place, Moore & McCormack clearly 
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had concerns about the profitability of the additional routes, so one of the company’s 
principals, E. J. McCormack, visited Ireland to investigate matters for himself. Despite 
Fawsitt’s efforts, the quantity of cargo on offer for the recently introduced Cork stop-off 
was not reaching expectations and the company were anxious about adding vessels into 
the Irish-continental trade.
41
 McCormack arrived in Cork in early May 1920 and was 
entertained by the Harbour Commissioners, as well as by Grace and Clarke. By this time, 
eight steamers were stopping off at Irish ports carrying $8 million worth of goods. 
McCormack, who was sympathetic to the Irish situation, promised to open up the New 
York–Scandinavia service, but reminded Irish suppliers of the necessity to develop 
suitable goods for the various markets; this was crucial, as while other Americans were 
also supportive and prepared to pay good prices for Irish products, the development of 
permanent shipping connections would depend on the ongoing volume of trade.
42
 
Fawsitt played a central role in improving shipping arrangements between the 
United States and Ireland, he was tireless in his attempts to solve Ford’s difficulties as 
well as opening routes for general cargo, but his part in the shipment of arms is less clear. 
While Harry Boland went about his secret arms deals, using his public work as a cover, 
Fawsitt’s role in the conspiracy appears to have been to develop legitimate shipping links 
and then for these to be used to transport Boland’s weapons to Irish ports.43  The 
introduction of additional ships obviously increased the number of opportunities for 
smuggling, but I have found no evidence of his direct involvement in the smuggling 
operation. According to Fitzpatrick, the Cork service facilitated trans-Atlantic arms 
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shipments, but despite the opening of the new routes only a trickle of arms and 
ammunition was getting through, meanwhile Michael Collins kept the pressure on Boland 
to procure and ship weapons for the armed struggle in Ireland.
44
  
In March 1921, Boland took delivery of a consignment of 653 Thompson sub-
machine guns and expected to use a Moore & McCormack vessel to ship them to Ireland. 
Instead, he found that despite the money which, according to Fitzpatrick, Fawsitt had 
apparently poured into Moore & McCormack ‘in the hope of guaranteeing security for 
the mission’s human and material freight’, that shipment was not possible. Particular 
difficulties were encountered ‘in seeking employment for Irishmen on the Moore & 
McCormack line’.45 In the end, the arrangements with Moore & McCormack failed to 
provide the means to ship the consignment. Boland recorded in his diary on 30 March 
1921 that ‘M.Mc have given us a raw deal’.46  It is not clear what the impediment was, 
but since Boland was unable to ship the guns as a single consignment, he was forced to 
send several small shipments; a delivery of 30 sub-machine guns arrived in Queenstown 
in late April, this was followed by another batch of 51 guns into Dublin shortly before the 
Truce.
47
 Subsequent attempts to find an alternative shipper led to delays which left the 
operation exposed and ultimately led to the seizure of the remaining weapons by 
American customs agents.
48
 
Fawsitt’s efforts in opening trade links proved very successful, but significantly, 
failed to provide transport for Boland’s cache of guns. Remarkably, Ford never linked 
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Fawsitt with the gun smuggling. During his period in the United States he enjoyed Henry 
Ford’s confidence and support, while both Ford and Sorensen apparently took his efforts 
to improve shipping links for Ford and Ireland at face value. As a pacifist, if Henry Ford 
had discovered that his company’s shipping was being organised to facilitate the 
shipment of arms to Ireland and that his Irish visitors were actively plotting to use his 
good offices for nefarious purposes, he would no doubt been very unhappy at this abuse 
of his benevolence. Ford’s emphatic instruction to his Irish management was that they 
should avoid involvement in the politics of the Troubles. Sorensen instructed Grace: ‘Be 
careful in the future, not to ally yourself with any organisations that are foreign to your 
business! Politics and politicians, particularly, are things that you must be absolutely free 
and clear of.
49
 The face-to-face deception and breach of trust perpetrated by Fawsitt and 
Boland would have angered him and could have lead to drastic action being taken at the 
Marina.   
With the ongoing attempts to smuggle arms into Ireland on Moore & McCormack 
vessels, it was almost unavoidable that this activity would impinge on the company 
affairs in Ireland. Late in 1920 the local Cork newspapers reported that a military search-
party had found a small packet of ammunition on board the Mason City, a steamer 
carrying Ford parts amongst its cargo.
50
  This incident, which Grace believed was part of 
a plot by British intelligence, threatened to bring Ford into conflict with the British 
authorities, worse still, from Ford’s point of view, it could have interfered with tractor 
production by cutting off the flow of parts from Detroit.  
On 17 September 1920, soon after the arms discovery, Grace cabled Sorensen: 
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‘large quantity ammo aboard Mason City unloading warn Moore & McCormack that it 
places us disagreeable position troops and armoured car guarding ship’.51 Sorensen 
immediately contacted Moore & McCormack, who replied that they had no foolproof 
system of preventing such an occurrence. As there was a considerable quantity of 
‘household furniture’ amongst the cargo, they seemed certain that the ammunition was 
amongst this consignment. They also contacted the British embassy and informed them 
of the situation.  The embassy said that they would have some of their officials inspect all 
future cargoes. Sorensen responded to Grace and reminding him of the delicacy of the 
situation and advised him to lend all assistance to the authorities.
52  
Later, when a more thorough investigation had been carried out, Grace wrote that 
the ammunition was not among the furniture, but was in a ‘large box [which] was found 
in the cupboard where the wiping rags and waste are stored in the engine room’.53  The 
box had been put there unbeknownst to the ship’s officers. Suspicion for the ammunition 
smuggling fell on Sinn Fein, but if they were responsible, it was remarkable that the 
ammunition had not been removed earlier, as the ship had been in dock for almost twenty 
four hours before being checked by the authorities. When a combined group of customs 
officers, police and military finally arrived, they went directly to the engine room and 
asked for the cupboard to be opened. Without opening the plain, unlabelled box, the 
British officer was able to state that it contained ammunition.  Grace closed: 
It seems to the opinion of certain people here that this was planted in New York by some 
agent of the spying system for the purpose of proving that it was not policy to allow boats 
or ships direct from New York to call at Irish Ports east-bound…the day following this 
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occurrence, east-bound passenger ships were stopped from calling at Irish ports. This, 
however, has not yet been applied to cargo ships.
54
 
On the face of it, it seems clear that it was a British scheme to end passenger traffic 
disembarking in Cork and thereby to reduce the opportunity for arms smuggling. 
Whether Grace was mistaken or mislead in this opinion is not clear, no doubt given the 
activities of Fawsitt and Boland it is possible that the cargo had emanated from them. 
Either way Sinn Fein lost one of its arms smuggling routes. For Ford, fortunately, no 
accusations of illegality were levelled against them. Equally, no further action was taken 
to prevent cargo vessels calling at Cork, permitting shipment of Ford’s tractor parts and 
supplies to continue uninterrupted. Yet despite this outcome, the incident would have 
served to remind Sorensen and Henry Ford of the risks of doing business in the troubled 
Ireland of the time.
55
  
By 1925 with tractor parts being manufactured in Cork and little cargo coming 
from Dearborn, Moore & McCormack, having failed to find adequate cargoes for the 
westbound run, discontinued the service.
56
  
*  *  * 
Like its parent, the Ford Motor Company in Dearborn, Henry Ford & Son of Cork 
maintained an open-door policy to visitors.
57
 Political personalities were always keen to 
inspect the factory and to benefit from the resultant publicity. Tomás MacCurtain, Sinn 
Fein Lord Mayor of Cork was elected to office on 30 January 1920 and soon after paid a 
visit to the works and attended a Fordson demonstration, where he was photographed 
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driving a tractor.
58
 Ten days later, on the 20 March, he was murdered in his home by 
several masked raiders believed to be members of the RIC.
59
 Later that year, the hunger 
strike of Terence MacSwiney, posed a delicate political situation for the company. The 
issue involved the attendance by Ford employees at a mass for the dying hunger striker. 
Grace confronted his employees about absenting themselves from the plant without 
permission or agreement, asserting his right to manage his business without interference 
from outsiders, however, the issue involved was a very emotional one and one that was 
bound to be highly publicised. Coming to the notice as it did of senior American 
management, it set alarm bells ringing in Detroit.   
Terence MacSwiney, Tomás MacCurtain’s successor as lord mayor, was arrested 
when Cork City Hall was raided by British army personnel on the 12
 
August 1920. Taken 
to prison he immediately went on hunger strike.
60
  In order to highlight his situation and 
to support his case, a call was issued by the Joint Labour and Civic Council of Action to 
all workers for a stoppage of work.  The call got a wide response in Cork city; all work 
ceased, shops and factories closed, according to the Cork Examiner ‘even the tram 
workers thronged to the nine churches’.61 The newspaper reports claimed that this 
happened in a disciplined manner and that the workers returned to work with 
‘conscientious punctuality’.62 A month later, masses were again said for the lord mayor, 
whose hunger strike continued in Brixton Prison.  Again, Cork workers responded and 
the Ford workers were included. Under a photograph of marching men published in the 
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Examiner, the caption read: ‘the employees of the Fordson factory marching in huge 
numbers in processional order to mass’.63 As MacSwiney’s hunger strike continued and 
his state of health declined, feelings in Cork ran very high. A notice in the local papers on 
Friday 15 October 1920 called the workers out once more:  
Masses for the hunger strikers…at the request of Irish Volunteers, Civic and Labour 
bodies, Mass will be celebrated on Friday 12 o’clock. Employers and shopkeepers are 
requested to close their premises 11.45 this day to allow their employees to attend.
64
 
On this, the third occasion that the men had abandoned their workplace, Grace attempted 
to prevent the walkout. His attitude was driven by his need to keep the plant in 
production. The previous week, factory output had been disrupted, when he had to report 
to Sorensen that there had been ‘no production this week due to seamen’s strike just 
ended today’.65 The previous mass stoppages had occurred during his absence from the 
factory and none of his subordinates had taken the responsibility to refuse the workers 
permission to leave the factory. When the workers had walked out for the second mass 
there had been an implied understanding that it was to have been the last time, however, 
given the atmosphere in Cork as MacSwiney approached his death, any implicit 
agreement was unlikely to be heeded.
66
 Additionally, another Republican, Michael 
Fitzgerald, was very weak and was to die two days later, on Sunday 17 October.
67
  
Grace, disregarding the heightened political and emotional state of the people of 
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Cork city and the feelings of his own workers, believed he had to assert his authority over 
his employees. When he read the notice on Friday 15 October he decided that things had 
gone too far, that he should end the disruptions. Accordingly, he notified his foremen that 
the works would operate its normal hours and that he would dismiss anyone who 
disobeyed these instructions by leaving the plant.
68
 Grace was conscious that his notice 
appeared ‘peremptory’ and ‘severe,’ but he was not prepared to tolerate a situation where 
an external political organisation, apparently had the right to call his workers away from 
their jobs whenever it suited them, despite them being employed by Henry Ford & Son.  
The majority of the workers ignored his threat and attended the mass, as Grace put it, 
‘fearing to disregard the notice’.69 When the mass was over and employees attempted to 
return to work they found the Ford management resolute in their determination to 
discharge all who had left the plant. 
In order to break the impasse, the Sinn Féin T.D., J. J. Walsh, a man respected by 
both Grace and the workers, was called upon to intervene and act as a mediator.
70
 In a 
later interview, Walsh explained that the elected workers’ representative committee, 
designed to act as an intermediary between the workers and the company management, 
had, due to the short notice, no opportunity to consult, leading to a situation where the 
workforce took their action in a spontaneous and essentially unorganised manner.  On the 
other side, Ford management contended that they had no right to leave without company 
approval, and insisted that they should have been sought the permission through the 
committee. Walsh pointed out the necessity of maintaining discipline, stating ‘that 
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everyone who went against the interests of Henry Ford & Son went against the interest of 
the country’.71 
Despite his earlier threats, Grace listened to the subsequent pleadings and 
assurances and relented. In a letter to the Cork Examiner, he set out to defuse the anger 
that his insensitive actions had generated. He stated that his action was not ‘motivated by 
any religious or political feeling against the sympathies of those workers who chose to 
leave the job without our permission’. Pointing out that his managers had a duty to their 
employer during working hours, to work conscientiously in the firm’s interest and that 
duty necessitated that the workers do the same. Re-emphasising the need to consult 
company representatives, he claimed that: ‘had he been consulted he would have 
willingly conceded to anything within reason’. Having been assured that no future 
breaches of discipline would occur he agreed to reinstate the staff and reopen the factory 
on the following Monday.
72
 
On Monday, a letter from the Sinn Fein deputy lord mayor, Donal O’Callaghan, 
appeared in the Cork Examiner.
73
 Speaking on behalf of the Irish Volunteers and the 
Civic and Labour Council he insisted: 
that we had, and have, an absolute right to issue such a call-or such other call as we deem 
necessary or expedient, whenever such is in our opinion advisable. Further, while it was 
fortunate that Mr J. J. Walsh T.D.E. [sic] was successful in removing whatever 
misunderstanding arose and in saving the management from carrying out their projected 
line of action, I have to make it clear that all workers who obeyed the call were not only 
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justified in so doing, but were bound to do as loyal citizens…. Mammon is not paramount 
in Cork.
74
  
O’Callaghan’s very public assertion of his right to do whatever he deemed ‘necessary or 
expedient’ was a clear rebuttal of Grace’s right to control his works and his employees. 
The remarks infuriated Grace who described it as ‘one of the most foolish productions I 
have ever read, and as soon as I saw it…my blood boiled’.75  He immediately contacted 
‘men higher up in authority than he is and told them clearly and definitely that I 
considered this letter entirely unwarranted’ demanding that O’Callaghan recall the letter 
or he threatened, somewhat cryptically, that he:  
Would print an answer to it which would set our men straight, as well as the general 
public. My answer would have been that we did not doubt or question the authority of the 
lord mayor in civic matters, but that we reserved the right, and would exercise it, to 
dismiss any man who left these works without our permission.
76
   
It is not clear what he meant when he stated he ‘would print an answer that would set our 
men straight’ but, in the light of his recent actions,  his threat to dismiss men leaving the 
plant without permission, was sufficiently powerful to ensure that he got his way. Not for 
the last time, Grace forced O’Callaghan to back down. The Cork Examiner printed the 
retraction, which Grace claimed was dictated by him and accepted by O’Callaghan. 
Grace felt that the original letter to the paper had been written by the deputy lord mayor  
against the advice of older and more experienced men; ‘(he is only a boy of 25 years), 
and I am sure he was forced to do so by some two or three of the more rapid [sic] 
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members of his organisation’.77 He also left O’Callaghan in no doubt ‘should there be a 
recurrence that we will close the works up tight until we get an entirely new crew, which 
I may mention, would not be a very hard thing to do here’.78   
O’Callaghan’s letter of explanation appeared in the Examiner on the 20 October. 
In it he said:  
As some misunderstanding has occurred over my letter of the 16th, I wish to make it 
clear that it was no way my intention or that of the bodies on behalf of which I wrote, to 
interfere with or undermine the authority of the management of Messrs Henry Ford & 
Son. Such would be very regrettable, as the maintenance of efficiency at an establishment 
like Fords is of great importance to the city.   
A misunderstanding also seems to have arisen over the reference to Mammon. This was 
not a reference to Messrs Ford’s establishment but was obviously, merely a general 
statement.
79
  
Reporting to headquarters in Dearborn, Grace claimed that ‘every man came back 
on Monday a chasten [sic] and better man…and that he had to obey orders in future in 
order to retain his job’. Insisting that his action was necessary to prevent an escalation of 
such stoppages and was ‘absolutely unprecedented, because any employer of labour in 
Cork has been afraid to take such action’. The habit of employees walking off the job 
anytime they wished had become a question of debate and concern amongst employers. 
Grace claimed that not only had the leaders of the Catholic Church supported him, but so, 
too, had the leaders of Sinn Fein.
80 
In confronting the political intimidation of the Ford 
employees, he believed he had won a major battle not only for Ford, but also for the other 
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employers of Cork, and perhaps elsewhere in the country as well. He had tackled the 
issue, despite being a non-Catholic in a predominantly Catholic city, which could have 
lead to accusations of religious bigotry. He felt that he had brought home to Sinn Fein the 
damage they were doing to the workers and the country, and believed that the adverse 
publicity which they had received in Britain and the United States would be harmful to 
them.
81
 Grace fought this issue purely on a point of principle, his right to manage his 
plant without interference from outsiders, making it clear that Henry Ford & Son would 
not tolerate political interference in the running of their business.
82
  
Despite Sinn Fein’s popular support in Cork and Peter Hart’s assertion that the 
Ford plant was ‘a hotbed of republicanism’, Grace’s threat to dismiss a thousand men 
from relatively well-paid jobs was a powerful warning to those involved and would test 
the political resolve of the majority.
83
 Regardless of the levels of republican support in 
the factory, Henry Ford & Son enjoyed relative political peace over the next few years. 
Grace’s action of ‘drawing a line in the sand’ may have helped focus otherwise militant 
minds to act with restraint where Ford was concerned. Grace also hinted at disloyalty 
amongst his management staff when he remarked that ‘I truly believe, had I had the 
proper co-operation on the part of some of our works officials, this thing would have not 
happened’.84  It is not clear who these works officials were or how their lack of co-
operation contributed to the disagreement. 
Within the Ford company, this confrontation highlights Grace’s dilemma in 
dealing with Sorensen, who in one breath harangued Grace to increase output and in the 
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next demanded that he stay out of the politics which were disrupting that output.
85
 
Despite Sorensen’s remarks, when it came to the control of Ford’s operations, Grace 
knew that in asserting control of their business, that he had the support of both Sorensen 
and Henry Ford. The aggressive, no-nonsense Ford management approach used on this 
occasion clearly demonstrated the drastic action they were prepared to take when 
confronted with opposition, regardless of the sensitivity of the situation. Their high-
handed attitudes and demands should have acted as a warning to local politicians to be in 
no doubt as to their likely actions in any situation. In the not too distant future, Donal 
O’Callaghan would have another opportunity to confront Grace, when the Ford company 
was found to be in breach of their lease agreement with Cork Corporation. Ford 
management would prove even more intransigent when that occasion arose. This issue 
will be dealt with in chapter five.    
*   *   * 
Despite the fact that Fords had been producing tractors for over a year, at the end 
of 1920, building work was still ongoing at the plant. Of the 1,429 workers employed by 
the company, 236 were engaged in construction. Grace confidently promised that 
construction work would be finished in the next few weeks-‘except for the power house 
which can be delayed’.86 Around the same time, Sorensen wrote in a slightly less 
trenchant manner, acknowledging Grace and Clarke’s numerous letters describing the 
situation that existed between the manufacturing operation and the sales organisation. 
Sorensen promised to try and find a way to get over to England and sort matters out, he 
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continued:  
But business here has taken such a bad turn none of us have felt that we want to leave 
here….We haven’t made a tractor here in three months and it does not look as though we 
will start up before the 1 February; so you can see we are as bad off as you are.
87
  
He cautioned Grace to slow down the building programme and to reduce stocks and 
expenditures to a minimum, warning him that ‘you must not get yourself into a position 
where you have to call over here for help on finance.’88  
Ireland, was still in the grip of depression, while hostilities continued, and on 10 
December 1920 martial law was proclaimed in County Cork and the adjacent counties of 
Kerry, Limerick, and Tipperary. The following night the commercial centre of Cork was 
burnt out by Crown forces, in reprisal for an IRA ambush. On the same night seven 
people were shot dead by the Auxiliaries. American newspapers carried the story with all 
the sensational details. When Sorensen read the reports, no doubt alarmed by the story 
and the accompanying dramatic photographs, he cabled Grace demanding a report, ‘How 
do matters look at works. Many papers report big disturbance yesterday.’89 Grace cabled 
back promptly that the works were not in danger.
90
 Later, he reported more fully and had 
photographs taken of the scene on the Sunday morning after the fire ‘while the ruins were 
still burning’. He also sent copies of the local newspapers. Explaining the different 
British military groups in Ireland at the time, he described the Black and Tans as the 
‘scum of England’ while he says that:  
the burning of Cork is alleged to have been caused directly by a lorry full of Auxiliary 
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Police having been fired upon and sixteen of them wounded and one of them 
killed…all went mad and sought to destroy the City as a reprisal. As much as all sane 
thinking people deplore the act of cowardly murdering men from ambush, still, one 
cannot imagine a modern government allowing its armed forces to take part in such an 
orgy of crime.
91
 
Having had assurances from the officer in charge of the British forces that Ford need 
have no fear of any recurrence, he opined that though the recently imposed martial law 
deprives people of ‘a great many privileges,’ people were apparently satisfied since a 
reoccurrence is unlikely, as all of the British armed forces have been placed under the 
control of the district commanding military officer and thereby subject to strict discipline. 
Grace reckoned that the only part of the factory vulnerable were ‘the wooden buildings 
which are well covered by insurance’.  Reassuring Sorensen that the main works were not 
in any danger he pointed out that:  
Because it is owned by an American, and they fear that it might involve international 
complications, and next because we have about 1,500 men employed, and while so 
employed they have no time to think of other matters than their work.
92
 
The following year, 1921, tractor output from the Cork plant was considerably 
reduced, the recession was still having an effect and demand for tractors remained poor in 
Britain and on the continent.
93
 In addition, European markets were introducing tariff and 
currency barriers hindering exports to many countries.
94
 The combined effect of strikes 
by seamen, followed by coal and railway men and the disruption arising from the War of 
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Independence all had a negative effect on the running of the plant.  These problems and 
the poor relative efficiency meant that, when the tractor production resumed in Dearborn 
midway through 1921, Cork’s tractors were overpriced in the marketplace and European 
agents could import tractors from the United States more cheaply than from Cork.  
In January, Grace reported that ‘sales have fallen off to nothing’ and that during 
December 1920 he had shipped 67 tractors to England, 100 to Cadiz and 110 to 
Copenhagen. The impact of the curfew introduced on 11 December 1920 meant that the 
factory could no longer work its normal three eight-hour shifts, but had to temporarily 
introduce two ten-hour shifts.
95
 Grace finally agreed to implement Sorensen’s demands to 
eliminate all non-productive activities and concentrate on items for which he had a 
market. With one hundred and fifty tractors in stock and few orders, in January 1921, he 
completely stopped tractor production, let go all of the workers involved as well as many 
of the construction workers, a total of about 600 employees.
96
 Construction work was 
reduced to protective activities such as the completion of the foundry roof. With orders 
for twelve hundred cast-iron parts per week, production efforts were now concentrated on 
Model T parts for Manchester, almost the only source of revenue.
97
 This layoff was a 
severe blow to the men concerned as well as the local economy, but it paled into 
insignificance beside the Dearborn cutbacks where Ford had stopped all production work 
on 24 December 1920 and let 150,000 employees go.
98
 
Grace was very conscious of the effects of the recession on Cork, as well as the 
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factory cut-backs. Acknowledging the social effect of the layoffs Grace said ‘there is 
terrible lot of unemployment here this winter, and if our funds were in better shape it 
would be a charity for us to build the road, which we are obligated to build, at this 
time’.99 The only bright spot on the scene was that they ‘were installing the foundry 
conveyors, and putting up Model T machines, which we must get going as quickly as 
possible’.100 Production for the week ending Saturday 8 January 1921 confirmed that the 
efforts to produce parts for Manchester was paying off as over 21,000 parts were turned 
out.
101
    
Meanwhile, in Ford of England, after only nineteen months in charge, Warren 
Anderson was dismissed. Liebold, Ford’s executive secretary, cabled him to return to 
Detroit immediately. Having been informed that he would not be returning to England, he 
arrived in Detroit where he was ignominiously fired without even being seen by any of 
the senior managers. His dismissal seems quite arbitrary and unfair in that he had 
operated the business very profitably, returning substantial sales volumes and profits for 
his period in office.
102
 At that time in Detroit, Henry Ford was slashing expenditures in 
all areas. Senior executives as well as factory and office workers were summarily 
dismissed, some were discharged due to ineptitude others went as they were considered 
by Henry to be too independent.
103
 
When Grace heard the news about Anderson, he cabled Detroit to find out what 
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the situation was. He had been advised by London that Anderson had resigned as 
‘European Commercial Engineer’ and he enquired disingenuously if he had also resigned 
as director of Henry Ford & Son. As the manager of the Cork plant and the sole senior 
manager in Britain and Ireland, he no doubt saw himself as a potential successor to 
Anderson. Sorensen replied that ‘Anderson has resigned and his affairs have been 
cleaned up so that he will not be returning to England’. Grace must have been relieved at 
this decision and optimistic of his chances of replacing him. Sorensen went on to explain 
that ‘things are horribly jammed up as a result of some of his attempts in managing 
financial as well as sales affairs’.104 Sorensen complained that he had had so much 
dumped on him that he would be unable to travel to Europe, so instead Grace would have 
to visit Dearborn. Sorensen demanded that Grace bring Port Stewart with him. While 
Stewart had been sent to Ireland to utilise his knowledge of Ford’s metallurgical 
developments and methods of working, he had achieved little, worse still Sorensen 
grumbled:  ‘I do not know what he is doing, only having received three letters from him 
since he left’. Dismissively he commented, ‘he is the most hopeless man I have ever 
seen’.105 As always, he had a complaint about costs: ‘your list [of employees] still shows 
too big, and your overhead [is] very large…I do not understand why you cannot cut down 
this office and overhead considerably more than you have’. Sorensen closed by telling 
him to prepare for his trip to the United States by getting together all his tractor costs as 
well as his anticipated Model T castings costs.
106
 
In the plant, the problems persisted, but some were easier to deal with than others 
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and the versatility of the Fordson tractor was able to solve at least one. When the power 
company employees went on strike, Grace harnessed his idle tractors to provide electrical 
power, permitting him to continue to operate the foundry and the machine shop.
107
 By 
mid-April, operations and employment numbers were down to the bare minimum. 
Sorensen was again cabling Grace and demanding: ‘Have you pulled down tight, no word 
as yet from you how many men in plant’.108 Grace replied that in total he had 196 people 
working; production 57, office 33, non-production 78, and construction 28.
109
 Even this 
shadow of its productive self did not satisfy Sorensen who responded immediately by 
cable: ‘office and non-production force too high…any prospects from Bate for tractors I 
am looking to you now to get some results’.110  While Grace’s responsibility was solely 
for the Cork plant, with the gap created by Anderson’s departure and armed with this 
prompt from Sorensen, he now assumed the role of senior manager in his dealings with 
the Ford European organisation. He cabled Harrington the English agent, demanding ‘a 
more determined effort on your part to market our product’, adding that he was ‘not 
satisfied with the [sales] estimate you sent me’.111 He also cabled Bate in Manchester 
informing him that he wanted ‘a redoubled effort from your end so that we can 
commence production’.112 Subsequently, Grace’s aspiration was to be frustrated and 
despite his posturing and his ambition, he was no doubt disappointed when H. A. Bate 
was appointed manager of the English operation. Bate was even less fortunate than 
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Anderson and destined to be fired some seven months later.
113
  
Undaunted, Grace continued to try and find sales. In desperation, he came up with 
a plan to sell tractors to Russia. It is not clear whether this was Grace’s imagination or a 
genuine creative opportunity, either way he proved himself indefatigable in pursuit of 
markets. Detroit had received their first Russian tractor orders in late 1918 and by 1921 
was doing a significant trade with them.
114
 With poor sales in England and little prospects 
in Europe, Grace was now trying to get a slice of this market. The scheme had stalled 
because of the Russians’ problems in obtaining hard currency. Grace’s solution was to 
get into barter. He claimed to have reached agreement with the Irish millers to accept 
Russian wheat. Of the 100,000 tons of wheat imported into Cork annually, the millers 
were prepared to accept up to 25 per cent from Russia, giving an approximate purchase 
value of 2,500 tractors. Putting such a scheme into operation all over the country, Grace 
believed, that he could get enough currency to ‘pay for’ 10,000 tractors, which the 
Russians had intimated they needed. He and Harrington had scheduled a meeting with a 
Russian commission which was due to arrive in London in mid-May 1921.
115
 In spite of 
his optimism, it is clear nothing came of the idea, as there is no record of the meeting or 
subsequent developments along these lines. 
In contrast with his hopes for Russia, by May 1921 he was pessimistic about 
prospects in England, though in the near future he was hoping for better results on the 
continent, as soon as exchange rates ‘become somewhere near normal’. To this end, he 
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continued to act as the senior manager, putting pressure on Harrington and Bate. He 
informed Sorensen that:  
While in the past I do not believe they have paid as much attention to the tractor as they 
should have, you can rest assured that they are working hard on it now, and if they don’t 
you can believe that I am going to know the reason why. I am continuously getting after 
them both on any little thing that I can think of in order to keep them moving and keyed 
up.
116
  
Notwithstanding Grace’s optimism and schemes, there was no improvement in sales and 
consequently tractors were only being produced intermittently. On the other hand, in June 
1921, the demand for Model T cast iron-parts for Manchester was showing positive signs. 
They wanted him to produce additional parts, namely transmission covers, which would 
employ several hundred men. Except now he had another problem-lack of coke to fire his 
foundry. Having cut back material inventory as well as manufacturing operations, he was 
caught out by the additional orders. After being refused permission by the British 
authorities to ship coke from South Wales as ‘Ireland had plenty of supplies’, Grace was 
forced to borrow 10 tons from the ‘Admiral in charge of the Navy in this district’ while 
he arranged for 50 tons to be shipped from Holland to tide him over for a week.
117
  
Around the same time Cork’s competitive inadequacies were finally exposed. In 
May 1921, the Fordson tractor distributor for Poland wished to buy 100 tractors, but 
insisted on getting prices from the New York office.
118
 From 1918, when Henry Ford & 
Son Ltd of Cork had been the appointed agents for all tractors sold in Europe and in the 
Middle East, it had been company policy that American prices were not to be quoted to 
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European agents, but instead they must order from Ireland.
119
 Grace protested at the 
Polish agent’s action and demanded that Sorensen issue firm instructions to the New 
York office not to encourage or deal with European dealer’s representatives.120 Grace 
thought this would be an end to it, but Borkowski, the Polish distributor, repeated his 
request for prices from the New York office. In response, Grace accused W. A. Ryan, 
head of Ford sales, of instigating the issue, by sending a cable to managers in continental 
Europe enquiring, ‘what saving could be affected by shipping from New York instead of 
from Cork and…would [this] effect the bulk of sales’.121 As always, Grace was 
convinced that sales would not be affected ‘providing they understand firmly that their 
only market is from here’.122 
For almost two years Grace had sought permission to increase prices and improve 
his costs. He had also prevented agents from buying tractors from the United States, but 
this time neither the extra costs nor his arrogant and hectoring attitude were acceptable. 
Sorensen referred Grace’s letter to Ryan, with the handwritten note: ‘Can you give me 
what you have done on this’.123 Subsequently, the matter was referred to Edsel Ford who 
consulted with his father. Despite Henry’s support for the Cork factory, selling tractors at 
an inflated price was contrary to his business ideology. As a result, Grace was overruled. 
The tractors were to be supplied from the United States. Edsel wrote to Sorensen:  
We have decided to accept orders for these tractors from New York, versus Cork, after 
very careful consideration, and I have discussed this matter very thoroughly with Mr 
Henry Ford and further wish to state that we are accepting orders today for ten tractors 
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for Tunis on the same basis. The writer feels that the only excuse for a foreign plant is 
the ability to serve the people surrounding it with our products at a reduction of the 
price from Detroit, plus freight and duty. We have thus far been unable to accomplish 
this at Cork.
124
  
Thus, Grace’s attempt to build an efficient tractor plant was shown to have been a futile 
endeavour. Despite his best efforts he could not compete with the production efficiency, 
the volume and ultimately the costs out of Detroit. Ford management were now faced 
with a decision about the future of the Cork plant. While the issue was being considered 
in Detroit, Sorensen prompted Grace to get out into the field and push the dealers once 
more.
125
  
Shortly afterwards, Grace set off for Europe to investigate the conditions there 
and to try to drum up sales. In his absence, Clarke reported that he was first taking a close 
look at the sales situation in England. Pointing out that while the economic conditions in 
England were very poor, exacerbated by the strikes and high agricultural wages, he felt 
that these difficulties did not account for the terrible slump in sales.  He believed that 
Ford dealers had enjoyed such flourishing sales over the previous few years, ‘when they 
had practically queues waiting at their doors to take any cars that they could get delivery 
of from the factory’ that they had not yet realised the necessity to work at creating 
demand and concluding sales. 
Discussing the Irish sales situation, with the War of Independence still in 
progress, Clarke noted that the problem was still the political one; while there were signs 
that the situation was coming to an end, tractors were still not selling, as ‘farmers are 
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reluctant to lay out any money while they run the risk of having their farms burned out as 
official or unofficial reprisals.’ Painting a very positive picture of the Irish farmer’s 
prospects and attitude in the event of that threat being removed, he continued: 
I believe there is a keenness on the part of the Irish farmer to adopt the most modern 
methods of agriculture. Also, practically all the Irish farmers (contrary to the practice 
prevailing in England) have bought their farms out at very reasonable prices, spread over 
a number of years’ purchase and, consequently, there is more of that personal interest that 
makes for efficiency and success. The country is fairly prosperous, and if a suitable form 
of government is reached, should make strides very quickly.
126
  
Working on the basis that if tractors could be sold in Ireland, Clarke believed that 
Ford would sell them, he described the efforts they were making to fully exploit the 
market potential. They had appointed a champion tractor man to give demonstrations 
round the south. He also assisted farmers with their running problems, as well as 
evaluating existing dealers and assisting with appointing new dealers. Within the factory 
Clarke set about identifying target customers by canvassing workers ‘ who come from the 
country districts to give us lists of the big farmers with whom they are acquainted…and 
these have been circularised and the names given to the dealers’.127  
The truce that marked the end of active hostilities in the Anglo-Irish war came 
into effect on 11 July 1921. Meanwhile, Grace was continuing his European tour where 
he was apparently having some success. He had sold and shipped ten tractors to 
Germany. Clarke expressed the hope that having broken into that market that they might 
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be able to expand it greatly.
128
 Attempting to find a way around an old stumbling block, 
he broached the issue of separate tractors dealerships, enquiring tentatively if is it ‘fixed 
policy of the company in America to only appoint as Fordson dealers those firms who are 
already Ford car dealers, or who are willing and capable to take all Ford products under 
dealership?’129 To this Sorensen responded: ‘We deem it advisable over here to continue 
with all Ford agents with a full line of Ford products represented….We find it is the best 
policy… and therefore think that you should follow out the same policy in Ireland’.130 
This closed off the option of appointing specialised Fordson dealers who could deal 
directly with farmers. It left Fordson sales in the hands of Ford car dealers who were 
suspected of not having any real interest in promoting sales of tractors. 
Grace and Clarke continued to exhaust all avenues in their efforts to find sales, 
but their schemes achieved little in the face of the economic circumstances of the time. 
Without substantial sales to absorb costs, the price problem still hung over them. The 
decision by Edsel and Henry Ford to permit United States-made tractors to be purchased 
by European branches, sounded the death knell for Fordson tractor production in Ireland, 
as the small number of tractors sold in Europe could easily be supplied from Detroit 
which was now back in full production.  Finally, with little or no sales, Sorensen 
instructed Grace to dispose of his remaining stock.
131
  No specific date was yet stated for 
ending production, but the departure of the tractor business, meant that a huge void would 
be left in Cork’s business, raising serious questions about its long-term future. While 
Grace had been scouring Europe for sales, Ford management in Detroit had been 
                                                 
128
 
E.
 
L.
 
Clarke to C. E Sorensen, 14 July 1921 (BFRC, Acc. 880, Box 7, Wilkins Papers, re:
 
Acc. 38, Box 45).  
 
129
 
Ibid., 16 July 1921.
 
(BFRC, Acc. 880, Box 7, Wilkins Papers, re:
 
Acc. 38, Box 45). 
130 C. E. Sorensen to E.
 
L.
 
Clarke, 8 Aug. 1921 (BFRC, Acc. 880, Box 7, Wilkins Papers, re:
 
Acc. 38, Box 45). 
131 WH, p. 106.   
 197 
considering Cork’s future, particularly in relation to Model T parts. In late July 1921, 
Sorensen announced some extremely good news to Grace. Previously when discussing 
the manufacture of different parts in Cork he said:  
We hesitated from time to time to give you the go head on these parts, but now we intend 
to push the Cork plant to the limit. There has been considerable discussion on the Model 
T motor as to whether it should be built at Cork and assembled at Manchester, but we 
now want it definitely understood that the Model T should be built and completely 
assembled at your plant in Cork.
132
  
This meant that as tractor production was being phased out, the new Model T 
business could be phased in. Henry Ford & Son, Cork would henceforth supply the Irish 
market with Model T motor cars, while continuing to manufacture engines, rear-axles and 
other parts for Manchester. 
In Britain, H. A. Bate was replaced by Charles L. Gould who had been head of a 
branch assembly plant in Omaha, Nebraska. Gould was supported by a senior machining 
manager from Highland Park, W. E. Davis, whose job was to supervise manufacturing 
operations and to improve Ford-England’s manufacturing efficiency.133 Well aware of his 
differences with the previous managers, Sorensen admonished Grace, ‘if you and Davis 
will work hand in hand on this, we are sure that you can put this across satisfactorily’. 
Davis was given the additional role of improving engineering in Cork. ‘We want to get 
you three fellows working together more than you ever have before’, was Sorensen’s 
advice.
134
  Now with a new high-calibre management team and the go-ahead to produce 
Model T’s in Cork the future looked positive again. The new arrangements would 
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eventually replace American imports with parts manufactured in Ireland, reducing freight 
charges and eliminating import duties.
135
 At the same time, it would eradicate problems 
brought on by poor handling and sea salt corrosion on the long sea voyage across the 
Atlantic.  But Sorensen’s entreaties fell on deaf ears, as the three managers resisted 
cooperation. Within a short while Gould and Davis were not even talking to each other, 
despite attempts by Detroit to mediate a solution.
136
  
With preparations being made to begin assembly work and the relative peace 
following the truce, Grace’s hopes rose and he set out to exploit this improvement and get 
local tractors sales moving again. Writing to Sorensen, he claimed to have received 
orders from 16 agents already, adding that ‘the only trouble here now is that the agents 
have been dead so long we have to get to shine the rust off them before they get moving’. 
He threatened that any agent unwilling to carry tractors would ‘get the axe’. However, 
since there were lingering fears that hostilities might resume, people were still wary of 
the future, ‘the farmers are not going to take any chances on purchasing new equipment 
which may be destroyed if hostilities are again resumed’.137 More generally, he described 
the very difficult conditions which motorists faced:  
because nearly all the bridges are blown up, and the roads are trenched, which makes it 
very dangerous for road travelling. I went the other day a distance of six miles and it took 
me 1 ¾  hours through fields, up lanes, and through small streams,….I hope you will try 
and appreciate the obstacles we are up against.
138
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As he struggled with the after-effects of the war, trying to find sales as well as converting 
the plant to assembly work, Grace had his hands full. Sorensen’s constant barrage of 
questions and criticisms finally provoked Grace. Exasperated, he had recourse to 
sarcasm. Answering Sorensen’s criticism regarding the number of millwrights being 
employed Grace replied: 
You must understand we have been erecting the reel type conveyor and that takes a lot of 
millwrights…you can also rest assured that everybody here on the staff is working hard 
and conscientiously, and we don’t go fishing or playing golf every afternoon at 4.30 p.m.  
I don’t know whether you realise over there the hell we have gone through here for the 
past year, and I feel quite proud of the fact that I have been able to keep out of politics as 
well as I have.
139
  
Grace felt particularly aggrieved by Sorensen’s accusation that he set out on the visit to 
Europe of his own initiative. He said: ‘You intimate that I have gone into this German 
thing off my own bat’. As he explained his attempt to obtain tractor sales in the interest of 
the firm, he reminded Sorensen that he ‘only did so after receiving instructions from you 
to do so–both by cable and letter’.140 This self-pitying epistle from Grace got no 
sympathy from Sorensen who responded with an angry letter which concluded:  
I should prefer very much if your letter of 12 September was not in your files at all, as I 
certainly do not intend to file the one that you sent me this morning. As I see it, it has no 
particular value and does not show the spirit that I had been expecting to receive from 
Cork.
141
 
Charlie Sorensen visited Cork in December 1921 and spent three days there dealing with 
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the various issues relating to the conversion of the plant to Model T assembly. One of the 
decisions to be agreed upon was where the tractor production equipment plant should be 
sent. Sorensen’s view was that it should be shipped to Germany and set up there. He 
sought Edsel Ford’s opinion on the matter.142 Despite the apparent plan to shift it 
immediately to Germany, the equipment remained on site for another year, producing 
tractors occasionally until it was finally removed at the end of 1922 and shipped back to 
Dearborn.  
Thus, the Ford tractor plant that was introduced in 1917 with such great 
expectations was now facing a new future as a parts and assembly plant. Originally 
designed to produce in excess of 20,000 tractors per annum, this capacity proved to be far 
in excess of demand in post-war Europe. In total 7,605 tractors were produced in just 
over three years, the largest output in 1920, when 3,626 units were produced.
143
 The 
effect of the world-wide recession came at a crucial time for the emerging Ford factory. 
The dearth of sales, apart from depriving the business of revenue, also undermined 
management’s ability to get the plant up and running with a degree of momentum that 
would have permitted the factory to achieve both quality and quantity goals; it never had 
the opportunity to reach its potential capacity.  
In his communications with Grace and Clarke, the issues that concerned Sorensen 
were sales, output, costs and quality. These never reached an acceptable standard. The 
plant lost money for all of the time it produced tractors; it needed a volume of sales that 
could only be achieved by producing motor car parts for Manchester. In competition with 
Dearborn’s massive manufacturing capacity, which in 1922 had seen 66,752 tractors 
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produced, followed by 101,898 in 1923, there was no business logic to retain a plant in 
Ireland producing a couple of thousand units.
144
 The decision to supply the European 
market tractors from America, ending tractor production in Cork was made by Edsel and 
Henry Ford and communicated to Sorensen.
145
  When closing down Cork, the question 
was, should the equipment be kept within Europe and perhaps another attempt made to 
produce. Sorensen had proposed sending it to Germany. Presumably, he had some hope 
of a large enough market being found there to support such a plant. In the end, the 
equipment was shipped back to the United States, suggesting that the only plant capable 
of producing the quality and quantity at low enough cost was Dearborn.   
The political activities in Ireland had little or no bearing on the decision to 
discontinue tractor production. The various political issues encountered were dealt with 
as any other production problem. Sorensen was insistent on being kept informed of 
unfolding events, but was equally adamant at all times that the company and Grace not 
get embroiled in the fickle and changeable business of politics. Political problems were 
seen as issues to be avoided at all costs, curiosities or distractions from the serious 
business of building cars and tractors.  On the occasions when an incident occurred in the 
vicinity of the plant, Sorensen having satisfied himself on the detail, always reverted 
quickly to the production problems.  
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CHAPTER FIVE   
Sabotage and threats:  
Problems with local powers (1921-1923) 
 
For Henry Ford & Son the truce signed between the representatives of the Dail 
and the British government promised an improvement in the business environment, and 
though their business was mainly export, the prospect of additional local sales, 
particularly of the locally-assembled Model T, was welcome. Unhappily, just when 
Ireland looked forward to the possibility of peace, a new challenge to Ford‟s business 
emerged. The Cork Corporation, which formerly had been supportive of the Ford 
venture, demanded in 1922, that the Ford company conform to the stipulations in its 
original lease and increase employment numbers to 2,000 workers, in line with the 
covenants agreed in 1916. The intervening years had seen the replacement of many 
conservative members of the Cork Corporation, replaced by younger and more radical 
Sinn Fein councillors, eager to put their stamp on matters. The dispute which followed 
pitted the corporation against a very stubborn Henry Ford and came close to closing the 
Cork plant.  
The land on the River Lee occupied by Henry Ford & Son was originally obtained 
by Richard Woodhead, acting as agent for Ford, under an option to purchase or lease 
which he negotiated with the Cork Corporation in late 1916. The agreement contained 
conditions which called for the erection of a factory and offices with an estimated 
building expenditure of £400,000, half of which was to be expended within three years, 
as well as the creation of a manufacturing operation employing 2,000 adult males at a 
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minimum wage rate of one shilling per hour.
1
 The original option was succeeded in 
November 1917 by a lease, whereby Woodhead agreed to lease the premises to Henry 
Ford & Son. The price agreed was £11,500 including £500 for the surrender of the 
racecourse tenancy.
2
 The contract also stipulated that in return for the above lease, the 
corporation and the Cork Harbour Commissioners, were to use „their best endeavours to 
apply and obtain from parliament such powers and authorities as may be deemed 
necessary to enable the corporation to complete said lease‟.3 Later, in a lease from the 
Cork Harbour Commissioners and the City of Cork to the company, on 27 February 
1918, Ford undertook to build a new roadway through its property to replace the road 
closed along the water front.
4
 A further agreement between the parties committed Henry 
Ford & Son to assume Richard Woodhead‟s obligations, including the agreement on 
building expenditures, numbers employed and rates of pay.
5
 
Percival Perry was acutely conscious of these conditions. Days before he left the 
company in September 1919, he pointed out that the available company financial 
resources were insufficient to finance the building extension as well as meeting its 
obligations under the agreements with the corporation.
6
  He reminded Sorensen that they 
were committed to the corporation to spend £200,000 and to employ 2,000 men. He said 
that these commitments, which were now unlikely to be achieved, were made during the 
war and had a time limit, which was now running out.  Typically, Perry recommended 
following the political route. He suggested that „if Cork city fathers are kept under the 
                                                 
1 Memo by  E. J.  Matz, Ford auditing department, 28 Mar. 1933 (BFRC, Acc. 38, Box 16).   
2
 
See chapter two.
 
3 Copy of contract, 28 Nov. 1917 (BFRC, Acc.
 
328 , Box 1).   
4 Memo by  E. J.  Matz, 28 Mar. 1933 (BFRC, Acc.
 
38, Box16 ).   
5 Dated 24 Aug. 1918, See  E. J.  Matz., 28 Mar. 1933 (BFRC, Acc.
 
38, Box 16).   
6 Minutes of directors‟ meeting, 29 Sept. 1919 (BFRC, Acc.
 
328, Box 1).   
 204 
impression that we are acting in good faith…they will not seek to impose literal 
interpretations‟. He believed that they had a way-out legally, because of the war, but was 
against taking „advantage of any legal excuses‟. An added complication was that the legal 
advisers to both Cork Corporation and Cork Harbour Commissioners had died recently 
and Ford would now have to establish relations with two new and unknown men.
7
  
Despite the fact that the date for compliance with the terms of the lease was still some 
years away, Perry was extremely keen that the management in Detroit were reminded of 
the issue. Whether he was anticipating problems arising from the changing political 
attitudes in Ireland and the increased influence of Sinn Féin, or whether he was 
attempting to prevent some other more personal information from emerging is not clear. 
Later, when the dispute with the corporation was in progress, Sorensen tried to use Perry 
as a scapegoat and shift the blame to him for going behind Henry Ford‟s back and 
making an unacceptable agreement with Cork Corporation.    
Following Perry‟s departure in September 1919 almost two years elapsed before 
the problem manifested itself. Under the terms of the lease, Ford was committed to 
building the road through the Marina and handing it over to the corporation by April 
1921. In January of that year, when Ford of Dearborn and Cork were both struggling 
financially, Grace wrote that „if our funds were in better shape it would be a charity for us 
to build the road, which we are obligated to build at this time. However, we will stall 
them off I think until the coming summer‟.8 By the time summer came around, no start 
had been made on the road and Grace was starting to feel pressure from the corporation 
who were becoming impatient with the lack of progress. Grace appealed to Sorensen for 
                                                 
7 P. Perry
 
to C. E. Sorensen, 1 Oct. 1919 (BFRC, Acc.
 
328, Box 1). 
 
 
8 Edward Grace to C. E. Sorensen, 10 Jan.
 
1921 (BFRC, Acc.572, Box17).   
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permission to proceed, as he believed the corporation had been „very patient and lenient 
over the whole proposition‟.9  
Municipal elections held in mid-January 1920 had returned thirty Sinn Fein (and 
transport workers) as well as sixteen other Nationalists out of a total corporation 
membership of 56.
10
 The matter of the lease came up for debate at a meeting of the 
corporation in late July 1921, following which the Law and Finance committee was 
instructed to prepare preliminary steps to serve notice on Henry Ford & Son Ltd.
11
 The 
committee, with Councillor French in the chair, decided that notice should be „drafted by 
the city solicitor to be served on the company calling attention to a breach of a covenant 
in the lease binding them to employ 2,000 adult males‟.12  They also decided that there 
was a need to clarify the corporation‟s view to the management of Henry Ford & Son. 
Consequently, Councillors Sean French and Barry Egan met with Edward Grace at the 
Victoria Hotel in August. French explained to Grace that the corporation „believed that 
Messrs Ford had done more than anyone could expect them to in the circumstances‟ and 
they were not demanding any increase in the numbers employed until „Ford were in a 
position to do so‟. He claimed to have suggested that the date in the covenant could be 
extended to some future date „when, and if, Messrs Ford are able to employ the stipulated 
number‟. According to French, Grace replied that he did not see any difficulty in such an 
approach and undertook to write to the corporation outlining his position.
13
  
                                                 
9 
 
Edward Grace to C. E. Sorensen, 11 June 1921 (BFRC, Acc.572, Box17).   
10
 
CE, 19 Jan. 1920.
 
11 CE, 6 Mar. 1922, the record of French‟s 4 Mar. 1922 statement in the corporation minute book in Cork City and County Archive 
comprises of a clipping of the published record taken from CE, 6 Mar.1922. 
 
In general, the reports published in the local newspapers 
are more comprehensive than that available in the corporation minutes.  
12 Minutes of corporation meetings, Law and Finance Committee, 27 July 1921,
 
Cork City and County Archive. Italics by author. 
13 CE, 6 Mar. 1922, Sean French statement. 
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Following this meeting, Grace wrote to the lord mayor, Donal O‟Callaghan, his 
adversary in the mass attendance dispute a year earlier, outlining the company‟s situation. 
He acknowledged that more than the stipulated three years had passed since the lease of 
27 February 1918 and admitted that „the corporation as representing the citizens of Cork 
are entitled to some account of our stewardship‟. He went on to describe their progress 
and problems. On the positive side he stated that:  
Despite the most formidable difficulties due in the first instance to the war and after-war 
restrictions, and in the second to the hostilities in this country, we have erected buildings 
which cover over six acres of ground at a cost of £250,000, and equipped them with the 
most modern machinery at a cost of approximately half a million.  
He explained that from an initial state when only ten per cent of the Fordson tractor was 
manufactured at Cork, this had now risen to ninety per cent, as well as engine and cast 
iron parts for the Ford Model T car produced in the Manchester factory.
14
  Addressing the 
contentious issue of the employment of 2,000 men, Grace stated that the serious slump 
which had taken place in the motor trade worldwide had forced the company to reduce its 
workforce from 1,500 in January to a current complement of 940 men. He pointed out 
that the men were being paid at a minimum rate of 2s.1d. per hour, double the rate 
stipulated in the agreement, amounting to a total of £425,000 up to that time.
15
 He 
emphasised that it was in the company‟s interest, having invested very large sums in 
machinery and buildings, to employ as many men as possible to make the „expenditure of 
capital productive,‟ and it was the company‟s intention to do that.16 He concluded by 
saying that he was hoping they would „realise the serious difficulties with which we have 
                                                 
14 Edward Grace to Donal O‟Callaghan, 25 Aug. 1921 (BFRC, Acc. 38, Box 45). 
 
 
15 Rate equivalent to £5 for a 48 hour week 
16 Edward Grace to Donal O‟Callaghan, 25 Aug. 1921 (BFRC, Acc. 38, Box 45).   
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had to contend since starting our operations here‟.17   Tellingly, he made no reference to 
the key issue, the proposal to extend the date for fulfilling the employment numbers. The 
vagueness of his reply led Councillor Fagan to telephone Grace who responded that he 
had, as yet, received no reply on the matter from Henry Ford. French agreed to postpone 
his motion until Ford‟s reply was received. Again, on 22 October he contacted Grace for 
a reply to his proposal that „an extension of one year to the term during which they 
agreed to employ 2,000‟. Still, according to Grace, there was no reply from Henry Ford. 
Thus, the issue was deferred for a number of months.
18
  
Grace sent a copy of his letter to the lord mayor to Detroit headquarters and 
followed this up with a letter to Sorensen, informing him that the issue had come up at 
the corporation‟s meeting some three weeks before and seeking his views on the matter. 
He mentioned that the corporation „were willing to postpone the period of this obligation 
to 1 January 1922, rather than 27 February 1921‟.19 Sorensen failed to reply until early 
November when he cabled to say that he would be in Cork in December.
20
 During this 
period, Grace was in regular contact with Sorensen on other issues, normally he kept 
Dearborn informed of his actions and problems and in turn got immediate replies from 
Sorensen with his comments or instructions, but on this matter he seems to have delayed 
writing to Sorensen until after he had written to the corporation. Also, his remark in the 
letter to the corporation about Fords „accounting for their stewardship‟ subtly suggests 
that he was writing of his own initiative, rather than replying to the corporation‟s 
proposal.  
                                                 
17 Edward Grace to Donal O‟Callaghan, 25 Aug. 1921 (BFRC, Acc. 38, Box 45).   
18 CE, 6 Mar. 1922, Sean French statement. 
19 Edward Grace to C. E. Sorensen,  31 Aug. 1921 (BFRC, Acc. 880, Box 7, Wilkins Papers, re: Acc. 38, Box 45).   
20 C. E. Sorensen to Edward Grace, 9 Nov. 1921 (BFRC, Acc. 880, Box 7, Wilkins Papers, re: Acc. 38, Box 45).   
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In Detroit, Sorensen was extremely busy and preoccupied with the massive River 
Rouge project. While the plant was still in the course of construction, production had 
already started in the foundry.
21
 Whether Grace was conscious of Sorensen‟s workload or 
was holding back the information for some other reason is not clear. Around this time, he 
was struggling with the tractor sales problems and also dealing with the issue of the Cork 
Building Sites & Construction Company which may have left him reluctant to raise 
another contentious issue with Sorensen.
22
 While the corporation were seeking an answer 
to the postponement issue, Grace was clearly in regular communication with Sorensen, 
but was not pressing for an answer. In the event, no answer was forthcoming until 
Sorensen‟s three day visit to Cork in December 1921. During Sorensen‟s visit, 
O‟Callaghan invited him to discuss the problem privately. He said: „I hope to have 
present with me the chairman of the Cork Harbour Commissioners. His interest, like my 
own, is simply the welfare alike of Cork and of Henry Ford & Son‟.23  
There is some doubt over what was agreed at this meeting as both sides have 
different versions of the discussions. Representing the Cork Corporation, Sean French 
claimed that „in the presence of several members of the council, Mr Sorensen agreed to 
the corporation‟s demand, saying that instead of 2,000 men there would be more than 
20,000 employed in Ford in the future‟. Thus, when Sorensen departed from Cork, the 
corporation were left with the understanding that „that he fully appreciated and agreed to 
the corporation‟s demand‟.24  
                                                 
21 NH, vol. II, p. 212. Blast furnaces had already come into operation and in Nov. the casting of  Model T cylinder blocks began.    
22 The issue of  the Cork Building Sites & Construction Company will be dealt with below; see Edward Grace to C. E. Sorensen, 4 
Oct. 1921 (BFRC, Acc.38 , Box 45).   
23 Donal O‟Callaghan to C. E. Sorensen, 3 Dec. 1921 (BFRC, Acc.
 
38, Box 45).   
24 CE, 6 Mar. 1922, Sean French statement. 
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In contrast, Sorensen who had attended the meeting in the company of Grace and 
John J. Horgan, the Ford company solicitor, never mentioned any such agreement when 
he wrote later to Grace from Berlin. Instead he demanded that Ford „be relieved of this 
ridiculous situation‟.25 Grace replied promising to see the lord mayor and to do his best to 
correct matters when O‟Callaghan returned from the Treaty debate in Dublin.26 He 
pointed out the difficulties, not to mention the risk of bad publicity, and that the 
corporation might want compensation. He enquired: „If they gave us fee simple title to 
the property now wiping out all the conditions of the lease-would you be willing to 
consider giving back to them a portion of the property, or a sum of money in 
compensation?‟27 This appears to be the first mention of fee simple, while previous 
comments were made about „impossible arrangements‟ and „ridiculous situations‟, Grace 
had now inadvertently articulated what would become Ford‟s demand. While the idea of 
a bargaining tool might have eased Grace‟s difficulties with the corporation, it was 
unlikely to find favour with „Cast-Iron‟ Charlie Sorensen. There is no record of 
Sorensen‟s reply, but he is unlikely to have agreed. 
In subsequent letters, Sorensen failed to mention any agreement on the 
troublesome covenants or any commitment to achieve the manpower numbers. Instead, 
he went on the attack, blaming Percival Perry for agreeing a bad deal, alleging that he had 
structured the deal so that he could purchase land and take advantage of a subsequent 
property boom in the city.
28
 While Perry‟s plan had apparently failed, Sorensen, refused 
                                                 
25 C. E. Sorensen to Edward Grace, 17 Dec. 1921 (BFRC, Acc.
 
38 , Box 45).   
26 The Treaty was signed on 6 Dec. 1921 and Treaty debates took place between 14 Dec. 1921 and 7 Jan. 1922.   
27 Edward Grace to C. E. Sorensen, 23 Dec. 1921 (BFRC, Acc. 38, Box 45).  „Fee simple‟ represents absolute ownership of land and 
the right to use or dispose of  it as one wishes. 
28
 
See chapter three. 
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to operate under the terms of the agreement, as he claimed that Henry Ford & Son were 
being forced to live up to „impossible arrangements‟ which were unfair to both the city of 
Cork and the company.
29
  
Armed with the justification that Perry had mislead the company, Sorensen was 
unwilling to permit any concession on the lease issue and while he had the luxury of 
threatening and ranting from a distance, Grace had to deal with the issue locally and 
attempt to get the corporation to agree terms. He was less aggressive and more attuned to 
the local political situation and was keen to avoid unnecessary negative publicity. In 
discussions with Horgan, the company solicitor, Grace suggested that he have a quiet talk 
with his counterpart, Galvin, the city solicitor. Deciding that their best course of action 
would be to avoid mentioning the contract, while at least maintaining, if not increasing, 
employment levels. In this way, they could avoid questions being raised about the issue. 
Immediately after the Treaty debate he wrote: „If we bring it forward now it is sure to be 
used as a plank in the platform of some of our local politicians at the coming elections‟.30 
Grace pursued a restrained and low-key approach to the issue, aware of the sensitivities 
of the political situation. No doubt, he was also conscious of the general state of politics 
and of the changes which could arise as a result of the newly independent status of the 
Free State. He was soon to meet with Arthur Griffith to explain the company‟s problems 
in relation to any new customs arrangements.  
With Grace‟s lack of action on the corporation‟s demands it was inevitable that 
they would return to the issue eventually. On 25 February 1922, the councillors‟ patience 
finally ran out and they voted to force Henry Ford & Son to comply with the terms of the 
                                                 
29 C. E. Sorensen  to Edward Grace, 1 Mar. 1922.
 
(BFRC, Acc.38 , Box 45). 
 
 
30 Edward Grace to C. E. Sorensen, 10 Jan. 1922 (BFRC, Acc. 38, Box 45).   
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lease and employ 2,000 men within two months.  The news immediately made headlines 
on both sides of the Atlantic. In Detroit, the evening papers carried the news that Cork 
Corporation had voted „18 to 8…to demand that Henry Ford & Son comply with the 
terms of the lease by which they were granted Cork Park for a tractor plant‟. The city 
„attorney‟ was quoted as saying that if Ford refused to comply he would be „compelled to 
proceed to eject the firm from Cork Park‟.31  Locally, the Cork Examiner, reporting on 
the corporation meeting of 25 February 1922 stated that Sean French, who had proposed 
the motion, claimed to be „tired of postponing the motion‟ and being put off by the local 
management who claimed to be willing „to comply with the clause, saying they would get 
back in touch with America‟, but this had not happened. With only 1,600 men working 
„three or four days a week, Messrs Ford were not entitled to any preferential treatment‟. 
Other councillors, such as Sir John Scott „would not agree to anything so drastic to such a 
large firm which gave so much employment‟. John Good suggested that the issue be 
postponed for a month „and that in the meantime they could get the opinion of the trade 
and labour bodies‟. In reply, Mr D. Gamble pointed out correctly that the Ford workers 
were not trade unionists. The lord mayor, Donal O‟Callaghan, felt that the corporation 
had been „very lenient with Messrs Ford in the matter of the employment and had not 
been treated properly by the firm‟. He continued that the corporation „had all along made 
allowances for the exceptional circumstances that prevailed‟. Galvin, the corporation 
solicitor and earlier described by Grace as somebody „who has always been our friend‟ 
suggested that if the covenants of the lease were not complied with they „would have to 
                                                 
31 Detroit News, 27 Feb.1922 (BFRC, Acc. 880, Box 7, Wilkins Papers, re: Acc. 38, Box 45).   
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take proceedings for forfeiture of the lease and proceed for ejectment‟.32  
The threat of ejection implied in the corporation‟s motion infuriated Henry Ford, 
who seems to have been unaware of the issue until it was published in the Detroit 
newspapers. On reading the reports he reacted angrily and immediately cabled his views 
to Grace:  
Papers here tonight state that Cork Council voted to evict us if we don‟t live up to 
terms of lease.  Make no changes in our plans and operations whatever. We stand ready 
to go and will do so immediately on their order without any further protest on our part, 
further, we will go no further under any restrictions of this lease. If this lease is not 
removed at once we will proceed to move to localities where we are not handicapped. 
Sorensen discussed this question with present mayor of Cork also Mr Horgan who 
knows what we want.
33
 
This cable became Charlie Sorensen‟s mandate for all further dealings with the Cork 
Corporation. Immediately following Ford‟s cable came Sorensen‟s version, addressed 
to both Grace and Horgan and reinforcing Ford‟s message. „See Mr Ford‟s cable to 
Grace today both of you now understand that the lease which was drawn up unfairly 
to ourselves and Cork Council must be cancelled at once or we will leave Cork.‟34  In 
Grace‟s absence, Horgan replied agreeing with Sorensen‟s view. Horgan had 
immediately contacted the city solicitor and warned him as to the consequences if the 
notice was served by the council.
35
 The following day Grace received the notice from 
the corporation demanding that they increase the workforce to two thousand men in 
                                                 
32 CE, Monday, 27 Feb. 1922.
 
„Friend‟ quote in  Edward Grace to C. E. Sorensen, 10 Jan. 1922 (BFRC, Acc.38, Box 45).   
33 Henry Ford cable to Edward Grace, 27 Feb.
 
1922 (BFRC, Acc. 880, Box 7, Wilkins Papers, re: Acc. 285, Box 56).   
34 C. E. Sorensen  to J. J.  Horgan and Edward Grace, 27 Feb.
 
1922 (BFRC, Acc. 266, Box 1).   
35 J. J. Horgan 
 
to C. E. Sorensen, 1 Mar. 1922 (BFRC, Acc.
 
266, Box 1).   
 213 
two months time.
36
 Acknowledging the notice, Grace suggested that the original 
object of the disputed covenants had been to „ensure that the company should start a 
bona fide manufacturing enterprise‟ and that objective had been achieved.  
Consequently, he continued:  
Mr Ford was determined not to submit further to conditions which would be a 
perpetual irritation and handicap to our business and which cannot be just. If the 
council persist…and refuse to settle the matter permanently…we are to take the 
necessary steps to close the Cork factory, surrender the premises and transfer our 
enterprise to some other locality where it will not be similarly handicapped.
37
  
Again, Sorensen confirmed this as the correct approach.
38
 
This was a new situation. Initially the corporation had tried to get Ford to live 
up to the covenants in the original agreement, or at least to agree arrangements which 
would see the covenants implemented at some suitable time in the future, however, 
Henry Ford and Sorensen were now not even prepared to discuss the employment 
levels, but were arrogantly demanding that the covenants be removed completely and 
that they receive fee simple title to the property.    
Meanwhile, the Cork Examiner launched a blistering attack on the 
corporation for its foolhardy decision, making clear its antagonism towards the new 
Sinn Fein controlled corporation. Pointing out that the citizens viewed „with alarm 
and a keen sense of anger, the grave situation which has developed out of the unwise 
and unjustifiable vote‟ they:  
Bitterly resent any attempt by a little coterie temporarily entrusted with authority to 
                                                 
36 Edward Grace cable to C. E. Sorensen, 2 Mar. 1922 (BFRC, Acc.
 
38 , Box 45).  Quoted in Sorensen‟s reply to Grace same day.  
37 CE, 2 Mar. 1922.  
38 C. E. Sorensen  to Edward Grace, 2 Mar. 1922 (BFRC, Acc.
 
38 , Box 45).   
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set in a manner which is unIrish, unwarranted, and unworthy. This city cannot afford 
that a corporation cabal …should jeopardise the employment of 1,500 men, dictate 
conditions to the greatest employer of labour the world has ever known and crush out 
a great industry that through Mr Ford‟s beneficence has been nursed through trying 
and troublous times.
39
 
More pragmatically, they pointed out that the consequences of the corporation‟s 
decision affected more than just Ford‟s employees. As well as „four outside firms in 
Cork doing production work for the Fordson Company‟, one of which employed 40 
men on Ford work alone, hundreds of others, including carters and dockers also 
benefited. Regular outward shipments of about 150 tons weekly together with 
cargoes of tractors to the continent had „helped the Moore & McCormack line to get 
freight carrying trade developed‟. Pointing out that even if the original jobs target had 
not been reached the economic effect was the same due to the higher wages paid.
40
 
Calling on the corporation to rectify their error, they said that „citizens will not 
submit to corporate dictatorship‟.41 
A separate contribution from the Examiner sarcastically pointed out that while 
the action cost the corporation nothing: 
The bright young men whom the recent election placed in power, egged on by 
advisors that ought to know better…threaten to give Cork a very severe lesson on the 
dangers of entrusting to inexperienced hands the conduct of the affairs of a great 
city….They will show the world how they can put Henry Ford in his proper place 
                                                 
39 CE, Th., 2 Mar. 1922. As well as the leading article, they published two photos, one taken before the arrival of Ford and the other 
of the Fordson works on the Marina, which demonstrated graphically the scale of the company‟s plant. 
40 CE, Th., 2 Mar. 1922: Ford had committed to 2,000 jobs at a shilling an hour which equated to about £2,400 per week; despite the 
lower numbers, the „actual average wages is between £7,000 and £8,000 per week‟. 
41 CE, Th., 2 Mar. 1922. 
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…they will evict him from his establishment and find-if they can-a new tenant. 
Youth, youth [sic] you are a marvellous acquisition…we ought to cherish you 
forever. Bluff is a dangerous game at best and bluffing Henry Ford with his hundred 
thousand employees is not safe. 
A favourite theme amongst Irishmen is that our industries were cribbed, cabinned 
and confined by English trade jealously. None would be more ready to advance 
charge than I, but if I were put upon proof, I would find it difficult to show that any 
action the British government –well say in the last century– took meant the closing 
of an industry where 1,500 men at excellent wages were employed. Will our 
corporation have more courage than the British government?
42
  
Ford‟s workers too were anxious to have their voices heard when, despite very 
inclement weather, several hundred of the Fordson employees attended a meeting 
outside the works and were pictured in the Cork Examiner protesting against the 
action of the corporation. Addressed by one Dan Fitzgibbon, they unanimously called 
on the corporation to take immediate steps to rectify the situation, which they feared 
may „become a serious calamity to us, our families and the city of Cork‟.43 The 
chairman of the ad hoc committee cabled Henry Ford dissociating the workers from 
the action of the corporation, stating that they appreciated and endorsed Ford‟s 
position.
44
 While the Cork workers were keen that Henry Ford was aware of their 
loyalty, others saw an opportunity. The editor of the Belfast Telegraph, seeing an 
opening for industry in the north of Ireland, cabled Henry Ford saying „try Belfast 
                                                 
42 CE, 2 Mar. 1922, The Corporate Dilemma, „a special contribution by Murricaun.‟ 
43 2 Mar. 1922 in  CE, 3 Mar. 1922. 
44 CE, 3 Mar. 1922, Also BFRC, Acc.38, Box 45. 
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instead [of] Cork welcome assured and Ulstermen can work‟.45 
Other local organisations, too, were alarmed at the situation and a flurry of 
meetings was reported. The Chamber of Commerce invited councillors Barry Egan 
and Sean French to address their meeting to hear a résumé of the negotiations which 
had led to the impasse. They decided that corporation should be requested to „get in 
touch with Ford to agree an amicable settlement‟.46 Meanwhile a deputation from 
CIDA met with Edward Grace.
47
 The CIDA had always had a special interest in 
improving the industrial base of Cork as well as assisting Ford in establishing their 
new industry in Cork.
48
 After their meeting they expressed the view that they were 
„hopeful that a satisfactory settlement is yet possible‟.49 The Cork Ratepayers 
Association who stated that they had „rarely known such a universal outburst of 
public indignation against any local act of the corporation‟, also supported Henry 
Ford, demanding that the corporation rescind the objectionable resolution and that 
Ford be granted the new clauses that he sought in the lease.
50
   
As we have seen, the editor of the Cork Examiner was very critical of the 
corporation‟s action and many letters published in the paper supported this stance. 
Several were anonymous, while at least one gave a false address.
51
 Nonetheless, they 
offered some interesting views. One contributor suggested that „Henry Ford…has not 
transformed our city into Tir na nOg, but has contributed to the happiness and 
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 to Henry Ford, 2/3 Mar. 1922 (BFRC, Acc. 38 , Box 45). 
 
 
46 CE,
 
3 Mar. 1922. 
47 CE,
 
3 Mar. 1922. Delegation comprised J.
 
C.
 
Dowdall, chairman, M. O'Herlihy, secretary, and E. Sheehan BL. 
48 See Riordan, Modern Irish trade and industry, p. 267. 
49 CE,
 
3 Mar. 1922. 
50 CE,
 
10 Mar. 1922, Meeting presided over by Sir John Scott, High Sheriff and councillor. 
51 CE,
 
7 Mar. 1922. The owners of an address at Wolfe Tone Street stated that one „M.
 
J.
 
O‟Sullivan‟  who had written to the 
newspaper earlier did not live at the address
 
mentioned. 
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prosperity of 1,500 families‟. He suggested that Ford‟s wage rates were not 
appreciated by other employers. „Is the corporation,‟ he asked, „unconsciously 
fighting a battle for the employers federation?…four days per week in the Ford works 
is equivalent to full time work in these concerns‟.52 Another writer suggested that it 
was „strange that the elected representatives of the workers-the Cork Trades Council-
have not a word to say on a question affecting the welfare of 1,500 of their own 
class‟.53 He went on to outline the benefits provided by the company, and referring to 
the Ford worker‟s elected representative committee, described the company as „the 
first experiment of democracy in industry in Ireland‟. On the same day as this 
anonymous letter was published, a report on the discussion at the Cork United Trades 
and Labour Council meeting appeared. The council pointed out that while Ford 
workers were not „organised workers‟, they nonetheless did not wish to hunt Ford out 
of Cork, but called on the anonymous writers to come out into the open.
54
 The 
appearance of so many well-informed contributions suggests that an organised 
propaganda campaign was underway by either the company or the Cork Examiner.  
However, despite the bulk of writers supporting Ford, a few wrote criticising the 
company. One correspondent, who was not afraid to give his name, blamed Ford‟s 
local supporters. He wrote: „That Henry Ford puts a pistol, in the shape of a threat to 
close down, to the Cork Corporation and to the citizens of Cork is surely humiliating 
enough, but it would not be possible if he did not get backing from your campaign of 
                                                 
52 CE,
 
3 Mar. 1922, Letter from „Tactics.‟ 
53 CE,
 
10 Mar. 1922, signed „An Organised Worker‟. 
54 CE,
 
10 Mar. 1922 
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misrepresentation‟.55  
Later Sean French and the lord mayor would claim, with some justification, 
that the newspapers were biased against the corporation and orchestrated public 
opinion against them. Certainly they gave little publicity to the fact that Fords were 
reneging on a legal agreement and using strong arm tactics to get their way.  The 
approach by the corporation in dealing with this matter reflected their political 
immaturity and naiveté. While they may have had a legal right to demand 
implementation of the labour clause, any consideration of the contemporary state of 
business, and Cork in particular, would have suggested caution. Even a cursory 
examination would reveal that the Fordson tractor business was operating at a loss 
and to demand that the company should employ hundreds of additional workers for 
whom there was no justification, was unrealistic and was bound to raise the ire of 
Henry Ford. Yet the corporation had a duty to seek to implement the agreement made 
earlier and while Ford management had engaged in prolonged delaying tactics, they 
may have felt that a „warning shot‟ across Ford‟s bows might speed up negotiations. 
What they did not anticipate was Ford‟s intransigent and stubborn response when he 
was threatened. Neither did they anticipate the response of public opinion articulated 
and perhaps orchestrated by the Cork Examiner. Ford had invested heavily in the 
tractor plant in Cork against advice and arguably, even against business logic. They 
had been operating for approximately two and a half years during which time they 
had coped with the difficulties of the post-war recession and the Irish War of 
Independence and they had seen the tractor business all but disappear. Now, to be 
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threatened with closure after bringing substantial employment to the city, no doubt 
seemed like „biting the hand that fed you‟. Over half a century later, Henry Ford & 
Son‟s publicity department put a benign slant on events:  
Henry Ford was doing his utmost to provide more employment for the citizens of 
Cork, but knew the council was trying to force him create extra work where none 
existed. Feeling that such a rash move could jeopardise the future of those men 
already employed, he opposed it.
56
 
            The confrontation gives an insight into the stubbornness of Henry Ford and 
Sorensen‟s role in implementing Ford‟s wishes. Ford was apparently prepared to shut 
down the Cork plant. Whether this was a bluff or not is hard to be sure. During this 
period the decision had been taken to wind-down tractor production and replace it with 
Model T work. Given the state of the world-wide economy and the excess capacity in 
Dearborn, it might in fact have suited Ford to close Cork completely and transfer all 
production back to the United States. Grace was caught in the middle, trying to walk a 
tightrope between the two militant forces. Henry Ford on the one hand, and a newly-
elected council, with a substantial majority of uncompromising nationalist Sinn Fein 
councillors, on the other. As the man on the ground, Grace tried to deal cordially with 
the corporation. Acting as mediator, he tried to soften the remarks of each side while 
achieving Ford‟s demand of a title free from „noxious clauses‟. He was aware of the 
very real risk of closure if the stubborn Ford management was pushed too far, but at the 
same time he was conscious of the new political forces exerting their political muscles 
in the council chamber. Sympathetic to the workers and people of Cork, he also had to 
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protect his own future career. His extensive European dealings and experience, together 
with the ineffectiveness of the contemporary managers in England, would have led him 
to believe that his future promotion prospects lay in Europe. For him to lose a business 
as substantial as the one in Cork would reduce his potential empire considerably.   
However, his actions were not always effective. He seems to have acted hesitantly 
and only reluctantly faced the issue, when to act earlier might have avoided the 
confrontation. With his knowledge of local politics and conditions, he was better placed 
to negotiate with the corporation. Despite the regularity of his communications with 
Sorensen, he was slow to raise the lease issue with him and seems to have ignored the 
corporation‟s offer of a postponement. His failure was to allow the issue to drift out of 
control. However, once the issue blew up he worked hard to find a satisfactory solution 
for the company. If Henry Ford had been determined to bring a plant to Cork, Grace‟s 
role in mediating between Cork and Dearborn was instrumental in ensuring that it stayed 
there, despite the obstinacy and inflexibility of the two opposing sides.   
While the stalemate with the corporation continued, Sorensen instructed Grace 
not to make any changes in his operations, but to discontinue all construction and 
installation work. „Employ no more help. Close up employment department.‟ More 
ominously he demanded to know what Ford‟s total current investment in Cork was.57 
Three days later Grace replied that he had „complied with instructions…our total 
investment £1,097,089‟.58 At this point, it seems likely that a review of Ford‟s situation in 
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Cork was under way on whether or not to continue manufacturing in the light of poor 
sales and the present political problem.   
The Cork Examiner of 7 March 1922, reporting the effect of these decisions said 
that: „construction work and the erection of all machinery and equipment at Messrs 
Ford‟s factory was discontinued yesterday. As a result 500 men will be thrown out of 
work until such time as the present dispute is settled‟.59 Soon the local labour exchange 
was having difficulty dealing with the additional influx of unemployed workers in a city 
where „already between 7,000 and 8,000 are in receipt of unemployment benefits‟.60 
Meanwhile, the lord mayor, presumably concerned by Grace‟s messages and the reports 
in the newspapers, cabled directly to Henry Ford: „Regret you appear mislead by hostile 
press misrepresents corporation attitude anxious to sympathetically cooperate with you 
attitude already explained to Mr Sorensen who was quite satisfied‟.61 By this stage, the 
expression of „cooperation‟ was unlikely to sway Henry Ford or Sorensen.  
With the chorus of criticism aimed at the corporation from all directions and 
another meeting of the corporation scheduled for Friday 10 March, a deputation of local 
dignitaries arranged a meeting with the Ford management. Grace and Clarke met the 
group which included Alderman Liam de Roiste, T.D., Diarmuid Fawsitt and Senator J.C. 
Dowdall, of CIDA.
62
 Later, Fawsitt circulated a minute of his interview to all the 
government ministers. According to this, Grace accused the corporation of „pin pricking‟ 
in a variety of ways, but especially in relation to the fulfilment of the lease. This had led 
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Mr Ford „without reference to his Cork advisers and representatives, to decide to close 
the entire plant‟ unless the corporation relented.63 
Attempting to break the impasse Fawsitt expressed himself „satisfied that the Ford 
company has passed the stage when the bona-fides of the undertaking might be called 
into question‟ and that there was „no longer any grounds for Cork Corporation insisting 
on the fulfilment of the clause in the lease‟. Nevertheless, he suggested that Mr Ford 
should be advised not to seek, at this stage, the fee simple, but that steps could be taken 
later. Meanwhile, he proposed that at Friday‟s meeting: „the corporation would be asked 
to refer the matter in dispute to their law adviser for settlement with the law adviser of the 
firm, the understanding being…that the clause…would be waived by the corporation‟.64 
The Ford management agreed to this suggestion and Grace gave a verbal 
assurance that the men recently let go would be taken back and the new road built, as 
required by the lease. According to this minute „suitable steps were then taken by 
Alderman de Róiste and others‟ to ensure that the corporation cooperated with this 
agreement and voted to rescind the recent resolution.
65
  
There was a large public interest in the subsequent corporation meeting. To 
ensure that only those who had business in the courthouse entered, in the absence of a 
police force, members of the Fire Brigade were on duty at the door.  The Cork 
Examiner’s report of the meeting included French‟s explanation and justification for his 
actions. He claimed that when it became clear that Ford had not lived up to its 
commitments, the corporation had only two choices, either to close their eyes to the facts 
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or take action. In advising the company of their responsibility, he denied demanding that 
2,000 be employed by Ford, but had assured Grace and Sorensen that they could comply 
when „they were in a better position‟ and that corporation  was prepared to extend the 
period for a year. Nevertheless, to say the motion which had been passed-the motion to 
force Ford to comply with their lease-was a motion to quit as the Cork Examiner and the 
American papers had done was „false and malicious‟. He believed that the attitude of the 
corporation had been grossly misrepresented to Mr Henry Ford.
66
  
Following French‟s presentation, the corporation debated the issue and was still 
divided and not easily convinced of Ford‟s bona fides. Councillor S. Nolan, referring 
back to early 1921 when men had been let go by Ford, felt that the layoffs were being 
contrived by the company for sinister reasons. He continued, stating that his grievance 
was that:   
The Ford factory was being run in the interests of a certain definite set of men and these 
were not Irishmen or Nationalists. There was a conspiracy down there to keep out the 
workers of Cork and to import foreigners and men from the North of Ireland. They had 
employed even ex-Black and Tans. Those who had been dismissed during the week were 
not Englishmen; Englishmen, Scotchmen and North of Ireland men were working there 
still, and the „ring‟ at Fords must be broken sooner or later in the interest of the workers 
at Cork and the Catholic workers of Ireland.
67
  
The lord mayor also complained of „a campaign of scurrility and falsification‟ by the 
newspapers which had mislead the public, while the truth was the corporation had made 
no attempt to force Messrs Ford to employ additional men they did not require.
68
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In return for Grace‟s assurances, Fawsitt and de Róiste had given a commitment 
to have the corporation see sense, now true to that promise, the corporation was 
persuaded to rescind their previous decision. They voted unanimously to withdraw their 
employment demand and thus lifted the implied threat of ejectment. „It was also resolved 
“that the city solicitor confer with the legal representatives of Messrs H. Ford” with a 
view to an amicable settlement.‟ The corporation also agreed that if necessary a 
delegation of two of its members would be appointed to visit Mr Henry Ford and explain 
the matter to him in person.
69
  
Generally, there was a huge sense of relief that the immediate threat to the plant 
had been removed. The Cork Examiner welcomed the decision and expressed a feeling of 
relief that the wishes of all the citizens had been implemented. No doubt the workers, too, 
echoed these sentiments. Fawsitt also seemed to think this was the end of the matter. He 
later wrote: „I believe that matter is now well under way to a permanent settlement being 
carried out‟.70 On Saturday 11 March, the day after the corporation meeting, Michael 
Collins, Chairman of the Provisional Government arrived in Cork by train from Dublin. 
On Sunday he addressed a massive pro-Treaty rally in the city, and before departing from 
Cork on Monday, accompanied by Fawsitt, he paid a surprise visit to the Fordson 
factory.
71
 As Collins approached the plant „the quay workers immediately identified the 
distinguished visitor, and cheers were raised all along the riverside‟.72 Later, the Cork 
Examiner enthused: 
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The party was taken all over the really wonderful works, the system of working and the 
procedure being lucidly explained by Mr Grace. The enormous mass of machinery which 
was fully employed and the great numbers of men surprised the visitors. In the casting 
room Mr.Collins cast four motor-car cylinders….Mr. Collins completed his visit by 
taking a turn on a tractor. 
73
  
The issue of the recent controversy was raised in the meeting between Fawsitt, Collins 
and Grace. Grace assured them „that all the discharged hands would be reemployed‟.74 
Before departure, Collins had the ritual photograph taken aboard a Fordson tractor.
75
 
With the immediate threat removed, the Cork Examiner reported that some of the 
men were being reemployed at once, with the remainder of the 600 returning „in a day or 
two‟.76 While, on the face of it, a resolution had been reached, the issue of the lease 
simmered on for some months. With the Anglo-Irish Treaty recently signed, the treaty 
debate, which would soon turn into a civil war, was raging. Against this background of 
turmoil, Grace continued to make contacts, working to find a complete solution, but when 
Sorensen detected this he commanded: „your last cable indicates you are still dealing with 
corporation. Read Mr Ford‟s cable again nothing else goes. Get proper title with no 
obligations. Nothing else will be considered‟.77  Quite how Grace was supposed to get a 
solution without dealing with the corporation is not clear. 
Henry Ford was adamant that he wanted not just the employment clause removed, 
but title to the land in fee-simple, without any impediments at all. As the solicitors from 
the two sides worked to find a formula for agreement before the next corporation 
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meeting, the corporation‟s solicitor, Galvin, was instructed to seek a number of minor 
concessions to benefit the interests of the citizens of Cork. The first related to a „right of 
passage‟ on the waterfront, while the second asked: „Will Messrs Ford give any 
undertaking that the number of men at present employed in the factory will be maintained 
for any period, or that the factory will be carried on on its present scale for any period?‟ 
Thirdly, he enquired: „Will Messrs Ford give any undertakings that they will not sell or 
sublet their holding without consent of the corporation?‟78   
In reply, J. J. Horgan said that he was „acting on Mr Ford‟s direct instructions‟ 
and that „our clients cannot consent to any of the conditions you suggest‟. Reminding 
them that Mr Sorensen had made it clear to the lord mayor:  
That the only limitations our clients would place on the development of the Cork factory 
would be those imposed by trade conditions and that they were fully determined to 
develop it to the greatest possible extent…these developments will eventually be on a 
large scale.
79
 
Thus, right up to the final decisive meeting of the corporation, Ford through his legal 
representative, remained rigidly intransigent, not prepared to give any concessions or 
commitments on either land or labour. The only commitment was of a vague and 
unspecified prosperous business future.  
On the eve of the meeting, Sorensen‟s message was calmer, but the underlying 
threat was the same, that if the outcome of the meeting did not meet Henry Ford‟s 
demands then there was only one course left: „Close the plant until they can look into Mr 
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Ford‟s wishes. They will find he is doing the right thing‟.80 There is no documentary 
evidence of decisions being made in Detroit at this point regarding the future status of 
manufacturing in Cork, but it seems certain from Sorensen‟s comments that if the 
corporation‟s decision had been contrary to Ford‟s demand, then the plant would have 
been closed, perhaps permanently.  Later Sorensen wrote in a more conciliatory, almost 
optimistic tone that „everyone of us here are very keen to do all to expand the facilities of 
the Cork plant, but at this moment none of us know whether we will have a plant there in 
a short while or not‟.81 
The corporation meeting of the 10 April 1922 finally settled the issue. Following 
a number of adjournments, the meeting was held in private with public and press 
excluded. A letter from Henry Ford to his solicitor, John Horgan, was read out which 
restated Ford‟s demand for the removal of the conditions under the lease and rejecting the 
recent conditions suggested by the corporation. After a protracted debate, Barry M. Egan 
moved that the conditions be waived and this motion was seconded by John F. Sullivan.
82
 
The outcome of the corporation‟s ballot, fortunately for the citizens of Cork, was a vote 
of 18 to 13 in favour of the motion that waived the requirement to employ 2,000 adult 
males for a period of five years. It also conceded fee simple title to the land as soon „as 
the Central Park Road has been completed and handed over to the Corporation‟.83 The 
following day, Grace cabled the good news to Dearborn. „Council granted all our 
requests, last night. Horgan sailing Saturday Mauretania with draft deed for your 
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approval.‟84   
Amongst those who voted in favour of the motion was the lord mayor, Donal 
O‟Callaghan.  He did this despite the fact that it was against his inclination to do so, but 
given the circumstances and for the good of the city and its citizens, he felt compelled to 
„make a sacrifice‟ and support waiving the covenants. He went on, in a persuasive 
analysis of the issue, to explain his actions. Pointing out that the dispute had not been just 
a „difference of opinion‟, but was „a case of a definite legal agreement voluntarily entered 
into by Messrs Ford and their predecessors in the corporation‟.  He insisted that the 
corporation had not attempted to „violate that lease‟, but had acted as custodians of the 
city‟s property and attempted to implement the agreement, as was their duty. He went on 
to accuse Ford of „hold-up‟ tactics in their approach to the legally binding agreement. He 
said: 
Nothing could be said…to justify the attitude taken by Messrs Ford to justify their 
demand. It was new to enter into an agreement and when one failed to carry out a 
particular part of that argument to insist that that particular part must be removed. When 
that kind of thing was done today with a revolver to force home the argument, it was 
generally known as a hold-up. The tactics of Messrs Ford were hold-up tactics introduced 
into business.
85
 
Originally at the meeting in December, he claimed Sorensen had accepted the clause and 
had „agreed with him that the clause would have to be carried for some time before the 
reversion to fee-simple‟, but subsequently, Ford‟s representatives had gone back on that 
agreement and demanded that clause be waived even though it could be „of no possible 
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advantage to Mr Ford to give them relief from corporate tyranny‟. O‟Callaghan felt that 
„public opinion had been stampeded‟ by certain elements and an „effort has been made to 
show that the corporation had been dealing in a petty spirit with Mr Ford‟. He refuted that 
view, identifying instead Ford‟s petty attitude. He placed on the record that he had, on 
behalf of the corporation:  
asked Mr Ford‟s representative for a particular site and later on for any site in a part of 
the property for a particular public purpose which was badly needed at the time, he was 
definitely told that there was not one square inch of that property which could be parted 
with by Messrs Fords as it would all be needed for the purpose of development.
86
 
In conclusion, he felt that Cork had not been treated fairly in the matter and reiterated an 
accusation heard earlier from Councillor Nolan, that „they had complaints and reports 
from all over the city that very little over five per cent of the employees of Messrs Ford at 
the present time had been citizens of Cork‟.87  With Horgan on his way to Dearborn to 
explain the details of the agreement, Grace wrote to Sorensen asking him: 
To look over [overlook]…the apparent antagonism of some members of the corporation. 
If you fully understood the conditions here and knew under what circumstances the 
corporation was elected, you could make allowance for the action of some of the 
members. The present corporation is not a representative body, and when things settle 
down here, we will have a better set of men to run the city.
88
  
Grace was referring, no doubt, to the Sinn Fein majority of 30 out of the 56 corporation 
seats, many of whom, including O‟Callaghan, were anti-Treaty.89 
While the corporation might have agreed to waive the „noxious clauses‟, the legal 
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details had to be agreed between the two sides. Sorensen was impatient and unhappy with 
the legal wrangling which followed and was unwilling to accept the replacement clauses 
being proposed by the corporation, he wrote to Grace:  
Your letter of 23 May  infers that there are no real changes of any importance, which they 
are asking for, but read the changes over very carefully yourself and you will see the 
things they are suggesting are absolutely nonsensical. The changes as I see them are 
made in order to implicate somebody. Now then what has that got to do with giving us 
fee simple title to the property?…No records of past actions on our part or on the part of 
the corporation or any other individuals who took care of this are necessary in the final 
document…there is plenty of room for accusations, but as I stated before we would prefer 
to have a very simple transaction.
90
   
Whatever allegations he may have made to Grace or verbally to the lord mayor, Sorensen 
now had no desire to see these views written into a legal document. More aggressively, in 
case anybody had forgotten, he reminded Grace that Henry Ford‟s original cablegram of 
February 1922 was still the policy, that „we will go no further under any restriction of this 
lease and we stand ready to go‟.91 Despite the foregoing, Sorensen finally accepted the 
agreement. In early July, Horgan wrote: „I am glad to be able to advise you that the 
Harbour Commissioner executed and sealed our deed of agreement on the 25 June, and I 
hope the Cork Corporation will finally approve of their deed of agreement and execute 
same on the 14
th
 inst.‟.92 Finally, the agreement was signed on 17 July, following which 
Grace, no doubt expressing his feelings truthfully following more than a year of 
bickering,  when he closed, „it is a great relief to have finally closed off these matters of 
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contention between the Cork Harbour Board, Cork Corporation and ourselves‟.93 
For Cork and Ford‟s employees, whether they realised it or not, this whole saga 
was a close call. Despite Ford‟s aim of bringing industry to Cork, his patience was 
severely tested in this confrontation. The threats to cancel the lease if 400 additional 
people were not immediately put to work was like „a red rag to a bull‟. Ford prided 
himself on his generosity. While he was hostile to charity, his philanthropic method was 
to provide people with the means to help themselves.
94
 This is what he had done for 
Cork, he had provided a manufacturing business in which men could work to improve 
their prosperity, but if the city was to threaten him, as he saw it, then he was clearly ready 
to leave. He had the pretext and he had the power. He could be very stubborn when 
confronted or did not get his way. Perhaps, if the demand had been couched in more 
conciliatory language, the contest might have been avoided, but publication of the 
ultimatum in the American papers in such a lurid manner, put him in a corner. He then 
laid down his demands and he, or perhaps Sorensen acting on his instruction, was never 
prepared to deviate from them. Ford was whimsical and stubborn and if he felt that the 
gift he had bestowed on Cork was not being appreciated, he was just as likely to 
withdraw it. Over the years, he implemented irrational decisions against all advice and 
often fired men who became too independent, regardless of how loyal or long-serving 
they had been.
95
 Sorensen‟s staying power in the Ford organisation resided in his ability 
to carry out Henry Ford‟s instructions, to act as his watchdog all the way through, never 
deviating until the stated goal was achieved. William Greenleaf described Sorensen and 
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the clique which surrounded Ford as „servile and obsequious‟ toward him but „hard-fisted 
and overbearing in their relationships with others‟.96 
Fortunately, the initial impulsive and obstinate response of the corporation was 
moderated, though the final vote was still very close and three extra votes could have sent 
it the other way, with potentially unfortunate consequences for employment in Cork. 
Grace‟s role as mediator must also have played a crucial part. Despite a barrage of 
instructions not to engage with the corporation, he kept getting on his message across, 
mainly through the Ford‟s solicitor, J. J. Horgan.  Additionally, his attempts to clarify the 
difficult political situation may have had some restraining influence on his senior 
management in Detroit.  
Ford‟s attack on the corporation was based solely on bullying tactics and brute 
force and was a very unequal contest. Ford could remove the jobs and with it a large part 
of Cork‟s prosperity, all the corporation had was the power of the law.  As the lord mayor 
had pointed out, for someone who failed to meet an agreement to then demand that the 
agreement be replaced by one more beneficial to them, was both illogical and illegal. The 
corporation had only demanded its rights under the lease. The attitude adopted by the 
newspapers, particularly the Cork Examiner, presented the corporation‟s claim as a threat 
to both Henry Ford & Son and the jobs of Ford‟s workers. When this view was in turn 
taken up by other influential public bodies, the resultant „stampede‟ of public opinion had 
the effect of reinforcing Ford‟s bullying tactics While the corporation claimed at all 
stages to be willing to compromise with the company, Ford were unwilling to budge on 
any aspect. This was typical of Henry Ford„s attitude on so many issues-absolutely 
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obstinate, stubborn and unmovable once he made a decision or adopted a position. 
 Paradoxically, it may have been Henry‟s stubbornness that kept the plant open in 
this period. Having had his way in the lease confrontation, this victory may have left him 
satisfied to revert to his original aim of bringing industry to Ireland. From a purely 
business point of view, this would have been a good time to close the Cork plant. Ford‟s 
expenditure in Cork amounted to more than $5 million and was unlikely ever to provide 
an adequate return on investment.
97
 With tractor sales depressed and production restarted 
in the Rouge plant, any decision on the future of production in Cork, if taken by 
accountants alone, would probably have been to close it down. A further concern was the 
issue of tariffs. The Treaty negotiations which had concluded in December 1921, had 
created a self-governing state with power to set its own trade tariffs. Henry Ford & Son 
needed to establish what these political changes and the new reality would mean for their 
business. Since, increasingly, the Cork plant‟s role was as a parts supplier to Manchester 
and there were suspicions that tariffs could be introduced, Grace sought a meeting with 
Arthur Griffith in early 1922 to air Ford‟s concerns.98 Despite assurances given by 
Griffith, tariffs were in the offing and the economics of the plant were about to 
deteriorate further.
99
 The emergence of the Irish Free State introduced new question 
marks over the viability of the factory and tested Henry Ford‟s commitment to bring 
industry to Ireland. 
*   *   * 
 The shelling of the Four Courts on 28 June 1922 signalled the outbreak of the 
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Civil War and created a new era of instability for Ireland and for Ford. Most Cork IRA 
units supported the anti-Treaty side and their forces quickly took control of Cork city and 
the surrounding counties and declared the so-called „Munster Republic‟. This situation 
posed immediate problems. Grace cabled Sorensen from England in early July in 
something of a panic: „Political crisis here may mean that we will be forced to close this 
plant. Banks are not able to function.‟100 He had transferred his account to England, but 
was concerned that he would not be able to pay the workers. He was also convinced that 
the war would paralyse the country and suggested that Manchester should draw its 
supplies from Dearborn.
101
 Two days later Sorensen responded and instructed him to pay 
the workers with cheques, which he believed merchants would accept if they were backed 
by Ford. On the question of closing the plant, Sorensen was resolute, he said: „Our wish 
is to keep every man employed no matter what the political situation may be. Don‟t close 
plant under any circumstances‟.102 
Albert L. Byrns, a Dearborn auditor and one of Sorensen‟s key overseas 
inspectors, despite his need to visit Cork said: „It is impossible to visit Ireland at the 
present time, owing to the inclination of the Irish, persist in fighting anybody and 
everybody‟.103 Instead, he met Clarke in London. Clarke was there to open a bank 
account with Lloyds to be used to pay English suppliers as cheques deposited in Ireland 
were not being cleared. Byrns found Clarke very pessimistic and disheartened by the 
situation in Cork at the time. Describing the wholesale commandeering of vehicles, he 
stated that the Irregulars „were patrolling the streets and river-banks all the time looking 
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for someone to shoot at and that there were no roads nor bridges passable round Cork, 
and he feels that in a very short time they will come to a standstill‟.104 
By mid-July, keeping operations going was proving very difficult. As usual, 
Grace was keeping Sorensen up to date on the local conditions. He reported: 
Up to this point no actual fighting has yet taken place in this district, but it is expected at 
any time. Business is of course considerably hampered through the commandeering of 
motor cars, motor trucks, etc. A sedan of ours was taken, but returned again after they 
used it for a few days.
105
  
Communications with Britain and the Continent were proving difficult with consequent 
effect on materials supply. „All mail, telegraph and phone communication stopped except 
local and American,‟ Grace wrote on 17 July. The payment of the men by cheque was 
going smoothly and despite the various challenges production was still going at full 
pace.
106
 By the end of the month, all of Cork was holding its breath. The Irregulars were 
still in control of the area, but the Free State troops were expected to attempt to reclaim 
control.  The Irish Times was pessimistic about the coming battle, it reported that the 
national forces were advancing „by way of Kerry, Bantry Bay and Mallow, and the 
Irregulars fighting stubborn rearguard action, the struggle will end in or about Cork, and 
that city will suffer severely‟.107 No one could guess how much damage or injury the 
impending battle would cause. In the face of the many difficulties, Grace did everything 
in his power to keep the plant going and believed that he could succeed despite the 
imminent battle. He anticipated having to close the plant down for a few days, or a week 
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at most, while the actual battle for possession of Cork took place. Despite the potential 
dangers, he also resisted any intrusion by the Irregulars into Ford‟s business. During the 
period some of Ford‟s employees joined the Irregulars. Grace reported that „about 50 of 
our men have gone to fight with the Republicans. We have replaced these with new men 
and have not granted leaves of absence‟.108 This action was in direct defiance of the 
demands by the Irregular forces who were „conscripting‟ volunteers under threat, „some 
were taken from their business houses and their employers told their places must be kept 
for them‟.109  
When officers of the Irregular forces arrived to commandeer some of Ford‟s 
machines, Grace  resisted strongly. He told them that: 
They were playing with fire, and admitted to them that while I could not resist their arms, 
I still had a greater weapon and that was the fact that if they hampered and we were 
unable to keep running that they would be making enemies of our nearly 2,000 men, and 
I did not believe that they wanted a condition of that sort…a lorry came down prepared to 
remove some machines and I told them they could not have them and they were to get out 
and stay out, which to my surprise, they did, and have not troubled us since.
110
 
On a personal note, Grace had sent his wife back to the safety of Detroit and was keen to 
have Sorensen reassure her that there was „no necessity for her to worry about his 
personal safety‟.111 
To add to the other difficulties, at the beginning of August, the Irregulars took 
over the offices of the income tax inspector for Cork. With access to the books and 
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records they were demanding that firms pay taxes due for the financial year 1921/22 „to 
the Collector of Customs and Excise, Cork within three days from the date hereof ‟.112 
Following a meeting of all the major industrial groups, including Henry Ford & Son, the 
group agreed to refuse to pay taxes to anyone other than the accredited representatives of 
the government. When a deputation visited the lord mayor, Donal O‟Callaghan, to 
convey their views, he „did not conceal his grave anxiety that the consequences might be 
serious‟.113  
To counter the pressure from the Irregulars, Grace needed support from 
headquarters. Direct communication was not possible so Grace was forced to 
communicate with Sorensen through the State Department and the American Consul, J. 
A. Gamon, located in Queenstown. As a precaution, he sought „a strong cablegram 
ordering me to close the plant entirely if any troops interfere too much‟.  Using the threat 
of closure, he explained that he wanted the stiff cable „so as to bluff these people and 
make them stop bothering us by commandeering our men and equipment‟.114  
By 4 August, developments were expected daily and all were of the opinion that it 
would not be long before the battle. The only question was „whether the rebels will make 
a firm stand or whether it will be a running fight‟.115 With the attack by Free State troops 
imminent, demands from the Irregulars grew more persistent, chief amongst these was 
the demand for manpower. Despite the pressure Grace reported that „at present, there are 
about a hundred men out of the works with them, some who went willingly and some 
who were conscripted‟. Ford had also received demands to do work for the Irregulars, to 
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help with their defensive arrangements. Grace continued steadfastly to resist supporting 
them in any way. He was conscious of his limitations in dealing with armed soldiers and 
informed Sorensen, „naturally, if they come down and use force, we have no other option 
but to carry out their demands‟.116 Within the plant work continued on converting the 
foundry for the manufacture of engines and axles, with drag conveyors for the foundry 
almost completed and scheduled to come into operation in about a week.
117
  
After what must have seemed like an interminable wait, on the following Tuesday 
the Free State attack came by sea. The previous day a convoy of ships commanded by 
Major General Dalton had left Dublin with the aim of using the element of surprise to 
dislodge anti-Treaty forces from the city of Cork. Dalton „had hoped that they could dock 
at Ford‟s wharf, near the city‟, but was informed by the local pilot that the channel had 
been blocked by a ship sunk to deny access.  Instead, Dalton opted for Passage West, the 
only other deep-water berth available and came ashore there early on the morning of 
Tuesday, 8 August. The Irregulars made a stand at Rochestown, located halfway between 
Passage West and the city. For the following two days fighting continued in the area until 
the Irregulars were routed and retreated to the city, followed by the Free State forces.
118
 
Grace kept the factory working until 3 o‟clock on Thursday afternoon, by which 
time the public buildings in the city were in flames. At this stage they „thought it best to 
get all the people home before any harm came to them‟ as a furious battle was expected 
to ensue. Fortunately, despite having to run the gauntlet of rifle fire, none of the 
employees were wounded. In the city, the fight continued „until Thursday night at about 7 
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o‟clock when the Republicans decided it was unhealthy to stay in the city any longer, and 
after burning all the public buildings, excepting the courthouse, made a complete 
evacuation‟.119 Grace was able to report that the factory had suffered no damage „with the 
exception of the loss of one Touring car‟.120 Grace was fortunate that his obduracy in 
protecting Ford‟s production facilty and assets did not have serious consequences for 
him. He had a close call after his car was fired upon by Irregulars, who commandeered 
the car and incarcerated him. Charged with not stopping when instructed, the man who 
arrested him was, in Grace‟s own words „a former employee whom I was forced to sack 
about a year ago because of laziness‟. After a brief confinement, he was released 
following the intervention of some of his local friends.
121
 By Saturday the crisis was over 
and Grace informed Sorensen that:  
The city is now occupied by Free State Troops and everything is again normal. There is a 
feeling of relief after getting rid of the rebels, who are composed of a lot of irresponsible 
corner boys and people who have no responsibility or property coupled with a lot of 
fanatical leaders. Our friend, the lord mayor was amongst them, and I understand did a 
bunk in my car.
122
  
For Ford and its employees the fact that the crisis had passed without damage or loss of 
life must have been a great relief, tempered by the shock at the chaos left behind by the 
Irregulars, of the railway bridges blown up and the consequent elimination of trains to 
Cork. „The telephones and telegraph are crippled by all the wires being cut and the switch 
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board being smashed up with sledge-hammers, likewise the telegraphic instruments.‟123 
Meanwhile, Grace‟s wife, receiving the news in Detroit, must have been equally relieved, 
unfortunately the problems in Ireland meant that money could not be transferred to the 
United States so Grace found it necessary to call on his boss, Charlie Sorensen, to 
advance her two hundred dollars to tide her over.
124
 
*   *   * 
Away from the publicity of the lease dispute and the subsequent activities of the 
Irregulars, work in the Marina plant carried on as normal. The market for tractors did not 
improve significantly and in the year ending December 1922, only 2,233 Fordson tractors 
were produced. Cork‟s price disadvantage remained and, as we have seen, Detroit took 
the decision to discontinue tractor production at Cork. The final Fordson tractor, serial 
number 253,562, came off the line and shortly thereafter, the tractor machinery was 
shipped back to Detroit, clearing space for full scale concentration on Model T parts 
production.
125
 More mundane matters came back into focus. For example, the quality of 
the parts being produced was an issue due to the high level of reject material. During 
week ending 1 April, the average quantity of bad parts was running at almost ten per cent 
on a mixed production of tractor and Model T parts.  Individual, particularly low-volume 
items, had a reject rate as high as thirty five per cent. As the year progressed the 
proficiency of the workers improved and demand became more consistent, so that by 
December 1922 the foundry was operating at a more acceptable five per cent average 
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wastage and output was up considerably from 11,863 to 46,146 units per week.
126
 On the 
April foundry report a hand-written note by J. F. Miller, who was in charge of the Rouge 
foundry, states that the „high loss on finished items no doubt due to low production, 
otherwise a fair report‟.127  This supports the view that the problems caused by low and 
variable production, had a detrimental effect on all aspects of costs, making life doubly 
difficult for Grace in his attempts to achieve profitability. At least now, as the year 1922 
closed, he could anticipate a high volume of production which would allow him to 
operate the plant to better quality standards and achieve the profitability which had so far 
eluded him. 
At the time the English company was buying parts from Detroit, Cork and 
suppliers in the Manchester area, as well as making some of its own. With the Marina 
plant now available to concentrate on Model T parts, the aim was to reduce costs by 
substituting Cork parts for parts from other sources. One substantial item which they 
were just getting started on was the rear axle assembly; in December 1922 Grace had 
confidently promised that: „we will be ready in plenty of time before Manchester‟s stocks 
run out‟.128  
At every stage of his career in Cork, Grace had worked conscientiously to defend 
his plant and to ensure that the production output and quality were maximised, making 
sure that his customers were supplied on time. As the year 1923 began, Manchester was 
his major customer, so ensuring that they did not incur any disruption of supply was of 
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paramount importance to him. In mid-January 1923, Cork dock workers went on strike. 
Ford, operating a non-union business attempted to ship their goods as normal. As with 
politics, Grace was neutral on the issue of the strike, but was determined to ship his parts 
out to Manchester, if necessary using his own employees. The dockers naturally tried to 
prevent Ford from loading and unloading cargoes.  
The cargo ship Cumbria had been loaded with parts destined for the Ford 
Manchester plant „when‟, according to Grace, „the crew assembled before the captain and 
told him that they had been intimidated by the strikers and as they were residents of Cork 
they would not be able to sail the ship‟.129 Grace was not about to see Manchester left 
short of parts, so he hired a volunteer crew from the factory to sail the ship. With the 
necessary crew in place and the ship about to sail they it was discovered that the Steam 
Packet Company had not supplied bedding for the men. When Grace arrived by truck on 
Penrose Quay, he was informed of the problem and went directly to the Glengariff, 
another of the Cork Steam Packet Company‟s vessels, to borrow blankets, only to be 
immediately surrounded by angry pickets. Despite the threatening situation, Grace forced 
his way up the gangway of the Glengariff, to reappear soon after with the necessary 
bedding materials. As he made his way back down the gangway, his progress was halted 
by stones and bricks thrown at him by the striking dockers. At this stage, believing his 
life to be under threat he drew a revolver to protect himself. Pointing the gun at the 
strikers, he made his way to the Steam Packet Office. On the way, he was warned by the 
men „that if he fired he would immediately be shot‟.130  In the safety of the office, he 
waited until a military escort had been summoned. The truck that he had arrived in was 
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sent away to get military protection, but in attempting to leave was stopped by the 
picketers who beat the driver and set fire to the truck. Grace, however, was not injured 
and was subsequently able to leave under armed military escort. 
Grace did not clarify where he got the gun in his possession, but the action of 
using it to protect himself during the dock strike was bound to gain him international 
notoriety and to send „Cast-Iron Charlie‟ Sorensen into a fit of apoplexy. On reading the 
dramatic report in the Detroit Free Press, Sorensen despatched a cable to Grace: „Papers 
here say that you were in a roit [sic] after you displayed a revolver. Do you carry gun or 
did you carry one at the time. Cable reply‟.131 Yet it was Grace‟s drive to meet his 
commitments to Manchester and his previous promise to Sorensen that resulted in him 
acting in such an extreme fashion.  
Reporting to the Dearborn office, Grace suggested that: „the sooner we get our 
own boats to carry goods between here and our English plant the quicker we will be 
getting rid of such troubles‟. In explaining his use of the firearm he stated that he had 
carried a weapon as protection because of recent threats that he had received arising out 
of the strike.
132
  He explained:   
I hope you will clearly understand that the incident on the quay was not brought about 
through any desire of mine to flourish a gun but merely to protect myself, because I know 
if they had got me I would have gotten a terrible messing around.
133
  
Ford‟s non-union status together with Henry‟s well publicised anti–union stance would 
have angered the more militant striking dockers, while Grace‟s blatant attempt at strike-
breaking would have provoked extreme reaction from them.   
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Grace‟s battles to keep the plant going, as this event shows, were quite 
extraordinary. His efforts played a big part in ensuring that the plant continued operating 
and maintaining its role as a supplier of parts. Meanwhile, Manchester was a difficult 
customer always ready to stab him in the back, to make life difficult over supply issues. 
A subsequent cablegram from Sorensen highlighted the dilemma Grace faced. Sorensen 
warned him against guns, „Don‟t carry any firearms. Won‟t have any of our employees 
taking chances. It gives everybody the privilege of shooting you down when they know 
you go armed‟.134 Having warned him against using a gun to protect himself, he 
immediately attacked Grace on his supply parts to Manchester: „Understand that 
Manchester is now being held up for stock from Cork. Give us the facts about this. They 
are asking for two thousand cylinders and other parts to be shipped from here. Want full 
details on delay‟.135  
The aim of Graces‟ dramatic efforts had been an attempt to ensure that the cargo 
of parts left Cork, so that Manchester‟s production might not be interrupted and thus 
complaints to Detroit avoided. Now, despite his efforts, he was being taken to task for 
causing delays. Grace was emphatic that Cork was fulfilling its commitments to 
Manchester and the fault lay with themselves for inaccurate scheduling and erratic 
inventory policy. The issue of supplies, as well as quality, was a regular source of 
contention between the Manchester and Cork plants. Clearly, shortage of supplies and 
poor quality parts could have a very detrimental effect on the production lines in 
Manchester, but they proved to be very intolerant in dealing with these problems. They 
demanded apparently impossible standards of quality while producing and shipping very 
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shoddy workmanship to Cork. Whether this friction was due purely to productivity 
reasons or whether there was a political, anti-Irish motive, is not clear. Sarcastically, 
Grace retorted that „someone at Manchester must be suffering from brainstorm‟.136 
Despite the battle with the dockers and the disruptions associated with removing 
tractor assets, the plant continued to expand its range of parts.
137
  As well as axle 
assemblies, plans were afoot „to bring the balance of the assembly equipment over here 
from Manchester and do the whole motor assembly job here…by the end of this month‟. 
Other parts such as wheels were also being considered. Grace could say with some pride 
that: „January was the biggest production month we ever had, and we are increasing 
every day‟.138 Prospects for the future success of the plant looked secure in the early 
months of 1923. Despite the loss of the tractor operation, its replacement seemed destined 
to become a substantial and successful business. 
Following a request from Sorensen in late February 1923 for an update on the 
political situation in Ireland, Grace passed the request to J. J. Horgan. Horgan, writing on 
21 February, suggested to Sorensen that „the one bright spot here amidst all the turmoil, 
is your factory which has given a constant example of what industry and determination 
can accomplish, and the lesson has not been wasted‟.139 He was optimistic about the 
political state of the country. On the one hand the government was gaining control and 
normality was returning, „firing at night has practically ceased, also street ambushes and 
bomb throwing, the theatres are running normally, and once more we have a mail train to 
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Dublin and London every day‟. He was hopeful that the June election would „sweep both 
contending factions of ex-assassins into the political waste paper basket with the formula 
“A curse on both your houses”, and this after all would be the most satisfactory finale to 
the opera bouffe which began with Easter Week 1916‟.140 
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CHAPTER SIX   
  
Tariffs: 
McKenna’s revenge and Cumann na nGaedheal inertia (1922-1926) 
For the employees of Henry Ford & Son, any disappointment felt at the winding 
up of the Fordson tractor production in December 1922, would have been mitigated at the 
sight of the Marina plant being transformed into a major supplier of parts for Ford of 
Manchester and an assembler of Ford cars for the Irish market. In the same month, the 
Irish Free State came into existence. Cork plant‟s raison d’etre had been endangered by 
the departure of tractor manufacture and in order for Ford‟s new business to be successful 
and profitable they needed free trade to continue between the two islands. In the years 
leading up to independence, Irish nationalists had talked of protectionist policies, yet 
Griffith, arguably the greatest proponent of protectionism, when interviewed by Ford 
management in February 1922 had assured them of a continuation of the status quo.
1
 The 
generally expected outcome to demands for Irish independence had been a version of 
home rule, which, while granting some degree of political independence had not 
envisaged fiscal autonomy and the imposition of tariffs between England and Ireland. 
From the introduction of the Act of Union in 1800, more than a century of free trade had 
led to a high degree of integration between Britain and Ireland, resulting in many respects 
in a single integrated economic unit.
2
  Ford‟s decision to develop a manufacturing base in 
Cork was based on this reality. The 1914 Government of Ireland Act, which had been 
suspended until the end of the war, had in effect, precluded the imposition of tariffs. 
Ford‟s factory in Cork, while established primarily for the production of tractors, 
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 2 
incorporated the only Ford foundry on these islands and could equally serve as a parts 
producer for Manchester. To achieve flexibility of supply between the two plants, Ford 
needed and assumed that the existing fiscal arrangement would continue.
3
  
On 1 April 1923, Britain introduced a 22.22 per cent duty on imported car parts 
from Cork, the Irish Free State followed with a similar tariff on cars and motor parts into 
Ireland.
4
  So, Ford, having weathered the disruption of the war of independence and the 
civil war, found that their former location within the free-trade zone of the United 
Kingdom was transformed. Now, with the dissolution of the customs union, Ford faced 
tariffs on imports into both countries. The unforeseen additional costs that accrued altered 
the economics of the Cork operation, divided it from its major customer, and threatened 
its viability as a manufacturing operation. Ford, was the only significant company which 
was manufacturing in both countries and trading between them in products which from 
1923 attracted tariffs in both directions.
5
 Uniquely, Ford‟s situation was to pose a 
conundrum which defied easy solution for almost a decade.  
Before the First World War Britain had operated a free trade foreign economic 
policy. Reginald McKenna became Chancellor of the Exchequer in May 1915 and in the 
interest of freeing up scarce shipping space and conserving foreign exchange, introduced 
the McKenna duties. He „doubled the duties on tea, tobacco, coffee, chicory and dried 
fruits‟.6  He also introduced a 33.33 per cent ad valorem tax on imported luxury goods 
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including cars, cycles, watches, clocks, musical instruments and film.
7
  These protective 
duties were retained after the war to the benefit of the British motor industry.
8
 While cars 
and car parts were subject to the 33.33 per cent tariff, tractors were not.
9
 Ford‟s change 
from producer of tractors to motor parts manufacturer came just in time to incur the tariff 
on parts imported into Britain.  
Despite McKenna‟s justification of the duties as a wartime necessity, it seems that 
American industry‟s capability at mass-producing low-priced vehicles represented a 
threat to British motor makers which needed to be countered. According to Jacobson, the 
British government were conscious of the situation with motor car supplies and keenly 
aware of the likely post-war situation and the necessity to protect the British motor 
industry once hostilities ceased. Tellingly, Wilkins and Hill suggest that there were 
rumblings as early as October 1912, when sales of the Model T Ford began to climb 
dramatically, that „the rapid progress of the ungainly American car shocked British 
manufacturers, who were soon to seek tariff protection against the alien in their midst 
(and got it, but not for a number of years)‟.10 
Clearly, with most of Britain‟s engineering industry involved in war production 
and the motor industry doing its share, the output and development of private cars in 
Britain and on the continent of Europe was almost stagnant, while in America the motor 
industry was in full production, leaving European industry at a potentially significant 
technological disadvantage after the war. Hobsbawm goes so far as to claim that: 
The motor industry was preserved from destruction after World War I by the McKenna 
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duties, which safeguarded it from the overwhelmingly greater American industry, at that 
time virtually the only exporter in the world and undoubtedly capable of swamping all 
other mass-produced car manufacturers.
11
  
The duties, having served their purpose of protecting Britain‟s motor industry during the 
war, were not repealed afterwards, but continued to provide protection up until the 1950s 
with a short break in 1924-5.  A modification of the duty improved matters for 
Commonwealth countries when the Finance Act of 1919 introduced the idea of Imperial 
Preference. This had the effect of reducing the tariff from 33.33 per cent to 22.22 per cent 
for goods imported from the British Empire.
12
 When Ireland‟s financial relationship with 
Britain changed as a result of the Anglo-Irish treaty agreement, Appendix 10 of the 
agreement stated that:  
Ireland shall have the same constitutional status in the Community of Nations known as 
the British Empire as the Dominion of Canada, the Commonwealth of Australia, the 
Dominion of New Zealand, and the Union of South Africa, with a parliament having 
powers to make laws for the peace, order and good government of Ireland and an 
executive responsible to that Parliament, and shall be styled and known as the Irish Free 
State.
13
  
The interpretation of the Anglo-Irish Treaty that treated Ireland as part of the 
Commonwealth, meant that the McKenna duties applied to motor parts exported by 
                                                 
11 Hobsbawm, Industry and Empire, p. 217. Note: In 1929 the US exported about three times as many motor cars as Britain, France, 
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Henry Ford & Son of Cork to Britain, forcing the Ford Motor Company of England to 
pay 22.22 percent duty to the British Exchequer on all parts shipped into Manchester. By 
accident or design, this arrangement ensured that motor parts for American cars imported 
into Britain, whether manufactured in the Irish Free State or elsewhere, were subject to 
duty and therefore, continued to protect British motor industry from American imports. 
In addition to protecting the motor industry using the McKenna tariffs, the British 
government introduced further support with the Roads Act of 1920 when the method of 
implementing excise tax was altered to favour British motor cars. The new excise duty 
came into effect on 1 January 1921. Its main effect was to tax motor bicycles, lorries and 
tractors by weight, but to tax private cars by horsepower using the Royal Automobile 
Club formula. This formula arrived at a horsepower rating based on the diameter of a 
car‟s cylinders, ignoring its stroke and capacity, so that while two engines might have a 
similar engine capacity, the one with larger diameter cylinders was deemed to be of 
higher horsepower and paid a higher tax.
14
 The government levied the tax at £1 per 
horsepower. Since American engines had generally much larger diameter cylinders they 
incurred the higher rates. The annual licence fee for the Model T had previously been   
£6. 6s. 0d., but its horsepower rating of 22.5 under the new scheme increased this to 
£23.
15
  In comparison, most small British motor cars qualified as eight horsepower and 
cost £8. Consequently, despite a low initial purchase price the cost of running the Ford 
became unattractive. The thrust of these measures was to protect British motor industry 
from imported American competition and even from locally assembled American cars. In 
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any event, the upward trend of Ford‟s sales, which had seen a dramatic increase in 1920, 
was halted and did not fully revive until the introduction of the Model Y in 1933.
16
  
Like Britain in the early 1920s, Ireland remained a very open economy, the 
exception being goods which fell under McKenna. While the British government secured 
the interests of its motor industry, in the new Irish Free State the new Provisional 
Government that took office in December 1922, had no clear view on protection and 
faced problems and questions which were largely unanticipated. Serious consideration 
had not been given to the issue of trade barriers or protection, other than a generally 
agreed non-specific protection of home producers. The opposition were largely 
protectionist, but their refusal to take their seats in the Dáil meant that opposition was 
weak. The deaths of Michael Collins and Arthur Griffith in 1922 deprived the 
government of men with some economic skills. The man who took over finance, Ernest 
Blythe, according to Lee, „had virtually no economic policy, beyond the act of faith that 
prosperity would follow from fiscal rectitude‟.17 Blythe is said to have believed „that if 
Finance looked after the book-keeping, the economy would look after itself‟.18 Thus, the 
first Free State government took the view that the state should „do as little as possible‟.19    
With little economic experience the government were concerned mainly with the 
survival of the new state and delivering a return to normality. They were keen not to 
disrupt the country‟s main export which was agriculture. Prudent and careful policies 
were needed to cope with the results of the recent wars, and to deal with reduced 
revenues and high security costs, minimal state intervention was required. The decision to 
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retain the British arrangements unchanged left Ireland with a totally unsuitable selection 
of import duties. Mary E. Daly, to whom I am indebted for the following pages, states in 
her work, Industrial development and Irish national identity that: „These duties made the 
option of continuity that existed for both agriculture and banking considerably less 
feasible for trade and industry‟.20 Thus the pro-Treaty government, facing a range of 
pressing problems acted pragmatically, ignored the views of their fellow revolutionaries, 
and instead pursued a course of orthodox economics which confronted neither economic 
orthodoxy nor the British and Anglo-Irish establishments. 
The priority of achieving independence had united nationalists in the struggle 
against the British; independence, it was believed, would lead to a better life for Irish 
people in every way, both politically and economically. Beyond achieving this goal little 
research or preparation had gone into planning that future. The economic views of Arthur 
Griffith dominated Sinn Fein, but as Richard Davis commented: „Griffith was a 
propagandist not an objective student of economic theory; like other nationalist 
politicians he was compelled to account in psychologically satisfying terms, for his 
country‟s subjection.‟21  
Griffith drew loosely on the theories of the German economist Friedrich List for 
his economic inspiration. He envisaged an independent Ireland which would erect tariff 
barriers against goods from outside, protecting industry and encouraging the development 
of a sound and diversified industrial base to counterbalance and reduce the reliance on 
agriculture.
22
 He had presented his ideas to the 1905 Sinn Féin convention and these 
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views remained the accepted economic policy until independence.
23
 Griffith‟s view of 
protection was expounded by him as follows:  
Protection does not mean the exclusion of foreign competition, it means rendering the 
native manufacturer equal to meeting foreign competition. It does not mean that we shall 
pay a higher profit to any Irish manufacturer, but that we must not stand by and see him 
crushed by mere weight of foreign capital.
24
  
Griffith invited „investors of capital‟ to profit from Irish resources: „They can offer us in 
return profitable employment for our people and an enormous increase in strength 
socially, politically and commercially‟.25       
As well as developing a sound industrial base, he believed that: 
The whole policy would be underpinned by the active participation in economic life by 
the individual, local government and a national assembly. With the onset of independence 
the banking system and the stock exchange would come to serve the interests of the Irish 
economy and would sever their links with British capital.
26
 
There is no doubt that at the time of independence, Ireland was relatively backward 
industrially, this lack of industrial development was blamed by Friedrich Engels on her 
lack of natural resources, specifically coal. According to Daly, few Irish nationalists 
accepted that interpretation. Publications such as Sir Robert Kane's Industrial Resources 
of Ireland, published in 1844, argued that Ireland had sufficient resources to support a 
strong industrial nation. Later, other Irish nationalists such as Thomas Davis and Arthur 
                                                                                                                                                 
the Dominion concept: Inter-state and domestic politics in the British Empire, University of Warwick, 21-25 July 1998.
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23 Cronin, „Anatomy of Dominion status‟, p. 3. 
24 Arthur Griffith,  Resurrection of Hungary (Dublin, 1918), p. 146. 
25 Ibid, p. 148. 
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Griffith adopted this view uncritically. The restoration of an Irish parliament and some 
form of protection were believed to hold the solution to Ireland‟s problems. Looking back 
on the late eighteenth-century and the last Irish parliament, many „saw the 
reestablishment of an Irish parliament as the solution to unemployment‟ and a return to 
the prosperity of the period.
27
  Daniel O‟Connell, also „advocated protection for Irish 
industry, and in the 1840‟s the Repeal Association produced a report that emphasized the 
benefits of tariffs‟.28 Later, figures such as Thomas Davis and Charles Stewart Parnell 
expressed the view that industrial development required tariff protection. Thus, „by the 
time of independence the case in favour of intervention, and specifically of protection, 
appeared to be well established among the ranks of the dominant Sinn Feiners‟.29 The 
idea that Ireland had sufficient resources to support a large population, but that it was not 
being allowed to do so by the British government, was widely believed and a new 
government with the power to protect deserving Irish industries, while avoiding corrupt 
practices, would give Irish people the jobs and prosperity they had so long been deprived 
of.  
If the nationalist view was that Ireland‟s industry could be expanded to support a 
much larger population, then there was also the question of the kind of industrial 
development that was appropriate. Certainly, the idea of large industrial complexes and 
enclosed factories were not in the minds of the proponents of protectionism. In the 
nineteenth century James Fintan Lalor had expressed the view that factory work was 
alien to Irish society, that moral ideals were „more dignified than the worship of 
                                                 
27 Daly, Industrial development, p. 4. 
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industrial efficiency‟.30 Commenting on the condition of the lives of factory workers, he 
painted a gloomy picture:  
They pass their lives from the cradle to the coffin shut from the sun and sky and air, 
working in the furnace and the factory, dwelling in the filthiest lanes of a filthy town, 
amid everything that is most offensive and disgusting and revolting, an abomination to 
human feelings and human senses.
31
  
This contrasted with the rural idyll and traditional values espoused by many writers. One 
such, Fr. Peter O‟Leary, a West Cork Gaelic Leaguer, presented what one writer has 
termed „a simple-minded, evil-city-versus-virtuous-village polarity, tied up, of course, 
with an identification of England and English modes with the former and Ireland and 
Irish-language traditions with the latter‟.32 Therefore, in comparison with industry, 
agricultural output was the backbone of the country and despite the memories of the 
Famine it still carried all the positive images that nationalists believed in, particularly 
when compared to the grim, dark smoky factories of England.  
Thus, according to Daly, the leaders of the new Irish state inherited a conflicting 
mix of ideals: „A desire to protect rural society and its values, and to stabilize the rural 
population; a vision of industrial development minus the evils of capitalism, materialism 
and urbanisation.‟ They were aiming for the economic equivalent of „wanting to have 
their cake and eat it‟.33 Economically the reality was never going to match up to the 
dream. Griffith did not live long enough to implement any of his theories of industry and 
protection, instead the pro-Treaty group who came to power quickly discarded his ideas.  
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On the face of it, the leadership of Sinn Fein would not appear to support the kind 
of industry which Ford represented, incorporating as it did the worst kind of conditions-
large, noisy, hot, dirty and overcrowded foundry and machine shops. Despite Henry 
Ford‟s efforts at improving his factories with airy architectural designs and 
comprehensive maintenance and cleaning practices, they came close to Lalor‟s 
description. On the other hand, the many visitors who toured the Marina plant spoke in 
glowing terms of the complexity, organisation and efficiency of the amazing array of 
machinery. In addition, the substantial employment and high wages paid to a large 
workforce provided a huge commercial boost to the city of Cork and as such was 
supported by all local politicians. Henry Ford & Son proved to be mixed blessing and the 
politician‟s ambivalence was apparent in the early years of the Free State as they 
attempted to integrate the reality of Ford‟s industry with their nationalist ideals. 
Pragmatically, the government could never turn its back on such a large enterprise and 
risk losing the jobs it provided and alienating its workers. Yet neither could they 
wholeheartedly endorse it. 
 Following the signing of the Anglo-Irish Treaty on 6 December 1921, no fiscal 
changes took place in the Irish Free State up to 31 March 1923, as the Treaty had 
stipulated that to allow for an orderly transfer of administration, taxes and duties would 
continue unchanged during the transition period.
34
  From late 1921, Henry Ford & Son 
were changing over from tractor to motor parts manufacture. When it became clear that 
the Irish Free State would now have the same constitutional status as Canada, then by 
implication the same 22.22 per cent tariff would apply to motor parts imported into 
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Britain.  In addition, Grace was no doubt acutely sensitive to the protectionist rhetoric of 
republican politicians demanding tariffs on imports into Ireland. The decision to produce 
motor cars and parts in Cork meant there was now a risk of incurring duty in both 
directions. These threats of increased costs concerned the Ford management and as we 
have seen Edward Grace immediately sought an interview with Arthur Griffith, President 
of the Provisional Government. 
 At the meeting on 4 February 1922, Grace and Clarke set forth their views on 
customs duties applying to motor cars and component parts between England and Ireland 
In order to plan the development of the Cork plant, they sought information and 
reassurance regarding the provisional government‟s future arrangements. Griffith, no 
doubt anxious not to upset a major employer:  
expressed his personal wish to support us and facilitate us in every way possible, and he 
was sure everyone else in the provisional government would do the same.  He thought 
that there would be no tariff wall placed between England and Ireland, and that in the 
future the same scheme will exist between England and Ireland as in the past.
35
  
According to Grace, Griffith assured him that nothing would change for several months 
and asked him to put his questions in writing, setting out Ford‟s main questions, so that 
he could bring it before the next meeting of the provisional government.
36
 Grace 
promptly did this, elaborating that since 80 per cent of Cork‟s production output currently 
went to Manchester free of duty, that if the situation that applied to Canada were it to be 
introduced, then this would mean an additional 22.22 per cent duty on goods into 
England which would place „a serious impediment on our future developments here‟. 
                                                 
35
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Ford‟s wish was that free trade should continue between Ireland and England, on both 
motor cars and motor parts.
37
  
Despite Griffith‟s assurances, in the months following his death in August 1922 
rumours that the McKenna duties were to be implemented were rife. Edward Grace wrote 
to President W. T. Cosgrave on 8 March 1923 and outlined once more the problems that 
the tariff would cause for the Ford company, with the knock-on effect on the people of 
Cork, where he said „at least 15 per cent of the bread winners [are] directly related to 
Ford‟.38 Many small engineering suppliers scattered around the hinterland, even as far 
away as Macroom, would also be affected. He pointed out that the company exported 
parts to the value of £1.25 million and were thus at risk of incurring an „impossible 
burden‟ of about £275,000 in British tax. He referred back to the meeting with Griffith 
and the assurances which the company had been given; this had led to substantial 
investment by the company, now again he was seeking an assurance for the future. He 
said: „We feel quite sure that when the government realise the magnitude of the issues 
involved they will take the necessary steps to negotiate some form of trade treaty with 
England that will provide for the termination of the prohibitive duty on our 
manufacturing goods entering England‟.39 In closing, he suggested that if such assurance 
was not forthcoming, he would „regretfully have to confer with Mr Ford for the purpose 
of learning his intentions regarding the future of the Cork factory‟.40 
The latter comment clearly hinted, if not threatened, that the company was not 
prepared to sustain the additional costs and that the Cork plant‟s prospects were likely to 
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be damaged by the decision. Within government circles Grace‟s implicit threat was seen 
as a bluff. A senior civil servant, Kevin O‟Sheil, analysing Grace‟s letter, identified the 
statement as a threat similar to that used over the Marina lease which „although veiled in 
courteous and formal language, is on a par with their hectoring conduct towards Cork 
Corporation‟.41  Now again, he noted that Ford were threatening to close and move to 
England if the government moved to erect any tariff barrier.  He dismissed the idea that 
Ford might pull out and „give up one of the most valuable sites in Europe‟. However, in 
the unlikely event that they carried out their threat, he said: „It would be undignified and 
improper for the government to set a bad precedent by yielding to such immoral threats at 
whatever cost‟.42  
The issue of a threat to the status of the Irish Free State or its fiscal independence 
clearly was a sensitive issue. Henry Ford„s intransigent stance in the lease confrontation 
less than a year earlier rankled with sections of the new administration, while this new 
threat appeared to question their new-found independence and authority. It prompted the 
response that no company, regardless of its benefit to the economy, was to be permitted 
to force its views on the Irish Free State government.  The view was that a concession on 
tariffs would be equivalent to abandoning the country‟s new-found economic freedom. It 
was repeated somewhat histrionically by government advisor, Joseph Johnston, who 
noted that „any argument based on the effect of the customs barrier on Messrs. Ford‟s 
activity in Cork would be arguments in favour not of a temporary postponement of the 
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barriers but of abandoning it and our fiscal freedom forever‟.43  
The Revenue Commissioners announced in late March that from 1 April 1923 all 
English-manufactured motor cars and motor cycles imported into the Irish Free State 
would be subject to 33.33 per cent duty, though this figure was later reduced to 22.22 per 
cent.
44
 They had apparently followed the British line without significant objection or 
discussion on the matter, perhaps impressed by the substantial revenues to be gained from 
applying the McKenna duties on imports of motor cars and parts. Despite the fact that the 
government had earlier stated its intention „to collect the duty on dutiable articles 
entering its territory‟, up to this time it had not been clear if the duty would apply to 
English-made vehicles, though most people who considered the issue had assumed it 
would.
45
 Now, the retail motor trade expressed surprise and dismay at the move, due to 
its likely impact on trade, while Grace‟s plea to the government seemed to have fallen on 
deaf ears.  
On the same day, following a request by an independent senator, Benjamin 
Haughton, for permission to bring forward a resolution as a matter of urgency, the Senate 
debated Ford‟s situation. The debate was typical of the confused dialogue which came to 
characterise discussions of the Ford issue over the coming years. Haughton, who was 
from Cork, introduced a resolution asking that the minister of finance enter into dialogue 
with the British Exchequer „with the object of obtaining the maximum of reciprocity in 
import and export duties, and at a minimum of inconvenience to the respective 
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interests‟.46 Haughton, briefed by Grace, summarised the Ford company‟s situation, its 
background and the substantial benefits it brought to the Cork region.  He reminded the 
house of the promise made by Arthur Griffith that there would be no tariff barrier 
between Britain and the Irish Free State. Seeking some accommodation for Ford, 
confusingly he proposed that „if they could differentiate between the manufacture of 
motor cars and automobiles and other exports or imports, so that the duty we would 
impose on imports manufactured in Great Britain would about cover the exports of Ford 
cars from Ireland‟.47 
 Another independent Cork senator, James C. Dowdall, seconded the resolution. 
Despite being involved in setting up a company to assist Ford with shipping issues, he 
confessed to „some misgiving, because I can see the importance from the Free State point 
of view of being master of its financial resources and collecting its revenue, and for that 
purpose some sort of customs barrier is absolutely indispensable‟.48 While Sir Thomas 
Esmonde, in supporting the resolution was not sure if Ford were „hampered under the 
present arrangement. Personally, I have not the remotest idea of what the present 
arrangements are‟.49 In the end the motion was withdrawn, but the issue was raised in the 
Dáil the following day, where an equally confused debate took place and speakers were 
clearly ill-informed on the state of the motor industry in Ireland and Ford‟s situation in 
particular.   
Independent Unionist Sir James Craig, who instigated the debate, expressed the 
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view that the announcement by the Revenue Commissioners had „created a panic in the 
motor trade, and already a considerable number of orders had been cancelled‟.50 He 
proposed that „instead of an ad valorem tax of 33.33 per cent that free trade should apply 
to all cars‟.51 Another supporter of free trade, Dr. McCartan suggested that taxing imports 
„would be a beneficial act if we were manufacturing cars in this country. But the fact is, 
we do not manufacture cars in this country, and therefore I think it is a tax on the user‟.52 
While Independent Alfred Byrne protested against the tax, he supported those who were 
employed in the trade as motor agents, mechanics and general workers. He stated that 
„there are some thousands of persons earning a living in the motor trade in Ireland, and if 
this tax is imposed it will mean complete ruin both to the motor trade and the motor 
industry generally in this country‟.53 Refuting the idea that there was no motor 
manufacturing potential in the country, Dr White reminded the house that Chambers of 
Belfast, manufactured motor cars and he continued optimistically that:  
Gorman, of Clonmel, and many other motor firms throughout Ireland are practically in a 
position to build motor cars themselves, and the sooner we start building motor cars 
ourselves from the wheels up to the crank and the piston rods and the cylinders and 
everything else connected with motor cars the better for this country. As regards spare 
parts, I think the sooner we make these the better. I do not know that Ford‟s in Cork are 
making motor cars at present, but if not they ought to start.
54
 
Later a more coherent and informed view was presented by deputy Liam de Róiste, 
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supported by Cork Labour deputy, Robert Day. They highlighted the real problem for 
Ford which was the cost of duty applied by the British government to Ford parts entering 
England. To safeguard the two thousand jobs involved in this export work they requested 
that the government negotiate a reciprocal arrangement to remove this tariff.
55
 
In his reply, President W. T. Cosgrave did not mention the Ford issue but 
concentrated on the revenue which was likely to accrue from duties on imports into the 
Irish Free State. He stated that: „I have not been impressed by the case made for the 
motor owners, or with the fact that people who can afford to pay five or six hundred 
pounds for a car cannot afford to contribute anything towards the finances of the State.‟56  
He reminded the house that the Dáil had previously passed the constitution, including 
Article 74 which laid down that after 1 April 1923 duties would apply on articles which 
were previously free of duty, and until such time as it was repealed by Dáil Éireann, it 
must stand. However, he said if it is repealed „you will also have to consider in what 
manner you will provide the money you lose by relieving one section of the community 
in this respect‟.57  
Thus, Cosgrave followed the terms of the constitution and the McKenna tariffs 
came into effect despite the representations of Ford and the Cork political representatives. 
Cosgrave kicked the issue to touch, characterising the issue as one of taxation of the 
wealthy and placing the onus on those who supported free trade to find an alternative 
source of revenue. Whatever enthusiasm the provisional government may have had for 
finding a solution to the Ford dilemma and safeguarding the jobs in Henry Ford & Son of 
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Cork, they were not eager to forego the substantial revenue which derived from applying 
22.22 per cent duty to imported cars and parts. Despite various attempts at solving the 
problem, this was to be the predominant approach to the issue for the following five 
years.   
 During the week following the Inland Revenue‟s statement on the McKenna 
tariffs there was a feverish rush by motor importers to beat the deadline of midnight on 
31 March 1923. According to the Irish Times: „Never since the motor car became a 
practical proposition have so many cars been landed in Dublin‟.58 For Henry Ford & Son, 
Cork, these duties came as a blow, given the previous reassurances they had received. As 
Grace had pointed out earlier, the added cost of these duties to Ford in Manchester was 
considerable and threatened Cork‟s viability as a parts producer.  Ford‟s workforce of 
approximately 1,800 workers, with weekly wages in excess of £8,000 would have reason 
to be concerned at the possible ramifications of the new tariff arrangements.
59
 After the 
duty had been in operation for six months, Grace informed Sorensen that Cork‟s exports 
were valued at £496,228.18s.11d., which meant duty amounting to £110,273.1s.8½d. was 
payable by Manchester.
60
 Duty on imports into the Irish Free State was of little 
significance to Henry Ford & Son since most imported parts came from America whose 
duty rate of 33.33 per cent was unchanged, while only a small volume of parts emanating 
from Britain incurred additional duty.  
On another front, Ford had gained a concession. Following representations by 
motor car owners and members of the motor trade, who appealed for an amelioration of 
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the annual road tax, the provisional government was persuaded to change the annual 
motor tax with effect from 1 January 1923.
61
 The government introduced a revised 
formula for horsepower calculation, which was based on the total cylinder capacity of the 
engine.
62
 This calculation removed the discrimination of the previous system against the 
shorter-bore American engines. The maximum reduction of £5 applied only to the Ford 
Model T.
63
 While this move benefited Ford‟s sales in the Irish market, it was unlikely to 
make a significant difference as they were already the predominant motor supplier with 
about fifty per cent of the very small market.
64
  In contrast with the minor increase in 
sales which was likely to derive from the lower license fee, the introduction of the tariffs 
three months later had grave implications for Henry Ford & Son Cork.  
Grace reported the tariff issue to headquarters in Detroit and enquired from 
Sorensen „if he should protest and launch a campaign to bring about the cancellation of 
the duty‟.65  While Sorensen was prepared to lobby and bully to gain advantages for 
Ford‟s operations he was against overt political action and was not prepared to publicly 
denigrate the government.  He swiftly cabled Grace and warned him: „Have nothing to do 
with any publicity or propaganda against ruling of the Irish Government.‟66 
With the additional costs of parts from Ireland and the company not prepared to 
campaign for a change to the tariff regime, Cork‟s future in the Ford organisation was 
questionable. Even a superficial examination of the cost structure would indicate that the 
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arrangement was unnecessarily expensive. Parts from Cork were now incurring the same 
duty as parts from the Ford Company of Canada which had a much better cost structure, 
and while its delivery charges no doubt were higher, overall, Ford could have had parts 
shipped from Canada at a better price than from Cork.
67
  Equally, transferring the foundry 
equipment to Manchester would have provided the most cost-effective solution. In the 
short term, Cork continued to supply Manchester despite the additional costs involved. 
As a result, the financial results of the British company were very unsatisfactory. 
According to John O‟Neill, who joined the company in 1919 and became manager of 
Cork in 1932: „Manchester was required to buy from Cork. There was much debate over 
the prices that Cork would charge Manchester.‟68 He later stated that the decision was 
taken by Henry Ford and that „no other organisation in the world could have undertaken 
that project with the generosity and determination of Mr Ford‟.69  
Ford‟s Manchester plant already had serious problems even before the McKenna 
tariffs went into effect and added to its woes. Sales of the Model T had been declining 
since 1920. In November 1922 in an attempt to reverse the decline, Sorensen had 
conceded that Grace should begin making parts to change from left-hand drive to right-
hand drive, thus finally accepting that American cars could no longer be sold unchanged 
in Britain.  In the marketplace, the Model T had become uncompetitive and unattractive 
as British manufacturers such as Austin and Morris adopted Ford‟s techniques and 
introduced smaller, inexpensive motor cars more acceptable to British customers.
70
 
Within the English company Gould and Davis both proved to be ineffective, resulting in 
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Edsel Ford having to admonish Gould: „We have made you Manchester manager and 
expect you to run the plant.‟71 However the problems continued and later that year a team 
of experts were sent from Detroit to sort out the British mess.  
Regardless of Henry Ford‟s benevolence or philanthropy, the tariff situation was 
one that the Ford company would not continue to tolerate, so shortly after it came into 
effect, Grace was called to Detroit, where Manchester‟s increased cost provoked a 
comprehensive re-evaluation of the British supply situation and finally forced the 
company to address an issue which had been ignored by Ford senior management since 
Perry‟s departure in 1919. After years of vacillating over what should be done with the 
British business, now finally, a firm decision on the need for a custom-built plant at a 
new location was forthcoming. Perry had promoted Southampton as the location for the 
Ford factory and when Davis heard of the new tariff he raised the idea with Sorensen 
again: „This I believe should open up the Southampton proposition again as we have 
plenty of room for a foundry there if you allow [us] to buy the mud lands that we wrote 
you about sometime ago‟.72  
Henry Ford had disliked the Manchester site for almost a decade. Apart from its 
unhappy industrial relations, the site was too confined, offering insufficient space for 
expansion. With the growth of Ford‟s business, the company needed a much larger 
factory to satisfy growing British and European car markets; what was needed was a 
plant along the lines of the River Rouge plant which Ford had recently built in Detroit; a 
totally integrated manufacturing operation capable of meeting the company‟s European 
needs into the future. For it to be efficient and cost effective it was necessary to eliminate 
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the transportation of parts and have them produced locally or on-site. At that time 
Manchester was still basically an assembly plant, drawing parts from Cork and Detroit as 
well as local suppliers. Without its own foundry, Manchester continued to rely on Cork‟s 
production capability of key items such as engine-blocks and axles, consequently the 
foundry proved to be Cork‟s saviour in the years that followed. 
Grace visited Detroit in May 1923 and reported on the situation in Ireland and 
particularly the tariff situation.  Following discussions the decision was taken that for the 
immediate future Manchester‟s requirements of motor and axle assemblies would 
continue to be sourced from Cork. But it was a temporary reprieve on the understanding 
that, according to Wilkins and Hill, „Cork is to stop manufacturing as soon as it is 
possible to secure a suitable site in England and erect buildings necessary to 
accommodate our Cork equipment‟.73 For the moment, until such time as the British plant 
came into operation the Cork plant was to remain open, but long-term Cork‟s prospects 
were bleak. From this time on management assumed that Cork was finished. For 
example, Grace, when discussing a new British location, said: „Mr Gould agrees with me 
that neither Southampton nor the Bristol areas are the proper places for location with the 
Cork plant as a production base eliminated‟.74  
Given Henry Ford‟s commitment and earlier enthusiasm for the Cork factory, it 
was unlikely that he would close the plant completely and Cork‟s most likely role would 
have been that of assembly plant. The assembly system was one that Ford had used from 
the earliest days in the United States. Originally set up to minimise transport costs, even 
by 1914 there were 15 such branch assembly plants assembling on average about 10 cars 
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a day using parts shipped from Detroit. Later the number of plants and the daily output 
grew considerably to meet the demand for the Model T.
75
  By the 1920s the Irish market 
was such that the assembly of about 10 cars per day would have been adequate to supply 
it. Grace wrote to Sorensen in mid-July 1923 reporting that he was about to start 
assembling cars from parts supplied by Manchester. He expected to sell 2,200 cars before 
the year end which he said „was equal to Manchester sales in any previous year in the 
whole of Ireland.‟76  This output puts it in the same category as American plants a decade 
earlier. The hypothesis that Cork‟s future role was as an assembly plant is reinforced by a 
comment made by J. J. Horgan to Sorensen, in February 1924, when he wrote that „Mr 
Grace appears to think that it is Mr Ford‟s intention to move the Cork plant to the new 
site near London and to leave only a small assembly works in Cork‟.77 
During Grace‟s visit to Ford headquarters in Detroit in May 1923, Edsel Ford 
authorised him to examine locations in England to order to identify a suitable site for the 
new factory.  In company with Gould, manager of the English company, Grace 
investigated but dismissed a range of possible locations on the East coast of England, 
including Hull, Grimsby and Yarmouth. Others, such as Bristol and the long-debated 
Southampton were also rejected.
78
 They settled on the London area as being the most 
suitable. Knowing Henry Ford‟s insistence that his plants should be located close to water 
transport, they investigated both banks of the Thames before settling on a site in the area 
of Dagenham.  Occupied by the Ministry of Munitions, the lease on the property was due 
to expire within the next few months, so Grace had their solicitors contact the owners and 
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begin negotiations without revealing the Ford connection.
79
  As Grace reported, despite 
part of the site being swampy and requiring filling, the location was excellent, well 
served by labour and transport facilities. Located about ten miles from central London, it 
had its own jetty with deep water, deep enough to accommodate the largest steamships 
which left regularly for destinations all over the world. It also had rail connections with 
the Midland Railway, which allowed uninterrupted access to the English Midlands and 
North, facilitating the shipment of cars to the largest of Ford‟s market, in addition to 
accessing the regions where local raw materials were sourced. Even the roads from there 
were good, allowing easy access to London and the North for customers wishing to 
collect their new cars. Finally, he reported that site was „closely situated to East and West 
Ham and Barking where the best labour in London can be secured‟.80 Shortly after 
receiving Grace‟s report recommending Dagenham, Henry Ford sent Ernest Kanzler, his 
manufacturing manager, to Britain to substantiate this judgement.
81
 Despite a fairly 
cursory check of the site he was impressed by its ideal location and supported Grace‟s 
choice.
82
  
Now, with Dagenham decided upon for a new integrated factory complete with all 
its own manufacturing resources, Cork would only continue casting until Dagenham 
came into operation. Fortunately, the project took much longer to come into existence 
than originally envisaged. In the interval, Cork survived, acting as a stopgap, the future of 
the plant as yet undecided, but distinctly vulnerable. The imposition of tariffs had 
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deprived Cork of any major role in Ford‟s European future. The only hope for its survival 
appeared to be in the assembling of cars for the Irish market, but it was difficult to see 
how a market as small as the Irish Free State could support a business carrying the huge 
overheads already invested in the Marina. 
Once the McKenna tariffs were applied to Irish exports into Britain in April 1923, 
Henry Ford & Son were bound to comply with its requirements. In addition to the duty 
which had to be incorporated into the Manchester costs raising the price of the Model T 
even further, the additional administrative effort involved annoyed Clarke.
83
 Reporting on 
the first six months operation of the new tariff, he bemoaned the company‟s misfortune 
that after previously overcoming so many difficulties, the government was now 
introducing fresh obstacles.
84
 Around this time, Cork had commenced assembling Model 
T cars for the Irish market which added further to the administrative complications.
85
  
Describing the system Clarke wrote: 
The Customs Authorities in Ireland have decided to treat our factory on the lines of a 
bonded warehouse, and therefore all dutiable materials imported from America or 
England may be re-exported by us without having to pay any duty. On the other hand all 
motor cars parts or cars imported into Cork and distributed by us in the Free State must 
have duty paid on them at the rate of 33.33 per cent in the case of American materials and 
22.22 per cent in the case of British materials. In other words, the Irish government 
allows a preferential rate in the case of British manufactured goods, one-third lower than 
that applying to foreign goods. The Irish Government took over the British tariff system 
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and applies to the outside world just the same as England does, with the addition that it is 
also applied to England. The British Government in turn treats Ireland in the same 
fashion.
86
 
In the city of Cork, the arrival of independence and end of the civil war had not brought 
an end to the turmoil and chaos of recent years, instead it had been replaced by a period 
of industrial relations unrest which brought much of Cork‟s commercial life to a halt.  
Clarke described the situation to Sorensen: 
About three months ago the employers decided to reduce the docker‟s wages by 20 per 
cent and they immediately went on strike.  A similar reduction was declared in the case 
of workers in stores, shops, drapery houses, and the workers refused to accept the 
reduction and a general lock-out was immediately decided upon. The result was that for 
three months no ships have been unloaded in Cork except those chartered by us and 
during the past few weeks some ships handled by the Workers‟ Union.
87
 
Henry Ford & Son avoided interruption from the strike by chartering their own ships. 
They handled two ships per week to and from Manchester as well as ships carrying pig 
iron, coke and coal from other ports. They discovered that they could reduce the cost of 
freight by controlling matters themselves. Surprisingly, the striking dockers did not 
protest or object to Ford handling goods from their own ships. On the other hand, half a 
dozen ships which had arrived just before the strike was declared, had been trapped and 
remained in place and any perishable cargo aboard was now spoiled. Writing in October 
1923 Clarke said: „It looks as though it will take a considerable time before normal 
relations will again be restored. The whole city has an idle appearance, and the strikers 
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are engaged in “picketing” the various business houses concerned‟.88 On this occasion 
Grace obeyed the instructions he had received from Sorensen following the Glengarriff 
incident in January and avoided unnecessary confrontation with the pickets. 
With war conditions beginning to give way to more normal politics there were 
still difficulties achieving sales. Clarke reported that sales demand had dropped 
considerably during the months leading up to the general election on 27 August 1923, as 
people were afraid to make a large outlay anticipating further political troubles.  After the 
election the strikes and general unrest continued, forcing industry to a standstill, tying up 
money and discouraging people from investing in cars and trucks. The roads which had 
been damaged in many areas during the civil war and had not been repaired were now in 
a dreadful state, adding to the high cost of motoring.
89
 
Without any clear policy on protection, and having followed the British lead on 
tariffs, the Cumann na nGaedheal government decided that another opinion was 
necessary, so in June 1923 they set up the Fiscal Inquiry Committee (FIC). In the Dáil, 
Cosgrave described its purpose as „to secure a disinterested, balanced and exhaustive 
analysis of a complex problem on which the future of the whole country largely 
depends‟.90  He went on to say that the committee would deal with facts and that policy 
„will be a matter for the people and the government when they have the facts before 
them‟.91  Its terms of reference were:  
To investigate and report— 
(a) As to the effect of the existing fiscal system, and of any measures regulating or 
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restricting imports or exports, on industry and agriculture in the Saorstát, and 
(b) As to the effect of any changes therein intended to foster the development of 
industry and agriculture, with due regard to the interests of the general community 
and to the economic relations of the Saorstát with other countries.
92
 
From the outset the committee was unlikely to support protection, being described by one 
of its members, George O‟Brien, „as heavily in favour of free trade‟.93 Lee states that a 
„study of the evidence makes it clear that the committee was arranged to secure a safe 
majority for the views of dogmatic free traders‟.94 Given this situation, there was a 
likelihood that the committee would recommend removal of some duties and that Ford 
could expect some relief from its tariff problem.
95
 
The majority of industrialists who made submissions to the committee sought 
protection. Ford was amongst a number of the larger companies who did not attend 
though their case was argued by Professor A. O‟Rahilly. The views of the absent 
companies were given disproportionate weight over those who had made representations. 
The committee came to the conclusion that the majority wished no change to the existing 
system, while according to Daly, „tariffs were condemned as raising prices and costs with 
adverse impact on exports and employment‟.96 Later in the Dáil, Sean Milroy, stated that: 
„close on forty Irish manufacturing industries gave evidence before the Fiscal Inquiry 
Committee in support of protective tariffs, and each one of these, with one trifling 
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exception, were prejudiced or damnified by the report, not upon the merits of each case, 
but upon general principles‟.97  
The first interim report of the FIC proposed, uncontroversially, the repeal of 
irrelevant legislation inherited from the British, while the second interim report, as well 
as recommending the waiving of duty on a number of other items, advised „the 
withdrawal of the duty on motor accessories and component parts‟ as this duty yielded 
only a small amount of revenue, but discouraged „any attempt at assembling in the 
Saorstat‟.98 If the Irish government was prepared to implement this recommendation, then 
the removal of these duties would benefit Ford‟s recently introduced Model T assembly, 
but the real issue was whether the British government could be encouraged to reciprocate 
and remove the duty on parts imported into Britain, which was Ford‟s main requirement. 
Ford‟s representations seemed to bear fruit when in October 1923, as the FIC was 
finalising its report, Joseph Brennan, secretary to the Minister of Finance, wrote secretly 
to E. L. Clarke and offered Ford a deal. Brennan said that he was directed by the  
Minister of Finance who was prepared to negotiate with Great Britain with a view to the 
removal of the tariffs, despite the fact that its removal would be unfavourable to the Free 
State from a revenue point of view, provided, „a reasonable assurance can be obtained 
that Messrs Henry Ford and Son will continue to carry on manufacturing business in the 
Free State on a substantial scale‟. He continued that: 
It will be appreciated that the advantage to the Irish Free State of possessing an industry 
such as your firm now maintains in Cork is in existing circumstances the only 
consideration which would afford sufficient justification to the minister for abandoning 
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the present customs duty on imported cars.
99
  
In closing he says that „the Minister expects and trusts that this communication will be 
treated as absolutely confidential‟ due its sensitivity in relation to the fiscal policy of the 
Government.
100
 
Despite Brennan‟s appeal for secrecy and even as he was writing this letter, 
Clarke had already heard rumours about discussions between the British and Irish 
governments concerning the repeal of the customs arrangements and the introduction of a 
reciprocal trading arrangement for motor cars, parts and accessories.
101
  While no public 
announcement had yet been made by either government, Clarke informed Sorensen that 
there was no doubt but that discussions were underway.
102
 Clarke forwarded the 
minister‟s offer to Grace, who was in Detroit, where he had a good opportunity to put 
Cork‟s case strongly to both Charlie Sorensen and Edsel Ford. However, the decision 
already made to sideline Cork was not changed and after some delay, Grace replied that 
„in accordance with instructions he received from Mr Edsel Ford‟ that no such assurance 
could be given.
103
  
It is unclear why the government made this offer. Brennan commented that they 
had carefully considered the issue „especially in relation to the general inquiry which the 
Fiscal Commission has been conducting‟.104 Certainly Ford were lobbying for changes to 
reduce their costs, but were unlikely to offer the kind of guarantees that the government 
was seeking. Also, as Ford suspected that secret negotiations with the British government 
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were already taking place, they might expect to see the removal of the tariffs without 
having to make any commitments. In turn, the Free State government may have heard 
rumours of Grace‟s site investigations in Britain and believed that the company could be 
encouraged to maintain its current level of activity in Cork by using the removal of tariffs 
as an inducement.  
Blythe was determined to keep tight control of the state‟s finances and at this time 
he was having significant difficulty balancing the books and had announced cuts in the 
old-age pension as well as in teacher‟s salaries.105 In that situation it seems extraordinary 
that he would have considered foregoing the revenue from duties on luxury goods and 
face a storm of criticism from the substantial protectionist lobby, unless he believed that 
the government would receive a very firm commitment from Ford which would allow 
him to publicly defend the decision on the grounds of additional jobs. In the event, 
despite Edsel Ford‟s refusal to commit to such a guarantee, the Free State government 
apparently continued negotiating with the British and reached an agreement some months 
later.
106
 
When the final report of the FIC was presented in November, it supported 
agriculture as the most important industry in the country and decided that the introduction 
of tariffs would disrupt trade with Britain, therefore the Irish Free State should continue 
as a free trade nation.
107
 Thus, according to Lee, „the government relegated industry to 
second place behind agriculture‟ and did little to promote industrial development.108  
Regarding the motor industry, the committee, in addition to its earlier 
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recommendation to remove duty on motor accessories and parts, acknowledged the 
representations of the coach-building industry and suggested that there was „a possibility 
of encouraging the building of bodies for motor cars‟ and that to facilitate the existing 
local industry „a much lower rate of duty could be levied on the chassis when imported 
without the body‟.109 It was judged that the manufacture of chassis required a very large 
investment in heavy machinery, while coach-building was a traditional industry which 
was already in existence and capable of being developed, however this ignored the fact 
that increasingly motor cars were being built as unitary all-steel units and that the art of 
coach-building applied only to luxury or commercial vehicles. 
The FIC report, having rejected the views of the majority of witnesses who sought 
protection, brought forward a pro-free trade recommendation which purported to be the 
result of a scientific investigation, but in truth had never considered the case for 
protection.
110
 If this result went against the business view, it was also against public 
opinion. The partisan outcome increased demands for protection and increased the 
bitterness of Sinn Fein activists.
111
 According to the partisan Milroy, the committee 
presented a report which was „blatant piece of propaganda in the guise of an impartial 
report‟.112 The general dissatisfaction with the outcome of the commission‟s deliberations 
was shared by the Ford management, but for different reasons. Ford‟s requirements were 
not just for free trade to continue, but that the existing tariff burden under the McKenna 
duties be reduced or removed.  
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In February 1924, almost four months after the Brennan‟s initial offer to Ford, J. 
J. Horgan, Ford‟s solicitor in Cork, raised the tariff issue again with Sorensen. Horgan 
said he had learned:  
That the Irish government‟s offer still holds good and that negotiations have been 
satisfactorily concluded with the English government which will enable the Irish 
government to provide for the repeal of the motor import duties (on motors made in 
England) in its financial budget which will be introduced in the Irish parliament about the 
first week in April. A similar repeal of the English motor import duties on motors made 
in Ireland will follow, and the Ford plant in Cork would then be free of customs duties as 
between this country and England, thus returning to its original position. Before finally 
deciding the matter the Irish government are anxious for some kind of answer as to Mr 
Ford‟s intentions concerning the Cork plant…before the end of this month if possible.
113
  
Having apparently negotiated an end to the problematic McKenna tariffs as they affected 
trade between the United Kingdom and the Irish Free State, and apprehensive that Henry 
Ford & Son might close down operations, the government was again seeking an 
assurance that Cork would not be left with just an assembly plant. They appeared ready to 
sacrifice the motor duties, provided they could retain Ford manufacturing jobs and the 
jobs of ancillary suppliers, some of whom were totally occupied with Ford production. 
Pointing out that a decision by Ford to move to the new site near London would be 
disastrous for Cork, Horgan appealed: „I am sure it is neither Mr Ford‟s intention nor 
yours that the Cork plant should be virtually shut down and all our hopes for its future 
ruined but I fear other influences are not friendly to Cork‟.114 
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Regardless of the financial benefits which would accrue to the company as a 
consequence of the removal of the tariffs, Sorensen offered no commitment when he 
replied in late February 1924 that: 
The Ford Motor Company cannot undertake to make any such promises such as 
requested …because we cannot control the future....If the operating of a plant in Ireland 
becomes impossible under present conditions or any future condition, you know full well 
that we are prepared to stop, and we think it is unfair to extract promises from the Irish 
government which would mean guarantees to us. 
115 
  
Again there was no hint of any change in the decision to downgrade Cork. Moreover in 
the Ford archive, this letter has no forwarding remarks or initials on it, indicating that 
Sorensen did not pass it to any of the other Ford executives, suggesting that the earlier 
discussions were final and not open to further negotiation.  Ford‟s experience of the 
previous years of political and fiscal turmoil, as well as the difficulties with the local 
corporation two years earlier, when they had tried to use the employment guarantee 
against him, may also have made him wary of dealing with Irish agencies. Ford was 
clearly intent on replicating his Rouge plant in Dagenham. The new factory, complete 
with foundry and machine shops would be able to turn out a high volume of cars at low 
costs and consistent quality. With Cork likely to be downgraded or closed in the near 
future Sorensen, was making it very clear that there would be no commitments or 
promises by Ford. 
After rejecting the government‟s offer Ford could not expect special treatment in 
the 1924 budget. The budget understandably made no reference to the offer to Ford. 
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Instead, the government performed a pointless shuffle of tariffs. Blythe, in this, his 
second financial statement, introduced experimental protective duties on a range of goods 
including footwear, confectionary, soap, candles and bottles as well as commercial motor 
bodies.
116
 In addition, the FIC‟s recommendations for the coach-making industry were 
acted upon. Blythe told the Dail: „The tax on motor bodies will be 33.33 per cent. Chassis 
and vehicles designed for use in commerce or husbandry will be free of tax, as 
heretofore. The tax will be on the body and parts of the body solely‟.117 But the 
committee‟s proposals to remove the duty on motor parts and accessories were 
ignored.
118
    
Despite Brennan‟s claim that the government had done a deal with Britain on the 
McKenna duties, there is no information as to what became of the agreement. In October 
1923 he had stated that the government was „prepared to negotiate‟ with Britain to 
remove the tariffs and in February 1924 said that negotiations had been „satisfactorily 
concluded‟, but it is not clear when, or indeed if, the deal actually happened.119 Soon after 
Joseph Brennan‟s overtures to Ford, Blythe was telling the Dáil almost the opposite. 
Speaking in the Dáil debate in April 1924 he said: ‘The duty derivable from the new 
taxes is £324,000. Most of it, £256,000, comes from motor cars and motor car parts….It 
seems to us that this is, in the main, something in the nature of a luxury tax. It is certainly 
not a tax that bears very hardly on the poorest.‟120 He claimed to have sounded out the 
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motor trade and believed their view was that a duty on tyres should replace the tariff, but 
this would have to be investigated before any action was taken.
121
 
In strengthening protection for the coach-building industry and retaining the 
tariffs on cars and parts the government maintained a facade of protection on luxury 
goods, attempting to appease protectionists, without unduly changing anything. The 
tariffs introduced may have marginally improved conditions for the coach-builders, but it 
was not enough to satisfy the protectionists, while Ford, having failed to reciprocate the 
governments offer to remove the McKenna duty, were left with their dilemma unchanged 
and continued to pay duty in Manchester.  
As well as their operations assembling cars for the Irish market and 
manufacturing parts for Manchester, Henry Ford & Son, Cork took over the car sales in 
the Irish Free State on 1 July 1923.  Some signs of a return to normality were apparent as 
customers developed confidence in the political and economic environment. In early 
1924, modifications were introduced to improve the ageing Model T‟s appearance and 
performance. Sales improved somewhat, but the car was now well out of date and its 
demise imminent.
122
 Normal sales and marketing activities were being reintroduced. 
Clarke wrote that „the general conditions in this country do not show any great 
improvement as the political situation is not fully settled. Trade has been picking up 
splendidly until the recent split in the government and the mutiny in the army‟.123  
Meanwhile, in Britain, a change of government gave Ford some respite from the 
McKenna duties. A general election held in late 1923, resulted in the formation of a 
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government led by Labour and supported by the Liberals. The Liberals under Lloyd 
George still favoured the principle of free trade and part of the price for Liberal support of 
the Ramsay Macdonald government which came to power on 22 January 1924, was the 
removal of the McKenna duties. Under the Finance Act 1924 the Labour chancellor, Phillip 
Snowden, repealed the duties as of 22 August 1924.
124
 While this led to an outcry from the 
British motor industry who prophesised ruin and demanded restoration of the duties, Ford 
as substantial importers of parts from the Irish Free State into Britain, benefited from the 
change for almost a year.
125
 For the Irish government this unilateral removal of the tariffs 
represented an ideal, albeit short-lived, solution and may explain why the agreement to 
repeal the duties discussed above was allowed to lapse. However, the coalition 
government lasted less than a year and in October 1924 the new Conservative chancellor, 
Winston Churchill restored the McKenna duties with effect from 1 July 1925.
126
 
 Blythe‟s 1925 budget imposed duty on clothing and furniture.127 Demands for 
protection from industry and trade unions continued, but Blythe refused to introduce any 
other tariffs until a general election had been held.
128
 The McKenna duties continued 
unchanged. Describing them as „a tax on luxury expenditure‟, Blythe commented that 
„the loss in revenue, if we were not to pass these duties, would amount to £370,000‟.129 
The duty had increased from £324,000 in 1924 and the Cumann na nGaedheal 
government seemed to grow more dependent on it with each passing year. Despite the 
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magnitude of this revenue, as Blythe had stressed in the Dáil in both 1924 and 1925, 
soon, he was once more again discussing the removal of these tariffs with the British 
government 
In May 1925, shortly before the British re-imposed the McKenna duties, the 
Executive Council approved a letter to Winston Churchill, the British Chancellor of the 
Exchequer proposing a „customs union between Great Britain and the Irish Free State in 
respect of motor cars‟.130 It is not apparent why Blythe restarted these negotiations, when 
he had so frequently commented on the financial importance of the duties and previous 
experience had shown that the government could not afford the resultant revenue losses. 
No doubt the lobbying by Ford and its dealers had a bearing on the decision as it was 
later noted in a memo to the Executive Council that the proposal was introduced „owing 
to representations made by Messrs Ford as to the possible effects on their Cork works.‟131 
In the Dáil he claimed that the government were „most anxious that an important 
industry, unique of its kind in the Saorstát, should be facilitated in every way‟.132  
To satisfy the Irish government financially would have required the unilateral 
removal of the tariffs by the British, leaving Irish tariffs intact. This outcome was not 
likely and as the documents show, was not even sought. Alternatively, Blythe may have 
felt that the temporary suspension of the McKenna duties implemented by the Labour 
government, which permitted duty free entry imports into Britain and which was now 
about to be lifted, could be negotiated into a more permanent agreement.   
The Irish advance met with a favourable response from the British side, so 
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following meetings between their officials, Blythe and Churchill got together in early 
July and after considering various alternatives the British government proposed: „an 
arrangement under which, subject to certain conditions, motor cars etc., of British 
manufacture would be accorded a preference of one hundred per cent, on importation into 
the Saorstát, and vice versa.‟133 While the potential revenue losses to the Irish Free State 
were substantial, estimated at £293,807, British losses were considerably less at about 
£140,000.
134
 The proposal also meant that the existing customs arrangements were 
retained for European and American car imports and since British manufacturers would 
have an advantage in the Irish market, then all other sales were likely to reduce, which 
would lead to a further loss of revenue. Despite this, and aware that, according to minutes 
of the Executive Council, there was likely to be „considerable opposition in the 
Oireachtas to any proposal to surrender the power of charging duties‟ on imports into the 
Irish Free State, on 12 December 1925 the Executive Council approved the scheme.
135
 
No immediate announcement of the decision was forthcoming, but rumours were 
widespread and in February 1926 Hugh Curran of the Irish Times wrote to William T. 
Cosgrave seeking an interview to clarify the situation. Curran claimed that other 
newspapers who were writing about the removal of tax on motors seem „very definite and 
from the association with your name have acquired a certain authority‟.136 In the end the 
Executive Council appeared to lose its nerve and almost on the eve of the 1926 Budget 
voted to rescind the decision. The reason recorded, not unexpectedly, was „the heavy loss 
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in revenue which as further investigation showed would be involved in the proposal‟.137  
Later Blythe told the Dáil that:  
After many months of consideration the Executive Council felt compelled to decide that 
the basis was not one which they could recommend to the Dáil. It would have involved 
the ultimate loss of most of the £300,000 annual revenue derived from the import duties 
on motors. It would also have involved some unemployment by worsening the conditions 
under which firms engaged in the production of commercial or other motor bodies are 
carrying on.
138
 
So the issue was again dropped and the Ford company was back to where it started. In his 
statement to the Dáil Blythe expressed concern for the future of the Ford plant, but 
offered no real clue as to why he embarked on this most recent set of tariff negotiations. 
Both he and the Executive Council must have been aware from the outset that the 
financial and political costs were bound to be insurmountable. Their inability to act 
decisively; the long negotiations with the British and the agreements no sooner concluded 
than discarded; the dithering and oscillating between protection and free trade 
demonstrated a clear lack of policy or even conviction or direction in dealing with the 
issue of protection. Clearly Blythe was concerned to retain Ford, but in the face of the 
revenue loss and probable public disapproval, did not have the conviction to face the 
challenge of foregoing the import duties. While the tariffs on imported motors and parts 
were left unchanged in 1926, in the Finance Act, Blythe sought to assist Ford by altering 
the excise duty. He said:  
If the Executive Council have felt unable to adopt measures which would relieve the only 
motor industry in the Saorstát from difficulties which the taxation of another country has 
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placed upon it, we feel that now the time has certainly come when anything in our own 
scheme of taxation which can be said to operate unfairly in relation to the Ford car should 
be removed.
139  
He introduced a new motor tax rate of £10 which applied where it could be shown that 75 
per cent of the cost of producing the vehicle was attributable to manufacturing operations 
performed in the Free State. Since Ford was the only company assembling cars the 
revision benefited Ford owners.
140
 Blythe had rejected a petrol tax or a straight 
horsepower increase as it „would be unfair to the Ford car‟.141 However, this action did 
not please the Motor Trade Association who, while keen to see a general reduction of car 
tax, even before the budget had lobbied Blythe against discriminating „in favour of a 
particular car‟.142 
This change arose from a government investigation into road funding. In 1924, 
the government had set up a Road Advisory Committee to investigate the financing of the 
maintenance of the country‟s roads. In turn the committee appointed a sub-committee to 
inquire into the question of motor taxation in the Saorstát.
143
 The sub-committee received 
submissions from Ford, as well as the main motor agent‟s associations and motoring 
organisations.  Ford‟s representatives, Grace and Horgan, argued that the annual licence 
fee should be lower for home-produced vehicles.
144
 The sub-committee went on to 
consider various forms of taxation including taxes on imported tyres, mileage, weight or 
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petrol, as well as horsepower modifications.
145
 They also took into account the 
conclusions of the British Departmental Committee on the Taxation and Regulation of 
Road Vehicles, which had rejected a petrol tax and had settled on changes to existing 
taxes.
146
  According to Jacobson, the sub-committee favoured the imposition of a 4d. per 
gallon tax on petrol, while retaining the taxes on cars at a rate reduced by forty to fifty 
per cent.
147
   
The new duty applied to cars manufactured in the Irish Free State, regardless of 
their horsepower and capitalised on the fact that since 1923 Ford had been assembling 
Model T‟s which were rated at 22.5 horsepower and had previously incurred a license 
duty of £18.
148
 The new arrangement had the benefit of supporting home-produced cars 
without interfering with the overall taxation structure. However, it also led to an anomaly 
whereby the owners of older Ford cars ended up paying the higher rate while newer cars, 
albeit produced in the Free State, got off with £10. In seeking to reduce the rate of excise 
for all Fords, T.D.s pointed out the inherent unfairness of less well-off owners of older 
cars, which inevitably were more expensive to run, having to pay the higher tax while 
those with the newer cars paid only £10.
149
 In the Dáil,
 
Blythe replied to these appeals 
stating that:  
The new arrangement is made for the purpose of inducing or encouraging people to buy a 
certain make of car, the production of which gives a great deal of employment in the 
Saorstát. We do not see any reason why cars which were not produced in the Saorstát and 
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do not come within the definition, should be given a reduction in duty.
150
 
While this concession was of minimal value to the Ford company it demonstrated that 
Blythe was at least listening to Ford‟s representations and attempting to find creative 
ways of improving the company‟s situation. It helped Ford to sell a few additional cars on 
the local market, but the export business remained in difficulty. The changes in excise 
duty reinforced Ford‟s role as an assembler and supplier to the modest local market of the 
Irish Free State, but was of no assistance to its export business. The ongoing negative 
effect on Ford‟s costs and the general uncertainty regarding future tariff arrangements 
remained a hindrance to Cork‟s potential as an export factory and did nothing to 
encourage Henry Ford to retain a substantial manufacturing operation in Ireland.  
The pressure for protection led Cumann na nGaedheal, to establish another 
agency to investigate matters relating to tariffs and protection.
151
 According to James 
Meenan, the Tariff Commission was intended „to assist the framing of what Mr Cosgrave 
described as a policy of selective protection‟.152 The commission‟s task was to examine 
applications for protection referred to it and present its findings to the minister so that the 
government could make informed decisions. Lee‟s view, however, was that the 
commission „was a mere cosmetic measure, designed to deprive the protectionist Fianna 
Fáil party, lately arrived in the Dáil, of easy propaganda. The commission was duly 
packed with three safe civil servants‟.153 In operation the commission proved to be slow 
moving, cautious and dealt only with relatively inconsequential issues. Daly wrote that 
„disproportionate attention was devoted to trivial industries, from the first report on 
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rosary beads to the final report on prayer books, with fish barrels and down quilts, an 
industry employing sixty workers, among those also considered‟.154  An application for a 
tariff on motor vehicles was under deliberation for almost three years before being 
rejected, in the meantime, the government had introduced protection for cars and motor 
parts in its 1928 budget, eighteen months before the commission‟s decision.155 In all, the 
commission dealt with fifteen applications for protection before its operations were ended 
with the change of government in 1932.
156
  
The dismal performance of both the FIC and the Tariff Commission provides the 
evidence of how Cumann na nGaedheal failed to act purposefully on the issue of 
protection. They ignored Griffith‟s philosophy and instead maintained the British trading 
connection supporting agriculture and the traditional industries of beer and biscuits. The 
only substantial tariff put into effect came about as a response to the British 
implementation of the McKenna duties, which, while it delivered revenue, did not 
materially benefit any Irish industry; instead it undermined Ford, the only substantial 
engineering industry in the Irish Free State. J. J. Walsh, Minister for Posts and 
Telegraphs, who resigned from the government because of their stance on protection, 
contended that Cumann na nGaedheal „has gone bodily over to the most reactionary 
elements of the state who will henceforth control its policy. Followers of Arthur 
Griffith‟s economic teaching will now be forced to subordinate their life-long conviction 
to the dictates of people whose only concern appears to be the welfare of England‟.157  
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Whereas the 1927 budget saw little change of any importance to Ford or 
motoring, the following year, in order to raise much-needed revenue and to encourage 
greater use of the railways, Blythe extended the McKenna duties to include commercial 
vehicles and tyres. Britain had recently introduced a 4d. per gallon tax on petrol and 
Blythe had considered a similar tax but feared it would be too heavy on the consumer.
158
 
Other changes introduced included the redefinition of motor cars to include tractors, thus 
subjecting them to duty, though agricultural tractors were specifically excluded. These 
adjustments brought the Irish Free State in line with recent British changes.
159
  
Fianna Fáil, who had entered the Dáil in August 1927, supported the thrust of the 
increases insofar as they extended the principal of protection. Lemass was prepared to 
accept the duty if it promoted industry and helped to bring factories to Ireland, but not as 
a device for raising revenue.  The existing tariffs of 33.33 per cent he considered too low, 
while the imperial preference of 22.22 per cent on parts from Britain was even worse, 
since two thirds of imports were from Britain and qualified for the low rate. Instead he 
called for a forty or fifty per cent tariff to force the production of these parts in Ireland.
160 
 
In defending the rate Blythe cited the situation of the Ford company. He pointed out that 
if the Irish Free State increased the 22.22 per cent rate then Britain was likely to retaliate 
which would effect Ford export costs.
161 
 In a foretaste of things to come, Lemass called 
on the government to consider modifying the import duty on cars and parts to ensure, „the 
building of cars here and if possible, the complete construction of them‟.162 His 
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suggestion was that in order to encourage Irish industry it would be necessary to increase 
the rate of duty on complete cars while reducing the rate on parts, this would discourage 
the importation of complete cars and encourage importation of parts, which would then 
presumably lead to the development of a motor car assembly industry.
163 
Later in his 
speech he became more strident, suggesting that „not even an increase would be adequate 
to meet the situation,‟ he demanded that the „importation of bodies for motor omnibuses 
should be prohibited. The importation of bodies for commercial vehicles should be 
stopped. We can produce all our requirements at home‟.164    
Thus, the arrival of Fianna Fáil into the Dáil introduced a markedly different 
approach to the issue of protection. From these exchanges, Lemass made it clear that, 
regardless of revenue collection, under a Fianna Fáil government Irish industry would be 
supported not just by high tariffs, but if necessary, he implied, by non-tariff barriers.  
Reading this from Cork, no doubt Ford management would have been satisfied that in the 
event of the Fianna Fáil party coming to power, Ford‟s long-term plan of converting Cork 
into an assembly works was a viable option and would leave them well placed to compete 
on the Irish market. In the meantime, the problem of exports to Britain remained and for 
Ford it would only be solved by building the new plant at Dagenham.  
Even as the political parties discussed these issues in the Dáil, in early April 1928, 
Henry Ford arrived in Britain. Asked if he intended visiting his Cork plant he attacked the 
Irish Free State government‟s policy on tariffs.165 His garbled and inexplicable remarks 
on the working of the tariffs and on the role of the Free State government appeared 
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grossly confused and misinformed. True to his threat he never visited Cork, but despite 
this, his visit led to substantial changes in operations in both Britain and Ireland. These 
issues will be discussed in chapter seven.  
In conclusion, Cumann na nGaedheal‟s reluctance to introduce protection as 
evidenced in the five years up to 1928 showed a remarkable paucity of independent 
thinking and lack of enthusiasm for a revolutionary party recently arrived into power. The 
exception was the McKenna tariffs which were thrust upon them and which affected only 
one significant industry. Despite their interest in keeping Henry Ford & Son in Cork, the 
government could not find a solution to the tariff issue which would satisfy the company. 
The implementation of the British import tariffs had prompted Ford to purchase the site at 
Dagenham. In response to the British action the Cumann na nGaedheal government had 
introduced tariffs on motor imports, but as the revenue from these tariffs grew they 
seemed less inclined to tackle the problem. With the State in a parlous state financially 
giving up the revenue from these duties was never going to be easy, yet it was a short-
sighted attitude that took no account of the benefits that Ford brought to the country, both 
in terms of direct as well as indirect employment. Thus, the government contrived to 
undermine the expansion of a skilled engineering industry and failed to exploit the 
goodwill demonstrated by Henry Ford when he set up the business in 1917. 
On two occasions the government seemed close to concluding a deal with the 
British, but each time backed out, firstly, due to the unwillingness of Ford to offer any 
guarantee of manufacturing stability and secondly, due to the potential loss of revenue. 
The Ford problem continued to haunt the government, no doubt prompted by lobbying 
from Ford‟s local management as well as Cork‟s public representatives. As late as 1928, 
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Blythe said in the Dail that „the whole question of what can be done to encourage the 
Ford works in Cork to extend is under the active consideration of the Cabinet at the 
moment‟.166 Instead of removing the McKenna duties the government adjusted license 
fees to assist Ford, firstly in 1922 and again in 1926. While Ford management 
acknowledged the benefits of these changes, as for example, when Clarke commented on 
their improving sales in May 1926, that „there is no doubt that the tax reduction has had 
its effect‟, nevertheless, these improvements did not address the real problem that Ford 
faced and which the delays in building Dagenham were obscuring.
167
 To restore Ford as 
a competitive supplier to Manchester a bilateral agreement between the Free State and 
Britain, removing all tariffs on cars and parts, might have altered Ford‟s decision. Of 
course, this action would not have satisfied the motor body builders who would have had 
to face British competition again and equally it would have incurred the wrath of the 
protectionists.  
From Ford‟s point of view the original choice by both the British and Free State 
governments to implement the McKenna tariffs made Cork an expensive supplier to 
Manchester and provoked the Detroit decision to relocate the foundry and machine shop 
to Dagenham. Once this decision had been taken Cork‟s position as a major industrial 
operation seemed doomed. Instead its role seemed destined to be that of an assembly 
plant, particularly since Fianna Fáil were promising higher tariffs if they came to power.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN     
Ford, supplier of parts:   
Cork’s fate in the balance (1923-1928) 
During the period from 1923 to 1928, despite a series of management changes and 
minor improvements to the Model T, Ford‟s sales in Britain were in serious decline and 
profits were eroded by duty costs.  A parallel decline was in evidence in the United States 
where the Model T was fast becoming obsolete and new, more modern vehicles from 
General Motors were beginning to dominate the market. When Henry Ford finally began 
development of the replacement Model A to restore Ford‟s fortunes, it was not clear if the 
new car would solve Ford of England‟s problems. Following the launch of the Ford 
Model A to unprecedented acclaim in the United States sales began to improve again and 
Ford sailed to Europe to see for himself the situation there. During his visit he formed a 
number of views and initiated a strategy to build the company to new heights of industrial 
and commercial power. Dubbed the „1928 Plan‟, his strategic decisions included firstly, 
the rehiring of Percival Perry; secondly, the commencement of the long-delayed building 
of a European manufacturing centre at Dagenham and thirdly, and most importantly to 
the people Cork, the decision to convert the Cork factory into a worldwide supplier of 
Fordson tractors.  
In the years leading up to Ford‟s visit, circumstances in both Ford of England and 
Henry Ford & Son, Cork were problematic The economic environment of the Irish Free 
State in 1924, was decidedly gloomy. E. L. Clarke described the year as „one of marked 
depression in trade and industry‟.1 The trade balance for the first eleven months of 1924 
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had been adverse to the tune of sixteen million pounds, while general prosperity was 
being „hampered by the high taxation ruling‟.2  Even nature seemed to conspire against 
the country, as according to Clarke, very wet weather had lead to poor harvests in both 
1923 and 1924. Meanwhile, the government were encouraging the farmers to re-establish 
agricultural output following the recent period of disruption. Politically, Clarke noted, 
that the country had improved considerably, law and order was almost restored and the 
army which had comprised as many as 50,000 men had been reduced „to between 10,000 
and 15,000‟ saving the country „a great deal of non-productive expenditure‟.3 As the 
country settled down after the years of disturbances and mayhem, Henry Ford & Son, not 
withstanding the additional costs caused by the tariffs, attempted to use the relative 
stability to build their business. In addition to manufacturing parts, since July 1923 the 
company had assembled the Model T using a combination of Cork parts as well others 
shipped from Manchester and the United States.  
As the sole motor manufacturer in the Irish Free State, they exploited the 
advantage they had in dealing with the government. Grace reported to Sorensen his 
success in having convinced the government purchasing agent „to standardise on Ford 
cars and trucks for the government services, including army and postal‟.4 This meant 
sales of about two or three hundreds vehicles per year. Out in the field, Ford salesmen 
were busy promoting tractor sales with demonstrations and assistance to dealers as well 
as educating their service and repair men.  
Despite some five years manufacturing experience, including eighteen months 
                                                 
2 E. L. Clarke to C. E. Sorensen, 24 Jan. 1925 (BFRC, Acc. 572, Box 17). 
3 Ibid.  
4 Edward Grace to C. E. Sorensen, 23 Aug. 1924
 
(BFRC, Acc. 572, Box 17).   
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spent producing Model T parts, the Cork factory still faced operational and quality 
problems, particularly in the foundry. Foundry scrap reports sent to Detroit caused 
Sorensen to highlight a number of parts where the scrap loss was still exceedingly high. 
Cork scrap exceeded ten per cent while at the Rouge plant scrap was less than three per 
cent. „We will expect to see a decided improvement in your next report‟, wrote 
Sorensen.
5
 The problem of poor quality was not a new issue. In earlier days it had been 
attributed to the large intake of inexperienced labour employed, the struggles to deal with 
machine installations as well as building operations, but now the plant was maturing and  
was expected to perform to a higher standard.   
Cork‟s fate was inextricably linked with Manchester and there manufacturing was 
also in poor shape. Perry‟s aspiration of replacing the cramped Manchester site with a 
new facility in Southampton, to act as a supply factory for Britain and Europe, had 
lapsed.  Instead, despite company reservations about the site, five million dollars had 
been invested in Manchester to increase its capacity from 15,000 to 25,000 units.
6
 With 
no foundry, Manchester relied on Cork for cast parts, but their output was of variable 
quality which interrupted the running of the assembly line. The team of Gould and Davis 
sent over from United States by Sorensen were apparently incapable of overcoming the 
problems of quality, output and cost.
7
   
Ernest C. Kanzler, who oversaw manufacturing in Highland Park, visited Britain 
in the summer of 1923 to inspect the Dagenham site and subsequently spent some two 
                                                 
5 C. E. Sorensen  to Edward Grace, 21 May 1924 (BFRC, Acc. 572, Box 17).  
6 Tolliday, „Ford in Britain‟, pp 14/15. 
7 Ibid., p. 15.  
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and half months in Europe.
8
 On his return to Detroit he reported on the glaringly 
unsatisfactory state of affairs at Manchester, observing that „a bunch of clowns ran the 
English company!‟.9  Since Perry‟s departure Detroit had appointed a series of managers 
each of whom had proved a disappointment; now, in order to sort out the situation for 
once and for all, a group of production experts were sent to investigate the British 
operation. The group, led by William Klann, head of production at Highland Park, 
arrived in November 1923 under orders „to go over there and fire the whole bunch‟.10 
With long experience of car-making at Highland Park, the group‟s brief was threefold: to 
improve British production methods; to modify the Model T and make it more attractive 
to British purchasers, and, finally, to prepare plans for the new plant at Dagenham. They 
were also free to make any personnel changes that were required.
11
 
On arrival at the Manchester plant they were shocked at the conditions and at the 
lack of organisation that they found. From their weekly reports Steven Tolliday recounted 
the appalling problems uncovered with men, machines and procedures.  
Processes were often shambolic and the products poor. In many of the cars being 
produced the top gear did not function; 90 per cent of the pistons received in the plant 
were defective; welding was „awful poor‟; defective rear axles were accepted because 
they would „wear in‟; and across the plant they found „poor sloppy jobs and terrible 
practice‟.
12
 
                                                 
8 WH, p. 136; Kanzler, was a very capable lawyer, related to Edsel Ford by marriage, he started work under Sorensen and by this time 
was managing manufacturing under Edsel. He was forced out of the company by Henry Ford in July 1926 for daring to point out the 
deficiencies of  the Model T  (Bryan, Henry’s Lieutenants, pp 147/9). 
9 WH, p. 141. 
10 Reminiscences of W. C. Klann, Sept.1955 (BFRC, Acc. 65 ) p. 170; other members of the group were Theodore Gehle (Sorensen‟s 
assistant), Victor Perini and Ed Harper (WH, p. 141). 
11 WH, p.
 
142. 
12 Tolliday, „Ford in Britain‟, pp
 
15/16. 
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Prompt action was necessary to improve matters. Davis was fired on 17 December 1923. 
He accepted responsibility for the poor quality output and slack work practices, 
explaining that he did not understand automobile manufacturing.
13
 Gould remained on 
until he was forced to resign in April 1924.
14
 H. S. Jenkins, who at the time was 
managing the Ford company in Argentina, was contacted by Edsel Ford and asked to take 
over managing the Manchester plant.
15
 In the meantime, the Dearborn experts operated at 
all levels of the plant improving engineering and introducing procedural change, „raising 
hell‟ with supervisors, inspectors and workers.16 Klann spent some four months in 
Manchester, while Theodore Gehle remained for over a year in his attempt to implement 
reforms and improve standards throughout the plant. Apart from their shock at 
Manchester‟s poor operational standards, according to Tolliday, their reports to head 
office also exposed 
a profound cultural gulf between the hustling hard-driving men of Detroit, accustomed to 
high-pressure, high-volume production, and the Manchester plant with its low and falling 
volumes, defective supplies, poor and cramped physical conditions, and workers who still 
aspired to craft status.
17
  
It was inevitable in dealing with the problems at Manchester that the Cork factory, as a 
major supplier, would also come under scrutiny. In early February 1924, Gehle and 
Klann reported that seventy per cent of the piston rings produced by Cork were rejected 
for being too wide, too thin or of improper tension.  Soon, many other problems  emerged 
and Gehle wrote that „things got so bad that we called Leddy, chief inspector, over from 
                                                 
13 Weekly report,
 
Klann and Gehle to Kanzler, 22 Dec. 1923 (BFRC,  Acc. 572, Box 18). 
14 WH, p. 143.   
15 Ibid.    
16 Tolliday, „Ford in Britain‟, p. 16. 
17 Ibid.  
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Cork to show him all the defects he was passing‟.18 Towards the end of February, Klann 
decided to visit Cork and inspect operations for himself. He informed Grace of his 
intention, but, without offering any reason, Grace requested him to postpone his visit 
until the end of the week. Klann ignored the request and left on Tuesday night, arriving 
into Cork at noon the following day. No one met him at the boat so he went directly to 
the Imperial hotel where Grace subsequently collected him.
19
  
Grace was very apologetic for not meeting Klann and being unable to 
accommodate him at his home.
20
 His home was in fact, the Ford company house, 
Clanlauglin, which occupied a fine site overlooking the scenic River Lee. In late 1919, 
Charlie Sorensen had purchased the house from Dr James B. Horgan for the sum of 
£4,800.
21
 The seven-bedroomed house was located on a site of about 17 acres and when 
Peter MacGregor and Ed Clarke took possession of it on behalf of Henry Ford & Son, 
their immediate priority was to modernise it and make it comfortable. To this end they 
carried out necessary repairs, installed electricity, phone, hot water and central steam 
heating system. When furnished at a cost of £1,423.19s.1d., the total bill for the house 
came to £8,605.18s.4d.
22
 Clanlaughlin was intended to accommodate the Ford manager 
and his family in luxury, as well as occasional visitors to the plant as, according to 
Sorensen, „hotel facilities were not too plentiful‟.23 After its purchase Sorensen described 
                                                 
18 Weekly report,
 
Klann and Gehle to Kanzler, 7 Feb. 1924 (BFRC, Acc.572, Box 18). 
19 Ibid.,  26 Feb. 1924 (BFRC, Acc.572, Box 18). 
20 Ibid.  
21
 
Also spelt Clanloughlin; this house was purchased by John J. Horgan‟s father, M. J. Horgan, in 1894, see John J. Horgan, Pearse 
to Parnell:
 
some recollections and reflections (Dublin,1948).
 
22 E. L. Clarke to C. E. Sorensen, 11 Dec.
 
1919 (BFRC, Acc. 62, Box 95).  
23 Reminiscences of C. E. Sorensen, June 1954 (BFRC, Acc. 65, folder 68-15) p. 34.  
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it as „a wonderful addition to the comforts of our boys over here‟.24 Much later he said 
that „on the regular visits that I made I stayed at this home and spent many pleasant 
moments there‟. He also complimented Mrs Grace on her hospitality.25  
Despite the fine company facility, on the occasion of Klann‟s visit there was no 
room available in Clanlaughlin, as it was already occupied by members of a visiting 
American women‟s hockey team.26 In dealing with this issue Grace proved less than 
tactful and may have created enemies for his later dealings with Dearborn. Like other 
American families living in Cork, Grace had been entertaining members of the hockey 
team. Grace had tried to get Klann to postpone his visit and when the latter arrived 
unexpectedly, he had to stay in the hotel. As Grace sarcastically put it: „I am sorry he had 
to rough it - I did it for four months‟.27 Klann was of the view that the „Ford Home‟ was 
supposed to be solely for company visitors to Cork and that Grace had „no right to 
entertain anyone at Clanlaughlin except company guests‟.28 That was not Grace‟s 
understanding.  Klann also complained about Grace‟s absence from the plant, taking the 
hockey players to the game and later delivering them to the train. „It seemed to the writer 
that sport during those two days were more important than business, especially when we 
had so much to do and only a short time to stay.‟29 Grace believed Klann had gone out of 
                                                 
24 C. E. Sorensen cable to Henry Ford, 1 Dec. 1919 (BFRC, Acc. 62, Box 95).  After Grace left the company, Clanlaughlin was put 
up for sale. 
 
Presumably, Clarke, a local, had his own home and did not want the task of entertaining visitors. Clarke wrote to 
Sorensen to say that he was advertising Clanlaughlin in the London Times having failed to get a local buyer due to the hard times and 
departure of wealthy people (8 July 1927, BFRC, Acc. 38, Box 110). 
25 For example, C. E. Sorensen to Edward Grace, 17 Dec. 1921
 
(BFRC, Acc. 38, Box 45). „Please give my thanks to Mrs Grace for 
the way she took care of us at Cork.‟ 
26 Weekly report, Klann and Gehle to Kanzler, 26 Feb. 1924 (BFRC, Acc.572, Box 18). 
27 Edward Grace to C. E. Sorensen, 29 Mar. 1924 (BFRC, Acc.572, Box 17 ).  
28 Ibid.  
29 Weekly report, Klann and Gehle to Kanzler, 26 Feb.
 
1924 (BFRC, Acc.572, Box 18). Later in his reminiscences, (BFRC, Acc 65, 
Oral histories,  p. 303) Klann stated incorrectly that „ I was there for  two and half weeks and never saw Grace once because he was 
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his way to blacken him in his reports to head office, so on 29 March he wrote to Sorensen 
refuting Klann‟s allegations and robustly defending his actions. Calling on Ed Clarke and 
a Detroit auditor, Al Byrns, as witnesses, he challenged Klann‟s report and said: „If you 
feel that you cannot believe me then I must ask you to accept my resignation, as I feel 
this is a challenge to my honour‟.30 Grace also suggested that Klann had his own 
underhand agenda and „that he had plenty of time to cut his Cork stay short in order that 
he might get into Germany to visit some of his people there‟.31 
Grace‟s letter of defence evoked no sympathy from Sorensen. Instead Sorensen 
replied on 11 April with his usual prescription: „The best diet, I know of, for a man who 
is making progress, is plenty of criticism‟.32 He claimed to have thrown Grace‟s letter in 
the wastepaper basket, suggesting that if Grace could not write regularly reports on the 
running of the plant, then it would be better to wrote nothing at all. In which case he 
threatened „you can certainly expect more visits from people who are going to find out 
what is going on at your plant‟.33  
After five years away from Detroit, Grace appeared to have „gone native‟, no 
longer driven by the work ethic and sense of mission typical of Ford management. The 
Ford culture precluded frivolous social engagements such as he had been involved in 
with the hockey team. While Grace believed he had the right to entertain outside guests, 
Klann saw such behaviour as an abuse of the company assets, similar to the abuses he 
had seen in Manchester.   
                                                                                                                                                 
entertaining a nine-girl hockey time from America.‟ 
30 Edward Grace to C. E. Sorensen, 29 Mar. 1924 (BFRC, Acc.572, Box 17 ).    
31 Ibid.  
32 C. E. Sorensen to Edward Grace, 11Apr. 1924 (BFRC, Acc.572, Box 17.) 
33 Ibid.  
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Klann spent the rest of the week in Cork and his report on other aspects of the 
Cork plant revealed a significant number of cases of poor workmanship and sub-standard 
parts, while the chief inspector claimed in his defence that some of the parts complained 
of had actually been sourced in Detroit. Klann was very critical of Grace as he had also 
failed to report poor quality car bodies which he had received from Manchester.
34
 It was 
clear from the reports that production methods and quality standards represented a serious 
problem both in Manchester and in Cork, and while the attitude of the Cork workforce 
attracted less criticism than Manchester, the disagreement over the American hockey 
players and the use of the company house gained Grace some notoriety and poor 
publicity back at headquarters.  
The deficiencies and shortcomings of the Manchester operation, as well as the 
additional imperfect parts from Cork reinforced the need for a larger, better run factory 
with its own foundry. As part of their brief, the group of experts were assigned to 
scrutinise the Dagenham site selected by Grace and approved by Kanzler. Klann and 
Gehle checked out the site and also had some borings done to check the foundations.  The 
results were sent to Kanzler, who gave Gehle authority to go ahead and purchase the 
site.
35
 Gehle felt „this was a rather major undertaking‟ to embark on in an unfamiliar 
country, so he asked Kanzler to permit Grace to assist him. With the recent critical 
attention he had received Grace was not a welcome choice and Kanzler only grudgingly 
agreed to his involvement in the project as, according to Gehle, „Ed didn‟t stand too high 
in Kanzler‟s estimation‟.36  
                                                 
34 Weekly report, Klann and Gehle to Kanzler, 26 Feb. 1924 (BFRC, Acc.572, Box 18). 
35 Reminiscences of  Theodore F. Gehle, Mar.
 
1956 (BFRC, Acc 65). p. 66. 
36 Ibid., p. 64.  
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The deal to purchase Dagenham was done discreetly to ensure that the identity of 
the purchaser did not emerge. Kanzler advised that the purchase should be done in 
Gehle‟s name, as he wasn‟t identified with the Ford Motor Company of England. Ninety 
days later title was transferred to the Ford Motor Company.
37
  Once the site had been 
purchased it fell to the latest new manager, Jenkins, to broadcast Ford‟s plan to build a 
huge new plant at Dagenham. In his announcement on 10 July 1924 Jenkins „predicted 
that production would be tripled and 10,000 men employed‟.38 With the new centre for 
Europe announced, Cork‟s future prospects seemed unpromising with no apparent 
product line once Dagenham was in production. 
Despite the announcement of the new plant it was not certain if it would go ahead 
or when. Even Sorensen was unsure. He remarked to Perry, with whom he had kept in 
contact, that „the truth is that none of us know whether to go ahead with it or not‟.39 
Meanwhile, until the new plant began producing, no significant changes were made to 
operational arrangements in Cork or Manchester.
40
  
In August 1924 Grace travelled to Manchester, where he had his first introduction 
to the new manager of the British company, H. S. Jenkins. Grace was impressed with him 
and wrote to Sorensen: „He looks like the best thing in managers I have ever seen come 
over.… I am sure that there will be real co-operation between us‟.41 Even as Grace was 
writing this letter, Sorensen was in touch with Jenkins, complaining about Grace‟s 
                                                 
37 Ibid., p. 68. In his reminiscences Sir Stanford Cooper claims „that he had to keep Gehle in the background for Gehle was so 
obviously American that he might mess things up.‟ However legal documents disprove that. Also, the London lawyers used by Ford 
were McKenna and Cole, including Reginald McKenna former chancellor who had introduced McKenna tariffs during World War I. 
(BFRC, See Acc.880, Box 5). 
38 WH, p. 143.   
39 Tolliday,
 
„Ford in Britain‟, p. 17. 
40 Ibid.  
41 Edward Grace to C. E. Sorensen,  23 Aug. 1924 (BFRC, Acc. 572, Box 17).     
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absence from the plant and the fact that Ed Harper had not been accommodated in 
Clanlaughlin. Harper, one of the group who had been assigned to sort out Manchester, 
had been sent to Cork en route to Detroit to further investigate operations there. Despite 
his earlier disagreement with Klann, Grace was still not forthcoming in opening the house 
to visitors. New on the job, Jenkins was unaware of the arrangements, he said: „I should 
have thought…there would have been no indecision as to the proper action to take upon 
Mr Harper‟s arrival there‟.42 Sorensen instructed Jenkins to ensure that „Grace should get 
permission to leave Cork‟ and also reminded him „that the house was for the use of 
company officials‟ and „is to be used in such a manner, and find out why Harper was not 
given that opportunity‟.43  
Clearly, Sorensen had his knife in Grace at this time. He had obviously annoyed 
Sorensen who was determined to limit his independent behaviour and to ensure that he 
was brought back to earth in relation to the company house. On the other hand, it seems 
that Grace was reluctant to open the doors of the house to visitors and determined to act 
as he saw fit. Klann later said he „called Grace the king of Ireland‟ due to his absences 
from his job.
44
 He suggested that „he should be watching his shop a little instead of 
entertaining girls all the time‟.45 Grace had always acted independently, though on 
occasion Sorensen had queried and criticised some of his absences from the plant, 
nonetheless, up to that time he seemed to enjoy Sorensen‟s confidence as well as that of 
Edsel Ford. At this juncture he appeared deliberately stubborn and provocative and his 
behaviour was not ingratiating him with his boss and others. Previously, his handling of 
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S. Jenkins to C. E. Sorensen, 10 Sept. 1924 (BFRC, Acc. 572, Box 17).  
43 Ibid.  
44 Reminiscences of 
 
W. C. Klann, Sept. 1955 (BFRC, Acc. 65) p. 303.  
45 Ibid.  
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the Cork housing project had angered Sorensen, but now he had become a target for the 
scrutiny of the American experts, who were critical of all aspects of the British and Irish 
operations. Grace‟s informal way of working, not to mention his use of company‟s 
resources, seemed to put him in the same category as the corruption of Manchester. 
Despite this he survived in the company for another two years before finally being forced 
to quit by Klann.
46
   
In Britain the market for motor cars was changing. Competitors of Ford, such as 
the Austin and Morris motor companies, were producing modern cars, smaller and more 
economical with cheaper tax, more in tune with their customer‟s requirements. Henry 
Ford refused to respond to the appeals from his managers who pleaded with him to 
produce a competitive car specifically for the British market. Sales of Model T Fords 
continued to fall as it became increasingly outdated.  Manchester‟s output of Model T‟s 
fell from 25,666 units in 1920 to just over 11,000 for each of the years 1921, 1922 and 
1923. The decline continued, reaching a paltry 1,817 in 1927.
47
 Some modifications were 
made to update the Model T, but these proved futile against the competition. In Cork, 
Clarke was optimistic that the changes, which included a lowered chassis, nickel plated 
headlamps and radiator, and later the addition of „balloon‟ instead of solid tyres and an 
additional four optional colours, would improve sales.
48
 Despite his optimism, sales of 
the Model T were also declining Ireland. First quarter sales in 1926 were down to 434 
from 629 units in 1925.
49
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48 E. L. Clarke to C. E. Sorensen, 24 Jan. 1925 (BFRC, Acc. 572, Box 17). „Radiators‟ see E. L. Clarke to C. E. Sorensen, 5 Apr. 
1924 (BFRC, Acc. 572, Box 17).   
49 E. L. Clarke  to C. E. Sorensen, 9 Sept. 1926 (BFRC, Acc. 572, Box 17). 
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Clarke tactfully suggested that the sales fall-off was due mainly to rumours 
regarding an anticipated road tax reduction. When the £8 reduction came about in the 
1926 budget, he accepted that it was a „big help‟ and improved sales, however subsequent 
months showed little real improvement and any boost from the tax changes was more 
than cancelled out by public disaffection with the Model T.
50
 Also, demand from 
Manchester for parts was very low, impacted by the national coal strike which was 
affecting almost all of the British engineering industry.
51
 Management in Detroit were 
unhappy with the European fall-off in sales and despatched another high-powered 
delegation to implement cost cutting. In Manchester they dismissed 250 men and at Cork 
145 men were discharged.
52
  But no amount of cost cutting or pressure could change the 
fact that the Model T was obsolete and an embarrassment whose once buoyant sales had 
now faded to nothing. 
From the time of Perry‟s departure, Ford of England had seen a series of 
management changes. Ireland, in contrast, had been managed during the turbulent years 
from 1919 to 1926 by one man, Edward Grace. Early in 1926, Grace departed from the 
company and on 1 July 1926 after nine years as second in command to Grace, E. L. 
Clarke took over the position of managing director of Henry Ford & Son Ltd.
53
 Like 
many other departures from Ford, clouds of suspicion hung over Grace‟s departure, the 
details of which will be covered in chapter eight.  
Notwithstanding the threat posed by the forthcoming new plant at Dagenham, 
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Ford‟s position as the major employer in Cork was growing.54 The relative political and 
industrial stability of the middle 1920s, allowed the company to settle and its eighteen 
hundred or so employees to thrive, adding to the prosperity of the city. Since his 
appointment Jenkins was responsible for both Britain and Ireland and worked diligently 
on both sides of the Irish Sea to restore the dealerships to strength and to motivate them 
to improve their standards and expand sales. To this end, he travelled the country 
regularly in 1926.  He found general conditions to be poor. More significantly there was 
an air of gloom about. At a banquet given by the Cork Chamber of Commerce attended 
by President Cosgrave and some of his ministers, Jenkins commented that: 
The keynote of the speeches given was the poor condition in which the country 
found itself. There were many hopes of improvement expressed, but we did not 
hear one logical suggestion put forward as to how business could be improved. 
The main wail put up was the fact that the breweries and distilleries were not 
working to their full capacity.
55
  
In contrast, the Ford factory, despite its problems with the obsolete Model T and the 
McKenna duties, was like a beacon in an industrial desert, utilising the most modern 
industrial engineering and the most progressive systems. It also acted as a training-
ground for locals to develop and grow their skills. Men like John O‟Neill, who managed 
the Ford‟s Irish business from 1932 to 1959, and Patrick Hennessy who joined in 1920 
and rose to become chairman of both Henry Ford & Son and Ford of Britain.
56
 Even 
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Ford‟s football team excelled and enjoyed meteoric success. The Fordson soccer team 
was founded in 1921 by an ex-Irish international player named Harry Buckle and within 
two years had „reached the semi-final of the Free State Cup. Their finest hour came on St. 
Patrick‟s Day, 1926, when they reached the cup final against Shamrock Rovers‟.57 The 
team defeated Rovers by three goals to two to take home the trophy to Cork for the first 
time. They came home to a heroes‟ welcome and at a subsequent victory ball arranged by 
the Fordson social club Edward Grace was presented with the football with which the 
match had been won. Almost on the eve of his departure from Cork, Grace thanked the 
team who had played such a wonderful match and expressed himself as „still quite hoarse 
from cheering the victors‟.58 
On 25 May 1927, Henry Ford finally announced that production of the Model T 
was to be discontinued and in Dearborn the following day, the fifteen millionth „Tin 
Lizzie‟ was driven off the assembly line by Henry and Edsel.59 The Model T had long 
been overtaken by more modern competitors and even Charlie Sorensen had to admit that 
he was „sick of looking at them–sicker, in fact, than the public was‟.60 60,000 employees 
were laid off in Dearborn while the company retooled for the new car, named the Model 
A. Around the world assembly plants used up available parts to produce the last Model 
Ts.  In August the final British Model T rolled off the line in Manchester and Clarke 
reported that their stock of Model T materials was depleted, but that he had 107 Model T 
Touring cars on hand, which were proving difficult to sell as people were waiting to see 
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the Model A before purchasing a new car.
61
 With the plant effectively closed for the 
remainder of the year drawings were shipped to Cork in preparation for the manufacture 
of Model A parts.
62
 During the previous five years the Cork plant at Marina had 
assembled over 10,000 Model T‟s to become the leading make in the Irish market.63 
In Dearborn the first Model A sedan was assembled on 20 October 1927.
64
 Over 
the following weeks problems with the new assembly line were ironed out so that by 2 
December 1927 the daily output had reached a hundred cars a day.
65
 The new car had 
been the subject of much speculation and was eagerly awaited by the American public.
66
 
Following its unveiling, the Model A Ford proved very successful, with cars being 
snapped up as fast as Ford could produce them, so that in 1928 633,594 cars were 
produced, while the following year output more than doubled to 1,507,132.
67
 
The Model A made its first appearance in Ireland in late December. General 
Mulcahy, Minister for Local Government and Public Health, opened an exhibition of 
Ford‟s new motor car in Dublin‟s Metropolitan hall.68 This appearance was only an 
advance viewing for the trade and likely purchasers. Clarke pointed out that it would be 
„some time before the plant in Cork was replaced so as to cope with the new designs, but 
the supervisor was at present in the United States arranging details in this respect‟.69 Now 
finally, with the arrival in the marketplace of a modern Ford car it remained to be seen if 
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the new model would find favour with the British and Irish public. Despite the earlier 
announcement of the plan to build a massive factory in Dagenham, so far nothing had 
happened. In truth, with low and declining sales, there was no justification for building 
the plant. The development and commissioning of the new car model had absorbed the 
attentions of Henry Ford and his management and consequently the new English plant 
had been overlooked. Despite the problems with quality and costs, Henry Ford & Son, 
Cork possessing the sole European foundry continued to operate as a supplier to 
Manchester.  
Over the months ahead the existing Model T machines and equipment, as well as 
jigs, tools and gauges were transformed to cast, machine and assemble engines for the 
Model A. While Cork produced the cast-iron parts, the remaining parts were shipped 
from Detroit.
70
 The Cork engines, designated „AF‟, were special small-bore 14.9 horse-
power engines unlike the original American Model A which had a much larger 24 
horsepower engine.
71
 The AF engines were substituted to reduce car tax in markets where 
such tax was based on the engine capacity.
72
 Model A cars for sale in Ireland were 
assembled in Manchester and shipped to Cork where the locally manufactured engine 
was fitted. The other engines were exported to Europe and Asia.
73
 Cork continued to 
produce spare parts for the many Model T‟s on the road and was being set up to produce 
Model A rear-axles. Up to the end of August 1928, Clarke reported that they had 
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produced 3,189 AF engines; by the year end 6,394 units had been produced.
74
  
*   *   * 
Ford from the earliest days operated as a mobile multi-national corporation.  
Henry Ford‟s initial expansion into Canada and Britain was followed by the development 
of local assembly operations across America and Ford was used to being invited and 
wooed to locate in particular towns.
75
 In the early days of the Marina development the 
Cork Industrial Development Association, the Harbour Board, and, as we have seen in 
chapter two, even Lloyd George had assisted and promoted Ford‟s project. Later, the 
wrangles with the corporation over the lease spoiled relations for a while. To redress this, 
local Cork bodies were keen to demonstrate their gratitude and support for Ford‟s effort 
in bringing industry to their area. Seán
 
French, Grace‟s erstwhile antagonist, wrote to 
Ford to inform him that the corporation had decided unanimously to confer the freedom 
of the city of Cork on him, „the highest honour that it is in our power to bestow.‟76 Later 
still, French wrote to Clarke on the occasion of Henry Ford‟s car accident: „regret 
accident to Mr Henry Ford. Hope no permanent harm and his recovery may be speedy 
and complete.‟77 Clarke passed the letter to Edsel Ford. No doubt the Cork Corporation 
were keen  to secure the company‟s future in Cork and to offset the poor publicity gained 
during the very public arguments over masses, leases and tariffs which had strained 
relations with the company.  
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While these attempts by the local council to mollify Ford were laudable but self-
serving, the Cumann na nGaedheal government‟s handling of relations with Henry Ford 
during the late 1920s appeared less enthusiastic. Ford was genuine in his desire to 
support Ireland‟s industrial development, but he was a difficult person to deal with. He 
had very fixed ideas on subjects such as free-trade and was disinclined to accept 
interference from outside agencies; he was independent, stubborn and could be extremely 
wilful. The Free State government seemed to have very little appreciation of the benefit 
that thousands of Ford jobs brought to the region and country. More importantly, there 
was little insight into the potential industrial development and consequent employment 
which Ford‟s schemes and ideas could provide. Where in more recent times a capitalist 
who promised industrial investment would be courted, wooed and offered inducements 
such as tax-free status, Ford got relatively little encouragement at government level. 
Local Cork businessmen and politicians worked hard to facilitate the Ford development, 
but they did not have the power to alter tax regimes or to provide the pomp or prestige 
necessary to encourage Ford. 
The pitfalls of dealing with Ford, even if honouring him, were demonstrated when 
University College Cork attempted to award him an honorary degree. Ford, who was a 
self-educated man, had little time for academic qualifications and often hired and 
promoted practical men like himself with little formal education. Early in November 
1926, Clarke wrote to Henry Ford‟s secretary, E. G. Liebold, stating that the Professor P. 
J. Merriman, president of „Cork National University‟ had phoned him to say „that the 
senate of his university had decided to confer on Mr Henry Ford the honorary degree of 
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Doctor of Laws‟.78 At the same time Merriman wrote directly to Ford explaining that the 
honorary degree reflected the appreciation of the great advantage conferred on the city of 
Cork by Ford in locating his factory there.
79
 After some delay, Liebold responded that 
„Mr Ford has never followed the profession of a lawyer and has no legal talent, he feels 
he is not qualified to accept such a degree‟.80 This strange rebuff suggested that neither 
Ford nor Liebold were familiar with the custom. Merriman in turn responded explaining 
that the degree is offered „to persons of notable achievement in any sphere of activity 
who have promoted the good of humanity‟. Pointing out that its acceptance did not imply 
„that the holder of the degree is connected in anyway with the law either as a pursuit or as 
a study‟.81 Simultaneously, Clarke wrote to Liebold and sounded the first warning of 
controversy: 
We are sure that his acceptance will be appreciated and looked upon as an indication that 
Mr Ford has an interest in the progress and development of the country, whereas if the 
degree is declined (no matter how good the grounds) it might be very easily be 
misconstrued, especially if the matter is taken up by the press.
82
  
As Clarke predicted, the press were soon aware of the issue, Time magazine reported that 
National University of Ireland had offered Henry Ford an honorary degree in recognition 
of his „Irish descent and for having set up a branch motor car factory at Cork‟.83 By 
March the honour had still not been accepted by Ford and the press had wind of the 
delay. The New York Times reported that Ford had been was rebuked by the Council of 
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the National University for not accepting the honorary degree; it reported that Dennis 
O‟Connor, a member of the council had said that Ford apparently did not consider it 
worth his while to inform the university if he would accept the degree.
84
 Clarke, aware of 
the newspaper criticism directed at Ford‟s apparent reluctance to accept the honour, 
decided to use another route to get his message to him. He cabled W. J. Cameron, editor 
of Ford‟s paper, the Dearborn Independent, and a close confidante of Ford‟s, advising 
that he communicate with the registrar of the National University and accept the degree, 
he also pointed out that the comments reported in the press were not made by the 
governing body of the university, but by a „convocation of graduates‟.85 
On 17 March 1927 the word finally came from Liebold saying that Mr Ford had 
„fully consented to accept this degree which he now understands to be conferred merely 
as an honor and not as a certification as a lawyer‟.86 Having passed the message on to 
Merriman, Grace informed Liebold that the degree would probably be conferred in 
absentia.
87
 Later F. H. Wilber, registrar of the National University of Ireland, wrote to 
Ford inviting him to the conferring, which was due to be held in the Senate room at 3.00 
pm on Friday 15 July 1927.
88
 Liebold duly responded that while they appreciated the 
honour it was impossible for Mr Ford to attend.
89
 After the conferring Wilber wrote that 
he was sending on „the Testimonium of the Degree of Doctor of laws recently conferred 
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on you‟.90 Ford wrote in response: „I will always consider it of particular value coming as 
it does from the community where my father lived.‟91 The manner of awarding the degree 
later came in for criticism by Professor Alfred O‟Rahilly, who expressed surprise at „the 
brutally unceremonious way in which the National University posted its honorary degree 
to Mr Henry Ford‟.92 O‟Rahilly claimed that two Corkmen, Professor Smiddy and 
himself, were in the United States and could have done the presentation.
93
   
Shortly after the degree conferring, Cosgrave visited the United States and 
Canada, making the first overseas visit by an Irish prime minister. On the trip he had an 
opportunity to visit Ford‟s plant and headquarters at Dearborn. Both Cosgrave and the 
Ford management were keen to see the visit go ahead in order to meet and develop 
relationships, but confusion over the travel arrangements turned the invitation into a 
combination of farce and deceit and led to a mix-up which did nothing to improve 
relations between the two sides. The trip came about when Cosgrave received an 
invitation from the Irish Fellowship Club of Chicago to visit America. Officials in the 
Department of External Affairs considered that  
a short visit from the President or Vice-President to Washington, Chicago and New York 
with no other public object than to make a few speeches at specially arranged banquets 
about the independence and development of the Saorstát would provide a splendid 
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opportunity of getting in touch with most of the influential Irish-Americans.
94
 
It was felt that there were many wealthy Americans who would invest their money in 
Ireland if „given the proper encouragement and publicity‟.95 The suggestion was that the 
Cosgrave visit would begin the charm offensive. When E. L. Clarke became aware of the 
proposed trip to the United States, he wrote inviting Cosgrave to visit the Ford factory, 
pointing out that Dearborn was on the main railway line from New York to Chicago, both 
of which were on his itinerary. He also assured Cosgrave of „a most hearty and sincere 
welcome‟.96 After a fortnight‟s delay over Christmas, Cosgrave replied that the 
arrangements, which were in the hands of Professor T. A. Smiddy, the Irish Free State 
Minister Plenipotentiary in Washington, were almost concluded and since the duration of 
the trip was short that „a difficulty in accepting your invitation may be experienced‟.97  
Following this, Smiddy was asked to fit in the Ford visit as well as a visit to Cosgraves‟ 
relatives in Providence, Rhode Island. Cosgrave insisted that he „should not leave the 
States without making these two calls‟.98 
Clarke wrote to Cosgrave‟s secretary and to the secretary of the Department of 
External Affairs, expressing his happiness that President Cosgrave would visit „if at all 
possible‟.99 Naturally, Clarke had contacted Dearborn and informed them that the 
president was anxious to visit the plant. As the trip planning was being done in 
Washington, J. J. Harrington of the Ford Motor Company in Dearborn contacted Smiddy, 
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who cabled back on 9 January to say that President Cosgrave‟s itinerary called for him to 
visit Detroit on 30 January, but that the final arrangements were being made in Dublin.
100
 
On the same day, Smiddy also wrote to Patrick Gilligan at the Department of External 
Affairs in Dublin, to say that he had completed the arrangements for Cosgrave‟s visit to 
the United States including a trip to Detroit. The plan was that he would call at the Ford 
plant, arriving by train at 8.30 a.m. on Monday 30 January 1928 and afterwards would 
travel on to Providence, Rhode Island to visit his relations.
101
 
Harrington asked Clarke to contact the government in Dublin to confirm this.
102
 
Simultaneously, Cosgrave wrote to Clarke apologising for the fact that it was impossible 
to get to Detroit as he had hoped. He explained that this was due to the fact that he was 
going south and the „altered programme has been communicated to the various cities‟.103 
He expressed his disappointment at missing out on one of his greatest ambitions which 
was to see the „greatest industrial concern‟ and to have „an opportunity to congratulate 
Mr Ford in person‟ and thank him for „his continued interest in the Irish Free State‟.104  
While Clarke was aware that Cosgrave‟s visit to Detroit had been cancelled, 
Harrington‟s communications with the Irish Legation in Washington led him to believe 
that Cosgrave would visit Detroit on 30 January and no doubt he passed this information 
on to Ford‟s senior management. It was not until 17 January that he was informed by the 
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Legation that Cosgrave was unable to attend due to his visit to Ottawa.
105
 Whether this 
confusion was caused by Clarke failing to inform headquarters of the cancellation or by 
the Free State government misleading the Irish legation in Washington is not clear. Either 
way, Ford would have been annoyed at the apparent rejection.  
Cosgrave‟s trip went ahead over three weeks at the end of January, but he never 
got to visit Dearborn. No doubt Ford was offended at being ignored and this may have 
played some part in his subsequent refusal to visit Ireland in 1928. In addition, it seems 
extraordinary that if the original purpose of Cosgrave‟s visit was get in touch with 
influential and wealthy Americans, he missed the opportunity to meet one of the most 
powerful industrialists in the world, one who already had a large stake in Ireland. It 
would seem that a few hours appeasing and flattering the „great man‟ would not have 
been wasted in the national interest.  
Months later, when Cosgrave visited the Cork plant and had a meeting with 
Clarke, the issue of the President‟s American visit was raised by H. A. Pelly who was 
also in attendance.
106
 Arising from the discussion, Cosgrave asked Clarke to outline in 
writing the steps which had occurred. This he subsequently did, pointing out that Ford 
staff in the United States had done their best to arrange the visit. Clarke continued: „I 
gather from what Mr Pelly said you were under the impression that the invitation had not 
been issued from Detroit at all.‟107  This was not the first, nor the last time that Pelly 
intervened ineptly in Ford affairs. A week later, addressing a Faculty of Commerce 
dinner at University College Cork, Pelly added to the confusion and created 
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embarrassment for Ford and the government when he announced that a mistake had 
occurred over the President‟s American visit.108 He claimed President Cosgrave did not 
get the invitation issued to him, while the Irish Legation in Washington received an 
invitation, but did not communicate it to the President.
109
 Pelly‟s distortion of the facts 
angered Clarke who wrote immediately to Cosgrave denying any knowledge of Pelly‟s 
remarks as well as disowning responsibility for them.  Describing the revelations as a 
„bombshell,‟ Clarke expressed his regret at seeing such „matters ventilated in the press 
and all times do our best to discourage publicity of this kind‟.110  
*   *   * 
Using the pseudonyms, Mr and Mrs John Robinson, Henry Ford and his wife 
sailed from Manhattan on the S. S. Majestic and arrived in Southampton on 6 April 
1928.
111
 Despite the apparent secrecy, word of Ford‟s arrival got out and rumours 
abounded about his plans, particularly in relation to the development of his business in 
Europe.
112
 The Irish government apparently took little notice of Ford‟s forthcoming visit 
until George Crosbie, owner of the Cork Examiner, wrote to W. T. Cosgrave suggesting 
that since he believed Henry Ford was coming to Ireland, some recognition should be 
awarded to him.
113
 Two days later J. M. Denvir, London correspondent for the Examiner 
followed with a note to James McNeill, the governor-general, referring to the „quite 
extraordinary possibilities about the Cork works‟ and suggesting that since Ford‟s might 
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get a poor reception in Britain that „a little spontaneous Irish warmth would make an 
appealing contrast‟.114 McNeill passed the suggestion to the secretary of the Executive 
Council commenting „perhaps External Affairs might like to telephone London‟.115 
Before any action could be taken, Henry Ford, who despite Denvir‟s prediction, was 
being feted in England, announced that he would not visit Ireland until the tariffs between 
England and Ireland were removed.
116
 Speaking in a rather confused fashion, he was 
quoted by the Evening Echo: „I‟m not going to Cork so long as the Free State prevents 
our manufacturing anything over there and sending it to this country, because we can 
send it over cheaper from America. That is wrong.‟117 In an even more confusing 
comment he said in relation to trade with Russia that „we sold them 30,000 tractors, all 
manufactured in the United States. They would have been made in Cork, if the Irish had 
not imposed certain restrictions which generally burdened us, so the Cork factory never 
materialised‟.118 After his outburst, there was an immediate flurry of activity in Ireland.  
The Cork Harbour Board wrote to Cosgrave, describing Henry Ford‟s comments 
as a „wild and highly prejudicial mis-statement of facts‟. They stated that they expect the 
„government to send a representative to Mr Ford with [an] explanation of [the] position. 
Cork wants Henry Ford and the Ford works to develop and increase‟.119  Meanwhile, 
Cork T.D. Liam de Róiste wrote to Cosgrave warning of the risk that his political 
opponents would attempt to put all of the blame for Ford‟s problems on the Irish Free 
State government „when at least part is due to England‟. He suggested that Cosgrave, as 
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the senior representative of the city, should dispel any impressions that the government 
has not assisted and supported the Ford works, by inviting Ford to come and meet him in 
Cork.
120
  
Cosgrave choose not to refute Ford‟s remarks, which were quite erroneous and 
confusing, as he believed that despite his outburst, Ford was the „best friend the Ford 
works‟ had and that attempts to analyse or criticise him would be unwise.121 No doubt 
refraining from joining in a public argument was sensible, but the suggestion of an 
invitation to Ford to visit Cork and meet with him in person, to iron out previous 
misunderstandings, made sense. Yet in the face of all the advice and prompting and 
despite the precarious state of the Cork factory, Cosgrave was slow to act. When he did 
finally decide to extend an invitation to Ford he also wrote to George Crosbie, gloomily, 
he expressed the view that while he hoped Henry Ford might be persuaded to come to 
Ireland, however, he was doubtful.
122
   
Cosgrave sent the invitation to John W. Dulanty, the Irish Free State Trade 
Commissioner in London, who was to deliver the letter by hand.
123
 The following day, 
Dulanty waited for the letter to arrive and when it did not appear he went ahead and met 
Ford and invited him to come and stay at the Vice-Regal Lodge, in Dublin. At first Ford 
was not keen, but he warmed to Dulanty and soon „spoke of his ancestral connections 
with the south of Ireland and said it would be an interesting and pleasant experience for 
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him personally if he could manage to get over to Ireland during his present trip‟.124 Ford 
promised to keep in touch and make time out from his visit to Manchester to come to 
Ireland. More importantly, he assured Dulanty that „he was determined to continue [with] 
his establishment in Cork‟. He claimed to be developing a new tractor and the „minute he 
got back to the States steps would be taken to put the plant at Cork in motion on the new 
tractor‟.125 According to Wilkins and Hill, Dulanty assured him that tariff adjustments 
could be made to facilitate Ford imports, however Dulanty does not mention this in his 
report and it seems unlikely that he would have made such a premature commitment.
126
 
A week later Dulanty was still in touch with Ford who promised to let him know 
at the coming weekend whether or not the visit would happen.
127
 At the end of the month, 
he had a second interview with Ford when he „seemed generally anxious to avail himself 
of the President‟s invitation‟, but unfortunately had to return early and would not be able 
to make the trip. Dulanty said: „There is no doubt in my mind that we succeeded in 
getting him to change his attitudes and he was anxious to visit Ireland.‟128 Dulanty‟s 
representations seemed to have had a positive effect on Henry Ford‟s attitude to Ireland, 
perhaps reawakening his former sentiment to improve the lot of his ancestral home, 
inspiring him to return tractor production to Cork for another attempt at creating an 
industrial business worthy of his name, in effect a complete reversal of his earlier 
opinions. While this commitment was made in private and could easily have been 
reneged upon, Ford was clearly thinking of his recent closure of the Rouge tractor plant 
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in Dearborn and was moved to reinstate his original plan to produce tractors in Cork. 
However, before this could happen a major reorganisation of European operations was 
necessary and Cork‟s situation would only be changed as part of that reorganisation. This 
was a crucial moment in the history of Ford of England. The lack of both professional 
leadership and a suitable product range meant that the company there was at a low ebb, 
changes were needed and Ford‟s visit was to be the catalyst for that change. For the Irish 
government to be on the right side of Henry Ford at this juncture could make a dramatic 
difference to Cork‟s future.  Cosgrave had not taken advantage of earlier opportunities to 
meet and encourage Ford. Dulanty, on the other hand, seems to have charmed Ford and 
while he did not get him to visit Ireland he seemed to develop a relationship with him and 
restored his interest in supporting Irish industry.  
If Dulanty‟s representations helped restore good relations with Ford, the 
intervention of H. A. Pelly, manager of the local Cork branch of Hibernian Bank with 
whom Henry Ford & Son did their banking, was less helpful and risked jeopardising 
relations between Ford and the Free State government. Following Henry Ford‟s outburst 
to the press in England, Pelly wrote to Cosgrave warning him about the risk of making a 
statement from Dublin which „might have the effect of confusing matters with Mr 
Ford‟.129  Pelly declared that Ford were now about to start producing cars and hoped to 
employ about 6,000 men.
130
 He later cabled Cosgrave seeking an audience, following 
which he apparently travelled to London to meet with Ford.
131
  Later, when W. T. 
Cosgrave visited Cork on 8 May 1928, Pelly was present at the meeting with Ford 
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management. Around the same time the Irish Times announced that a local Cork 
deputation had suggested that Mr Henry Ford might see his way to give the Irish Free 
State a monopoly of car production for Europe thus providing employment for 6,000 men 
for ten years in return for the abolition of the McKenna duties.
132
 While this idea made no 
sense at all, it seems likely that Pelly had some part in advancing this scheme as he had 
earlier mentioned the figure of 6,000 men. This number was never mentioned by the Ford 
company, besides they were unlikely to require such a large staff, as their plan only 
envisaged building Model A engines and axles and installing engines in cars for the Irish 
market. Furthermore, Henry Ford had made his views known about such commitments 
six years earlier, while the notion of locating such a business in Ireland, far away from all 
the main car markets, made no logistical sense. It was clear that Ford felt strongly about 
having tariffs imposed on his business and anyone suggesting such a trade-off was likely 
to incur his wrath.  
In Pelly‟s speech to the Faculty of Commerce in late May, he claimed that he had 
earlier interviewed Henry Ford at the instigation of the Irish Free State government.
133
 He 
said that Ford had expressed sympathy with the Cork‟s case and that „he meant 
determinedly to work the Cork factory for all its worth‟.134 Pelly also stated that it was 
possible that the mix-up over the President‟s visit to Detroit was behind Mr Ford‟s 
statements in London.  Despite Pelly‟s assertion that he was revealing all of this in public 
for the first time and „with Mr Ford‟s absolute permission‟, E. L. Clarke denied 
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knowledge of and responsibility for the remarks.
135
 Pelly‟s claim that he had met Ford at 
the government‟s instigation is not borne out by the record and it is unlikely that having 
nominated Dulanty, a professional diplomat, to deal with Ford, the government would 
then send Pelly. Any interview he had with Ford was most likely in an unofficial 
capacity, however differently he might present it.  Later, Michael MacWhite of the Irish 
Legation in Washington
 
reported on a visit to Detroit where he lunched with Edsel and 
Henry Ford, when it was evident that somebody whom Ford had met in London a couple 
of years earlier and who „represented the Saorstat‟ had „rubbed him the wrong way‟.136 
Referring to the conversation he had with him and the proposals put forward regarding 
tariffs, Ford said angrily „I‟d see him damned first‟.137 While the person is not identified, 
it seems quite likely that Pelly had met Ford purporting to represent the Irish Free State 
and suggesting the aforementioned deal. In this case it was fortunate that Dulanty had 
gained Ford‟s confidence and commitment prior to Pelly‟s potentially disruptive 
intervention.  
*   *   * 
By the time Henry Ford stepped ashore in Southampton in April 1928, business in 
the United States was well on the way to recovery with the new and increasingly popular 
Model A. While the Model A might be successful in America, the market in Europe, 
including Britain, was for smaller, cheaper cars, such as those produced by Austin and 
Morris.  Henry Ford had not been prepared to consider a smaller car, putting his faith in 
the new large-engined Model A. The Ford Motor Company of England had other 
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problems and was generally in a sorry state with an inefficient and overcrowded factory 
as well as an inappropriate product. The many management changes over the previous 
nine years had not succeeded in addressing the problems or in providing direction or 
leadership. It was clear that a dramatic solution had to be found if the company was to be 
restored to its former successful state. Ford‟s visit to Britain in 1928 was to prove the 
catalyst to revitalising the English company after the years of decline and lack of 
direction.   
The aim of Ford‟s visit to Europe was to decide the course of the company in the 
years ahead. Arguably, the single most significant issue to be addressed was the question 
as to who should manage and drive the business forward.  Though H. S. Jenkins was an 
able sales executive, he lacked the vision and capability to build the massive 
manufacturing centre required to serve not alone Britain, but also many of the European 
assembly plants. When Ford returned to Dearborn Sorensen asked him what he had 
accomplished. Henry Ford replied, „I have hired Perry again. “That is the best news you 
could have brought me,” exclaimed Sorensen‟.138  Whatever had transpired in 1919 was 
to be dismissed by Ford so that when the company‟s legal advisor, Clifford Longley, 
produced the records dealing with Perry‟s resignation, Ford snapped: „never mind those 
papers, I made a big mistake‟.139 
Perry had departed in 1919 over policy issues. William Knudsen‟s critical reports 
undermined Perry‟s position and he departed from the company in September 1919. 
However, Henry Ford regretted his decision and apparently wrote to him „expressing 
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keen regret over the differences which lead to the severance‟.140   Despite having left 
under a cloud, Perry was eager to return to the company. He had kept in touch with 
Sorensen, but had waited until the time was right to approach Henry Ford.
141
 In August 
1923 when he had broached the subject with Sorensen about „doing something for the 
company again‟, Sorensen showed the letter to Henry and „while he did not comment on 
it one way or another, I felt you would have no trouble in having a pleasant meeting when 
you met again‟.142 It was to be almost five years before that meeting occurred, by which 
time those who had been responsible for Perry‟s resignation were gone from the 
organisation. Perry met Ford at Southampton immediately before he sailed and Henry 
invited him to manage the English operation again.
143
 As Perry‟s secretary put it years 
after, „the expansion that Perry wanted to undertake in 1919 was now being offered to 
him‟.144 
Up to the time of Ford‟s visit, little had been done about developing Dagenham. 
Efforts were made to have him reconsider sites at Southampton, but despite some 
disadvantages he seemed satisfied with Dagenham as the location of his „Detroit of 
Europe‟.145  Once back within the company, Perry‟s first task was to investigate the 
Dagenham site and to give his opinion on its suitability as the location for expansion. 
Perry duly reported. He had reservations about the swampiness of the site, but could see 
its potential in terms of location, size and access to water.
146
 Invited by Edsel to come to 
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Dearborn, he sailed from England on 9 June. During the following weeks, plans for the 
future of the English company and the role of Dagenham were teased out with Henry, 
Edsel and Sorensen.
147
 Once a plan was agreed, Perry returned to England and set to 
work, implementing Ford‟s ideas for Europe and rebuilding and directing the company.   
Though the Model A had first appeared in the United States on 2 December 1927, 
it was not available in Europe until May 1928 and then only in very small numbers. It 
was not until 1 October 1928 that all the European plants were producing it.
148
 Cork‟s 
role in the production of the new car was along the same lines as the Model T. Fully 
assembled cars were imported from Manchester and locally produced 14.9 horsepower 
engines installed for the Irish market. During 1928, Cork built 6,394 of these 14.9 
horsepower „AF‟ engines for Europe and the Far East.149 Following the departure of 
tractor production at the end of 1922 Cork had also supplied the small Irish market with 
tractors imported complete from Dearborn.
150
  During the five years a total of 427 
tractors were imported.
151
  
With Percival Perry back in Ford and the „1928 Plan‟ being shaped, Irish fears 
would have centred on the vulnerability of the Cork plant in the final outcome. Since the 
advent of the McKenna duties it had been assumed that the Cork plant as a production 
unit was due to be eliminated, but its life had been extended for 5 years as the Dagenham 
project had failed to materialise.
152
 Now with the massive plant imminent, operations 
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such as parts and engine casting as well as machining were likely to cease and be 
transferred to the new, more efficient plant. Cork faced a gloomy future. Its best hope 
was that it would continue as a local car assembly plant, circumventing the Free State 
import tariffs. However, since all other makes on sale in Ireland also faced tariffs, there 
seemed little benefit in having a plant in Cork for the small sales volumes of the Irish 
market. Everything depended on whether or not Henry Ford would keep his promise to 
Dulanty and restart tractor production again. 
Ford‟s tractor production in the United States had been closed down unexpectedly 
early in 1928.
153
 The reason for this abrupt decision is not evident, but it was to have a 
significant impact on Henry Ford & Son of Cork. It has been suggested that American 
demand for the tractor had declined, but production reports for the preceding three years 
showed strong output, even if there was a slight decline.
154
 Edsel stated that „the tractor 
assembly line has been shut down…we are starting on designs for a new type of 
tractor‟.155 According to William Squire:  
They [the Rouge] were doing 500 tractors a day, up to the time when the Model A was 
ready for production. Then all the factory equipment was packed up and put into a 
storage area in the Rouge plant. It was stored in the open. It was all oiled up so that it 
wouldn‟t rust. The thought was to „get it off the floor as quickly as possible,‟ and make 
room for the Model A. The space was required for Model A components.
156
  
Very little development work had been done to the Fordson, leaving it fundamentally 
unchanged since 1917. Ford competitors such as International Harvester had grown and 
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improved their products taking over much of the market. As with the Model T, Henry 
Ford may have been reluctant to change the design however, abandoning production 
completely without any apparent alternative plan seemed foolish and unwarranted. 
Leffingwell, too, suggests that Ford needed room for the Model A but adds that: 
Ford stopped because he felt defeated by the tractor price wars and technology skirmishes 
he initiated in 1922. Dealer complaints over his warranty reimbursement policies and 
rigid delivery methods put them at odds. Ford warned them he would as soon not produce 
tractors as accede to their demands.
157
 
Another suggestion was that the tractor had become unmarketable due to its poor safety 
record. Certainly, the Fordson had a bad reputation in the early days, which the company 
blamed on accidents caused by inexperienced users. Ford maintained that in normal and 
careful operation it was a safe tractor, but if operated incorrectly the tractor could tip over 
backwards which could result in serious injury to the operator.
158
   
A general letter to the Henry Ford & Son sales department was slightly more 
explicit. It blamed excess inventory as the reason for the discontinuation, but made it 
clear there was no plan for future production other than a vague suggestion that, as Edsel 
said, an improved design might be introduced. In a statement which had been prepared 
for dealers, equipment manufacturers and distributors, the company explained that after 
the end of the Model T, when the plant was closed down for changeover to Model A, 
they had built up an inventory of Fordson tractors to meet requirements for the coming 
months. Therefore the company had „suspended tractor manufacture for the present, but 
will continue the production of parts to service the 600,000 Fordson tractors now in use‟. 
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Sales staff were informed that it was okay to say that „we have in mind when producing 
tractors again to incorporate several improvements.‟ However, the Company wanted little 
publicity „because of the indefiniteness of our future plans‟.159   
Whether the decision was made to make room for the Model A or to dispose of 
excess inventory arising from concerns about safety and declining sales, the decision 
must have come from Henry Ford himself as no one else, including Edsel, would dare 
make such a decision. After all his work developing and producing tractors to assist 
farmers, this decision seemed to run counter to his previous attitude, but as with many of 
his decisions it may have just been a whimsical or stubborn response to some other 
stimulus.  
In Ford‟s conversations with Dulanty, some two months after the cessation of 
American tractor production, it is not clear what Ford had in his mind.
160
 Wilkins and 
Hill suggest that he was gathering information for his guidance both as to Ireland and 
England‟.161 Ford hinted at the same „improved model‟ story that was being disseminated 
by the sales department and while in the United States prospects for restarting production 
were being left deliberately vague, Henry Ford was now apparently promising to move 
production to Cork. Since there is no previous mention of this move it seems likely that it 
was a spur of the moment decision on his part, and part of an emerging plan for Europe. 
Ford‟s comments were reported to William T. Cosgrave and later when the scheme was 
made public, Cosgrave, expressing Cork people‟s satisfaction with the decision, seems to 
have believed that the Ford‟s hint was actually a commitment. „You were good enough 
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during your European visit last spring to indicate to Mr Dulanty…your intention to put 
the plant of the Cork factory on the production of a new tractor,‟ he wrote to Ford in 
Dearborn.
162
 Presumably, if tractor sales had diminished and inventory was high then 
moving the production to Europe, to either Dagenham or Cork, not only freed up space in 
Dearborn but also absorbed overheads in Europe. Howard Beebe, a Ford tractor engineer 
suggested that Ford moved to Ireland as „the majority of our sales were with 
Russia…manufacture would be closer to market. It was just a question of not having 
sufficient demands in this country to absorb production‟.163  
Ford may have been developing a more coherent business plan for his various 
enterprises and products, but it was not until he rehired Percival Perry that the plan 
became a reality, probably at the June meeting in Dearborn. Regardless of the fact that 
Henry Ford was the most likely instigator of the move to Cork, others seemed to want to 
claim the credit. For example, Squires said:  
During 1928, James Connolly made a visit to the Rouge plant from Manchester. He had 
heard that the tractor machinery was being thrown out. He suggested to Sir Percival Perry 
that this be acquired at scrap value, and Cork would make tractors for the world. A. R. 
Smith and Sir Percival Perry went to the United States to negotiate for the purchase of 
this tractor equipment.
164
  
After Perry‟s planning session in Dearborn he returned to be confronted with a 
typical example of the skirmishing that went on between Cork and Manchester.
165
 Cork 
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were setting up to manufacture Model A engines, but no sooner had the first examples 
been shipped than complaints arose about their quality. In this case there seems to have 
been a deliberate bias against Cork production. H. Scott, Cork‟s plant superintendent, 
wrote to Sorensen outlining the details of Manchester‟s quality complaints. He explained 
that Cork had rectified the minor setting-up faults encountered with the engines and that 
the British manager, Jenkins, while on a visit to the Cork plant inspected operations and 
was satisfied with his findings. However, on his return to Manchester he changed his 
mind and announced that he was sending over two Manchester inspectors to spend a 
couple of weeks in Cork to carry out „a minute inspection of all assembly operations‟ 
there.
166
 Despite a thorough check they apparently found little to complain about.  One of 
the inspectors passed 52 motors as satisfactory, but then, according to Scott, „in a burst of 
confidence, informed us that, undoubtedly, they would be rejected by Manchester‟.167 He 
expressed the view that „no engine would ever pass Manchester inspection unless built by 
Manchester‟. In due course Jenkins wrote complaining of being „very disappointed‟ with 
the particular engines, suggesting that he would „send over five or six men to take up key 
positions‟ in the Cork plant. Scott rejected this suggestion as the previous visit by 
Manchester inspectors had contributed little to the process.
168
 All of this was reported to 
Sorensen, who over the previous decade had encouraged managers to keep him informed 
of everything that took place in the plant and with no clear European leader that is exactly 
what they did. Now, however, he passed the problem back to Perry who was quick to 
stamp his authority on events in both Manchester and Cork.    
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Perry‟s approach was to take the macro-view, attempting to find answers which 
benefited the Ford company as a whole rather than siding with local, partisan attitudes. 
He reminded the disputants that both companies belonged to Henry Ford and that there 
was a need to minimise inter-company differences and to cooperate more closely in these 
matters. He pointed out that the Jenkins‟ motive in complaining was to ensure high 
standards of engineering efficiency and to avoid shipping defective motors all over the 
world and that „whilst it is comparatively easy for Manchester to get any faults corrected, 
it would be very much harder for the faraway branches to do the same, and, therefore, a 
quick kick from Manchester will probably stop a lot of long delayed future kicks from 
abroad‟.169 Thus, for the first time in nine years there was someone in overall charge of 
the business in Britain and Ireland who has the clear vision and authority to address 
problems. However, despite his leadership the issue of quality was to continue as a 
problem between Manchester and Cork.  
At the end of July 1928, after Perry had spent a week reviewing matters and 
finding his feet in Manchester, Jenkins and he went to Cork where he introduced the idea 
of restoring tractor production to Cork, substituting Fordson tractor manufacturing 
equipment for the recently installed Model A machinery which would now be transferred 
to Manchester.
170
 After discussing the issue thoroughly with Clarke and Scott he asked 
them to prepare a report outlining their views on the project. Clarke was somewhat wary 
of the speed with which the report was prepared and pointed out in his covering letter: 
„You will realise with the short time at our disposal it as been impossible to go into all the 
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details‟, but agreed that subject to certain caveats, it could be done.171 During the 
previous eight months Clarke‟s group had almost completed the conversion of machinery 
from Model T to Model A production, while continuing to produce Model T spare parts 
and also tooling up for the production of Model A rear axle parts.
172
 In effect, now that 
the factory was almost settled into Model A production, they were being asked to change 
everything again: this was to be the story of Cork over the next three years.
173
 
Remarking on the effect of tariffs, Clarke suggested that while materials 
manufactured in Cork had been competitive with best British prices, he estimated that, 
based on his figures, Manchester had incurred customs duty costs of approximately 
£510,452 over the previous 5 years and that these were likely to increase if no agreement 
was reached between the two governments.
174
 He made no comment on duties in 
connection with the proposed change to tractor production. The budget of 1927 had 
changed the definition of tractors which meant that imported tractor parts were liable to 
duty, however since the Perry proposal meant most parts were to be produced in Cork, 
duty was no longer as onerous a burden on the new business. At this point in the various 
communications between Perry and Sorensen there was no comment about tariffs. 
Despite his reservations, Clarke‟s report suggests that he was keen on the logic of 
Perry‟s proposal. He commented that: „the suggestion of developing this plant again 
principally for the manufacture of tractors would appear to us to be a most practical 
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one‟.175 He went on to deal with the costs, conditions, space and layouts of the new 
tractor operation. Suggesting that Detroit should ship the tractor manufacturing 
equipment as soon as possible and in as complete a condition as possible, so that its 
arrival would coincide with the removal of the Model A equipment and he could retain 
his cohort of trained men, who were essential to achieve acceptable costs. Clarke 
estimated that with the existing assembly line a daily output of 50 tractors was achievable 
and recommended that they retain the business of casting Model A parts in order to 
maximise foundry utilisation and thus minimise costs.
176
 
Perry in turn reported to Sorensen, passing on Clarke and Scott‟s verdict that the 
scheme was viable. He went on: „I believe that if it is done then Cork should have a 
sufficient and profitable future‟.177 Based on a tractor retail price of $750 he estimated 
demand in Britain for about 3,000 tractors per annum, together with another 9,000 units 
on the continent, giving a total European demand of 12,000 tractors. Turning to North 
American operations he pointed out that Dearborn foreign sales the previous year had 
reached 24,974, while Canada had sold 6,820 (3,741 in Canada and 3,079 in the British 
colonies), together amounting to sales of almost 32,000 tractors. With Dearborn and 
Canada out of tractor production, Perry asked „could not Cork have world-wide rights for 
sale, and get into all foreign territories whilst the Fordson is still known and in 
demand?‟178 He recognised that getting into the North American business was dependent 
on obtaining approval from Detroit and Canada, so his basic proposal related only to the 
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European demand of 12,000 per annum.
179
 Clarke had based his plan on an output of 
10,000 to 12,000 units per annum and stated that it would „be sufficient to ensure 
economical manufacture, and enable us to build a sound production unit, capable of 
bringing to the company a satisfactory return on the capital employed‟.180 Perry, with 
much more ambitious plans, promoted his scheme for producing all Ford tractors in Cork. 
To justify his plan he pointed out that both the foundry and machine shop were capable of 
producing 30,000 units and the Dearborn equipment had a massive capacity of 300 
tractors a day (or 144,000 units per annum), suggesting that once the Marina plant took 
delivery of the American equipment it should well equipped to meet worldwide demand. 
In converting Cork into a tractor plant he recommended that the plant cease 
engine machining and assembly, retaining only the foundry work „for Model A engine 
and such other Model A castings as they can economically undertake‟.181 He listed the 
benefits of such an arrangement and said that Cork‟s „machining and assembling of 
Model A engines is cumbersome, unsatisfactorily and costly‟.182 In effect the process of 
machining castings in Cork and then shipping them to Manchester was incurring duty on 
Cork wages, while also suffering additional costs in transport, packing and insurance 
because rates were much higher on finished engines than on rough castings. Where 
engines were shipped to continental plants the costs of shipping was higher from Cork 
than it would be from Manchester. Finally, instead of European plants drawing parts from 
three locations-Detroit, Manchester and Cork, drawing from only two sources-Detroit and 
Manchester-reduced administrative and shipping complexity. This list highlights the 
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benefits of producing parts in Manchester and is in effect a catalogue of Cork‟s 
deficiencies, deficiencies which never really changed through the years. The difficulty 
was based mainly on Cork‟s isolated location which added to transport costs and 
increased complexity. Inherent in it also are the additional cost incurred by McKenna 
duties. 
Perry laid out a programme of action to prepare for tractor production. Firstly, he 
proposed increasing the output of machined engine castings to accumulate a stock of 
eight weeks supply to cover for the time when the associated equipment was being 
transferred to Manchester. Secondly, he suggested that the preparation work for Model A 
rear-axle production which was in progress, but not yet complete as certain essential tools 
were not scheduled to arrive until September or October, should be halted and equipment 
already in place in Cork be removed and shipped to Manchester. Finally, he asked that 
Dearborn arrange shipping of the Fordson tractor machinery so that it would arrive into 
the vacated production areas in Cork plant by 2 November in order to „be in full blast 
production by 1 January 1929‟.183 
While Perry‟s proposals were based on improving the economics and co-
ordination of Model A production, he was also concerned with: 
The desire to make Cork a self-contained and self-supporting profitable plant with a 
permanent and independent business. All enquiries confirm that the Fordson tractor is 
still the best and cheapest tool of its kind in Europe and there is an increasing demand for 
it. Once established I can see no reason why it should not maintain its premium position 
indefinitely.
184
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This statement clearly suggests that for Perry the future of Cork was a serious issue on his 
agenda, with Henry Ford fully behind the plan, keen to give the Cork plant a solid and 
permanent future, restoring it to the position it had in the early days. Despite the earlier 
doubts about Ford of Cork‟s future arising from the construction of a fully integrated 
factory at Dagenham, the reintroduction of Fordson production offered new possibilities. 
Anticipating Detroit‟s acceptance of his ideas, Perry had stopped the millwrights laying 
out the axle department. He declared: „I would much appreciate a decision by cable 
respectfully on the rear-axle proposal as this work could be proceeded with 
immediately‟.185 Clearly he had tentative permission from Henry Ford to act, but was 
now seeking specific permission particularly to issues such as stopping axle casting and 
extending production to include markets outside Europe. 
Within two weeks, Sorensen had agreed to Perry‟s proposals and Perry proceeded 
to put the plan into effect.
186
 No doubt Henry Ford was satisfied to see tractor production 
restart, ensuring that his long-held aspiration of establishing an industrial centre in 
Ireland would become a reality. The company made no formal announcement of its 
activities or intentions, but by the end of August the word was out that they were 
shipping machinery, probably the rear axle equipment, to Manchester. In the absence of 
official information the local perception, according to the Irish Times, was that the Ford 
works was being „denuded of the newly erected machinery for the manufacture of motor 
cars‟ which was assumed to be as a consequence of the failure to negotiate a reciprocal 
removal of the tariffs.
187
  News of the shipments did not come from Ford but from one of 
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their contractors. The newspaper revealed that „the announcement that Messrs Henry 
Ford  have decided to transfer the bulk of their work from here to Great Britain, made at 
today‟s luncheon of the Cork Rotary Club by R. W. Sinnott director of the City of Cork 
Steam Packet Company has given rise to feelings akin to consternation‟.188 Sinnott‟s 
comments were based on the fact that his firm had already carried a „great proportion‟ of 
the recently installed machinery to Manchester.
189
 According to the Irish Times Percival 
Perry‟s view was that Ford had grown „tired by months of apparently fruitless 
negotiations with this government‟ and „is wholly justified in making its present 
decision‟.190 However, no record of such negotiations are apparent and based on his 
relatively recent arrival and the pressure of work involved in the mammoth task of 
preparing for Dagenham, it seems unlikely that he had much time for such negotiations. 
The Irish Times in its leading article seemed to accept the inevitability of Ford‟s 
retrenchment, stating that the decision was a disappointment to Cork, but that it could not 
have come „as a complete surprise‟ since on his visit to Britain Ford had „made no secret 
of his intention to abandon Cork‟ if the duties continued.191  Thus, doom and gloom 
pervaded Cork as the machinery was moved out and the long expected downturn seemed 
to have arrived. The information in the public domain was broadly accurate, but left out 
the positive news that tractor production was about to restart. Up to this point the Ford 
company had made no official announcement to relieve the concerned people of Cork. 
However, even as the newspapers were purveying news of imminent departure, within 
the plant Clarke‟s concentration was on the forthcoming changeover. He reported to 
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headquarters that he had shipped 564 Model AF engines bringing his total shipments for 
the year to 3,184 units. More importantly, he claimed to have trained up a team of 
workers to form the nucleus of a tractor assembly department.
192
 
On 30 August the Irish Times carried a statement from Mr H. S. Cooper, general 
manager of the Trafford Park works which should have countered the gloom. Cooper 
claimed that there was „nothing particularly new in what was now going on‟ and it 
„would possibly turn out to be a benefit‟. He said that as Cork was a supplier to 
Manchester it did not make good business sense to make car parts there „from English 
raw materials and then have to pay not only transportation costs, but an import duty on 
them as well‟.193 He continued that Mr Ford was not preparing to shut the plant but 
wanted to find alternative work for Cork announcing that „very shortly Cork will take up 
the concentrated manufacture of the Fordson tractor for the European market‟. At this 
stage he mentioned only tractors for the European market, as presumably the worldwide 
aspect suggested by Percival Perry was not agreed until his visit in October. Cooper also 
pointed out that „Mr Ford has stood the cost of the duties here on Irish Free State produce 
for four years out of his own pocket. Had he been a hard-hearted business man he would 
have stopped Cork four years ago before the time had come to put the works on a 
different product‟.194 Cooper‟s remarks are broadly in line with the plans laid down by 
Perry and within a few days the facts had been officially confirmed by the local 
management.
195
 In some quarters there were still doubts about Ford‟s future as Sir 
Stanley Harrington, accompanied by H. A. Pelly headed a deputation of the local 
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Chamber of Commerce to President Cosgrave and declared that „unless the Free State 
Government could make some very great concession to Mr Ford to induce him to 
manufacture not alone tractors, but to resume manufacturing motor cars, a calamity might 
come to pass‟.196  
It was not until the end of September that the full details of the plant 
reorganisation were released and a sceptical Irish Times accepted that Cork would indeed 
benefit from the new tractor factory. It reported that the plant was due to come into 
operation by 1 January 1929 when the company anticipated employing 2,500 men, 
earning wages of close to £1,000,000 annually and producing 200 to 300 machines per 
week.
197
   
Prior to his departure for Detroit in late September, Clarke wrote to Cosgrave 
informing him of the decision to manufacture tractors not only for Europe but for „several 
other countries‟ as well.198 He raised one difficulty with their plan: „that rather 
unfortunate word “tariffs”‟, he went on to say that in the recent budget „the net was set 
out wide and included tractors in its meshes‟. In addition to the cost of the duty he 
pointed out the difficulty and expense of administering large quantities and types of  parts 
through customs and then later the necessity to have to claim „drawbacks‟ on exports.199  
In Clarke‟s absence, the company secretary John Cohalan, kept up the company 
demands. Cohalan wrote to Cosgrave informing him that the amount of machinery en 
route from the United States was even greater than previously expected and that tractor 
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parts had also been shipped which would pose problems with customs.
200
 Finally, at the 
end of October, Cosgrave wrote in confidence to Cohalan saying that „the Minister of 
Finance and I are agreed that the law should be altered to admit of the free importation 
for the factory in Cork‟.201 However, he still offered no clear date for implementation of 
the change and for Ford there was still the issue of elaborate accounts. Clarke in a 
covering letter to Sorensen pointed out:  
Whilst this would not effect us very seriously from a financial point of view they would 
be the cause of considerable bother and trouble because of the amount of clerical and 
Customs labour involved …this is purely his personal promise given confidentially, and 
although it does not bind the government I have no doubt that it will come through 
without difficulty.
202
 
On 19 November 1928 Cosgrave again wrote to Henry Ford anticipating that he 
hoped soon „to be in a position to make certain customs adjustments which should 
facilitate the development of the tractor industry in Cork‟.203 In the letter he also 
expressed his gratitude to Henry Ford for the restoration of tractor manufacture to Cork. 
Two days later the cabinet finally agreed to exempt Ford tractor parts from import 
duty.
204
 Meanwhile, behind the scenes Cosgrave was trying to find additional ways of 
supporting Ford.  Having conceded the elimination of tractor duties he instructed J. J. 
McElligott, secretary of the Department of Finance to investigate other means of 
facilitating Ford‟s activities in Cork. Specifically, Cosgrave asked him to investigate 
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income tax and death duties to see if any alteration to the existing arrangements could be 
introduced which would benefit the company. Upon investigation McElligott discovered 
that Ford would incur no death duties in either the Ireland or England. As for income tax, 
the company was making no profits at that time, so there was nothing to be gained by 
discussing either of these ideas with Ford.
205
    
As the date for production start-up approached Clarke and Cohalan kept up the 
pressure on Cosgrave, as did the Cork Chamber of Commerce, reminding him to follow 
through with his promises in the forthcoming budget.
206
  The tariff adjustment went 
through the Dáil in March 1929 when the Finance (Customs and Stamp Duties) Bill 
1929, proposed that motor tractor parts and assemblies of such parts be exempt from 
import duties.
207
 President Cosgrave stated that: „the intention that is behind Section 3 is 
to remove all the difficulties affecting the great Ford industry in Cork.‟208 Even Sean 
Lemass of Fianna Fáil was positive, responding that: „with regard to Section 3 of the Bill, 
the section dealing with the exemption of tractor parts from the motor car duty, we are in 
thorough agreement‟.209 The Minister for Finance, Ernest Blythe, later clarified the issue 
of excessive bookkeeping in the Senate. He said that Ford: „are relieved of the necessity 
of keeping special records for the purpose of getting draw-backs on parts exported‟, in 
effect, as the sales of tractors in Ireland was so small „they get all their parts, both for 
what they sell in Ireland and export, free of duty‟.210 Despite Blythe‟s assurances Colahan 
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had to write to the Revenue Commissioners asking them to reconsider their approach as 
their system was „unworkable‟.211 Finally, in May 1929 the Revenue Commissioners 
relented.
212
  
In late November 1928  the first consignment of 2,000 tons of machinery arrived 
on the Lady Benbow and during December and January a further 5 shiploads of 
machinery followed.
213
 Installing and commissioning this machinery required expert 
assistance and direction, so in conjunction with the equipment Sorensen also sent over a 
dozen American experts to support Clarke. According to Wilkins and Hill, „it was a 
strong team and Clarke needed it‟.214 Meanwhile, on the broader stage Perry was busy. 
During the latter half of 1928, having set in motion the plan to restore Cork, he was 
occupied revitalising the English and European companies providing them with new 
direction and motivation. He hired competent staff and reinstated capable men who had 
left the company.
215
 In October he returned to Dearborn to finalise the details of the 
„1928 Plan‟.216 Central to the plan was a new financial structure. A corporation called the 
Ford Motor Company Limited was created which replaced the Ford Motor Company 
(England) Ltd. and acquired the latter‟s assets as well as those of Henry Ford & Son Ltd., 
Cork. The Ford Motor Company Limited also acquired the shares of Ford‟s nine other 
European operations which were previously owned either by the American company or 
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the Ford family.
217
 The plan was that the Ford of America would control policy through 
its 60 per cent share of the English company‟s stock, while the remaining 40 per cent 
would be offered in small lots to the British public. Similarly, the English company 
would control Ford‟s European companies through a 60 per cent shareholding in them, 
while the remaining 40 per cent would be offered to the public in the respective countries. 
Ford hoped that with local ownership would come a sense that Ford was not a foreign 
company and would offset previously encountered anti-Americanism.
218
  
On the Dagenham site a huge factory capable of producing 200,000 cars per 
annum was to be built.  Despite being only a fraction of the size of the Rouge plant in 
Detroit it would be the largest automobile factory in the world outside the United 
States.
219
 Based on the structure applied to Dearborn and Windsor in Canada, Dagenham 
became Ford‟s third manufacturing centre, the „Detroit of Europe‟, directing assembly 
and marketing in Europe as well as the Middle East and parts of Asia and Africa.
220
 
Despite European dislike for Ford‟s large engines, Henry Ford was still not prepared to 
deviate from his single model theory. „The Model A and the Model AF (with the small 
bore engine) would be sold everywhere‟.221 
In Cork, after years of uncertainty during which Henry Ford & Son seemed 
destined to succumb to the effects of the McKenna tariffs, a new opportunity had arisen. 
The massive amount of machinery being offloaded on the docks testified to the 
magnitude of the new business and Cork could afford to look forward to 1929 with hope 
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and optimism. Ford‟s decision to bring tractor manufacture back to the city would create 
substantial employment and business, securing the prosperity of the city for the coming 
years. In contrast with the original installation a decade earlier, Henry Ford & Son was to 
be not just a tractor producer for European markets but the sole world-wide producer of 
Ford tractors. Cork‟s future as a producer of Ford tractors seemed secure. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT       
World-wide supplier of Fordson tractors:  
Tractor production thwarted a second time (1928-1932) 
Transferring the complete Fordson tractor manufacturing operation from 
Dearborn to Cork was a substantial undertaking. In addition to off-loading and installing 
the complex machinery, modifications and extensions to the Marina factory were needed 
to accommodate it and thousands of workers had to be hired and trained to operate the 
plant. Local workers were keen and willing, but skilled labour was scarce and the large 
numbers of inexperienced employees proved a substantial obstacle to the achievement of 
production quantity and quality.  Even as the company was overcoming these difficulties 
and starting to achieve substantial production output, demand for tractors declined as the 
worldwide depression took hold and countries began to implement protectionist policies. 
The rapid decline in tractor sales led to the closedown of most of Cork‟s operations, 
forcing the local management to find alternative product lines in order to provide work 
for at least some of their employees. Meanwhile in Dagenham, Ford‟s gigantic and 
expensive new plant was under-utilised and Dearborn was faced with taking harsh 
decisions to absorb its excess capacity and reduce costs. However, Ford‟s plans were 
frustrated by Fianna Fail‟s protectionist policies which compelled the company to 
reconsider its decision and forced it to revert to motor car assembly. 
Once Percival Perry had agreement from Charlie Sorensen on his proposals for 
setting up the Fordson tractor operations in Cork, he was keen to get the plant up and 
running quickly.  Ambitiously, he planned to be in production by 1 January 1929.
1
 By 
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early November 1928 the newspapers were reporting the arrival of the first shiploads of 
Ford tractor manufacturing equipment from Detroit.  During the month a series of 
consignments arrived, each carrying up to two thousand tons of machinery, described by 
the Cork Examiner as „the finest machinery plant in the world‟.2  The newspaper‟s tone 
was optimistic and proud. Speaking to the faculty of commerce at University College 
Cork, E. L. Clarke reinforced this optimism when he predicted that Cork would „have one 
of the largest single manufacturing units in Europe‟, employing five thousand men with 
wages of one and a half million pounds per annum.
3
  With production forecasts of about 
30,000 tractors, the plant was on a scale which dwarfed the original installation.
4
 In the 
past, fewer then two thousand workers had been employed in the Marina, now, with a 
much expanded factory, three or four times that number would be required. So, from the 
beginning of 1929 recruitment began for the Cork plant. Numbers employed grew 
quickly. Where 1,327 had been employed in January 1929, by February 1930 this number 
had risen to 6,712.
5
  This huge influx of workers put an immense strain on the capability 
of the Ford company management to absorb and train them.   
Despite Henry Ford‟s various hints about a new, improved tractor, the model to 
be produced in Cork was basically the original Model F. Ford himself took little interest 
in developing the Fordson at this stage, though his staff continued working on its design 
and the move to Cork was used to introduce a number of electrical and mechanical 
improvements.
6
 The new tractor was designated the Model N and in late 1928, a pre-
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production model was demonstrated to dealers in Britain in preparation for its 
reintroduction to the marketplace.
7
 
While Dearborn had produced 93,972 tractors during 1927, Henry Ford‟s abrupt 
cessation of production in late January 1928, when only 8,001 tractors were produced, 
meant that the marketplace was without tractor or parts production for almost a year and 
consequently orders, especially for spare parts, had accumulated.
8
 Clarke was under 
considerable pressure to meet this demand, despite lacking trained manpower to operate 
the equipment. In January 1929, he reported to Perry that „we have made our first small 
shipment of tractor service parts‟.9 So great was the demand for the parts that production 
had begun without a roof over some of the machines. In a space between the foundry and 
the machine shop it was planned to build a press shop, but while the roof was being 
designed and installed Clarke commenced operations. The men worked in the rain. 
William Squire recalled that „over the machines, we built “dog boxes” of tarred felt to 
keep the water out‟.10 The building work was delayed by inclement weather, so that, as 
late as mid–March 1929, Squire was informing Sorensen that only about 75 per cent of 
the structural steel was up, 18 per cent of the roof was on, while the end walls and glazing 
had not even started.
11
 Electrical power was another potential problem. Ford‟s heavy 
machinery was a large consumer of electricity and the Free State‟s electrical system was 
still undeveloped. Awaiting a new electrical generator from England, Squire signalled 
Sorensen that the power situation was likely to create problems for them since the local 
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power company were reluctant to undertake the laying of additional cables as:  
The Irish Free State has taken control of all the municipal power plants preparatory to 
buying and obsoleting most of them as soon as the Shannon Scheme is producing….The 
power commission are not willing to sanction the laying or erecting of power lines which 
would interfere with the high tension lines from Limerick.
12
  
Instead, the power commission planned to build a transformer station adjacent to the Ford 
works as the most efficient method of supplying power. Meanwhile, power demand 
during the day was up to capacity and some departments had to be transferred to the 
afternoon shift to spread the load and to avoid power failures.
13
 Late in April, Ford took 
delivery of the generator which was to supply electricity until the Ardnacrusha Hydro-
electric station began commercial operations on 21 October 1929.
14
 The building of the 
power station by the Cumann na nGaedheal Government in the early years after 
independence showed some foresight of the need for domestic and industrial 
infrastructure.  
Getting Cork production up and running with the shortcomings that existed was 
no easy task, the combination of ongoing building work, shortage of suitable equipment 
and most particularly, the incorporation and training of the floods of new employees was 
to prove a challenge to the management of the company. The shortage of skilled men, 
such as toolmakers, lathe and grinder operators, made operations particularly difficult. 
William Squire reported that he had only 156 toolmakers and machine repair men 
available to erect machinery and maintain the whole plant. To cope with the installation 
of the additional machinery he was forced to bring skilled men from Dublin and 
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England.
15
 He had hired about a hundred men from England and was still trying to find 
more, but part of the problem was that many of the new recruits were not prepared to live 
in Cork.
16
 According to Clarke, only about fifty percent were prepared to settle, the 
remainder preferred to return to England, even if it meant living on the dole.
17
  In the first 
three months of 1929 over 1,400 employees were added to the payroll so the need to hire 
and retain skilled workers was crucial, as in large part, Ford was relying on the skilled 
men to break-in and train the new recruits.
18
  
With the exception of the foundry, conditions at Ford‟s plant were generally good, 
while high pay rates made it an attractive place to work. For men coming from a farm 
labouring background, the Examiner’s comment that „the work was harder than the fields, 
but the rewards were greater‟ was apt.19  As Henry Ford & Son hired labour, they quickly 
absorbed all of the available skilled and semi-skilled men in the hinterland of Cork. Since 
the number of skilled workers available was relatively small, inevitably a large number of 
the new employees lacked any industrial experience. Describing the difficulties with the 
unskilled labour Squire informed Sorensen that:   
We have started all the production lines but are making rather slow progress on some of 
the steel jobs...not enough foremen and mechanics to break in new men as fast as we can 
use them…the men here are very anxious to have employment and are good workmen, 
but are hard to break in, afraid of grinders especially, and the multiple tooling of some of 
the machining operations seems too much for them to master.
20
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One group who were hired were local fishermen. In late February a deputation of 
unemployed Blackrock fishermen made representations to the Cork Board of 
Conservators, asking them to use their influence in getting them employment at Ford. 
Apparently, the board had previously applied on behalf of other unemployed men who 
had promptly been hired by Ford. The Conservators, described Ford as a „god-send‟ for 
hiring fisherman who were in very poor circumstances.
21
 Inevitably the shortage of 
skilled workers and the pressure on management led to other problems. Plant 
superintendent, Harry Scott, reported a fire in the factory in late April. This was the 
second fire within a few weeks. The previous fire in March was of little consequence 
apart from damaging several feet of insulating cable.
22
 This time the fire was caused by a 
defective flue in the old foundry roof and, fortunately, also caused little damage. When 
the fire had started, the electrical power to the area was turned off leaving the area in 
darkness. Clarke, who was apparently supervising some of the firemen, tripped and fell 
into a pit breaking two bones in his leg necessitating his removal to hospital.
23
  John 
Cohalan, the company secretary, reported that Clarke was „progressing favourably‟ in the 
hospital and that business continued to be discussed with him there.
24
  
With Clarke partially incapacitated and William Squire, who had overseen much 
of the machinery installation, recently returned to the United States, the pressure fell on 
Scott and Cohalan to manage the development of the plant.
25
 The additional workload 
and pressure so affected Cohalan that he was afterwards forced to resign citing „a 
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breakdown in health due to overwork‟.26 Cohalan had started as a clerk with the company 
in 1917, later he was promoted to accountant, chief clerk and finally company secretary, 
often acting as plant manager in Clarke‟s absence. Four years after leaving Henry Ford & 
Son he wrote to the company seeking a reference.
27
 His request was dismissed by a 
former colleague, Moekle, with the comment that it was „not our practice‟ to give 
references.
28
 Like so many other Ford managers, Cohalan was treated shabbily and his 
circumstances were ignored by the company, despite his years of hard work and loyal 
service. 
In spite of the many challenges, steady progress was being made. On 27 February 
the Examiner reported that the first consignment of parts manufactured in Cork was being 
shipped to the United States.
29
  Within weeks, Cork was turning out a steady supply of 
spare parts and was shipping them to the European branches, South America and the 
United States, while work had started on the largest parts order which was from Russia.
30
  
The first dozen tractors were produced on 1 April 1929 using components manufactured 
at Cork or bought from suppliers in England, Scotland and Ireland.
31
 Soon, Clarke could 
report that „our production is now running fairly satisfactorily and is growing every 
day…all our cast-iron parts are running good and the scrap percentage is fairly low, but is 
being watched carefully‟.32  With some 3,300 men on the pay-roll, like Squire before 
him, Scott had to account to Sorensen for the excess labour and his report shows that the 
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problems were still the same-masses of untrained men terrified of the unfamiliar 
machinery and requiring the reassurance of a trainer on almost every machine. 
Notwithstanding their fears, Scott was confident that „once we get them broken in we 
shall have a fine bunch of men and we are sure we can get twice as much production with 
the present number employed‟.33 To help him get through these and the other 
commissioning difficulties, Scott wrote to Sorensen and sought permission to retain some 
of the American experts who had come with the machinery.  
They have written their wives to see what they think about it. They have also asked if 
they would be able to go back to Detroit before really settling down here and I have 
informed them I believe it would be agreeable to the firm when the job is in the position 
that someone can look after it while they are away…. We are watching the [local] men 
we expect will take over the jobs from the others very carefully and will be able to say 
shortly if they can swing it without any more of the Detroit boys staying here.
34
 
Inevitably, the commissioning difficulties in Cork were reflected in the finished product 
and tractors produced there caused problems for the American Fordson dealers. Peter 
MacGregor, who had helped set up the original tractor business in Cork in 1919, was sent 
by Sorensen to investigate the complaints of poor workmanship. Finding the complaints 
justified Sorensen despatched him to Ireland to „raise hell‟ and to resolve the quality 
problems. In Cork, he found that the Detroit experts were not very assiduous in their 
work, instead he discovered that they „were paying more attention to motor boats, golf, 
dog racing, etc. than to the art of building tractors‟. MacGregor went on to spent six 
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months in the factory during 1929 getting the tractor production into shape.
35
    
In June 1929, reports of complaints by Ford that they could not get men with 
technical skills resulted in the Associations of Chambers of Commerce passing a motion 
calling for more money to be spent on technical education.
36
 Meanwhile, Ford were still 
hiring men almost as fast as they could process them and the task of recruiting and 
training „green‟ labour was still adding tremendously to the problems of the plant. As the 
men became competent at their tasks the company management pushed them harder so 
that by early May a total of two hundred tractors had been assembled.
37
 When Sorensen 
visited in September, the plant had almost 4,400 men employed, was assembling a 
hundred tractors a day and trying to catch up with spare parts demand. Expressing the 
hope that Sorensen was pleased with what they had achieved in the previous year, Scott 
wrote: „He was much nicer to us than we really expected‟.38 
In the United States, in late 1929, the Ford Motor Company announced a raise in 
the minimum wage rate from six to seven dollars per day. Perry, set out to follow the 
American increase and „to compile proper wages to be paid in Europe comparative with 
those which you settle as being right and proper in the United States‟.39 Due to the 
diverse cost of living and taxation structures existing in Europe, Perry was faced with a 
complex problem in trying to harmonise his wage structures. Following his investigation 
he proposed a twelve and a half per cent increase for Britain and Ireland, effective 1 
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January 1930.
40
 Increases in the other European plants ranged from thirty three and one 
third per cent in Italy and Spain, down to a reduction of seven per cent in France, where 
they had received a fifty per cent increase the previous February. At the same time Perry 
laid down a set of rules covering payments, hiring of staff and conditions of employment. 
New employees were to be hired at the minimum rate with preference given to former 
employees, though they were only given the rate for their new job, regardless of their 
previous rank.  Promotions were to be made from within the organisation where possible 
and were to be based on merit. The company displayed an enlightened approach to 
gender equality as managers had discretion to hire women and were directed that „no 
differentiation in rates of pay between male and female employees where engaged in 
similar duties is to be recognised‟.41 Relatively few females were employed, in part due 
to the social conventions of the period, while those who were employed worked on 
traditional female tasks such as upholstery machining. In the case of holidays, salaried 
staff who qualified were entitled to two weeks holiday with full pay, while workers on 
weekly payroll were permitted to take two weeks holidays, but without pay.
42
  
From Dearborn, Ford‟s auditing department kept a firm grip on the minutiae of 
plant operations, particularly where issues regarding wages and employment policy were 
concerned. For example, the company secretary, Cohalan, reported to the audit 
department that in order to reduce overheads he had laid off some of the office staff „for 
alternate pay periods‟.43 His stated reason for alternating the staff was „to preserve the 
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organisation in readiness for busy times ahead‟.44  In reply, he was informed that 
Dearborn preferred that unnecessary employees be laid off indefinitely, as it gave 
„necessary employees continuous employment‟ and allowed „those laid off to look for 
permanent employment elsewhere‟.45 Cohalan responded that he was anxious not to lose 
experienced staff and that as alternative employment was almost unavailable in Cork, 
staff themselves were anxious to work part-time, even with the reduced pay.
46
 
Grudgingly, this was accepted by H.L. Moekle on condition that Cork „return to normal 
soon…and watch carefully‟.47 Another issue which disturbed the auditors was the fact 
that one or two company employees were supervised by relatives.  Clarke claimed that 
these were long-standing arrangements and that he had „never any reason to suspect that 
company have in any way been affected‟.48 The auditors permitted the arrangements to 
stand, but emphasised that they did not want „any individual hired in the future who 
would come under this ruling‟.49  Up to World War II, it seems that two people from one 
family were not permitted to work for the company though this policy was overturned in 
the years after the war.
50
   
By the end of 1929, Cork had produced a total of  9,686 tractors which had been 
shipped to about twenty-five countries, including Australia, Italy, Canada and France. In 
addition, Clarke had sent 1,409 units to the United States.
51
 Sorensen might have been 
pleasant to Scott during his September visit, but by January he was „Cast-Iron‟ Charlie 
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again, demanding to know from Clarke, why he had built only 89 tractors during the 
previous ten days. „Doesn‟t it seem reasonable that if you are going to delay shipments to 
us that you should give some warning to our people. What is the trouble?‟52 
Clarke did not respond until 28 January 1930, when he finally explained that the 
low output was due to a combination of Christmas holidays, work connected with year-
end inventory reconciliation and meeting delivery promises on Russian spare parts. He 
went on to say that they had built 2,167 tractors to date in January and would almost 
complete the promised shipment of 2,000 units to the United States.
53
 Sorensen was 
impatient with Clarke as he felt he was not being kept fully informed of events in Cork 
and also that outputs were still poor. After nine months in production, they still had not 
averaged more than 100 tractors per day during period July 1929 to January 1930.
54
  
Ford‟s employment figures rose to almost seven thousand in February 1930, 
making the company, apart from the railways, the largest employer in the Free State, 
dwarfing traditional companies like Jacobs and Guinness and employing more workers 
than any other Ford plant outside the United States.
55
 No doubt impressed and pleased at 
the size of Ford‟s workforce and the beneficial effect of their wages on the city‟s 
business, the manager of the Cork Harbour Commissioners, Eugene Gayer, wrote to 
Clarke inviting members of Ford‟s board to visit Cork during the coming summer. 
Expressing the commissioner‟s appreciation, he promised them a thoroughly Irish 
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welcome.
56
 Clarke passed the letter on and three weeks later Sorensen‟s office replied 
that he would be glad to accept Gayer‟s invitation.57 While the hiring of workers was to 
continue for a short time, it came to an abrupt halt in May and by summer the plant was 
almost deserted. The welcome which would greet the Ford group in June was to be 
decidedly frosty, certainly not in keeping with that promised by Gayer.  
With the employment numbers at an all time high, the early part of 1930 had also 
been a period of very high production. In January, Cork plant assembled 2,646 tractors 
followed by 3,026 tractors in February, making it the best month yet. This brought output 
to a total of 16,045 tractors.
58
 The company also recorded their best single day‟s 
production, 185 tractors on 28 February, justifying Clarke‟s earlier optimism and beliefs. 
Demand for the firm‟s products continued to be buoyant. Manchester was ordering large 
numbers of Model A parts; Russian orders for parts had been extremely high for the 
previous four or five months and Cork had succeeded in meeting Perry‟s commitments, 
though by March demand had eased somewhat. In supplying the United States, Cork fell 
short of meeting their requirements, having shipped only 1,792 tractors. In order to 
redress the shortfall Clarke was aiming to produce 3,600 in March.
59
 So that in early 
March 1930, the Fordson plant had more orders that it could cope with and its future 
prospects appeared bright.  
Yet the efforts to drive up production came at a cost. Product quality fluctuated 
due to the many inadequately trained workers who caused high rates of scrappage. In 
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Dearborn additional men could easily be added to the car assembly line or rotated to 
other stations as many tasks required little skill and could be taught quickly without 
compromising overall quality or output. Tractor manufacture was neither as automated 
nor were the tasks as subdivided, consequently, it required a higher level of individual 
capability and knowledge. To add to the difficulties, some of the equipment necessary for 
production was not in place. The foundry was a particular problem area. The environment 
there was very difficult. The need to produce technically correct product in an area of 
extreme heat, fumes and heavy work tested the workers. Clarke wrote:  
We had to increase our foundry force considerably, and as the bulk of these men were 
totally unused to factory or foundry conditions, it has taken them some time to get broken 
in…our struggle has been to keep down scrap percentage, while at the same time we had 
of necessity to boost up daily output.
60
 
The level of scrap was severe enough for Perry to take action. He despatched Rowland 
Smith, Dagenham‟s production manager, to investigate the problems in Cork.  Smith had 
broad experience on the production side of the motor industry. He had previously worked 
for Ford, but had fled to the Standard Motor Company from where Perry had wooed him 
back to rejoin the company as part of the 1928 plan. Perry considered him to be the best 
production man around. Smith, later Sir Rowland Smith, became chairman of Ford of 
Britain in 1954.
61
   
Following Smith‟s inspection of the Cork operation, he reported comprehensively 
to Perry, listing an array of problems. He highlighted two main issues-insufficient output 
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and a persistently high percentage of scrap.
62
 Where Clarke had glossed over 
Manchester‟s situation in his earlier letter to Sorensen, Smith identified a large part of the 
problem as a lack of production capacity, pointing out that „the foundry can take care of 
the present requirements for tractors, but falls short on our Manchester engine casting 
requirements‟.63 To prove his point he provided a long list of Model A and AF casting 
materials ordered by Manchester that had been short-delivered, forcing Manchester to 
order supplies from Detroit. Regarding the quality issue, he remarked that the efforts of 
William Squire and Eck had reduced the percentage of scrap, but that within six weeks 
quality had deteriorated again and was as bad as ever.
64
 Cork‟s recent cost figures for 
scrappage ranged from 17.9 per cent in January to 14.3 per cent in February, not 
including the cost of substantial rejections by Manchester.
65
 Smith ascribed the quality 
problems to three causes. Firstly, he attributed twenty per cent of the factory losses to 
inexperienced supervision, men unable to cope with the volume of work and unable to 
train green labour quickly enough.  Secondly, the need to meet enormously increased 
demand using makeshift methods while awaiting equipment such as conveyors and 
cranes to be installed, he estimated accounted for thirty per cent. Finally, the use of green, 
untrained labour he regarded as responsible for fifty per cent of the losses. The foregoing 
difficulties made for a chaotic working environment. The shortage of proper mechanical 
handling equipment created problems due to excessive manhandling as well as blockages 
and overcrowding, while the poor organisational and technical experience added to the 
confusion and congestion.  The issue of inexperienced labour was, according to Smith, 
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the major problem, responsible for half the quality problems encountered. To put this in 
context, of the 6,712 people on the factory payroll in February, 2,017 were described by 
Smith as „green labour‟.66 To further exacerbate matters the pressure and the working 
conditions took its toll on the employees working in the foundry, where, according to 
Smith, absenteeism was a serious problem, „223 were absent on 21 March–unable to stay 
the pace. This is more than 10 percent of the total foundry labour‟.67  Later, Cork foundry 
workers in Dagenham would express their view of the foundry conditions in the 
following verse:  
I saw strong men drop in the knockout shop. 
It was only one step from hell. 
Half hour on, half hour off was how they worked the shift,  
Till your eyes were red and your poor feet bled  
And your lungs near came adrift…
68
       
Before he left Cork, Smith instigated a number of changes to production procedures and 
sanctioned the purchase of machinery in an attempt to improve operations. He also 
brought pressure to bear on Clarke and the management team to improve matters. He 
assured Perry that Scott „has really got to work and stuck to it…Clarke has been “riding 
him” hard, and the whole outfit are “on their toes”…we should see an improvement as 
the new equipment is installed‟.69 Perry in turn reported his concerns about scrap to 
Sorensen: „I know you will appreciate how difficult is foundry labour anywhere when it 
has to work on our methods, but particularly in Cork where men have to be taught 
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everything‟.70 Quality problems continued to blight the finished tractors. Perry admitted 
that while the tractor quality was improving it was still far from perfect and the company 
was receiving a large number of service complaints.
71
 The Fordson‟s reputation was to be 
further dented when a very public failure occurred at the 1930 world agricultural tractor 
trials held at Wallingford in Oxfordshire. The Fordson entered in the trials broke down 
and had to be withdrawn with a cracked cylinder due to a faulty casing.
72
 Drastic action 
was necessary to remedy these problems. As part of the ongoing programme to control 
waste and to improve quality, the number of quality inspectors had been increased 
steadily in line with the growth of the general workforce. Starting with thirteen inspectors 
in January 1929, the number rose to 109 in August and to 202 in February 1930.
73
 Perry 
now fired the chief inspector and instructed Clarke to further increase the inspection staff 
to ensure that they had one hundred per cent inspection in certain key areas. He also 
arranged to introduce an independent fault-finding department, working directly under 
Clarke and independent of the factory inspection.
74
 Addressing Smith‟s comments on 
production capacity, Perry promised Clarke that he would shortly discontinue production 
of Model A castings and import them directly from Detroit, freeing up Cork to 
concentrate on tractor castings.
75
  
Despite the fact that the Cork factory had originally been designed only about 
thirteen years earlier, the dramatic changes in use during that period, together with the 
scale of the new operation, meant that the factory and particularly the foundry were now 
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unsuited to its current use. The many additions and changes led Eck to say that he „would 
really like to tear down the whole foundry as he finds it and substitute a better one, in fact 
he says this is the only proper remedy‟.76 While Perry dismissed him as an „idealist‟, 
there seems little doubt, that if the anticipated production output had been sustained, that 
the inadequate, unsuitable factory facilities and the associated quality problems would 
have called for further significant investment in the plant. With the new factory in 
Dagenham well under way, no such investment was likely to take place. Perry, in this 
report of early April 1930, refers to Cork‟s future for the first time: „In view of your 
decision that when Dagenham is going we shall draw most of the castings from that 
source, I do not feel at liberty to make any costly extension to the Cork foundry.‟77 So in 
effect, the Cork foundry, the plant‟s unique asset, was likely to receive only minimal 
investment in anticipation of the opening of the new enlarged British facility and while 
the decision appears to be have been made by Sorensen, Perry supported his view.  
I entirely agree with your decision to make the Dagenham foundry the main source of 
supply for the reason that we have to have a foundry there in any case and I would rather 
have one foundry than two; also in practice I believe it will be cheaper and easier for us 
to send castings from Dagenham rather than ship pig iron and coke to Cork.
78
  
The foundry had been the key to Cork‟s success over the years; it was the foundry that 
identified the factory as a manufacturing operation as distinct from a purely assembly 
operation. The threat to its existence posed by Dagenham was implicit from the time a 
new enlarged British operation was mooted. Now with Dagenham‟s opening on the 
horizon it was certain that foundry work would be transferred there. While the loss of the 
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foundry introduced a question mark over Cork‟s future, the scale of tractor production 
meant that the remaining operations-machining, pressing and assembly-still represented a 
substantial industrial enterprise, employing thousands of workers. Nor was there any 
suggestion at this point that these latter operations would be transferred to Dagenham. It 
could even be argued that the shipping of castings from Dagenham might improve costs 
and quality, enhancing Cork‟s potential. The freeing of resources from the foundry could 
also help Henry Ford & Son to concentrate on building tractors more efficiently. The 
requirements for Cork to continue as a successful manufacturing business in the short 
term were threefold: firstly, a substantial ongoing demand for Fordson tractors; secondly, 
the continuation of the existing tariff regimes and thirdly, Ford senior management‟s 
support and determination to persevere with tractor production in Cork and not transfer it 
to Dagenham or Dearborn. Unfortunately, all of these conditions were about to change 
radically in the coming months. 
While Clarke grappled with the local problems and the factory personnel got to 
grips with the commissioning problems and seemed likely to achieve the targets laid 
down by Perry, world economics intruded and changed the Cork plant‟s future. In the 
United States the stock markets were in turmoil. „Black Thursday‟, 24 October 1929 had 
seen the Wall Street stock market crash giving the first indication of a deep depression 
which would affect markets for some years to come. Henry Ford, with his usual disdain 
for Wall Street, refused to accept the looming depression and in late 1929, with other 
leading industrialists, issued statements expressing confidence and suggesting the cure 
for the depression was to increase production. To this end, he raised wages and went 
ahead with the building of new plants in continental Europe. Work continued apace on 
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the giant new factory at Dagenham and an additional 191 acres were added to the 
property.
79
 In the United States, the motor industry had sold almost 5.4 million units in 
1929, making it the best year in history. Ford‟s Model A captured thirty four per cent of 
the market.  Elsewhere sales of the Model A were also buoyant.  Worldwide, as 1929 
came to a close, the outlook for the Ford Motor Company seemed encouraging. In 
Ireland, the board of directors‟ meeting, reported promising results for 1929. From the 
recommencement of tractor production in April to the end of December, they had 
produced 9,686 tractors, generating a net profit of £108,324.18s.2d. and reducing 
accumulated losses on the balance sheet to £242,802. 5s.10d.
80
 In the early months of 
1930 Cork had almost seven thousand employees, compared to the Manchester factory 
which employed only 2,600.
81
 The tractor plant had more orders than it could fill. In 
January and February, output of 5,662 tractors seemed to proclaim that the boom would 
continue indefinitely as production promised to dwarf the total output figure of 7,605 
achieved in the 1919-1922 period.
82
 
The demand which was driving the Cork plant came about as a result of Ford‟s 
closedown in 1928. This had led to an accumulation of orders, particularly in America 
and Russia, Ford‟s two major tractor markets. While Americans demand was mainly for 
finished tractors, the Russians had switched to purchasing International Harvester tractors 
and were solely concerned with obtaining spare parts for tractors supplied by Dearborn 
before 1928.
83
 By early March 1930, Clarke noted that Russian demand for parts had 
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tapered off after a four or five months of very high, but irregular demand. Despite some 
very big orders Cork had succeeded in meeting Perry‟s promises. Of 3,337 tractors 
shipped in February, 1,792 went to the United States though Clarke admitted that this did 
not meet their requirements, but that they were doing everything in their power „to 
increase production and catch up on the U.S.A. orders‟.84 Thus, apart from some easing 
of Russian orders for parts, demand for tractors was strong and all looked positive.  Two 
months later optimism remained and Ford‟s programme for expansion was still 
proceeding. According to Pearce, assistant manager in Cork, capital expenditure for the 
following months amounted to £132,700. Work had begun on a substantial building 
programme which included a new office building, a tractor store warehouse, a new 
transformer house, a wharf extension, and a new fettling shop. Despite earlier remarks by 
Perry some additions to the foundry were also envisaged as well as the installation of a 
new transporter crane and other machinery.
85
 Even while these plant improvements were 
being planned the depression was beginning to be felt in the business, orders were drying 
up and sales of tractors and parts began to drop alarmingly. Clarke informed Perry that he 
was in discussions with the Russians concerning an order for four thousand tractors, but 
felt agreement was unlikely because of the difficulty with credit arrangements. He feared 
that if he failed to get the order he would be forced to shut down most of the plant.
86
 No 
order was forthcoming and in mid-May Clarke announced the closure „of a few 
departments‟.87   
In a statement to the Cork Examiner he was at pains to present an optimistic view. 
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He wanted the people of Cork and the Free State „to know that at no time would the 
whole of the factory be closed down‟. He was vague about specific details, but insisted 
that the demand for their tractors remained strong with a steady flow of orders coming in 
daily. He attributed the closedown to the need to overhaul and relocate machinery.
88
 
However, his optimism was misplaced as over the weeks ahead the majority of the Ford 
workers were let go. On 5 June 1930 he wrote to H. S. Cooper: „we have had to lay off 
6,000 men during the past 3 weeks, which is a very serious consequence in a city of this 
size, and where there are practically no other industries of any importance. Naturally 
these men are all on the dole.‟89 
 According to Wilkins and Hill, the main cause of the „sudden collapse‟ at Cork, 
was that:   
The automotive business was running head on into the growing economic depression 
which Henry Ford had been refusing to recognise. Spreading out from the United States, 
where it had affected American capital and government, like a collapsing house of cards 
it had now wrecked their European counterparts.
90
   
While the United States dealt with the economic problems arising from the stock market 
collapse and the subsequent recession, overseas investment in Europe was curtailed, 
forcing European farmers and other consumers to a limit or defer purchases.
91
 As the 
European market for tractors contracted, Cork‟s other main outlets, in Russia and the 
United States, also ran into trouble.  
The Russian business, which represented a large portion of Cork‟s production and 
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whose disappearance helped to undermine the Cork plant, had come about as a result of 
Henry Ford‟s willingness to trade with the communist state from its foundation. Ignoring 
the ideological differences between Russia and the United States, in 1919 Ford had begun 
to develop the Russian market.
92
 By the early 1920‟s his vehicles had grown in popularity 
and later when the Russian government set up the Amtorg Trading Corporation to serve 
as its trade agent between the USSR and the United States, sales rose, so that by the peak 
year of 1925 a total of 11,140 units were sold.
93
 When Ford abruptly halted tractor 
production in 1928, he created an opening for the International Harvester company to 
step in and meet the Russian requirements.
94
 Earlier, in 1923, the Russians had built a 
plant to produce a replica Fordson, called the Putilov.
95
 Output remained slow for some 
years, but by 1929 the Putilov factory in Leningrad had come on stream, with the result 
that Ford was squeezed out of the Russian market for new tractors by the combination of 
home-produced and imported competition.
96
  Wilkins and Hill state that when the Irish 
plant started production in 1929 „it received large Soviet orders for both tractors and 
spare parts‟, however, apart from fifty units shipped in 1929 and a single unit shipped 
from Cork in 1930 it seems no tractors were shipped to Russia.
97
 Nevertheless, the 
25,000 Fordsons already operating on the ground in the U.S.S.R. meant there was an 
enormous demand for spare parts, which in 1929 was beyond the capability of the Cork 
factory to satisfy.
98
 The growing depression undermined the Russians‟ ability to buy 
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abroad as they were unable to establish foreign currency credits to pay for imports, 
consequently, relationships with them proved complex and problematical, particularly as 
Detroit were discussing the establishment of a Ford factory in Russia and Henry Ford, in 
the interest of business, was prepared to offer the Russians as much assistance as 
possible.
99
 Part of this support was to send Peter MacGregor, who in 1929 was involved 
in the Cork start-up, to advise and assist them.
100
  Russians technicians were sent to study 
Ford‟s production methods at the Rouge plant and at the Marina.101 While Henry Ford 
and Charlie Sorensen were unperturbed by these actions, Perry was not keen to allow the 
communists into his plant. „It is the political aspect that worries me,‟ he wrote to 
Sorensen, „the Russians deliberately use every means in their power to sow dissention 
amongst the British working class‟.102  Perry already had enough problems, he did not 
need „the seeds of Bolshevism planted in Cork‟.103 When the Russian business petered 
out in May 1930, the problem of finding insurance to cover credit risks was a key part of 
the problem.  
No doubt aware of the layoffs in Cork, E. J. Riordan, Secretary to the Minister of 
Industry and Commerce telephoned Clarke to express the concern of the minister, Patrick 
McGilligan, as well as that of the whole government. In particular he mentioned that the 
„government was eager that Ford obtain insurance of the credit risks…‟.104 However, no 
assistance was offered and Clarke was pessimistic of their chances. „Cooper thinks the 
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possibility of obtaining such insurance is remote-at least at reasonable terms.‟105 It would 
appear that the credit insurance was not forthcoming and while Cork might have had 
Russian orders, without satisfactory credit arrangements it was not possible to do 
business.
106
 Later Sorensen‟s attitude hardened and he instructed Perry to „let the Soviets 
understand very definitely that they cannot expect any assistance from you in securing 
credit….If they need tractors so badly they can economise in other directions‟.107 
Rumours of Cork‟s quality problems were blown out of all proportion when in the 
autumn of 1930 the New York Times reported that large Russian orders for tractors had 
been transferred to the Vickers Company of England and that the Soviet Government had 
returned a thousand tractors to Cork due to substandard specification and mechanical 
defects.
108
 Perry refuted these rumours asserting that there was no basis for the report.
109
 
He pointed out that the Cork plant had never sold tractors or assembly parts to Russia and 
that they had only provided service parts to replace worn parts for tractors which had 
previously been supplied by the United States. He emphasized that no complaints had 
been received about these parts and neither had any been returned.
110
  
The demand for tractors was also disappearing in Cork‟s other major market, the 
United States. The absence of Fordson tractors from the market place for the period 
January 1928 to April 1929 had created a backlog of demand from loyal Ford customers. 
As this demand was being met it cloaked the effects of the recession and the declining 
market. When, in the spring of 1930, Henry Ford & Son of Cork finally began achieving 
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production figures close to two hundred tractors per day, the American demand for them 
slumped. As we have seen, in May 1930 with inventory beginning to pile up, Cork 
management were faced with the painful decision of closing down most of the Marina 
plant to curtail expenses and prevent the accumulation of unsaleable tractors. Prospects 
for a speedy upturn in the business were dashed when, in June 1930, the American 
Congress passed the Smoot–Hawley bill which erected a high tariff wall against imports. 
The bill had its origins in a promise made during the 1928 election by the Republican 
presidential candidate Herbert Hoover, to protect farmers by imposing tariffs on 
agricultural products. Once the process of tariff revision started, it led to calls for 
increased protection from special interest groups in the industrial sector, thus, the bill 
originally intended to provide relief for farmers led to increased tariffs in all sectors of 
the economy.
111
 Immediately the act came into effect, European countries began to 
implement retaliatory tariffs resulting in a severe drop in trade between the United States 
and Europe, so that when Henry Ford embarked on a trip to Europe in September 1930 
the effects of the Smoot-Hawley tariffs were already evident.
112
  
 Soon after production had started at the Marina in early 1929, Henry Ford & Son 
exported seven tractors to the United States. The tractors were assessed at the point of 
import by the custom‟s appraiser in New York who concluded that they were not 
agricultural implements and therefore not entitled to duty-free entry. The Ford company, 
who always vigorously opposed tariffs, took the issue to the Commissioner of Customs, 
who, after examining the various uses of the tractor, overturned this decision. Even as the 
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Cork tractors were granted tariff-free entry in June 1929, the Smoot-Hawley Bill was 
already under discussion.
113
 By mid-July it had been passed by the United States House 
of Representatives and was being revised by the Senate Committee on Finance.
114
 In 
September, an amendment to the tariff bill was proposed which was directed at Ford and 
particularly at the Cork exports to the United States. This amendment sought to prevent 
the importation of goods bearing a trade mark registered in the United States and was 
intended to prevent manufacturers from availing of lower wage rates overseas, and 
thereby to protect the jobs of American labour.
115
 While Ford continued to protest the 
upcoming bill, Matthew Woll vice-president of the American Federation of Labour, 
attacked Ford‟s position. He wrote to Congress, in June 1930, supporting the bill in order 
to safeguard „the employment opportunities of American workers‟. He claimed that Ford 
was producing tractors in Ireland at sixty per cent of the American cost and then 
benefiting from the ruling of the treasury department which permitted them to be 
imported into the United States duty free. This, he claimed, had resulted in between six 
and ten thousand workers in the Ford tractor plants in Detroit being thrown out of 
work.
116
  The Smoot-Hawley bill became law on the 17 June 1930 by which time the 
majority of the seven thousand Ford workers in Cork had already been laid off. While the 
depression caused the fall-off in demand for Cork‟s tractors, the Smoot-Hawley tariff 
limited the export of tractors to the United States to meet whatever little demand existed.  
Without its major markets in United States and Russia, demand for Ford‟s tractor was 
drastically reduced, production output was curtailed and only continued as a trickle for 
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the following two years.  
With so many workers laid off and on the dole, Cork, in the summer of 1930 was 
in a very depressed state. The contrast between the intense activity and optimism of the 
previous six months and the recent complete stoppage was stark. The Irish Times 
commented on „anxiety locally‟, but expressed optimism for the future, having identified 
„abundant evidence of the permanence of this industry‟.117 Rumours abounded. Clarke‟s 
statement to the Cork Examiner in May sought to dispel the many rumours, but it did not 
provide any concrete answers on the future of the plant.
118
 Sorensen, Perry and Smith 
visited the Cork plant in mid-June to review matters. When they arrived, they were 
surprised to find a building strike in progress, holding up work on the erection of their 
three-story office building. Perry threatened to cut out contracts in the future and have all 
such work done by their own staff.
119
 Meeting the press, Perry expanded on Clarke‟s 
earlier remarks. He explained that the machinery had been installed in the factory in a 
very rushed manner at the end of 1928, to meet the pressing demand for tractors. This led 
to an inefficient working layout which now needed rearrangement in order to get full 
value from the equipment.  Responding to the rumours that they were about to close the 
factory, he pointed out that they were spending £100,000 in building work. He expressed 
surprise that the people of Cork would listen to such „idle tales‟ that they „should have 
more confidence in the Ford firm who had done so much to promote the prosperity of 
Cork‟.  Perry promised that they would be „busier than ever at a later date‟.120  
In putting forward this view Perry was being less than honest, as despite his 
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reassurances to the people of Cork, within Ford management circles a somewhat different 
view was held. As we have seen, the decision had already been taken to use the 
Dagenham foundry as the main source of castings.
121
 So Cork‟s role would diminish once 
Dagenham went into production, but as the decision to continue investing in the factory 
shows, the company seemed determined to keep the Cork plant open and working. 
Management also seemed keen to ensure that the maximum number of workers were 
employed, even going so far as to augment Ford‟s own activities with additional outside 
work. Perry wrote in 1932 that „the decision taken two years ago to close the foundry at 
Cork as soon as the Dagenham foundry was operating, also involved us in an adventure 
to procure work which would occupy the factory in other directions‟.122 Perry‟s 
„adventure‟, producing industrial castings, would later occupy the plant and keep men in 
employment for a period, but like the tractor production would turn out to be another 
dead end.  
At the end of June, there was a glimmer of hope for the Ford workers. Under a 
headline: „Early resumption of work expected‟, the Examiner reported that the first three 
hundred men were being summoned to return to work on the following Monday.
123
 In 
addition, it was suggested that in the next few weeks the great majority of workers would 
be recalled. These reports, as well as the ongoing building work and machine 
installations, all encouraged optimism in the future of the company. The paper also 
announced that Henry Ford would soon be visiting Europe and that the Ford company 
was opening new plants in Germany, China and South America. As usual, Henry Ford 
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was expansive in his public pronouncements. He was quoted in the Examiner: 
I am an internationalist in industry and believe that a world economic scheme that does 
not embrace the idea of prosperity for all is unsound. That is the idea we have had in 
mind in establishing these plants all over the world. In the South of Ireland our plant is of 
tremendous importance to the people of the whole Southern region of the Free State.
124
   
So, while the majority of Ford workers were still unemployed, at least Henry 
Ford‟s view of the future and his comment about the importance of the Irish plant seemed 
reassuring. However, despite this optimism the future of the plant was fragile and the 
huge numbers employed in late 1929 and early 1930 would never be reached again.  
 The financial outturn for the year 1930 showed that the company suffered a net 
loss of £68,016. 2s. 8d., the deficit being largely due to the reduced demands for tractors 
and tractor parts.
125
 Tractor output for the year was 15,196 tractors of which 5,672 had 
been produced in the first two months.
126
 At the annual general meeting in 1931 it was 
stated that for the first four months production had grown steadily. Based on the 
January/February figures it seems likely that about six thousand tractors were produced in 
March/April, leaving an output of perhaps four thousand for the last eight months of the 
year.
127
 Tractor production, therefore, was negligible from May onwards, averaging 
perhaps 500 a month. Despite the recession, demand for motor car castings by 
Manchester had increased while the sales of cars and trucks in the Free State came to a 
total of 3,656, a record up to that time.
128
 With production pressure on the factory 
reduced, work on building and overhauling continued. As part of a programme of quality 
                                                 
124 CE , 30 June 1930.  
125 Results for 1930, minutes of  annual general meeting, 15 May 1931 (BFRC, Acc. 38, Box10).   
126 E. L. Clarke to C. E. Sorensen, 8 Mar. 1930 (BFRC, Acc. 572, Box 17).
 
Output for 1930 see Appendix 2. 
127 Results for 1930,
 
minutes of annual general meeting, 15 May 1931 (BFRC, Acc. 38, Box 10).  
128 Ibid.
  
 
 134 
and cost improvement, Clarke sought permission to send the supervisors of Cork‟s 
metallurgical operations to Detroit for three months training.
129
 Later, Sorensen agreed to 
this and on 29 March 1931, James Sullivan and Albert Arbuthnot, foundry and pattern 
shop foremen respectively, sailed from Queenstown.
130
  
The lay-off at Ford‟s Marina plant appears to have gone largely unnoticed by the 
Free State politicians and there is little evidence of any awareness on the part of either the 
Cumann na nGaedheal government or the opposition of Ford‟s situation or the misfortune 
that had befallen their seven thousand employees.  Despite the magnitude of the lay-off 
the issue was neither raised nor debated in the Dáil. I have discovered no record of 
communications by or from the government other than the telephone call made by E. J. 
Riordan in June 1930.
131
 While a number of passing references were made to the issue in 
Dáil Éireann no attempt was made to understand or improve the situation, even by Cork‟s 
local representatives. Senator Oliver St. John Gogarty made a passing cryptic reference to 
Ford while discussing „the development of home industries through a co-ordinated policy 
of inter-Commonwealth trade‟ in the Senate. He said: 
Ford, excellent though he may be as a wage payer, is, after all, a magnificent, but 
itinerant tinker. He is not a native product of Ireland and Cork quite possibly could be left 
in the position Belfast was left in, if Ford took his folding factory and went away, 
because I believe it is in sections and could go out any moment.
132
  
This comment was made about a month after the workers had been laid off. Gogarty 
seems to be poetically dismissive of Ford‟s enterprise apparently suggesting that the Cork 
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investment was always a temporary one and that his departure was inevitable. Later that 
year the Ford company was mentioned briefly in the Dáil. During a debate on relief 
schemes, Richard Anthony, Labour Party T.D. for Cork Borough, seemed to be decrying 
the existence of Ford in Cork when he said:  
It may be suggested that Cork is particularly well off because of the Ford industry, but I 
want to tell you what may appear to be paradoxical, that at the peak point of the Ford 
industry, when some 7,000 persons were employed, there was never so much 
employment in Cork and never so many persons unemployed. That may be a paradox but 
it is true. I will explain the reason. Because of the activities of the Ford industry many 
thousands of persons were attracted to the city, but that great industry could not absorb all 
the unemployed persons.
133
 
Even opposition spokesman, Sean Lemass, seemed quite accepting and low key on the 
debacle that had taken place:  
When the Ford tractor works in Cork were started some 7,000 hands got employment 
there. That number has now been reduced to 2,000. Recently, quite a number of industrial 
concerns have been forced to reduce the employment given by them, while some of them 
have closed altogether.
134
  
In a country with so little industry, and so in need of economic improvement, where such 
a major employer could benefit the lives of so many people, the loss seems to have 
received only cursory attention from all politicians. Perhaps they were misled by Perry 
and Sorensen‟s assurances and the promise that the company would be „busier than ever 
later‟.135  
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In the spring of 1931, the Cork plant was still turning out a small quantity of 
Fordson tractors, and despite the tariffs some of these tractors were being shipped to the 
United States where they fell foul of the customs authorities over „country of origin‟ 
labelling. According to the New York Times a consignment of 441 tractors was refused 
entry because they did not comply with the tariff law regulations which provided „that 
imported articles must be indelibly marked with the country of origin‟. Clarke‟s team had 
inadvertently shipped the consignment with incorrect marking.
136
 Sorensen wrote to 
Clarke, saying that heavy penalties were being threatened if the tractors were not marked 
„Made in Ireland‟.137 The problem arose since under the 1928 plan the assets of Henry 
Ford & Son had been transferred to the Ford Motor Company Limited and consequently, 
tractors exports had been labelled „Ford Motor Company, Cork‟.138 American customs 
demanded that the vehicles be identified with a clear statement of their country of origin 
and Clarke‟s advice suggested that the attachment of an additional label stating „Made in 
the Irish Free State‟ would satisfy this requirement, however, he had not implemented the 
change for the current shipment.
139
 In response to Sorensen‟s query Clarke replied lamely 
that they had only received the dies and would correct it immediately.
140
 Clarke‟s 
oversight proved expensive as to gain admission required the payment of an extra ten per 
cent duty, otherwise the tractors could be returned to Ireland.
141
 Sorensen said: „it looks 
like we will have to pay penalties up to $20,000‟.142 Meanwhile, Michael MacWhite, 
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Irish Free State Minister plenipotentiary, having read of Ford‟s problem in the American 
papers, wrote to Sorensen asking to be informed of the situation, so that he could make 
official representations in Washington.
143
 It is unlikely that his representations were of 
any benefit because by mid-summer the negotiations were still ongoing and the issue was 
now being dealt with by W. C. Cowling of Ford‟s general traffic department. Cowling 
wrote to Clarke to say that he was still awaiting a final decision from the customs. He had 
asked for a leeway of ninety days after the decision was made in order to change the 
manufacturing process to meet their requirements. By now the attitude of the customs 
authorities had hardened and they were demanding that a substantial number of parts be 
marked. While Cowling could ask for a delay in implementation of the marking 
requirements he admitted that „we could hardly insist that the marking be omitted in view 
of the fact that our part number or the name “Fordson” has already been placed there 
during manufacture‟.144 Thus, tractor exports from Cork continued to face, not just the 
increased tariffs under the Smoot-Hawley legislation, but also considerable bureaucratic 
intransigence on the part of the American customs department. 
As the months of 1930 passed and it became apparent that tractor sales were not 
reviving, Perry sought to find work to absorb Cork‟s increasing overheads. The first 
option, as always, was to provide parts for Manchester. William Squire, who had returned 
to England about the beginning of July 1929, drew up a list of additional Model A parts 
which could be produced using Cork‟s existing equipment and at a price competitive with 
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Detroit.
145
 Estimating that the parts listed would employ about 85 men working on two 
shifts, he reminded Perry of the plant‟s capacity problem-that if tractor demand increased 
to about one hundred and fifty per day then the equipment would have to revert to tractor 
production.
146
 Unfortunately, such a prospect was no longer likely. Earlier in the year, in 
the very busy days of April, Perry had intended to move Model A engine castings to 
Detroit in order to free the Cork plant from having to supply Manchester and to allow it 
to concentrate on the quality and quantity problems in the foundry.
147
  Now, it was 
necessary to reverse this policy and give Cork as much work as possible. Perry pointed 
out to Sorensen that the range of additional Model A parts which Cork could produce was 
very limited, „moreover, we have to pay duty of 22.22 per cent on everything that is taken 
to Dagenham or Manchester‟.148  The combination of excise duty and the poor quality of 
Cork parts seems to have dimmed his enthusiasm for producing parts there. With about a 
thousand men employed turning out Model A castings and a small number of tractors, 
when Perry wrote to Sorensen in late August 1931, this work was due to finish as 
„according to programme this is petering out and will cease entirely when the foundry at 
Dagenham starts‟.149 The much-delayed Dagenham plant was scheduled to come on 
stream within the next few months and when Perry and Sorensen had discussed Cork‟s 
future they had agreed that with regard to „the question of Cork‟s foundry, it will either 
have to be closed altogether or occupy itself on outside work.
150
 In other words, its role as 
a Ford foundry was finished and its only future lay in finding work outside the Ford 
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organisation. It was no longer a question solely of absorbing overheads, the survival of 
the foundry was at risk and with it the survival of the whole Cork plant. When the 
foundry closure had been first decided in 1930 the Cork plant had a substantial tractor 
business, but with that business reduced to a fraction of its former output, there was no 
justification for maintaining the Cork plant. Closing the foundry would have involved a 
write-off of £182,000 worth of equipment as well as leaving a building valued at 
£120,000, standing idle.
151
 Faced with no alternative but to find a new product line led 
Perry to the „adventure‟ mentioned earlier; a scheme to produce industrial castings-
plumbing supplies, such as pipework and guttering.
152
   
 Prompted by Sorensen, Perry and Clarke had „followed every possible avenue for 
the purpose of obtaining outside foundry work‟.153 In the face of stiff competition from 
other suppliers, who like Ford, were suffering from the recession and were, to quote 
Perry, just keeping „the wheels turning round irrespective of profit‟, they succeeded in 
getting an order for 50,000 lavatory flush cisterns to a value of £8,750.
154
 Ford‟s costing 
calculations were worked out in ignorance of the issues and the problems to be overcome; 
Perry authorised the deal despite incurring a loss, solely in order „to reduce overheads 
and also to bring down the average wage rates‟.155 A further deal for rainwater gutters 
and similar fittings to the value of £80,000 was achieved on a more accurate costing 
basis. Perry reported that the order was from a ‟combination of builders merchants, 
ironmongery merchants and builders, under the leadership of Mr Robert Donald of 
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Rownson, Drew and Clydesdale‟.156 Henry Ford & Son were on new and unfamiliar 
ground when quoting for these products and had the additional problem that their higher 
wages invariably made their quotation uncompetitive. In dealing with the builder‟s 
merchants, Donald had informed them of the prevailing prices for such goods and also 
the price that he was prepared to pay, which helped them formulate their quotation.
157
 
However, Clarke‟s costing showed that, at best, the company would lose about £1,500 on 
the deal. It remained to be seen if this „outside work‟ represented a viable business for the 
company.   
 With Henry Ford & Son about to embark on this totally new venture, Clarke saw 
an opportunity to introduce suitable expertise to help get it started. He wrote to Russell 
Gnau, Sorensen‟s secretary, saying that:  
In order to fully utilise our foundry capacity we are considering [the] advisability of 
manufacturing cast-iron piping and fittings and other industrial castings. Would you like 
to arrange for Sullivan and Arbuthnot to visit some good factory on the class of work for 
the purpose of getting lined up on equipment and moulding and coremaking methods?
158
  
Later, Detroit organised for the two men to have a comprehensive introduction to the 
manufacture of industrial castings at J. B. Clow‟s, Coshocton, Ohio and on their return to 
Ireland they assisted with setting up the new industrial casting operation.
159
  
 Perry was aware that the whole venture was risky, particularly where costs and 
profitability were concerned. Additionally, a large part of the work contracted for, was 
piping, which Sorensen had specifically cautioned Arbuthnot and Sullivan to avoid. Perry 
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had no choice but to accept the piping, as otherwise he would not have got the order. He 
felt that while they had to learn to do the work efficiently, even so, he feared that the risks 
being undertaken were „too onerous‟ and such was the possibility of a very big financial 
loss that it might be more prudent to close Cork rather than incur this cost.
160
 
Consequently, to lessen the risk and perhaps make a profit, Perry proposed that they 
would reduce wage rates. „There is no doubt at least until such time as we learn how to 
make our labour on “outside work” as efficient as it is for the automobile work, it will be 
impossible to pay the established Ford rate of wages.‟161  He proposed an eighteen per 
cent reduction, reducing the average wage from 2s.4d. per hour down to 1s.11d. He 
believed that if he implemented this scheme „the men would be only too glad to take less 
wages and get more regular employment‟.162  His plan would replace intermittent work, 
two or three days a week, for 1,250 men at Ford wage rates with full-time work for a 
thousand at the new lower rate, while converting a projected loss into a profit of about 
£1,787. The new work might also offer better security since Ford foundry work was 
scheduled to transfer to Dagenham, the industrial castings could be continued in Cork. 
Hence he believed that the cast-iron work was a solution to their problems and that the 
company could learn this new business, become more efficient and eventually dominate 
the markets and restore the worker‟s wages. In closing, he said, „if we can swing clear 
with this contract and at the same time give regular employment to a thousand men we 
shall be doing a useful thing‟.163  When Sorensen received this letter he passed it to Edsel 
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Ford with the scribbled comment „note Perry is reducing wages, first I heard of it‟.164 As 
often in the past, Perry was operating on his own initiative. The new reduced rates were 
scheduled to go into effect on Monday, 24 August 1931. 
*   *   * 
From the earliest days the fate of Henry Ford & Son, Cork had been bound up 
with British events, but the building of Dagenham represented the greatest threat so far to 
the existence of the Cork plant. In the years between the original purchase of the 
Dagenham site in 1924 and the turning of the first sod on 17 May 1929, Cork‟s foundry 
had the benefit of all the casting work it could handle, but now after many delays, work at 
Dagenham was progressing rapidly.
165
 On 1 October 1931 Rowland Smith, works 
manager, ceremoniously drove Dagenham‟s first vehicle, a truck, off the production 
line.
166
 The new Dagenham plant was a vast manufacturing centre, designed to benefit 
from the economies of scale brought about by integrating British and European 
operations under one roof. Originally designed to turn out 250,000 cars per year the plant 
was calculated to replicate, on a European scale, the Rouge system of supplying 
American branch assembly plants.
167
 Clearly, to be profitable Dagenham needed volume 
throughput, but as a result of the recession and the public‟s increasing disenchantment 
with Ford‟s oversized and outdated cars, there was a massive fall-off in demand. Total 
British production for 1931 amounted to 24,152 vehicles, down from 27,861 the previous 
year.
168
 Thus, by the time Dagenham came into operation its huge excess capacity meant 
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that any production would have been welcome there, particularly the Irish production 
with its additional tariff costs. Even the Manchester plant was abandoned to provide 
production for Dagenham. In the original scheme Manchester had been designated as an 
assembly plant, but now its production lines were moved south as soon as the Dagenham 
buildings were completed, so that by the end of 1931 most of Manchester‟s buildings had 
been vacated.
169
  
 Events in both Cork and Dagenham were causing such concern for Perry, that by 
the year end, he was sarcastically describing Cork as our „white elephant‟ plant.170  Thus, 
three years after Henry Ford‟s restoration of Cork as the sole Fordson tractor factory and 
only eighteen months since it had reached its peak output, support for the Cork factory 
was fading, its prospects of remaining opening looked bleak if the industrial castings 
contracts were not successful. From a financial perspective the logic of moving the small 
remaining tractor demand to Dagenham was inescapable; it avoided additional tariffs and 
absorbed Dagenham overheads; moreover, Ford could expect that quality would improve 
when all foundry operations were consolidated into one large and efficient unit. This left 
Cork with no substantial motor business, but even as it seemed that Cork would close, 
other events were taking place which would affect this outcome. For example, the 
alarming decline in demand for the company‟s „American style‟ cars forced the company 
to consider designing a new small-engined British car to regain market share. Henry 
Ford‟s stubborn policy of marketing a single model both at home and abroad was finally 
changed, when on 19 October 1931, work began in Dearborn on a new small car for 
Europe. This project resulted in the Model Y, a prototype of which made its first 
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appearance on 19 February 1932 at the Royal Albert Hall in London.
171
  The Model Y 
proved to be very popular and changed Ford‟s fortunes in Britain and Ireland. 
Meanwhile, in Ireland and equally significant from Henry Ford & Son‟s point of view, 
the protectionist Fianna Fáil party, led by Éamon de Valera, were about to contest the 
Irish Free State 1932 general election. 
*   *   * 
 Following investigations by the costing department in early January 1932, Perry 
was informed, to his dismay, that Cork‟s industrial casting operation was proving to be 
less than successful. He admitted to Sorensen „that the amount of scrap was abnormal and 
the cost of production was much greater than the selling price‟.172 Following the signing 
of the contracts, specialised equipment had been purchased, expert advice had been 
sought on specific problems, but despite this, little improvement was forthcoming.
173
 
Clarke and his team seemed incapable of overcoming the industrial casting‟s production 
problems. Perry despatched Rowland Smith to investigate. Smith‟s assessment of the 
operation was scathing; he wrote: „Clarke and Zierold are “chasing their own tails”.174 
They have certainly been “stampeded” on this job and this has reduced them to a frame of 
mind which quite unfits them for finding a way out of their troubles and putting the job 
on a profitable basis‟.175 He quoted the case where an opportunity had arisen to produce 
manhole covers, but the idea was rejected by Clarke, despite the fact that the additional 
product line would have helped reduce overheads, which were about to be adversely 
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affected by the transfer of all motor car and tractor castings to Dagenham. According to 
Smith, Clarke „lacked industrial courage‟. Clarke‟s only suggestion to improve costs was 
to reduce wages again. Smith felt this „should be the last expedient as men were not 
likely to work “all out” for such a rate‟.176  Describing Clarke and Zierold as „beaten 
men‟, he recommended sacking them both and changing the management completely.177 
The only issue remaining was what to do about the industrial castings contract. Smith 
identified two choices, firstly, close the foundry and pay the customer a large penalty 
charge for failing to meet their contractual obligations, or alternatively, continue with 
production and make the business pay. He recommended the latter as the most sensible 
option. His opinion was that it would cost less in the longer run and that the company‟s 
prestige would be maintained. In addition, since they were at the early stages of an 
eighteen month contract, they could expect efficiency to improve as they gained 
experience. The hope for the Cork plant was that if, in the following eighteen months, 
Ford fulfilled their contract they would command eighty per cent of the English builder‟s 
merchants‟ market, and be well placed to have a profitable business. The only risk he 
foresaw to this scheme was the political risk that the British Government might impose „a 
tax of ten percent or even more on castings from the Free State in the event of de Valera‟s 
government seceding from allegiance to the Crown‟.178 
 Perry supported Smith‟s view in spite of his initial feeling that „the best economy 
would be to endeavour to cancel the orders we had accepted and/or place them with sub-
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contractors who could work at lower costs‟.179 Won over by Smith‟s report he felt 
justified in trying to create a profitable future for the Cork foundry, but claimed to have 
lost „the last vestige of faith‟ in Clarke and the Cork management. However, he was 
reluctant to sack him „because of the existing political situation‟ in Cork.180 He suggested 
that John O‟Neill, a man who was „well trained in Ford policies‟ and who had worked in 
a number of branches overseas, could act to bolster up Clarke „as he seems to be a much 
stronger character‟.181  Two years earlier when the pressure was on to get the plant up and 
running, Clarke had been rewarded for his efforts by having his salary increased to 
£2,250 per annum. Now, Perry proposed telling Clarke „that he was not worth and never 
could be worth‟ such a high salary and intended giving him, what he called, „a good 
Irishman‟s rise‟.182  Lest Sorensen think he was weak not to sack Clarke, Perry pointed 
out that it this would be unwise course to take, since Clarke, an Irishman, had been 
identified with the Cork plant for almost six years and Perry could „readily envisage riots 
and all sorts of destruction at Cork if, on top of everything else, we threw Clarke out into 
the street‟.183  
Perry‟s sensational assertions arose from his fears regarding the recent change of 
government in the Free State. Fianna Fáil had contested the February 1932 general 
election and gained enough seats to form an administration with the support of the 
Labour party. The economic difficulties of the depression and de Valera‟s promises of 
political and social change had led to the first change of government since the foundation 
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of the state. Many wondered if after ten years in power, Cumann na nGaedheal, the 
victors of the civil war, would relinquish the reins of government to their opponents. In 
the event, Cosgrave adhered to the principles of democracy and handed over power, but 
in the lead up to the election and in an attempt to hold onto power, the government had 
made efforts to mount a „red scare‟. So there was a widely held expectation of 
disturbances or even revolution, according to Hoppen: „The comfortable classes expected 
the skies to fall in as red republicans led by the archfiend himself turned the world upside 
down.‟184  
Perry, too, was alarmed by the situation and his reaction to the intelligence 
received was somewhat hysterical, his anxieties no doubt stoked by local rumours and 
newspaper reports. Perry‟s fear, as expressed to Edsel Ford, was added to by the advice 
he received from an unnamed, but prominent cabinet minister, who, around the time of 
the election had warned him that there was „trouble on the horizon‟.185 The minister‟s 
„confidential verbal communication‟ warned Henry Ford & Son that they „ought to 
“watch [their] step” because of possibilities of political disturbance‟.186 This opinion 
seemed to be confirmed when Perry attempted to get „insurance against first loss caused 
by civil disturbance, riot and war‟ for a sum of £104,000, but was unable to get the full 
sum underwritten.
187
  He wrote to Edsel Ford in April: 
When I tell you that we were totally unable to get outside insurance, or underwriters to 
complete the policy, and it is impossible at this time to get any insurance at any price 
against the risk of loss by civil disturbance, riots and war in the South of Ireland, you will 
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appreciate the condition of affairs is considered to be very bad.
188
 
Perry‟s interpretation of de Valera‟s statements added to his fear of imminent revolution. 
Writing to Sorensen he said that „in this morning‟s papers deValera has come out flat-
footed with a declaration that he is going virtually to turn the Free State into a republic by 
abrogating the oath of allegiance, repudiating the national debt, and other revolutionary 
steps‟.189 As we have seen previously, Perry was wary of the threat of communism and 
obviously gave sufficient credence to Cumann na nGaedheal‟s propaganda, as well as the 
anonymous minister‟s comments, to warn his management and shareholders at the annual 
general meeting in April 1932, that: 
We regard the changed political outlook in the Free State with grave concern and 
apprehension. As a consequence we have made provision out of capital reserve for 
possible loss and depreciation in respect of our investment in Henry Ford and Son Ltd., 
of a sum amounting to £1,224,262.
190
  
Justifying these remarks, he informed Edsel Ford that: „The reference to the matter made 
by me in the speech to the shareholders was carefully considered and the actual wording 
approved by a cabinet minister‟.191 Perry offered no clue as to the identity of his cabinet 
confidante, but presumably he was from the former Cumann na nGaedheal government. 
Based on both public and private intelligence Perry seemed convinced that the Irish 
situation was about to erupt into violence, creating further problems for the company. 
According to him Ireland‟s unique situation meant that it was „impossible to escape the 
political situation or to pursue an independent commercial policy‟. His outlook contrasts 
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with Henry Ford‟s attitude. Ford had traded with the Russian Bolsheviks from as early as 
1919 and while he did not support their ideology and insisted that his managers stay out 
of politics, he was a believer in change as part of the progress of society.
192
 Perry had not 
been with the company during the war of independence and the civil war in the early 
1920s and seems to have little understanding of the Irish political situation. He also 
appears anxious and ambivalent, lacking his usual confidence and drive in his report to 
Edsel. 
Cork [Ford factory] lived through, without any considerable damage, all the Sinn Fein 
damage of 10 years ago. I do not contemplate anything very serious in the near future, but 
it is more than likely that there will be an organised revolution in Ireland and as you are 
aware, it is impossible to prognosticate what may happen as Irishmen, when their blood is 
up, do the most unreasonable and unaccountable things. De Valera‟s unofficial „Irish 
Republican Army‟ is, I‟m told, 24,000 strong, trained up to the minute, well armed and 
itching for a fight.
193
  
Whether he was genuinely fearful of a revolution in Ireland, with possible damage to the 
Cork factory, or whether he was using the political position to reinforce the decision to 
close the Cork factory is not clear. Certainly, in reporting to Sorensen, he was 
increasingly pessimistic at the uphill struggle he faced. He said he was „really in despair 
concerning the personnel and management at Cork, but also I have cold feet about 
Dagenham‟.194 With the Cork foundry still producing Model A engines and tractor 
demand running at about 35 units a day, Perry proposed that while they would continue 
„to rely on Cork for tractor production until next September and casting until Dagenham 
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foundry starts up‟, that the tractor department should be moved completely in 
September.
195
 He was fully aware that the closure of Cork‟s foremost industry was bound 
to cause anger and disappointment amongst the workers and people of Cork, so he 
determined to keep the news of the move quiet, leaving Rowland Smith to organise the 
removal with the minimum of fuss and expense.
196
   
 Looking back on the three years of tractor production in Ireland, Perry appeared 
disappointed and discouraged that his earlier hopes for the plant had not materialised. He 
outlined the numerous difficulties encountered at the Irish plant, hinting that the idea of 
putting such a huge project into Cork was a mistake. The task, which had been 
undertaken so optimistically in 1928, had been damaged by inadequate management, 
unskilled labour and unsuitable machinery. The original production demands were more 
than could be coped with: 
The optimistic estimates of all managers everywhere (including U.S.A.) called for a 
production far in excess of anything we could live up to and the ultimate collapse of 
demand and the necessity to clear the ground of heavy accumulated stocks all over the 
world, caused not only a hold-up in production, but considerable expense in re-
distribution.
197
  
The project had been embarked upon without adequate planning or organisation. 
Problems caused by the rapid introduction and installation of a large number of complex 
machines were exacerbated by the many changes in the tractor‟s design which Cork was 
instructed to incorporate. Since these changes were often unproven, they caused 
considerable delays due to the need for subsequent corrections. The demand for the 
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production of accumulated orders, especially from the Russians and particularly with 
unsuitable machinery operated by inexperienced labour, proved an impossible task. Even 
the decision to find work to occupy the Cork factory when tractor operations were 
transferred to Dagenham, he dismissed as an „adventure‟. However, in Perry‟s opinion, 
the biggest issue was the poor local management, unable to cope with the challenges 
presented to it: „The management of Cork has never been strong and big enough to take 
hold of the rapid expansion which was occasioned by the transfer of the Dearborn plant.‟ 
While everything possible had been done to make a success of the venture, Perry went on   
that even had the management been competent the world depression and events over 
which they had no control would still have undermined Cork.
198
 He acknowledged that he 
was wrong in his optimism and that „all this is going back on what I have hoped so 
ardently to achieve at Cork, but I have to face facts, and in my excuse I hope you will 
agree that conditions are so different from what anyone and everyone thought they were 
going to be three years ago‟.199 
            Henry Ford‟s enthusiastic efforts on two occasions to bring real industry to the 
city, had both ended in failure and the Cork factory was now finally doomed. The very 
promising global tractor business brought to Cork had failed to live up to its early 
promise, killed by the depression and American tariff barriers. Cork‟s respite was now at 
an end as the Dagenham plant started to produce. Perry presented Cork‟s future very 
starkly when he informed Edsel that „the Cork premises would be retained as a 
distribution centre for the Irish Free State for our motor car and tractor products and 
should certainly pay its way (apart from the interest on the building and land 
                                                 
198
 
P. Perry to Edsel Ford, 15 Apr.1932  (BFRC, Acc. 572, Box 18). 
199 P. Perry to C. E. Sorensen, 23 Mar. 1932 (BFRC, Acc. 572, Box 18). 
 152 
investment).‟200 In preparation for the move out of Cork, Perry sought formal permission 
from Edsel Ford to go ahead with centralising operations in Dagenham.
201
 
 In an apparent last ditch attempt to redeem some of Cork‟s losses, Perry, at a 
meeting of the directors on 1 April 1932, introduced the second wage reduction in less 
than a year. The minutes of the board of directors reads: 
Having regard to the economic conditions of this country and other European countries, 
consideration was given to the question of affecting economies, and it was decided that 
effective 1 April 1932, the directors, executives and staff be requested to accept a 
reduction of 10 per cent in the amount of their salaries.
202
  
The wage cut went into effect immediately, but the workers were not prepared to accept 
another unilaterally imposed wage cut and stopped work on the following Friday. 
Following the intervention of Mr D. O‟Sullivan of the Department of Industry and 
Commerce and Fianna Fáil T.D. Mr T. P. Dowdall, the men resumed work.
203
 The Irish 
Times reported that: 
The exact terms of the settlement are not yet known but it is understood that any 
reductions in pay will affect only a small proportion of the workers and that the wages of 
those on the lower grades will not be reduced at all…nearly all hands, who number about 
1600, were involved….204  
It is not clear from the documentation available what percentage cut was applied to the 
workers, but since it was later described as the „ten per cent reduction in salaries and the 
general reduction in wages‟ it seems that the ten per cent cut was applied to salary staff 
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while a different regime applied to the general workers.
205
 The deduction scheme 
continued for at least 21 months, as the manager, John O‟Neill, in his quarterly report for 
December 1933, reported that total savings from the scheme for the period 1 April 1932 
to the end of December 1933 amounted to £12,786.
206
 A further meeting of the directors 
was held three weeks later, when again Perry had little in the way of good news to 
convey. He reported that the financial outcome for the year 1931 was an adverse balance 
of £129,316.1s. 6d. Tractor production for the year had amounted to 3,501 units while 
motor cars and trucks sold in the Irish Free State had dropped almost 30 per cent, down 
from 1930s record performance to 2,604 units. Perry also reported that the company had 
entered into a contract to produce cast-iron goods for Britain‟s largest group of builder‟s 
merchants. Despite the fact that the manufacture and costing of these products was 
already extremely problematic, strangely, he stated confidently that a „considerable 
volume of business from this source will accrue in the year of 1932‟.207 He had already 
written to Edsel Ford seeking confirmation of the decision to close down all of Cork‟s 
production operations in September which meant that without a foundry these parts could 
not be produced.
208
 It is not clear what his motivation was in making such a statement at 
that time, other than to distract from the imminent closure of production operations. 
There is no further mention of the industrial casting business in the available documents, 
but it would appear to have ceased soon after this, as the transfer of tractor equipment to 
Dagenham began on 30 July and continued through August 1932.
209
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*   *   * 
 The strategy of cutting Clarke‟s salary solved a problem for Perry, so that at the 
directors‟ meeting on 22 April he was able to report that „Mr E. L. Clarke intimated that 
he desired to tender his resignation as director, secretary and general manager of the 
company‟.210 As we have seen, Perry was unhappy with Clarke, believing that he was not 
doing a good job and was overpaid for the work. He had refrained from sacking him due 
to the risk of a reaction in Cork, instead, he had instructed Smith to reduce his salary 
from £225 to £120 per month, effective from 1 April 1932.
211
  Clarke was not prepared to 
accept this affront and tendered his resignation, which was accepted without comment. 
His severance pay amounted to three months salary at his new, reduced rate, covering a 
month‟s notice together with holiday pay for the previous and current years.212 Following 
this ignominious dismissal by Perry, Clarke left the company. From his home in 
Knockrea Park he wrote a polite and dignified farewell letter to Sorensen  stating that: „I 
have at all times done my utmost to give to the company the best and most concentrated 
service of which I was capable‟. Offering Sorensen his „sincere thanks for the many 
kindnesses and great support‟ he wished the company success with its new models and 
tendered his best wishes to Henry and Edsel Ford.
213
 Like others before him, Clarke was 
probably „burned out‟ after fifteen exhausting years with Ford. In his farewell letter to 
Sorensen, he made no negative comment about the company nor his relationship with it, 
which suggests that he may indeed have been relieved to be finished. Thus, another loyal, 
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long-serving Ford employee was pushed out in the typical Ford manner. His replacement, 
John O‟Neill, was appointed managing director of the company and went on to manage 
the company for the next twenty-seven years. 
214
 
*   *   * 
Clarkes‟s forced resignation was not unusual; in fact the Ford company was 
notorious in this era for its treatment of its managers. As we have seen, many of the 
senior managers appointed to run the English business only lasted a short period and were 
then either fired or eased out. In Dearborn, Henry Ford was ruthless when it came to 
removing men who did not meet his approval or fully support his ways. According to 
Brinkley, Ford cultivated instability in the management ranks believing that „insecurity 
fostered achievement‟.215  While the Irish company was less harsh in its treatment of its 
senior employees, nonetheless a significant number of the early managers, including 
Perry, Grace and Clarke, all left in unhappy circumstances.  
During the financial difficulties in January 1921 Ford decimated the management 
ranks including many of his best executives.
216
 According to Dean Marquis, who saw the 
sackings close up, Ford did not deal with these matters himself, instead he deputised 
Sorensen to do the dirty work. At first, Marquis, like many other workers, believed that 
Ford did not know what was actually going on.
217
 While Ford was not aware of all of the 
actions taken by his subordinates, both Liebold and Sorensen were scrupulous in 
following the wishes of their boss. When Marquis eventually became convinced of 
Ford‟s involvement he left the company in January 1921, disheartened by what he had 
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seen.
218
  
  Callous and absurd methods of dismissal were common in the company. 
Managers could arrive at work and find their desk destroyed or their department moved 
and nobody prepared to tell them where it had gone to, giving them a clear signal that 
they no longer had a job.
219
 Many executives were frozen out of their jobs and forced to 
resign.
220
 Another method of dismissal was to send someone on holidays and telegram 
him with the bad news. For example, in August 1928, William Klann was fired in this 
manner. He was worried about his position, as many other managers had recently been 
fired, but was persuaded to take holidays by P. E. Martin, production superintendent. En 
route, Klann stopped off at a tractor dealers and while he was there helping the agent with 
a problem the local sheriff arrived and told him he had been discharged from the Ford 
company. No reason was given. Klann, who hated Sorensen, was clear that he was behind 
the dismissal.
221
 Sorensen, acting at Henry Ford‟s behest had also fired Klann‟s boss, 
Ernest Kanzler, on 26 July 1926.
222
 Peter Drucker argues that Henry Ford wanted to 
manage the business without managers, but in doing so lead the company to near 
collapse. When executives „seemed to acquire managerial authority or responsibility of 
their own they were generally fired‟.223  According to Drucker, Ford „misdirected 
managers, set up their jobs improperly, created a spirit of suspicion and frustration, 
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misorganised his company and misdeveloped management people‟.224 Ford needed 
technicians, but as the owner, he felt that management was his prerogative. He expected 
his executives to be personal assistants, to follow his instructions, but not to initiate, only 
those who followed his dictates to the letter, such as Sorensen and Liebold, survived.
225
  
While Perry used typical Ford tactics to oust E. L. Clarke in 1932, Perry himself, 
despite his work for the Ford Motor Company through the war years and before, fell from 
favour and was dismissed, sharing the fate of so many Ford executives. As in many other 
cases, the exact causes are unclear. As early as March 1918, criticism of his work was 
expressed by Frank L Klingensmith, newly appointed vice-president and treasurer of the 
Ford Motor Company. He felt that Perry had spent too much of Ford‟s time on 
government work, that he was „not working for the Ford Motor Company but giving [his] 
entire time to the British government‟.226 Perry responded to Klingensmith, with a copy 
to Edsel Ford, defending his actions, outlining how he had used contacts at government 
level to further the company‟s aims and pointing out that the government positions which 
he held had been of significant assistance in furthering Ford‟s business.227 Perry claimed 
that the accusations were „either made in ignorance of the prevailing conditions or with 
the intention of deliberately misleading you and making mischief”.228 After a lull when 
the matter seemed to have subsided, further allegations arose. H. A. Bate, Perry‟s 
assistant, cabled Klingensmith making accusations against Perry of „subordination of 
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funds, organisation and product to personal interest‟.229 Klingensmith did not believe the 
charges against Perry describing them as „too serious to be well founded‟, but nonetheless 
decided, in early 1919, to send the Highland Park plant manager William S. Knudsen and 
Albert Byrns of the Auditing Department to Europe to investigate.
230
 
By this time Perry‟s health was poor and while Knudsen was impressed with his 
business ideas and tended to dismiss the charges that had been made against him, he was 
critical of Perry‟s administration and his political manoeuvrings. He was doubtful of the 
benefits to the company of his political contacts in peacetime and suspected that Perry 
had political aspirations which might cause problems.
231
 In his reports to Klingensmith 
there were hints of wrongdoing regarding his use of business contacts.  
There is no doubt that a coterie of men have until recently received substantial preference 
in their business the directorates of which interlock to a great extent, and that these men 
have possibly obtained such advantage by assisting the managing director‟s political 
aspirations which are frank and undisguised.
232
    
Perry‟s political networking and lobbying on Ford‟s behalf was interpreted by Knudsen 
as ambitious political scheming and while he did not spell out the nature of Perry‟s 
political ambitions, Knudsen listed a number of business issues, such as hire purchase, 
truck distribution, insurance arrangements, all of which were being operated against Ford 
company policy. Even Perry‟s management of the business was found wanting. Knudsen 
reported that: 
The way our business here is run…on a kindergarten plan with different men getting 
                                                 
229
 
F. L. Klingensmith to Edsel Ford, 5 Feb. 1919 (BFRC, Acc.572, Box 18).
 
230 Ibid.,  Knudsen (of whom Henry Ford said „the best production man in the United States‟, Lacey, Ford, p. 274) and Klingensmith, 
were both soon gone from Ford; Knudsen in Feb. 1921 and Klingensmith in late 1920, see Lacey, Ford ,p. 273. 
231 WH, p. 84. See Knudsen to Klingensmith, 4 Mar. and 15 Mar. 1919, (BFRC, Acc.
 
334 , Box 1).  
232 Tolliday, „Ford in Britain‟, p. 12.  
 159 
overlapping charges…An enormous amount of business radiates direct from the office on 
Shaftsbury Avenue where business, politics, personal matters, and policies are being 
worked at with feverish haste and in a hopeless tangle.
233
  
These allegations by Knudsen were too serious to be left unanswered. To put his case in 
person, Perry sailed to Dearborn and on 29 April 1919 met Edsel and Henry Ford who 
questioned him critically on his stewardship of the business. Henry Ford appears to have 
been unhappy with Perry‟s business practices and rejected his other ideas on the future 
development of the company, as well as his continued promotion of the Southampton 
location. Ford offered Perry a salaried position managing the Cork tractor plant, while 
insisting he step down as managing director of Ford of England.
234
  Effectively, Perry 
was being rewarded for his success and loyalty with a demotion to a backwater, with little 
responsibility or scope for advancement. This exile to Cork with its associated loss in 
prestige and status presented a deliberate affront to Perry, in all probability calculated to 
encourage him to leave the company.  
A special meeting of the shareholders of the Ford Motor Company (England) was 
held on 13 May 1919 to confirm the new arrangements. Having demoted Perry, Sorensen 
was clearly under instructions to ensure that Perry spent his time in Cork. At the end of 
July Sorensen cabled Perry asking him to assist Edward Grace who had arrived in Cork 
earlier in the month.
235
 He said he „would like to have you spend every moment you can 
with him until he returns. [I] would like to see him home in four weeks‟.236 At the same 
time Sorensen was writing to Grace: „Is Perry working right along with you? If not show 
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him that he must be with you continually so you can turn your work over to him in four 
weeks. How much has he been in Cork?  [I] insist upon his being with you.‟237 Perry‟s 
health was still very poor and on 15 August 1919 he wrote to Dearborn explaining his 
medical situation and the necessity to follow his doctor‟s advice. However, the last straw 
for Perry arose out of a cable he sent to Henry Ford notifying him that J. L. Fawsitt of 
CIDA was in America with a letter of introduction to Ford from him. Perry asked to be 
kept advised of these matters as he was aware of the „extreme delicacy of the political 
and industrial situation in Ireland‟. Ford‟s secretary E. G. Liebold, who acted as both 
protector and spokesperson for Ford, cabled back to Perry: „[I] cannot see what can be 
gained through keeping you posted from this end [and] believe the best manner for you to 
keep posted would be in Cork.‟ This rebuff was interpreted by Perry as an instruction to 
stay in Cork which his health forbade him from doing. His response was to resign his 
position.
238
 
Protesting his loyalty to Ford, Perry wrote to both Edsel Ford and Sorensen.  In 
his letter to the latter he said: „I must ask you to believe it possible that anything Knudsen 
may say is very much biased by prejudice and self–interest.‟239 After his departure from 
Ford, Perry headed a successful company trading in war surplus motor vehicles until his 
return to Ford nearly nine years later. Not everyone believed his story of ill-health. „Perry 
had an ulterior motive for resigning‟ wrote Ford‟s public relations department almost six 
decades later, „well aware that peacetime would bring a huge demand for motor vehicles, 
he had formed a consortium to purchase war surplus cars and trucks in France and sell 
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them in England‟.240 Meanwhile in nationalist circles gossip regarding suspicions of 
Perry and his departure were widespread. In an internal memo Kevin Sheil wrote that 
Perry was dismissed „for carrying on with the English motor interests against Fords‟.241  
Perry was unusual in that Henry Ford afterwards accepted that he been mistaken 
in his decision and in 1928 welcomed Perry back into the company.
242
 Fifteen years later, 
Ford in a confused state following minor strokes in 1937 and 1941, again turned against 
Perry and ordered him to resign.
243
 A letter sent on 7 June 1943 signed by Sorensen 
instructed him to resign from Ford, but as Perry was a very sick man the English board of 
directors decided not act on it.
244
  According to Perry‟s long-time secretary, Miss 
Howard, they never understood what was behind the dismissal, but the following day 
they received another letter saying to „ignore the previous letter…Henry Ford was getting 
senile, and he was acting entirely irrationally‟.245 Perry finally retired in 1948.246 
Following Perry‟s departure Edward Grace took over as his successor and 
managed Henry Ford & Son until July 1926 when he too was forced out of the company. 
For much of his period as manager, Grace was the locus of continuity and stability in the 
management of the company in both England and Ireland. He remained in position while 
British managers came and went. His battles to ensure the success of Cork, as well as his 
role in advising and directing British management, all contributed to the Ford‟s 
development and success. During this period he enjoyed the confidence of Edsel Ford 
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and Sorensen, though he endured plenty of criticism and abuse from Sorensen. The 
reason for his dismissal is uncertain, but early in 1926 on a visit to Dearborn he was 
obviously facing a personal dilemma. An unsigned letter to Gehle stated that: 
Ed Grace is pretty much undecided just what to do. His little boy you know, has a touch 
of the con and the doctors advise keeping him in Arizona, until he outgrows this 
disease.
247
 Ed will probably have to move there as he says he will not live anywhere 
without his family and you can‟t blame him. I think he deserves a lot of consideration 
because he has things in pretty good order in Cork and he put in quite a bit of hardship 
over there. On top of this it is a 100 to 1 shot that the little fellow contracted this disease 
while in Ireland and the company should feel obligated to a certain extent. It is a pretty 
tough problem for Ed to decide just what to do. It would be quite a job to find a position 
for him in Arizona.
248
  
Shortly after, during the week ending 13 February 1926, H. S. Jenkins visited Ireland and 
carried out an investigation of the Cork organisation as well as the main Ford 
dealerships. Identifying „no outstanding weaknesses‟ he reported that he had spent 
considerable time with Grace discussing operational problems, however, he made no 
comment on the likelihood of Grace departing from Cork, or whether the issue had been 
discussed during Grace‟s recent trip to the United States. Jenkins‟ report was addressed 
to the company president, Edsel Ford and reached his office on 15 March from where it 
was then passed to Kanzler and Sorensen. Kanzler scribbled on it: „This will give you an 
angle on how Grace handled his plant and organization‟.249  These comments and the 
plant report seem positive, suggesting no criticism of Grace. Subsequently Grace‟s 
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departure was reported by the Cork Examiner on Thursday 18 March with the 
explanation that he was „to take over control of the Ford works in California‟.250 The 
report also commented on the valuable presentations which he had received „during the 
past few weeks‟ implying that the announcement of his transfer had been made at the end 
of February. Two days later, on Saturday 20 March, the same paper published a 
photograph of Ford‟s 1,300 employees after a retirement presentation to Grace. 
Somewhat prematurely they said: „Mr E. L. Clarke who has been assistant manager, has 
been appointed by Mr Henry Ford as Mr Edward Grace‟s successor‟.251 All of this 
implies that Grace‟s transfer was communicated to him about the end of February or 
early March, perhaps even as early as his January visit to Dearborn. At this time there 
seems no suggestion that it was other than an amicable arrangement. By the time of the 
next inspection of the Cork operation at the end of May, Grace was definitely gone, but a 
successor had not been appointed and speculation was rife. Jenkins said: „We understand 
that Mr Grace told Mr Clarke he would succeed to the managing director‟s job.…I would 
suggest that the appointment be made there at the earliest possible date‟.252 From the 
foregoing it appears that Grace departed from Cork sometime around the end of March, 
however the reasons for his departure are not clear.
253
  
William Squire, who had worked as a machinist alongside Grace in Dearborn in 
1915/16, later said that he was a marvellous character, a non-drinker, non-smoker and a 
good churchman, but „wine, women and song‟ ruined him in Ireland and led to his 
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discharge from Ford and he never returned to work for Ford in the United States.
254
 
Klann in his oral testimony claimed to have been responsible for getting rid of Grace.
255
 
He said that he had told Grace to return to America, then criticised him for entertaining 
the hockey team, „I didn‟t like that because I thought he should be watching his shop a 
little instead of entertaining girls all the time‟. However, in America, Klann claimed he 
had instructed Grace to don overalls and get to work. Grace refused to accept this order, 
preferring to quit. By forcing Grace to accept a reduction in status, in effect a demotion 
from management back to working in overalls, Klann was attempting to freeze him out, 
leaving him with little choice but to resign.
256
 Klann offered no date for this event, but it 
may have been after Grace‟s return from Ireland at the end of March or early April. 
While Klann and Squire‟s recollection suggest that Grace‟s behaviour in Ireland was the 
cause of his downfall an alternative explanation is that internal Dearborn politics was the 
cause. Grace may have been caught in the crossfire of a power struggle between 
Sorensen‟s faction and P. E. Martin‟s group, to which Klann belonged. As manufacturing 
operations were being moved from Highland Park to the massive new River Rouge plant, 
the atmosphere became increasingly tense as Sorensen struggled to consolidate his hold 
on the new plant and prevent P.E. Martin from taking over. One of the tactics used was to 
fire managers from the opposition‟s group. These dismissals were not based on necessity, 
but seem to be based on undermining the opposition and unsettling employees at all 
levels leaving them tense and fearful with their job security undermined.
257
 Klann was 
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unhappy with Grace‟s behaviour in 1924, calling him sarcastically the „king of Ireland‟, 
and may have taken this action in order to undermine Sorensen. He admitted that 
„Sorensen got sore because I fired Grace‟.258 However, if this was the case, it might have 
been expected that Sorensen would have supported Grace, but he did not. Whether this 
was because Grace had fallen out of favour as a result of the various disputes over the 
previous years, or whether he had another dispute with Sorensen arising from the issue of 
his son‟s illness is not clear. Grace could have sought a transfer to a more healthy climate 
and been declined by Sorensen, leaving him little alternative but to resign. 
Sorensen‟s feelings can be determined by his response in 1929 when Grace, 
somewhat in desperation, applied to Ford for a job. His application arrived on Percival 
Perry‟s desk. Perry who had known him only briefly in 1919, referred the letter to 
Sorensen who replied sharply: „The writer is very well acquainted with the above 
individual, having known him for the last 10 years. I would advise that no one in our 
business, in any of our plants, to have anything to do with him‟.259  Clearly, Sorensen 
was still very angry with Grace. Apart from this job application Grace does not feature in 
the records after that. Thus, despite Grace‟s efforts in the factory in Cork and his loyalty 
to the company, like so many other Ford employees, he was ignominiously dismissed. 
Whether he a good worker destroyed by Klann‟s vivid reporting, or whether he had 
indeed drifted into a life of „wine women and song‟ is not certain, but clearly his 
erstwhile friend William Squire seemed ready to believe the latter story.  
After forty years of wielding the axe on others „Cast-Iron‟ Charlie Sorensen 
finally found himself at the receiving end. According to his autobiography, on 2 March 
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1944 Frank Campsall, Henry Ford‟s secretary at that time, called him with word from 
Ford suggesting that he should resign. Sorensen claimed that the reason Ford fired him 
was that he believed that Sorensen „was ambitious to be president of his company‟.260 
However, it is more likely that with the appointment of Henry Ford II as vice-president 
following the death of his father Edsel in May 1943, Ford family members were ridding 
the company of men who had been bothersome to Edsel.
261
 Either way, within months of 
leaving Ford Sorensen had joined the jeep company, Willys-Overland, as president.
262
  
 While many of the Ford senior managers were fired, even those who held onto 
their jobs were often poorly treated. For example, Peter MacGregor, Cork works manager 
was a key figure in setting up tractor production in 1919 and again in 1929. He worked 
for 35 years with the company on many assignments, but when the time came to retire he 
was informed that he was not eligible for a pension and was forced in old age to seek 
scarce work as a tool and die maker. Finally in desperation at eighty years of age he 
wrote to the company: „I beg of you to open my case and give me the pension. My wife 
and I cannot get along on our present income. I will not ask you to give me a pension 
from the time I was laid off, if I could only get it from now on. At my age, it cannot be 
long‟.263 
*   *   * 
Clarke‟s departure was reported to headquarters who duly confirmed the next 
steps. Sorensen stated that: „We have explained to all of our people here, including Mr 
Henry and Mr Edsel Ford, that Clarke has resigned, and further that your program is to 
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move out of Cork as soon as possible. Everybody here is in accord with you on this‟.264 
Thus, after thirteen short, but turbulent years of production at the Marina and despite 
Henry Ford‟s earlier enthusiasm, it seemed that he now confirmed the decision to 
abandon manufacturing, to pull out of Cork and convert the site into a distribution centre. 
All that remained was to run down tractor production and transfer operations to 
Dagenham. On 30 July 1932 the first shipment of tractor production machinery left the 
wharf in Cork bringing an end to tractor manufacturing operations by Henry Ford & Son 
in Ireland. The 3,088 tractors produced that year brought the total output since 1919 to 
39,076.
265
  
As Perry was receiving his instructions in early May, Éamon de Valera and 
Fianna Fáil were settling in to government and were about to announce their long-
promised protection and self-sufficiency plan. Clearly, Perry had given little thought to 
the form that Fianna Fáil‟s tariff barriers might take, for even as Sorensen‟s letter, written 
on 3 May and authorising the move out of Cork, was on its way to Ireland, the Fianna 
Fáil Executive Council made a provisional order covering customs duties on motor car 
bodies and parts. The order introduced 75 per cent tariffs on imported cars and 
eliminated tariffs on car parts. This came into effect on the 6 May 1932.
266
 The intention 
of the order was to use the high tariff to discourage the importation of complete motor 
cars, while promoting the assembly of motor cars in the Free State by eliminating import 
duty on car parts.
267
  Fianna Fail‟s tariff impositions forced Perry to reconsider his plan 
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to convert the Cork site into a distribution centre. Instead, he had to seek approval from 
Sorensen to set up a body assembly department. He wrote: „You will observe that the 
duty is so prohibitive that it would practically put us out of business unless we either buy 
or assemble our own bodies‟.268 He arranged to spend a total of £3,400 to set up a basic 
assembly system. „This equipment will consist only of simple box type ovens, with the 
usual assembly fixtures, but no conveyor; we propose to handle the bodies on trucks‟.269 
He estimated that with this installation they could produce twenty four car bodies each 
day which would be more than sufficient to meet the contemporary demand in the Free 
State.
270
 Fianna Fáil‟s tariffs came at precisely the right moment to forestall Ford‟s final 
closure of all of its production operations, though presumably even if the company had 
given up production they would have been forced to restart due to the draconian level of 
tariffs and the later imposition of quotas in 1934.  
Later, Henry Ford & Son‟s publicity department suggested that following the 
imposition of duty by Fianna Fáil and the subsequent retaliatory measures by the British 
government that „Ford management decided to transfer production to the newly-opened 
factory at Dagenham‟.271 However, it is clear from Sorensen‟s letter of 3 May that the 
decision to close Cork was made with Henry and Edsel Ford‟s agreement prior to the 
announcement of the Fianna Fáil decision on tariffs. Moreover, Fianna Fáil‟s tariff 
imposition was instrumental in forcing the company to revisit the decision and set up 
assembly operations to the benefit of at least some of the Cork workforce.  
While the Marina became an assembly plant to supply the home market the main 
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loss to the plant was its foundry operation which had been the key to its continued 
existence over the previous 13 years. As the equipment was transferred to Dagenham 
many of the Cork workers followed. According to William Squire, „the foundry labour 
was largely recruited from Ireland, 95 per cent from Southern Ireland. The supervisory 
personnel came from Cork. The foundry which began by being run by the Irish has been 
run by the Irish ever since‟.272 As late as 1954 it was stated that in the Ford foundry „50 
per cent of the 3,300 men are Irish: our proportion in the supervisory grades–men with 15 
to 20 years experience at Dagenham is even higher‟.273 In the post-war years Irish 
emigrants came to represent a significant proportion of the population in the Dagenham 
suburban estates which followed Ford‟s industrial expansion.274 
In conclusion, Henry Ford‟s 1928 decision to convert the Cork plant into the sole 
worldwide supplier of Fordson tractors, seemed to make sense. The tractors had been off 
the American market for over a year, so Ford‟s decision to restart production and supply 
world markets from a single source permitted economies of scale to be achieved. It 
utilised an existing resource, with manufacturing equipment and furnace as well as 
trained labour.  With Ireland centrally located between the United States and Europe it 
allowed relatively easy access to both markets. Meanwhile, space was freed at the Rouge 
plant to produce cars for the still burgeoning car market. The decision by the Irish Free 
State government to cooperate with a suitable tariff arrangement as well as lenient 
administration arrangements also helped to make the plan attractive.  Finally, it allowed 
Ford to continue to keep his promise to bring industry to Ireland.  
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On the negative side the plan to introduce the complex Dearborn equipment to 
Ireland proved to be an overambitious. The main market for Fordson tractors was in the 
United States, which resulted in high shipping costs, as well as vulnerability to potential 
changes in United States tariff regimes. The attempt to turn Cork into a world 
manufacturer was undermined by the men expected to manage it and to cope with the 
flood of untrained labour necessary to make it work. The fall-off in demand for tractors 
as a result of the worldwide depression rendered the plant uneconomical, while the 
advent of the Dagenham works, with its huge excess capacity in foundry and elsewhere, 
meant that Cork‟s fate was inevitable once it came into operation. In a depressed market, 
Ford‟s need to achieve economies of scale to maximise throughput and absorb overheads 
while ensuring the elimination of quality, costs and tariff problems meant that there was 
no choice but to discontinue manufacturing operations in Cork. Attempts at introducing 
new product lines such as the industrial castings which required substantially different 
skills from Ford‟s core business, proved unworkable.  
In the end, Fianna Fáil‟s decision to introduce tariffs and quotas forced Ford and 
later other car distributors to move to assembly instead of importation and provided the 
framework where the company could flourish, albeit on a much more modest scale than 
originally intended. Twenty years after his first thoughts of bringing real industry to the 
land of his forefathers, Henry Ford‟s altruism ended. Instead of a mighty industrial 
enterprise churning out agricultural tractors for a global market, Cork was left with a 
modest assembly plant to supply the tiny Irish market.  
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CHAPTER NINE   
Ford as assembler:  
Tariffs and quotas bring frugal stability (1932-1984) 
Fianna Fáil‟s protective tariff policy was introduced at a crucial moment and it 
dissuaded Ford management from closing their factory down permanently. Instead, 
tractor operations were wound down, workers were let go, and Henry Ford & Son began 
to reconfigure itself once more. Under a new manager, John O‟Neill, Cork was soon 
assembling a range of models including the new Ford Model Y with parts shipped from 
Britain.
1
 Following the introduction of import duties and, later, quotas, Ford found 
themselves competing with a growing number of assemblers, many of them dealers who 
had formerly only imported cars. Within two years there were ten other assembly plants 
in the Free State, turning out makes such as Dodge and Chrysler, but despite the 
competition Ford retained the majority of new car registrations. The change to assembly 
operations, with a smaller workforce, marked a final transition and the beginning of a 
half-century of relative stability and success for Ford‟s of Cork. Before 1932 the fate of 
the factory had been constantly affected by matters external to the Irish situation, but the 
tariffs imposed by the Fianna Fáil government ultimately ensured Ford‟s long-term status 
as an assembly plant. The earlier attempts by Ford to find a suitable product line for the 
plant resulted in a series of dramatic turnabouts, demonstrating the company‟s financial 
and technological power as well as its flexibility as a major multinational manufacturer. 
From 1932 on, with the exception of the war period, the factory continued to operate 
profitably and to supply Irish consumers with a range of popular cars. As protective 
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tariffs were scaled down under the Anglo Irish Free Trade Agreement (AIFTA) in 
1965and then further reduced upon Ireland‟s entry into the European Economic 
Community (EEC), Ford remained Ireland‟s largest motor producer until January 1984, 
twelve months before the end of tariffs, when they finally announced the closure of all 
factory operations in Ireland.
2
    
*   *   * 
After a decade of Cumann na nGaedheal‟s cautious approach to tariffs, Fianna 
Fáil took office on 9 March 1932 with two ideas, self-sufficiency and the elimination of 
the land annuities. Éamon de Valera, leader of Fianna Fáil, like almost all of those who 
survived the struggle for independence and the civil war, had little understanding of 
economic issues.
3
 His aspiration was for a simple lifestyle with a strong rural ethos and a 
„desire for industrialisation without urbanisation‟.4 He believed in the promotion of 
traditional Irish culture with emphasis on national sports and pastimes, dancing, 
storytelling, folklore and literature.  Independence was likened, by de Valera, to a servant 
leaving the house of the master and accepting fewer luxuries. „If he goes into the cottage, 
he has to make up his mind to put up with the frugal fare of that cottage.‟5 De Valera‟s 
austere vision for Fianna Fáil and the Irish Free State involved sacrifice. Apart from 
food, he saw little hope of establishing an export industry. Protection was introduced by 
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him not as a means to develop industry to compete in export markets, but rather as a way 
to provide employment and to reduce emigration.
6
 
Fianna Fáil‟s action in introducing protection was not unique, as in that period, 
described as „the darkest hour of the Depression‟, many countries were erecting tariff 
barriers.
7
 The economic collapse of 1929 led to the American Congress passing the 
Smoot-Hawley bill in June 1930 which introduced high tariffs on imports.
8
 Italy, Spain 
and France introduced reciprocal tariffs.
9
 Even Britain introduced tariffs at the end of 
1931, leaving the Irish Free State as one of the last countries operating principally on a 
free-trade basis.
10
 Pressure for a change of policy was mounting even before the Fianna 
Fáil government took office. Seán MacEntee articulated the party‟s policy of 
protectionism in the Dáil: „so long as Irish hands are idle, nothing that can be made in this 
country or grown in this country should be imported unless very good reason can be 
shown for its importation. That is our policy‟.11 John Horgan suggested that protection, in 
addition to boosting employment also addressed the „need to wean industrialists and 
manufacturers away from their political and class based association with Cumann na 
nGaedheal‟.12 It provided an emotionally satisfying way of creating a self-sufficient 
economy, particularly appealing to those who wished to make a distinct separation from 
Britain and all things British. The introduction of duties in May 1932 initiated the process 
of protection. However, two months later, the dispute with Britain over the payment of 
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annuities raised the stakes, accelerated the process, and led to the economic war. Once de 
Valera withheld the payment of annuities due on 1 July 1932, the British government 
retaliated by imposing a twenty per cent duty on Free State agricultural exports. This in 
turn led to Irish tariffs on British imports, notably coal, cement and steel.
13
  
Seán Lemass, was appointed Fianna Fáil Minister for Industry and Commerce in 
March 1932 and within months of entering the Dáil went into action. On 5 May 1932, the 
Free State Executive Council made an order under Section 1 of the Customs Duties 
(Provisional Imposition) Act, 1931, which imposed „ad valorem duties from 15 to 75 per 
cent on 38 classes of goods, with specific duties on five other classes‟.14  Section 14 of 
the Finance (Customs duties) (No.2) Act 1932 referred to the importation of motor car 
bodies.
15
 Under this act complete motor cars were to be subject to a 75 per cent ad 
valorem duty, while assembled parts and sub-assemblies for use in the car building 
process were subject to 15 per cent duty.
16
  Discrete parts, to be used in the assembly of 
motor car bodies, which previously would have incurred 33.33 per cent duty, were 
permitted to be imported, under licence, free of duty.
17
 Lemass believed that this 
reallocation of duty would encourage motor assemblers to set up in Ireland and lead to a 
reduction in the cost of locally assembled cars as well as generating much needed jobs.
18
 
The trade viewed the tariffs with outrage and anger, predicting that the outcome would be 
the opposite, that it would reduce the sales of cars and lead to unemployment, while the 
Irish Times saw the tariff as anti-British, undermining British goodwill on which the Free 
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State‟s trade depended.19 Lemass, however, was confident of the effect of his tariffs and 
he told the Dáil: 
Every motor manufacturer whose cars sell in any quantity in this country has made, or is 
making, arrangements to have the bodies assembled here.…It is anticipated that very 
considerably increased employment will be given in centres in which the existing works 
are or in which new works will be established….Motor cars will be cheaper when these 
Irish bodies are available than they are at present or have been in the past.
.20
 
The opposition disagreed with his view that the higher tariffs would improve matters. 
The former Minister of Industry and Commerce, Patrick McGilligan, suggested that most 
bus and commercial vehicles were already being supplied locally and that higher duties 
would only remove potential competition from abroad, leading to higher costs and lower 
productivity. He pointed out that motor car bodies required mass production for 
efficiency so they were unlikely to be built, as demand was too low and production 
volumes too small to support an efficient body plant.  As evidence, he quoted approaches 
made to a manufacturer, probably Ford, he said: 
That was investigated to the point that about five years ago when, tentatively, a 
suggestion, I will not say an offer, was made to one firm as to whether it would not pay 
them to set up an assembling factory in this country if they got the entire monopoly of 
the business, and the answer was that it would not pay them.
21
  
Lemass disputed the opposition‟s view, but the different approaches to protection are 
evident. Where McGilligan believed that it was up to the manufacturers to act and to 
have what he called „sound business push‟, Seán Lemass „considered that this could and 
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should be changed, and saw protectionism as a means of achieving this change‟.22 
Lemass, ignoring the cost benefits of mass production continued: 
The cost of assemblage here should not be higher than anywhere else, and the fact that 
the duty will have been remitted upon the parts and that bodies assembled here will pay 
no duty whatever will enable them to be sold cheaper in competition with the imported 
bodies. I am quite satisfied that if there is a single tariff which the government has 
imposed which justified itself to the full in the shortest possible space of time this is that 
one. Within three months we shall have reached a position in which no new motor car 
will be offered for sale in this country except with an Irish built body.
23
 
However, despite Lemass‟s confidence, progress in the setting up of motor assembly 
plants was slow. The increased tariffs did little to promote manufacturing or to encourage 
industrial efficiency, but instead led to increased prices which were borne by the 
consumers.
24
 While the application of tariffs to motor cars imports appeared to have a 
rational thrust, insofar as its aim was to produce a home motor assembly industry, 
generally, protection was introduced piecemeal and with no coherent basis.
25
 Firms made 
representations for the introduction of tariffs for their own industry, leaving the system 
open to abuse or cronyism. For example, on 9 March 1932 Dr James Ryan, the newly-
appointed Fianna Fáil Minister for Agriculture, received a deputation of workers from the 
agricultural machinery industry, many of whom were employed in his Wexford 
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constituency. The following day Lemass introduced an emergency duty of 33.33 per cent 
on imported agricultural machinery.
26
  
Despite the deficiencies of the tariff system, it did achieve its main aim of 
increasing employment, so that between 1931 and 1938 industrial employment increased 
almost fifty per cent from 110,600 to 166,100.
27
 
*   *   * 
From early 1932, Percival Perry had been conscious of the political situation in 
the Irish Free State and would have been aware of Fianna Fáil‟s trade protection policy. 
Given Fianna Fáil‟s stated intentions, it was quite likely that tariffs on luxury goods, such 
as motor cars, would be increased, yet Perry appeared to have no contingency plan to deal 
with that eventuality. Consequently, when Fianna Fáil dropped their tariff bombshell on 6 
May Perry was forced to react and convert the Cork factory to assembly. For the Ford 
Motor Company, car assembly was a long established practice. From its earliest years in 
the United States the company had, in the interest of transport cost efficiency, shipped 
cars in a knocked-down state from Dearborn to outlying assembly plants. Dagenham was 
meant to fulfil that same role in Europe. Despite the Ford company‟s experience in 
assembly, Perry does not seem to have considered it as an option for Cork. Instead he had 
planned to convert the Marina site into a distribution centre, importing complete cars, 
despite the relatively high cost of transport, the existing duty of 22.22 per cent duty and 
the risk of further new tariffs.
28
 Additionally, Henry Ford had apparently concurred with 
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this decision and reneged on his stated commitment and aspiration to bring industry to 
Ireland.
29
   
Faced with prohibitive tariffs on their motor car imports, Henry Ford & Son 
quickly changed their plans and converted the Marina to assembly operations. With this 
transition the business began to benefit from a degree of stability not experienced up to 
that time. To quote John O‟Neill: „After 1933, the Irish company assembled British and 
American vehicles. Nothing eventful happened. It functioned as would any assembly 
plant‟.30 O‟Neill, who succeeded Clarke, was to manage the company for almost three 
decades. Originally from the north of Ireland, he had joined Henry Ford & Son in 1919 
when they were recruiting all over Britain and Ireland. O‟Neill‟s first job in the company 
was in costing, purchasing and stock control.
31
 Five years later he accepted the 
opportunity to go to Antwerp as office manager. Having improved his school French, he 
was promoted to assistant manager in Paris, where he spent a year before transferring to 
Istanbul as assistant manager of the Ford Motor Company Export Inc. During a visit to 
Istanbul early in 1932, Perry found that the Turkish sales were in poor shape due to the 
recession, so in order to cut expenses, he transferred O‟Neill back to Cork as assistant 
manager.
32
 With O‟Neill‟s experience and familiarity with Ford policies, Perry felt that 
he „may be a good bolstering up for Clarke as he seems to be a much stronger 
character‟.33 By the time O‟Neill arrived in Cork Clarke had resigned and O‟Neill was 
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appointed manager in his place.
34
 At a subsequent board meeting in April 1932 he was 
appointed a director of the company.
35
  
 August 1932 found O‟Neill overseeing another major changeover at the Marina. 
The remaining part-finished tractors were completed, bringing tractor production at the 
Cork plant to a final end. Shipment of the production machinery to Dagenham had 
commenced on 30 July and a further five shipments were made during August.
36
 At 
Dagenham, the machinery arriving from Cork showed signs of neglect. When W. E. 
Carnegie of the accounting department was requested by Perry to investigate why there 
were so many men working in the tool room, he discovered that the equipment was in a 
poor state and had to be completely overhauled before it could be put into production. 
Carnegie reported and submitted photographs which „plainly demonstrated that the 
machinery did not get sufficient lubrication while in use on production at Cork plant‟. 
Whether the condition of the machinery was due to carelessness or sabotage is not 
suggested. However, John Squires who was in charge of the Cork production was held 
responsible and fired by Percival Perry.
37
 No doubt, for the workmen in the Cork plant it 
was hard to be enthusiastic about maintaining the machinery when their own livelihoods 
were to be lost as a result of the transfer. 
 In Dagenham the company‟s struggle to get the Model Y into production finally 
bore fruit in mid-August 1932 when the first car came off the line.
38
 Despite being in the 
process of winding down, Cork was still acting as a manufacturing support to them. 
                                                 
34 Mira Wilkins interview with John O‟Neill, Sept. 1960  (BFRC, Acc. 880, Box 7), pp 6/7. 
35 Minutes of board of directors‟ meeting, 22 Apr.1932 (BFRC, Acc. 38, Box 10).   
36 Cork manager‟s monthly report for Aug.1932 (BFRC, Acc. 38, Box 10). 
37 W. E. Carnegie to Percival Perry, 6 Feb.
 
1933 (BFRC, Acc.
 
572, Box 18), p. 11.  
38 Roberts, Ford Model Y, p. 54. 
 180 
During the early part of the month the number of tool room and pattern shop workers had 
been reduced significantly, but those remaining were working to get Model Y patterns, 
particularly the cylinder block, into production.
39
 Meanwhile, Perry‟s original proposal to 
install a very basic assembly operation at the Marina had been expanded and by the end 
of August the installation of conveyors, sprayer booths and ovens was complete and a 
start had been made on body-building.
40
 Setting up the assembly plant was a substantial 
financial undertaking, though not on the scale of parts manufacture with its furnaces, 
metal presses and other expensive capital equipment. In the initial stages, Cork imported 
knocked-down parts and built-up chassis to assemble the Model BF which had replaced 
the Model A in early 1932.
41
 While the car sold in Tudor, Fordor and deluxe body 
configurations, for the moment, sales had dropped owing to the new duties which had 
increased low-priced models by at least £40.
42
  
 Perry‟s attitude to the Cork facility had changed somewhat. The Marina plant 
seemed to have fallen out of favour, and had lost the preferential status that it held as a 
manufacturing plant. He informed Sorensen that:  
I propose in respect of Cork to treat it just like a little assembly plant, e.g., as Barcelona. 
The Irish Free State is now a foreign country and the big duties make it profitable for us 
to assemble there. I think we can make it pay, although the output will be very small, 
excepting that, of course, we have big buildings which we cannot use and the expense of 
which cannot be charged against the operations of Cork as a small assembly plant.
43
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 As stated earlier, assembly was an area where Ford had considerable experience 
and expertise.
44
 According to John Rae, between 1910 and 1915 Ford had developed this 
form of decentralised manufacture and opened assembly plants in some twenty seven 
cities all across the United States.
45
 The Ford system of branch assembly plants gave rise 
to a number of cost benefits. Transportation, as well as loading and handling charges 
were reduced, while inventory could be stored away from the main factory in Detroit, 
reducing storage costs as well as providing inventory of parts to meet peak demand. 
Where suppliers existed, parts could be manufactured locally and delivered directly to the 
assembly plant. Finally, the system helped Ford maintain tight control over their dealer 
network, as the local branch managers could supervise dealers ensuring they carried 
adequate stocks of spare parts and provided an efficient service to Ford car owners.
46
 In 
Europe, following the appearance of the original assembly plant in Manchester in 1911, 
production had been supplemented by assembly plants opened in locations throughout the 
continent, including Denmark, Spain, Belgium, France and Germany.
47
 Cork, too, had 
assembled Model T‟s in the 1920s. 
 The process of changing from tractor production to car assembly continued at the 
Marina for the remainder of 1932. In the building shop department work progressed 
steadily and the company assembled 72 cars in September and were scheduled to produce 
10 cars a day in October.
48
 In addition to building car bodies onto imported chassis, 
production of some iron castings continued, as well as a reducing range of parts for 
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Dagenham. The number of workers employed continued to be cut as the remaining 
tractor equipment was shipped, while departments such as the machine shop, having 
completed their orders, were closed down. Trained factory personnel were hired by the 
Ford Motor Company in Dagenham beginning the practice of Cork workers migrating to 
Dagenham and later to other Ford factories in Britain. Upon their return they were known 
as „Dagenham Yanks‟.49 
  Business in the country remained depressed due to the uncertainty hanging over 
the tariffs and the high cost of motor cars. Sales for Ford, the only firm assembling car 
bodies, crept up slowly while competitors‟ sales were negligible.50 The retail motor trade 
wrote to Lemass in November stating that since the imposition of the tariffs, business had 
stagnated, compelling them to let 120 workers go. They claimed that their combined 
gross turnover had dropped by 60 per cent and was continuing to decline, forcing them to 
contemplate closure.
51
 As 1932 closed, O‟Neill was concerned about the political and 
economic situation in the country which had a depressing effect on the demand for 
passenger and commercial vehicles. He reported that amendments to the import tariffs 
had become effective during December.
52
 This arose because the Fianna Fáil government 
had, following representations by motor dealers, refined the duties to further encourage 
the assembly of the motor chassis. The duty on complete cars as well as the duty-free 
status of car parts remained unchanged, but in the case of motor chassis and motor bodies 
the government introduced a three-tier tariff system. This system allowed unassembled 
body and chassis parts to be imported into the Free State duty-free, but provided for two 
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levels of duty to be imposed, depending on the amount of assembly work which had been 
competed at the time of importation. It was introduced as an incentive to import the 
chassis parts and carry out the chassis assembly work in the Irish Free State.
53
  In January 
1933 John O‟Neill remarked that: 
It may encourage our competitors to commence assembling operations. The 
commendable reductions in rates of duties on chassis and engine units are definitely 
designed to encourage chassis assembly and we are investigating the desirability of 
commencing such operations. Consideration is also being given to the advisability of 
assembling Model Y job at this plant.
54
  
Moving the amendment in the Dáil in early December, Lemass pointed out that since the 
tariff scheme had been introduced in May 1932, Ford alone, representing more than half 
the total trade of the country, had begun building their own motor bodies. In general, 
motor traders and coach-builders had not, despite concessions, made any serious attempt 
to begin assembling motor vehicles.
55
 Shortly after the introduction of the tariff, Lemass 
had given a concession to the motor traders which applied a reduced rate for a period of 3 
months from mid-May to mid-August. The concession was given on the undertaking that 
they would set up to build motor cars by the end of the period. This had not happened as 
a lack of cooperation between the motor trade and the coach-building industry was 
preventing progress.
56
 Speaking for the retail motor trade, Cumann na nGaedheal T.D. for 
Cork West, Eamonn O‟Neill, claimed in the Dáil that they accepted the tariff provided 
that Irish coach-builders were prepared to assist them by producing motor bodies locally. 
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Meetings between the two groups had convinced the motor traders that the coach-builders 
were either unable or unprepared to invest in the equipment to build bodies. Since the 
motor traders were essentially retailers and the coach-builders, the only industry 
competent to build cars, were unwilling to do so, the motor trade was left with a 
dilemma.
57
 In revising the rules the government refused to allow further concessions for 
firms doing only part of the manufacturing process, as it would be uncompetitive and 
damaging to Ford‟s profitability.58  Eamonn O‟Neill, in response, claimed that the tariffs 
represented a grave injustice to the whole motor trade. In effect, he suggested that the 
new structure was subsidising Henry Ford & Son at the expense of the much longer 
established motor traders.
59
 Belittling Ford‟s assembly process, he claimed that „some of 
the citizens in Cork would tell you that the advent of Messrs Ford to Cork was the biggest 
curse which ever fell upon them…the bodies come over finished and they are admitted 
free because there are a few rivets to be put in them at the works in Cork‟.60 O‟Neill 
offered no elaboration on why he considered Ford a curse, however, his suggestion that 
the assembly process consisted only of adding a few rivets was unfounded. His remarks 
perhaps represent the resentment of the motor trade, who, while not prepared to undertake 
assembly themselves were resentful of Ford‟s head start in the business.    
 Despite the apparent preferential treatment gained by Ford, 1932 was far from 
profitable. The balance sheet for the year ended 31 December gives a picture of the 
magnitude of the losses incurred by the company. Trading losses for the year amounted to 
£67,379.10s.7d., while accumulated losses up to December 1931, together with the 
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charges for writing off surplus plant, machinery, stores and tools brought the adverse 
balance to £1,210,002.3s.4d.
61
 By any standards, these were huge losses which no 
ordinary company could absorb. While there may have been a transfer of benefits within 
the Ford organisation, insofar as machinery written off could be reused elsewhere, the 
enormous losses incurred support Henry Ford‟s assertion that he had wanted to assist 
Ireland on the road to industry and proved that he had been prepared to support it 
financially. However, the magnitude of the accumulating losses would explain Perry‟s 
despair with the Cork situation and confirm his rationale in proposing closure of the plant 
in 1932.  
 Somewhat incongruously for a major motor manufacturer, but a sign of the 
company‟s financial difficulties, Ford had used some of their land to plant crops. This 
enterprise helped to provide employment for some Ford workers and in the autumn 
O‟Neill reported on the outcome of these farming operations. The wheat crop had been 
harvested and the potato crop dug and stored, while cabbage was being disposed of 
locally. Potatoes, vegetables and hay brought in £74 in November. O‟Neill commented 
that while prices obtained compared favourably with general market prices, but were low 
due to a fall in market conditions.
62
 
 Following the sale of all of the tractor plant, machinery, tools, stores and parts to 
Ford Motor Company in Dagenham, Henry Ford & Son now redefined its objectives. No 
longer a tractor producer, the company‟s activities instead would, according to the 
directors, be directed to the „assembly of chassis and production of bodies for the Irish 
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Free State market, and the sale therein of automobiles, tractors and service parts‟.63 With 
the process of converting to its new role as an assembly plant well under way, the board 
expressed confidence that the demand for Ford products appeared to be favourable, and 
as the scale of operations was now considerably less than before, negotiations were 
commenced to lease or dispose of surplus company land, buildings and plant.
64
  
Preparatory to any action being taken on the land, and no doubt mindful of the dispute 
over the lease with the Cork Corporation in 1922, a full investigation of the various leases 
was carried out by Ford‟s auditing department, who came to the conclusion that there was 
„no restriction on sale or other disposition of the property by the Company‟.65 As the 
process of closing down departments continued and parts of the Marina site were sold off 
or leased, the plant‟s future now depended on the success of Dagenham‟s new car, the 
Ford Model Y. Fortunately for both Cork and Dagenham, the Model Y had been well 
received and sales in England were buoyant, so that the outlook for the car was very 
promising.
66
 
Henry Ford‟s original business strategy had been to produce simple, but well-
engineered vehicles with few variations and to manufacture them in the most cost-
effective manner possible, thus making them accessible to the greatest number of people. 
This attitude extended to the models on offer in Europe. He saw no reason to offer 
separate European designs, sticking instead to the large-engined, heavy vehicles which 
were so well suited to conditions in the United States even though motorists all over 
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Europe were buying smaller and cheaper locally produced cars. As far back as 1920, 
Ford‟s competitors in Britain had begun providing the compact, economical cars that 
motorists wanted. When sales of the Model T were declining in the mid-1920s, despite 
repeated appeals from his European managers, Henry Ford refused to budge.
67
 Later, 
despite sluggish sales, he insisted on tooling up Dagenham to produce the Model A, but, 
by the time production began in 1932, the car was almost unsaleable.
68
 Edsel Ford had 
returned from the opening of Dagenham in early October 1931 convinced that the 
European market required a small car and succeeded in convincing his father to develop 
such a car.
69
 Nevins and Hill, on the other hand, claim that it was the tactful Perry who 
was able to convince Henry Ford to design a baby Ford suitable for the English and 
European markets.
70
 Either way, where previous attempts by Gehle and others in 1925 
had failed, this time Henry Ford was finally convinced of the need to build a car 
specifically for the European market.
71
   
 Once the decision had been taken, the „car for Europe‟ project started in Dearborn 
on 19 October 1931.
72
 Following an intensive evaluation of the best European 
competitors, work on designing the new car, the Model Y, was progressed rapidly and the 
first prototypes were shipped to Europe for assessment in early 1932.
73
 Unveiled to the 
public at the Royal Albert Hall on 19 February 1932 with a projected price of £120, it 
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went into production six months later.
74
 Sorensen insisted that Dagenham follow the 
American example by forcing costs down to achieve an attractively low sale price and 
thus enlarge the market. Through paring of costs and pressure on suppliers the target 
price of £100 was later achieved.
75
 For Ford, in both Britain and Ireland, the Model Y 
was the most significant model of the era. While early sales were depressed by a 
combination of the ongoing recession and teething problems with the car, it soon began to 
gain acceptance, though it was not until 1936/1937 when the price reductions were 
implemented that sales took off.
76
 In the Free State sales of the Model Y rose steadily and 
new sales records were broken regularly despite increasingly stiff opposition as the other 
motor companies began assembling. Up to the end of 1937, a total of 153,197 Model Y‟s 
had been sold in Britain as well as 13,201 in the Free State.
77
 
 British production commenced on 10 August 1932, but early output was sluggish 
as the newly-opened Dagenham factory grappled with the difficulties of producing the 
brand new model. Problems with the car‟s rear-axle arose and as the claims and troubles 
accumulated, Perry, awaiting the implementation of the necessary engineering 
improvements, was acutely conscious of the importance of the Model Y to the British 
company. He stressed that „we cannot afford to get a black eye over [the] Model Y 
because it is our bread and butter so long as the present high tax and commercial 
depression continue. We are therefore watching it very carefully indeed‟.78 By year end 
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only 7,341 cars had been produced, insufficient even to meet the British demand.
79
 
Consequently, the introduction of the Model Y to the Free State market was delayed until 
early 1933, though a single car was shipped to Cork in September 1932, probably as a 
sample for demonstration purposes.
80
  
 Imported as complete cars, the early Model Y Tudors sold for £210 and the 
Fordors for £230, against the equivalent British prices of £120 and £135 respectively.
81
 
The high price reflected the additional duty imposed by the Free State government. Cork 
had to wait till the spring of 1933 for fully dissembled kits to be shipped.
82
  In early 
March 1933, John O‟Neill cabled Bill Neiland in the London office to confirm his order 
for the knocked-down (KD) kits. He was planning to begin work on the Model Y bodies 
on 27 March, allowing the body department time to assemble a stock of bodies and then 
to start building the chassis the following week. His order was for 240 KD vehicles.
83
 He 
also ordered separately, five KD bodies and five chassis as well as a Model Y Tudor body 
and a Fordor body. He explained: „The knocked–down items are for negotiations with the 
customs, and the two built up bodies more or less samples for our assembly hands‟.84 
This delivery marked the beginning of full body and chassis assembly. As noted 
previously, Ford had assembled the Ford Model BF on chassis which had been imported 
fully built up. Lemass‟s new reduced rate of duty, which applied to the KD chassis, was 
sufficient incentive for Ford to adapt their process to introduce both chassis and body 
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assembly in order to ensure the lowest cost and therefore the most price-attractive motor 
car on the market.  
 According to O‟Neill, the arrival of the new 8 horsepower Model Y excited 
considerable interest amongst the Irish car buying public, particularly since it was 
assembled in Cork.
85
 On Monday, 17 April 1933, newspaper advertisements announced 
that the latest Ford models would be on show the following week and by the weekend 
dealers were advertising the Model Y at a price of £170 ex-works.
86
 While this price was 
cheaper than the earlier imported fully-built-up models it was still considerably more 
expensive than the British price. No doubt the higher price reflected the additional 
transport and less efficient assembly costs, but Ford‟s claim that „to make the price as 
attractive as possible, the factory made no profit at all on the first Models Ys to be 
produced and dealers took a reduced commission‟, seems somewhat doubtful in the light 
of the high sales price and the subsequent trading profits reported for 1933.
87
 The 
relatively high price meant that the cost-conscious and cash-strapped Irish opted for the 
more inexpensive two-door model. O‟Neill wrote to Roland Phillip in Dagenham, stating 
that the Model Y Fordor and deluxe cars had not met with ready acceptance by the 
public, resulting in his need to reduce stocks by replacing his orders for these models 
with the more economical Tudors.
88
  
 In July 1933, O‟Neill reported that he had received an enquiry to purchase thirty 
tractors for the new peat industry, as well as a delivery of twelve V-8 Fordors to the Free 
State army along with six tractors for hauling guns. Sales for the month amounted to 282 
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passenger vehicles, the highest month‟s sales recorded in 3 years. By year end, conditions 
in the country showed no signs of a general improvement; farmer‟s earnings were 
depressed due to the economic war with Britain and the agricultural recession.
89
 This was 
reflected in the fact that out of record-breaking sales of 2,152 vehicles for the year, tractor 
sales only amounted to a trifling 54 units.
90
 On the other hand, sales of the inexpensive 
Model Y continued to increase with 866 cars sold up to November 1933.
91
  In contrast 
with the two previous years, a profit of £51,631.4s.9d. was returned in 1933, while the 
company continued to implement the ten per cent salary cut, accumulating savings of 
£12,786 since it was first implemented in April 1932.
92
   
The proximity of the Northern Ireland market, serviced by Ford from Britain, 
highlighted the fact that while the border might be a political reality, commercially it was 
porous and any attempt to pass-off an out-of-date or a less advanced model was quickly 
spotted. According to O‟Neill:  
All important newspapers and periodicals published in your country and in which you 
advertise, circulate to an enormous extent in our territory. Automobile opinion in our 
country is largely influenced by the trend of events in the English market. Therefore, we 
strongly recommend that any changes which you might contemplate for your own 
territory of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, should be made effective at the same time 
in our territory of the Free State.
93
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He quoted the example of a dealer in Donegal who refused to accept delivery of a truck 
which did not have a refinement, a full floating rear-axle, which was available in 
Northern Ireland. Obviously the company acted on this advice as assembly parts 
delivered to Cork conformed to the British offering, while other assembly operations in 
Europe absorbed surplus stocks of parts.
94
  
Early in 1933, de Valera had dissolved the Dáil and called a general election. 
Fianna Fáil were returned with an overall majority, no longer relying on Labour‟s 
support. In August, Lemass reported to the Dáil regarding the effect of his tariff policy on 
the motor industry:   
The imports of motor chassis for the first six months of this year show an increase of over 
400 per cent on the imports of last year. Those chassis are now coming in here to be fitted 
with bodies in Irish works, instead of being imported complete as heretofore. In respect 
of private cars, there are now four or five makes of car available from Irish works. In 
some cases those cars are completely assembled. In other cases they are imported at the 
medium rate of duty, and finished and fitted in those Irish works.
95
  
Despite the optimism of this statement, apart from Henry Ford & Son, there was little 
move towards assembly. Motor dealers and importers were unanimously opposed to the 
tariffs and cognisant that the additional duty added to the retail price, reducing sales. 
Since any duty imposed increased prices proportionally for all dealers, there seemed little 
advantage to be gained in unilaterally setting up an assembly operation.
96
  Shortly after, 
on 22 November 1933, Lemass introduced a further incentive to encourage dealers to 
commence assembly. He reduced the road tax on higher powered cars whose body and 
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chassis were assembled in the Irish Free State. The rate was to be £1 per horsepower, to a 
maximum of £16. The scheme was designed to encourage American car importers, whose 
cars were of higher horsepower and who, according to Lemass, seemed more interested in 
setting up plants than the importers of British cars.
97
 While this further attempt to woo the 
American motor companies seemed to acknowledge that, apart from Ford, they were not 
showing great interest in assembly, however, within months agents for some of the 
American firms, namely Dodge commercial vehicles and Chrysler cars, had begun to 
assemble and were advertising their vehicles as „Irish built‟.98 For Ford the taxation 
change was of no benefit in selling their 8 horsepower Model Y, but it did make their 
larger cars more attractive and Ford highlighted the new reduced road tax in their 
advertising of the new Ford deluxe V8.
99
 Inevitably the competition grew as motor agents 
began setting up their own assembly.  In March 1934 O‟Neill wrote:  
For the first time for many years it seems we shall have to meet competition of American 
cars and trucks here in the Free State market. Dodge and Chrysler cars are at present 
being assembled by the dealers in Dublin. Studebaker and Dodge Cars and trucks are also 
being assembled by dealers in Cork. It is rumoured that Terraplane and English Singer 
cars are to be assembled in Dublin.
100
 Bedford trucks are now being assembled in Dublin 
by the dealer. Continental cars are being imported by the dealers semi-KD. All of these 
items, with the exception of the Dodge, are in a very small way, and so far, in the 
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99 CE, 27 Aug. 1934. 
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preliminary stages. None of them are expected to develop into large production for some 
time at any rate.
101
 
After Ford, Dodge had been next to begin assembling in November of 1933, By the end 
of June 1934 O‟Neill reported that there were ten plants in the Irish Free State including 
Morris commercial vehicles, Singer and Vauxhall cars.  However, Ford‟s early entry into 
the assembly process, allied to their previous industrial and sales experience, not to 
mention their aggressive marketing, meant they had a decided advantage over the 
newcomers. In their advertising, Ford, like Chrysler and Dodge, emphasised the fact that 
their vehicles were built in Ireland. However, their relatively long history of motor car 
and tractor manufacture in Cork allowed them to highlight their experience and technical 
knowledge. In a clear reference to the potential quality problems likely to be encountered 
by the newer assemblers, Ford assured customers that it was „no new, inexperienced firm 
that is turning out the work, but rather one well grounded in the niceties of detail required 
to ensure that well-finished product it has been, and is the pride and pleasure of so many 
in this country to own‟.102 Describing their highly developed assembly operation the 
advertisement continued:  
First-the stores of material both for body and chassis–from the hides for the seat 
coverings to the channel section of the frame and the body panels-requiring welding and 
riveting to bring them into any semblance of the finished article. Then, the conveyors 
with their burden of bodies in initial stages…a steady flow of them–each operation done 
carefully and well, and minutely inspected before being passed on to the recent new 
installation of equipment-a paint conveyor, which takes the body shell through the 
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painting booths and drying ovens as well as the rubbing down stands at a predetermined 
rate of progress. 
…to upholster and fit window glass, windscreen, sliding or fixed roofs to these bodies, 
another army of men are ranged on a separate conveyor and work deftly and surely –each 
at his special operation. The final polishing-and then the body waits for its chassis on one 
of the two assembly conveyors, where meanwhile, the results of the chassis construction 
lines have been gathering to that stage when a body is all they need to complete the car or 
commercial vehicle… 
Rigid inspection of every detail of chassis and body marks the closing stages of the 
vehicle‟s progress…This is then no experimental, unfledged, inexperienced production of 
an article for use in the Irish Free State, but a highly-efficient, skilled organization 
turning out a product second to none…that any Irishman can be proud to own. 
103
  
*   *   * 
Publicity, promotion and advertising were key factors in Ford‟s success from the 
beginning. The company used conventional press advertising as well as other 
promotional activities. Henry Ford had first came to public attention with his racing 
exploits as his first win at Grosse Pointe in 1901 made him the talk of automotive circles, 
but his success in breaking the land speed record at an official rate of 91.37 miles per 
hour on 12 January 1904 brought public acclaim and fame, enhancing his reputation as a 
car-maker and promoting his business.
104
 With the advent of the Model T in 1908 the 
Ford Motor Company staged publicity stunts to promote the ruggedness and reliability of 
the car. One such exploit was a 4,000 mile transcontinental race which started on 1 June 
1909. The event was won by Ford, but complaints that Ford dealers had been „overly 
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helpful‟ en route saw Ford‟s winning entry being disqualified in November. In the 
meantime, Ford had benefitted from the publicity by aggressively advertising the Model 
T‟s achievements.105 Subsequently, the success of the Model T, Ford‟s well publicised 
price reductions and the introduction of the five dollar day were widely recorded and 
publicised, so that Henry Ford‟s reputation was known worldwide. His frequent and often 
controversial remarks kept his name in the headlines, ensuring valuable publicity and 
advertising. In Britain too, press advertising was supplemented by promotional stunts as, 
for example, when in May 1911 a Scottish Ford dealer, Henry Alexander, prompted by 
Percival Perry, drove a Model T to the top of Ben Nevis to demonstrate its ruggedness 
and capability.
106
  
In Ireland, Ford‟s cars gained publicity by competing successfully in reliability 
trials run by the Irish Automobile Club (IAC).
107
  Ford advertised their cars, commercial 
vehicles and tractors extensively in the newspapers and trade publications, and following 
the American example, advertisements concentrated on vehicle quality, price, versatility 
and the availability of after-sales service.  In America, from as early as 1910, Ford 
provided guided tours for visitors to view the wonders of his massive plants, as their mass 
production system turned out thousands of cars every day.  This innovative approach to 
public relations was in direct contrast with other industrial firms of the time who feared 
that competitors might use the visits to indulge in industrial espionage.
108
  The Cork plant 
was not on the same scale as the Rouge plant, nonetheless it was the most modern 
industrial enterprise in Ireland at the time and it too attracted many visitors, particularly 
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politicians. Days before his murder, the lord mayor of Cork Tomás MacCurtain visited 
the plant.
109
 Michael Collins too, while in Cork addressing a pro-treaty rally, took the 
opportunity to spent time in the Fordson factory.
110
  Unusually for a politician, Collins 
tried his hand at casting some cylinders and, like MacCurtain, was photographed astride a 
Fordson tractor. During his period in office W. T. Cosgrave visited the factory twice in 
the late 1920s and his political opponent and successor, Eamon de Valera, was also 
shown round the Marina plant while in Cork to open the restored town hall in September 
1936.
111
 Post-war, the custom persisted and Jack Lynch opened a new extension in 
October 1967.
112
 These visits and the attendant publicity offered mutual public relations 
benefits providing a platform for the politicians, particularly local politicians, to be 
associated with the success of the Ford business, while the company got to spread the 
Ford message and promote their vehicles. 
Though the tariffs of 1932 left Ford with little choice but to commence motor car 
assembly operations, in their advertising they could justifiably emphasise their relatively 
long presence in Ireland. With manufacturing activities in the country dating back to 
1919, they could boast in their advertisements of Henry Ford‟s personal association and 
business foresight in bringing the factory to the banks of the River Lee, asserting that 
„Cork and its factory have striven and prospered together‟.113 Unlike their competitors, 
they could claim that they had never been forced to set up assembly to avoid the tariffs, 
as their advertisement proclaimed, their factory „was never a mushroom growth forced in 
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expediency‟.114 While Ford‟s long established operation gave them a distinct advantage 
in assembling cars, as O‟Neill had noted, the tariffs imposed were likely to encourage his 
competitors to set up too. By early 1934, Ford‟s factory was fully operational making 
them the only substantial assembler in the Free State and in a very strong position with 
increasing sales and a higher market share deriving from their new Model Y. The 
company was determined to maintain its position and used all its skills at marketing and 
promotion. Activities in the period were particularly intense and included an „open house 
week‟ at the factory when 16,525 people visited, souvenir booklets were distributed and 
Ford films were shown in local cinemas and round the country.
115
 Price reductions, made 
possible by the lower tariffs applying to assembled vehicles, were introduced. On 1 
August 1934 a new tractor parts price list was implemented which reduced prices by ten 
per cent. The following month retail prices on all models of Ford Model Y were reduced 
by £10, down to £160.
116
 When the national newspapers were strike-bound for nine 
weeks in late 1934, and newspaper advertising was effectively eliminated, O‟Neill 
overcame this difficulty by getting the news of Ford‟s price reduction broadcast as a news 
item from 2RN, the national broadcasting station.
117
 Other sales incentives included retail 
hire-purchase schemes, demonstrations and reduced insurance premiums on all Ford 
models.
118
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The government‟s introduction of quota restrictions in late 1934 finally forced the 
remaining motor companies to set up assembly plants.
119
 In this new situation with 
practically all cars makes assembled locally and therefore in a position to claim to be 
„Irish made‟, Ford no longer held this unique position, but being longer established in the 
country gave them other advantages which could be exploited. In January 1937 they 
advertised their factory policy as: „To make better transport available at less cost to all 
Irish people; to achieve this with Irish brains and Irish labour, and as far as possible with 
parts and raw material of Irish origin.‟120 During a visit to the Ford works in December 
1937, Seán Lemass, the Minister for Industry and Commerce, was given an extensive 
tour and briefing by the management. Lemass was apparently impressed by the plant and 
the amount of Irish-made materials incorporated in the Ford cars.
121
 The following month 
Ford highlighted this aspect, taking a quarter page advertisement to draw attention to 
their suppliers‟ use of Irish labour and Irish-made materials.122 Ford also emphasised their 
higher production capacity and by implication their quality advantage over their 
competitors.  Morris Motors, Ford‟s nearest competitor, advertised in late 1937 that their 
assembler, G. A. Brittain Ltd., would produce 200 cars per month at a new assembly 
works at Portobello on Dublin‟s Grand Canal while Ford already overshadowed that 
production with a claimed output of 1,000 vehicles per month.
123
  
Ford‟s unique position as a long-term and high-volume motor manufacturer 
created other opportunities for marketing promotions. In Detroit, milestones such as the 
                                                 
119
 
See below.
 
120
 
IT, 2 Jan. 1937.
  
121 Montgomery, Ford manufacture, p. 24. 
122 IT, 3 Jan. 1938, see Appendices for list of suppliers. 
123 Advertisement, IT,  25 Sept.1937 and IT, 2 Jan.1937 respectively. 
 200 
millionth model produced were opportunities to be highlighted and publicised. The 
Marina‟s output figures were much more modest, but were celebrated nonetheless.  The 
25,000th car to be built by the company since the commencement of assembly operations 
in 1932 came off the line in mid-January 1938, while the company‟s coming of age, the 
21st anniversary of Henry Ford & Son‟s incorporation in 1917, was celebrated on 1 April 
1938.
124
 As on previous occasions, the company held an „open house‟ with guided tours 
when thousands of visitors viewed the plant.
125
  
Another feature of Ford‟s marketing was their annual national exhibition. For 
example, in January 1939, they staged an elaborate exhibition of their Irish-built vehicles 
at the Mansion house in Dublin. The show exhibited the full range of Ford products as 
well as films explaining Ford‟s technology and history. Musical entertainment provided 
by the No. 1 Army and Garda bands helped to justify the one shilling admission fee. The 
exhibition was accompanied by large scale advertising in the national newspapers.
126
 
*   *   * 
 
Deepening depression combined with the effects of tariffs caused motor car 
imports into the Irish Free State to drop sharply from 7,333 units in 1931 down to 2,903 
in 1932.
127
 Ford‟s rapid response to the tariffs, substituting locally assembled cars in 
place of imports in the second half of 1932 year accounted for part of the decline, though 
probably less than 500 cars as total Ford sales amounted to only 708 vehicles.
128
 
Furthermore, people were holding off purchasing in the expectation that the tariffs would 
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eventually be reduced.
129
 In the following two years imports declined further; 2,508 cars 
and 2,176 were imported in 1933 and 1934 respectively, while total new car registrations 
reached 4,659 in 1934, the majority of which were assembled by Ford.
130
 These figures 
showed that the move to assembly had not been as comprehensive as Lemass suggested 
and that the remaining car imports represented a significant number of potential jobs still 
to be realised. Since neither the extra duties nor the road tax incentives had persuaded all 
of the importers to set up assembly, in March 1934 the government introduced the 
Control of Imports Act, 1934 which authorised the imposition of import quotas.
131
 
Subsequently, the act was used to introduce quota orders on a variety of goods. On 19 
October 1934 the Executive Council introduced quota orders numbers 8, 9 and 10, which 
prohibited the import, except under licence, of assembled motor cars, chassis or bodies. 
These rigorous quota orders effectively eliminated the import of complete vehicles and 
forced the remaining motor vehicle distribution firms to set up assembly plants. While 
rumours had been afoot about imminent quota orders from the beginning of October, 
there were mixed views in the motor trade.
132
 No doubt Henry Ford & Son were satisfied, 
for, as we have seen, they had fully developed their assembly plant. Later, F. S. Thornhill 
Cooper, company secretary, remarked smugly that „our competitors both English and 
American, have been very jealous of our position vis-à-vis the automobile trade and our 
holding of a large percentage of the registrations‟.133 Equally, firms who were already 
engaged in assembly had reason to feel pleased.  F. M. Summerfield, who was both an 
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importer and an assembler, assembling Chryslers as well as other makes at his works on 
the North Wall, Dublin, welcomed the quota orders as he believed they „should give my 
fellow car builders and myself a decided fillip in our activities‟.134 Regarding importers 
he stated that „several well-known car agencies, including some I hold myself, will be 
wiped out‟.135 Thus, where previous measures had failed, the draconian quota orders 
forced all remaining importers to adapt to assembly.  A measure of the success of the 
quota orders can be seen from the fact that car imports dropped from 2,176 in 1934 to 
426 in 1935 and then to 227 in 1937.
136
    
Towards the end of 1934, as the new assemblers were setting up, government 
inspectors began checking the motor plants, clarifying specifications and informing 
assemblers of the conditions necessary to qualify for the reduced road tax rate of £16 
from February 1935.
137
 This caused problems for Ford‟s V-8 Model 48. On the previous 
V-8 Model 40 the customs inspector had noticed welds on back-panel assemblies called 
„balloons‟, had designated them as complete assemblies and refused to allow them enter 
duty-free. Since these parts were imported from Dearborn and the process of welding 
them required specialised and expensive equipment John O‟Neill sought a meeting with 
the Minister of Industry and Commerce to discuss the matter.
138
 The minister was 
prepared to grant the necessary certificate for cars assembled up to 1 February 1935 on 
condition that the knock-down state, at importation, was similar to the previous V-8 
Model for which certificates had already been issued.  He was not prepared to make any 
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commitment regarding cars assembled after that date. Despite O‟Neill‟s submissions he 
could not get any concession on this matter.
139
 Sorensen, when apprised of the issue, was 
his usual obstinate self and said: „You will only need to tell them that this is the only way 
it can be made…‟140  The argument rumbled on and Ford‟s first consignment of the V-8 
Model 48 were disqualified from the reduced tax. The minister remained adamant that the 
part was not one piece, as the various welds were clearly visible, while Ford‟s case was 
further undermined by the fact that Plymouth and Terraplane were doing the equivalent 
assembly locally. O‟Neill finally cabled Sorensen recommending that Ford re-examine 
the possibility of shipping the parts knocked down so that they could retain prominent 
position in the Free State market and avoid the exclusion of the V-8 Model 48 from the 
Irish market.
141
  
Notwithstanding Ford‟s problems with the V-8, general trading conditions 
improved in 1934, cars sales increased and Ford‟s share of the market rose steadily. The 
leading light in this revival was the Model Y. In Britain it had become the market leader, 
selling 54 per cent of all vehicles of 8 horsepower or under.
142
 Sales in Ireland, too, were 
buoyant with 1,600 Model Y‟s sold out of total Ford sales of 3,074 vehicles.143  Ford‟s 
share of the market at the end of 1934 accounted for 54.4 per cent of new registrations.
144
 
The year also saw the addition of new small commercial vehicles, the Model Y 5-cwt van 
and the Model B 12-cwt light van.
145
 Even tractor sales in Ireland for 1934 were the 
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highest in the company‟s history, though at 150 units, small in absolute terms. The 
company‟s intensive marketing was paying off.146 Gross profits for the year at £66,129 
showed a substantial improvement over 1933. However, net profits were less strong 
having been affected by the reduced retail vehicle prices, and the preliminary costs 
associated with setting up production facilities for the new models.  
After sixteen years of fluctuating markets, plant installations and removals, not to 
mention tariff issues, Henry Ford & Son finally settled down to a steady business and in 
1935 had their most profitable year before World War II. With stocks of Model Y parts 
now freely available from Dagenham, the company sold 5,563 vehicles of which 2,877 
were Model Y‟s.147 Profits rose to £126,680, almost double the previous year.148  Ford‟s 
market share, expressed monthly, averaged over 60 per cent of new car registrations and 
reached 71.2 per cent of the market in June, followed by a peak of 71.7 per cent in 
July.
149
 Dealerships numbered 191 (of which 72 were main dealers) up from 158 in 
1934.
150
 The price of tractors and parts were reduced on 1 January 1935 and further price 
reductions were made in March 1935 on the Model Y „Popular‟ and V-8 models.151 With 
the advantage of being first to assemble, vigorous marketing and lower prices, Ford had 
become the dominant motor company in the Irish Free State. Nevertheless, serious 
competition was looming, the quota restrictions had forced the remaining motor 
companies to change their attitudes and there was now a rush to set up assembly 
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operations. Moreover, Ford‟s commanding position, around sixty per cent of car sales in 
1935, left very little market share to be divided amongst so many other competitors and 
Ford‟s near monopoly was bound to be attacked and eroded. O‟Neill warned Dearborn of 
the effect on revenue likely to result from the combined effect of the increased 
competition, reduced prices, as well as higher costs of supplies such as tyres, now 
available only from the Irish Dunlop Company Ltd.
152
 His warnings were well founded 
and in 1936 a number of cost issues arose which reduced the company‟s profitability; at 
the same time Ford‟s share of the market declined about ten percentage points, though 
they remained the clear market leader with over fifty per cent of new car registrations.
153
 
The Austin Motor Company and the Morris Motor Company, two of Britain‟s 
major motor manufacturers and Ford‟s main competitors there, had delayed setting up 
assembly operations in the Ireland until forced to do so by the introduction of quotas. 
Morris was first to set up in September 1935 with a competitive range of vehicles, 
including 8 and 10 horsepower cars as well as a large six-cylinder model, while Austin 
motors followed soon after.
154
 Lemass had his suspicions about their unwillingness to 
assemble in the Free State. In early 1935, defending the quota system, he told the Dáil:  
The number of cars sold during 1933 was down…the main cause was that certain traders, 
representing the manufacturers of the types of cars at that time most popular in the 
country, other than the Ford car, were deliberately shutting down on any attempt on 
behalf of their principals to assemble these cars here; and they hoped, in that way, to 
secure the defeat of the whole policy. The quota order changed that situation. These 
particular traders, and others in the same position, will in due course disappear entirely 
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from the motor business unless they proceed to sell Irish-assembled cars. The number of 
persons engaged in the business of distribution and servicing cars will be no less in the 
future than in the past and the number engaged in manufacture will be a clear gain.
155
 
Certainly, the quota system had forced the remaining car makers to assemble locally, but 
Lemass appeared to have a bias against the British manufacturers.  Previously he was 
prepared to improve taxation arrangements for the larger-engined American cars, but 
clearly was suspicious that the British companies were trying to frustrate the 
government‟s policies. Whatever Lemass‟s view of the trade, none of the motor 
companies withdrew from the Irish market. On 1 January 1936, to counter the efforts of 
their many competitors, Ford reduced the price of the Model Y Popular by a further £10 
to a very competitive price of £140. This reduction had become possible as Dagenham 
had stripped and pared the original Model Y Popular and introduced it in Britain at a 
price of £100 in October 1935.
156
  
*   *   * 
           Fianna Fáil initiated legislation to improve the working conditions of Irish 
workers in 1936. Designed to regulate the hours of work and conditions for individual 
employees, the Conditions of Employment Act came into effect on 29 May of that year 
and introduced compulsory annual leave and public holidays with pay. Previously at 
Henry Ford & Son only salaried staff had enjoyed paid leave, now according to O‟Neill, 
these new requirements would add to Ford‟s annual costs.157 In September, O‟Neill had 
reported that the recent Model Y price cut would cost £27,000, while higher priced tyres 
from the monopoly supplier, Dunlop, cost an additional £12,000 and the new holiday 
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payments added £3,500.
158
 The end-of-year results for 1936 showed that while total car 
sales reached 5,467 units, up 17.5 per cent on the previous year, gross profits, affected by 
the additional costs, had dropped by 32 per cent to £86,025. 6s.3d.
159
 Despite the dip in 
profits O‟Neill was confident that prospects for 1937 appeared good and conditions 
throughout the country indicated that more money was being spent.
160
 The number of 
assembly plants continued to rise with the addition of production plants for Nash cars as 
well as Opel cars and Opel commercial vehicles.
161
 At the end of 1937, John O‟Neill, 
outlined the state of play with his competitors. He said that:  
There are now, including our own, 26 assembly plants in the country, assembling 36 
different makes of cars and 16 different make of commercial vehicles. The latest 
additions are Chevrolet cars and trucks, which with the Opel, Vauxhall and Bedford 
completes General Motors best selling lines.
 162  
With only 194 cars imported in 1937 Lemass‟s ambition of substituting assembly 
for importation had become a reality, but not everyone in Fianna Fáil agreed with the 
policy.
163
 According to his son, Gerry Boland did not agree with the strategy of setting up 
„little factories everywhere making inferior goods and large profits‟; he was particularly 
opposed to car assembly, describing it as „a fake “industry” producing an inferior article 
for which you paid double the price...bloody madness.‟164 Boland‟s remarks were not 
without truth, for by 1937 the six largest producers accounted for almost 91 per cent of 
the new car registrations, while the remaining twenty were very small scale assembling 
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only a handful of cars each week.
165
 Inevitably the inefficiency of such low volume 
output would be reflected in both the price and quality. For example, as we have just 
seen, the Ford Model Y was being sold in Britain for £100 in early 1936 and was on sale 
in the Free State for £140, the higher price being due to additional transport and assembly 
costs.
166
 If fully built up Model Y cars could have been imported duty free from Britain 
they would have incurred only the transport cost making them slightly dearer than in 
Britain, perhaps £110, some £30 less than the Irish price. However, if the government‟s 
duty of 50 per cent was applied to such a car, clearly the price would be greater than 
£140, perhaps as much as £160.
167
 So Boland was right in that importing the parts and 
assembling them in Ireland meant that Ford cars were dearer than when imported duty-
free, but about £20 cheaper than when imported under the existing duty regime. This 
example applies to Ford, the largest and most experienced assembler who sold almost six 
thousand cars in 1937, but many of the smaller companies were producing less than 150 
cars per annum and did not have Ford‟s economies of scale and were therefore likely to 
have proportionally higher costs and prices. His comments about the quality of the 
vehicles also applied to the smaller volume producers who had neither Ford‟s experience 
nor their quality systems and controls. With the exception of Ford, and perhaps Morris, 
Boland‟s criticism that the consumer was paying a higher price and in some cases getting 
poorer quality, is probably true, but against this we can set the many jobs created by the 
assembly industry and the opportunities it provided to develop basic engineering skills.  
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In spite of the large number of competitors, 1937 was another excellent year for 
Ford, sales continued to improve, though at a slower rate than in 1936; even a protracted 
building strike in Dublin and Cork, while it had an upsetting influence on business 
generally, did not significantly affect Ford‟s progress.168 The year also saw the 
introduction of two new models, a new Ford 10 horsepower and the Ford 7Y.
169
 The 7Y 
was designed in the United Kingdom to replace the Model Y which was becoming 
antiquated and was being overtaken by its competitors. Patrick Hennessy, who had 
started in Henry Ford & Son, Cork, but had been transferred to Dagenham in 1931 to take 
over purchasing, worked with the Dagenham engineers during 1936 to produce the 
improved Model 7Y.
170
 This was strictly against Ford‟s rules as all designs were expected 
to emanate from Dearborn. Perry despatched Hennessy to Dearborn to persuade 
headquarters of the merit of the new design. Despite initial criticism from Charlie 
Sorensen, Hennessy succeeded in getting Edsel Ford‟s approval.171 The Model 7Y, which 
has been described as the first Ford car to be designed and developed in Britain, was 
launched in August 1937 and  went on to become Ford‟s most successful car of the late 
1930s, despite it being only a reworked version of the original Model Y.
172
  The Model 
7Y arrived in Ireland towards the end of 1937. It was launched as the „New Ford Eight‟ at 
a price of £165, against £140 for the previous Model Y and £177.10s.0d. for its nearest 
competitor, the 8 horsepower Morris.
173
 In spite of returning a profit of £110,151 for the 
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year, O‟Neill, always cautious, was concerned for the coming year.174 He anticipated that 
the market would not expand and that Ford‟s leading position would be weakened by the 
recent retail prices increases.  
In mid-January 1938 negotiations commenced between the British and Irish 
governments on the dispute which had been ongoing since 1932. For the motor trade, 
uncertainty over the negotiations together with the worsening international situation led 
to a fall off in sales. O‟Neill reported that a severe trade recession was being felt as the 
public postponed purchases of all kinds, pending the outcome of the negotiations.
175
 Even 
after the Anglo-Irish agreement had been concluded on 25 April, sales continued 
weakening probably in expectation of prices being reduced. The general election held on 
17 June 1938 further interfered with business. With the market contracting, Ford were 
now facing much stiffer competition from the other assemblers, particularly G. A. 
Brittain, Morris assembler in Ireland, who were investing very heavily in advertising.
176
 
Towards the end of 1938 both Austin and Morris reduced prices in an attempt to regain 
sales. Despite these efforts new car registrations for 1938 dropped by 27 per cent on the 
previous year while Ford sales had contracted by 28.5 per cent.
177
 With the deteriorating 
political situation in early 1939 as the world drifted to war, car sales showed no signs of 
revival.  
*   *   * 
The outbreak of World War II in September 1939 left the Irish Free State largely 
isolated by its limited access to shipping and its neutral status. For the motor industry, 
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relying mainly on imported materials, production effectively ceased. Ford‟s position was 
put succinctly by O‟Neill: 
Operations came to a standstill from 1941 to the end of 1945, owing to the inability to 
secure supplies due to the war. The Irish company was completely dependent on the 
American and English companies. During the war, dealers supplied service parts to 
enable authorised vehicles to function. When the war ended, the Cork plant resumed 
production with the same models.
178
  
For the first year of the war, life continued in a surprisingly normal manner. As 
late as January 1940 the Ford Prefect, the first Ford to have a model name and so called 
because it was „at the head of its class‟, was still being promoted in the national 
newspapers.
179
 Petrol was fairly plentiful and a liberal ration permitted motorists to travel 
without too much inconvenience.
180
 The Ford company took the necessary air-raid 
precautions and built ten air-raid shelters to accommodate its employees. Production 
continued in Cork at a much reduced rate, but O‟Neill saw little prospects of obtaining 
further supplies of parts. By September, amongst his main competitors, Morris had 
already been out of stock for some time, but Austin, Hillman and Vauxhall still seemed to 
be securing sufficient stocks of assembly parts.
181
 By the end of 1940, assembly parts for 
all Ford vehicles were exhausted. Sales for the second half of 1940 had amounted to 819 
passenger vehicles compared with 1,151 and 1,869 in the comparable period in 1939 and 
1938 respectively.
182
 However, there was a glimmer of hope as deliveries of materials to 
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assemble both the Ford 8 and 10 horsepower were promised for the end of January 1941, 
but in the meantime assembly operations were shut down for at least a month.
183
  
The last 26 Ford passenger vehicles were sold in early 1941.
184
 Presently, with 
national supplies of petrol dwindling, the government introduced an order to curtail petrol 
consumption. The original rationing scheme had allowed private motorists with eight 
horsepower cars an allowance of eight gallons per month. This was later increased to 
twelve gallons, but the order announced on 9 January 1941 reduced the allowance to two 
gallons per month.
185
 Gloomily the Irish Times predicted: „in consequence of last night‟s 
order, private motoring for most practical purposes will come to end in Éire‟.186 Petrol 
imports for January 1941 dropped further forcing the government to reserve stocks for 
vital services. On 29 January 1941 they announced the complete elimination of petrol 
supplies to private owners: „no licences can be issued to owners of private cars except for 
very limited quantities for clergymen, doctors, veterinary surgeons and those engaged on 
work of national importance‟.187 With petrol only available for essential services the 
motor trade in the Free State came to a standstill, while the Ford factory was now 
working at four per cent capacity.
188
 To maintain a degree of mobility, resourceful 
motorists began converting their cars to run on town gas, but the shortage of gas in turn 
led to the government banning its use for car propulsion.
189
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With normal production suspended Henry Ford & Son turned to other areas to 
occupy its resources. Conscious of the availability of both premises and a trained 
workforce, the company sought permission from the government to manufacture aero-
engine components for export to Britain.
190
 However, the government‟s firm position on 
neutrality meant that permission was refused. Subsequently, many of the Cork workers 
volunteered to go to England and worked at Dagenham or at the Ford aero-engine factory 
at Manchester where they endured the German bombing and wartime conditions.
191
 At 
first the British government had been reluctant to use Dagenham as a supplier due to its 
location, visibility and consequent vulnerability, but under full war pressure in June 1940 
they changed this and Dagenham went on to make a massive contribution to the war 
effort, despite regular German bombing.
192
 
Because the majority of the cars still running on Irish roads were Fords and since 
new parts were unavailable until later in the war, and then only in small numbers, the 
company began reconditioning old parts. 
Gears which normally would have been scrapped were reclaimed by welding and re-
machining: such components being prominently marked WESP –„War Emergency 
Salvaged Part‟. Axle parts were made from old tram axles purchased from the Great 
Southern Railway. The country was scoured for machine parts to keep the factory 
running.
193
  
Later in the war the company looked for other ways of providing employment and 
contributing to the national emergency. By salvaging packing crates they were able to 
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produce items such as wooden clogs, while the nails removed from the crates were 
straightened for reuse by Ford employees. Products as diverse as screwdrivers were made 
from old valve stems and wheeled-carriages for Irish Army Bren-guns were turned out.
194
 
The company contributed to the defence of the Free State by arranging to import from 
Dearborn, via Spain, some V-8 chassis and components for use by the Army.
195
 The V-
8‟s were shipped to Thompson‟s engineering works in Carlow who were commissioned 
to build fourteen armoured cars on Ford chassis. The vehicles proved very reliable and 
one squadron commander commented that „you could drive them from hell to eternity 
with no problems‟.196 
When the realities of the war becoming clearer, in January 1941, Dr James Ryan, 
the Minister for Agriculture, in anticipation of the curtailment of grain imports, called on 
farmers to increase tillage by a million acres to make the country self-sufficient.
197
  
O‟Neill responded to the government‟s urgent appeal by planting 60 acres of wheat and 5 
acres of beet on Ford‟s land, in addition, he acquired a further 74 acres at Carrigtwohill, 
also for the cultivation of wheat.
198
 The company also retained part of its workforce 
harvesting turf at a bog near Nad.
199
  O‟Neill reported that: 
We have placed 150 and are hiring 30 of our unemployed workers on turf production to 
protect our own company‟s fuel supplies and also the domestic requirements of our 
workers. The surplus, if any, would of course be made available to the public. An 
experiment will be made by the Midleton (Co. Cork) Gas Company for us in producing 
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peat charcoal for sale to users of producer gas outfits on trucks, the Gas Company taking 
the peat gas for mixing with their town supply. We are endeavoring to secure a forest to 
enable us to transfer these men during the winter period and others will be used to repaint 
interior and exterior of our factory if sufficient paint can be obtained.
200
 
Nationally, in February 1941, the country faced a foot and mouth outbreak which affected 
home and export trade, while the rationing of other essentials such as tea, cocoa and coal 
was also implemented. At the end of March, O‟Neill wrote that he had no remaining 
stock of tractors and urgently required a minimum of five hundred for the coming sowing 
season.
201
 It is not clear if or when these tractors were delivered, as Dagenham was under 
considerable pressure to supply the British market. Tractor production there had risen 
steadily since Dagenham took over production in 1933; the factory produced 22,210 units 
in 1941, 27,650 in 1942 and went on to produce a total of 136,811 tractors during the war 
period.
202
 Dagenham‟s Fordson tractors played a vital role in reducing Britain‟s 
dependence on imported food by ploughing millions of extra acres in a „Dig for victory‟ 
campaign.
203
   
The war period saw a number of significant changes in Ford‟s management. 
Though the Ford plant in Cork was at a standstill, in both Britain and the United States 
the company was occupied producing materials for the war effort. Henry Ford had 
initially refused to undertake building Rolls-Royce aircraft engines for Britain, but later 
relented and became fully involved in producing aircraft as well as land vehicles.
204
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Following the unexpected death of Edsel Ford in May 1943 at the age of 49, Henry Ford 
resumed the presidency of the Ford motor company, despite declining health and mental 
ability.
205
 With the death of the heir-apparent and the company being managed in a 
chaotic and inefficient manner, the United States government, in order to protect its war 
output, decided, instead of seizing the firm and managing it, to recall Ford‟s grandson, 
Henry Ford II, to take over.
206
 Released from the navy in August 1943, the American 
government officials hoped that he might put an end to the growing chaos in the company 
management.
207
 He had not been expected to run the company, and had not been 
groomed for the position, but given the circumstances there was little other option. He 
was appointed vice-president in December 1943 and later Clara Ford convinced her 
husband, Henry Senior, to hand over control of the business to him.
208
 On 21 September 
1945 the board of directors voted Henry Ford II, aged 28, president of the Ford Motor 
Company a post he held until 1960 when he became chairman and chief executive 
officer.
209
 Old Henry took little interest in the company after this and died at his home in 
Fair Lane on Monday, 7 April 1947, following a cerebral haemorrhage. He was 83.
210
 
Meanwhile, the Ford family were determined to rid the company of managers 
who had been troublesome to Edsel. Sorensen was one of these, and on 13 March 1944 
he was forced to resign after almost forty years in the company.
211
 Percival Perry, who 
was rewarded for political and public services and made Lord Perry of Stock Harvard in 
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1938, survived as chairman of the Ford Motor Company in Britain until his retirement in 
1948, following which he continued on as a director until his death in 1956.
212
 Another 
man who came to prominence in the period was Patrick Hennessy, a Corkman, who had 
joined Henry Ford & Son on his return from service in World War I. He rose to become 
purchasing manager at Dagenham and was appointed general manager in 1939.
213
 
Knighted for his war work in 1941 he became chairman of the British company in 
1956.
214
 
The period also saw a major change in Ford‟s industrial relations policy. Henry 
Ford‟s lifelong battle to keep the unions out of his plants finally ended in the United 
States in 1941. Unionisation activities had climaxed in April 1941 when Ford employees 
went on strike. Under pressure of government regulations and also, reputedly, from his 
wife Clara, Ford conceded. An election was held on 21 May 1941 to decide which union 
would represent the workers. When the ballots were counted the United Automobile 
Workers of America had gained almost 70 per cent of the votes, while only 2.7 per cent 
voted for Ford‟s non-union code. Henry Ford, despite his long-standing opposition to 
unions, altered his stance and agreed a contract in June 1941 which met all the worker‟s 
demands.
215
 In Britain too, the war forced changes. Before the war the motor industry 
was described by Huw Beynon „as the most weakly organised section of British trade 
unionism‟, but the war period changed that and by the 1960s it had become the most 
organised and militant section.
216
 Government wartime regulations and the demand for 
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munitions made it difficult for employers to sack employees, particularly union activists, 
permitting them to organise the rank and file workers.
217
  The Ford Manchester aero-
engine plant, while being managed by Ford, was effectively under government control 
and consequently Perry, in December 1941, was forced to sign an agreement with the 
Amalgamated Engineering Union, thus recognising trade unions for the first time in its 
history. This was followed two years later by an agreement with Dagenham and while the 
achievement of union recognition was considerably less bitter than in the United States, 
Dagenham workers demonstrated their militancy when shortly after recognition, trade 
union activists occupied managerial offices.
218
 Unionisation did not arrive in Cork until 
1949, when, according to O‟Neill, the company followed the British example and 
accepted trade union representation of the workers. By 1960 the Henry Ford & Son was 
negotiating with 13 unions through a joint negotiating committee.
219
 The main body of 
workers was represented by the Irish Transport and General Workers Union (ITGWU).
220
 
*   *   * 
Soon after the war‟s end, the Ford Marina plant resumed motor car production. 
The factory management were once more concerned with issues such as sales, marketing 
and production efficiency, without the interruptions and dramatic directional changes 
seen in the interwar period. John O‟Neill, in 1960, described events during his post-war 
tenure in office as „humdrum.‟  He said: „There have been no scandals or explosions, no 
front page stories. “We kept on selling and kept on making money”.‟221 Following a 
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period of stagnation immediately after the war, the Irish government began to move 
towards free trade from the late 1950s, however the pre-war tariffs and quotas remained 
and continued to protect the motor assembly industry, including Ford, up to the 1980s. 
During this period, Ford carried out a series of rationalizations aimed at reducing 
complexity and improving costs and quality. Despite their efforts, the Marina‟s size and 
location worked against it and factory operations ceased when it finally succumbed to 
market forces in 1984. 
In Britain, once the war in Europe ended, Dagenham got back into production in a 
remarkably short time. The first Ford Prefect came off the production line on 21 June 
1945.
222
 In Cork, it was the spring of the following year before production restarted.
223
 
News of the imminent production restart was announced in the Cork Examiner on 8 
February 1946 and the following day the paper reported that the first car, a 10 
horsepower Prefect, had rolled off the line.  The company emphasised that in the short 
term output would be limited and would depend on assembly parts received from United 
States and Britain. Plant capacity was given as ten thousand vehicles per year.
224
 Cork‟s 
post-war range of private cars included the 8 horsepower Anglia and the 10 horsepower 
Prefect, both of which differed very little from the pre-war models they replaced, yet 
even at a price of £340 for the cheapest model demand outstripped supply.
225
 By the end 
of 1949, Cork sales for the year had exceeded ten thousand for the first time ever.
226
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In the immediate post-war years Henry Ford II concentrated on rebuilding and 
reorganising his American business, but once it had been secured he turned his attention 
to the difficulties in Europe. In the spring of 1948 he crossed the Atlantic to get a first 
hand view of the damage inflicted by the war, to evaluate Ford‟s remaining assets and to 
assess the prospects for developing the European business. Though the company in 
continental Europe was in a shattered condition there was a huge hunger for cars.
227
 
Major rebuilding, reorganisation and restructuring were required and to do this it was 
necessary firstly to tighten both ownership and administration. While Perry‟s 1928 
reorganization had carried the organisation through the previous two decades, the post–
war problems demanded a new structure to manage and coordinate sales and capital 
expansion.
228
 As well as reviewing continental operations, Ford paid particular attention 
to Dagenham, whose plant had emerged from the war relatively unscathed. He appointed 
Lord Airedale as chairman in place of Percival Perry. Perry was approaching his 
seventieth birthday, but was clinging to power despite his failing health and inability to 
attend board meetings.
229
 Henry set up the new International Division in Dearborn to 
coordinate and control Ford‟s overseas activities.230 He said: „This is an American 
company and it‟s going to be run from America.‟231 According to O‟Neill, while the 
United States „acquired the holdings of the European continental companies, there was no 
thought of shifting the holdings of the Cork company to the United States‟ as „unlike 
most of the European continental companies, the Irish company was a wholly-owned 
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subsidiary of the English company‟.232 Henry Ford II, on his way back to the United 
States, paid a brief visit to Dublin on 26 March 1948 where he was entertained for the 
weekend by the American Minister to Ireland, George A. Garrett. On this his first visit to 
Ireland he insisted that it was private „and had nothing to do with the business of his 
firm‟.233 The fact that he did not visit Cork suggested that the Marina plant had little 
bearing on the development of his European strategy. With a clearer view of the 
European situation, Ford, on his return to the United States called a meeting of all the 
overseas managers to present the results of his investigations. John O‟Neill of Cork was 
amongst the thirty managers representing Ford organisations in seventy-eight 
countries.
234
  In Dearborn, the managers were introduced to Ford‟s plan to rebuild the 
company in Europe and while substantial investments were planned for the other 
European plants the Irish plant seems to have been little affected. O‟Neill commented 
that he was impressed not just with the ideas and the presentation, but also with the views 
of the future, he described it as „a good conference, very well organised‟.235 Despite being 
impressed with the trappings of the event, O‟Neill, in his interview with Mira Wilkins, 
made no reference to planned developments or implications for the Cork plant.  In fact, in 
this period Cork seems to have received scant attention from Ford senior management. It 
was simply a matter, as Perry had indicated earlier, of letting the plant continue to supply 
the local market, fulfilling its role in avoiding the Irish tariffs with little else to offer. 
Henry Ford‟s sentimental support of earlier days was being replaced by the more 
pragmatic and business-like approach of his grandson, Henry Ford II.   
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In the decade after the war Britain led the boom in car sales, with a record total of 
1.4 million cars sold by 1955.
236
 Britain already had the best Ford factory in Europe at 
Dagenham, but massive investment was required to increase its capacity to meet market 
demand. Company investment on buildings and machinery in the 1950-1953 period 
exceeded £15 millions.
237
 A further programme of modernisation and expansion, 
including a new assembly plant together with stamping and machining facilities was 
initiated in 1954. Original cost estimates of £65 million ($180 million) rose to almost £80 
million ($216 million) by the time of its completion in 1959.
238
 As well as new 
organisational structures and increased production capacity, new, more modern car 
models were required to attract consumers. The obsolete pre-war models continued to be 
sold until Dagenham finally brought forward a new range of models. First to be 
developed was the larger Consul/Zephyr range which appeared in early 1951.
239
 After 
twenty one years on the market, in various guises, the Model Y, now known as the Ford 
Popular 103E 8 horsepower, went out of production on 8 August 1953.
240
  In October it 
was replaced by the new Anglia 100E and Prefect.
241
  Both models were introduced to 
Cork shortly after their Dagenham debut.
242
 
The Cork plant carried on assembling private and commercial vehicles for the 
Irish market, operating behind the tariff walls with all the inefficiencies of a small scale, 
multiple product operation. Investment in the plant was minimal. The initial post-war 
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sales boom pushed production at the Marina to 11,007 in 1949 and then to 11,881 
vehicles in 1950.
243
  Demand declined during the 1950s, affected by the introduction of 
the Volkswagen Beetle in 1950, whose sales reached 2,155 cars in 1952, while 
production of  Ford vehicles fell to 6,046 units in that year. The Korean conflict of the 
early 1950‟s and Suez crisis of 1956 also affected sales and it was 1958 before production 
returned to 1949 levels with 11,479 vehicles produced.
244
  As the market grew, the 
dominant market share held by Ford in the 1930s dwindled, according to Ford, „to 
between 25 and 35 percent of the Irish car market‟ from the 1950s.245 Even as late as the 
mid-1970s production output was averaging less than 17,000 vehicles per annum.
246
 
While the tariffs had ensured that the Marina plant remained operational in 1932, plant 
expansion depended on increased production volume and improved efficiency, but Irish 
sales remained small so expansion was only going to be achieved through exports. The 
8,286 vehicles exported during the years 1955 to 1960, was too little to materially 
improve the efficiency of the Marina plant.
247
 No doubt it would have helped absorb 
overheads, but the exports only served to add further complexity to an already complex 
assembly mix. On John O'Neill‟s retirement in 1959 he was succeeded by Thomas J. 
Brennan, another local man who benefited from the advancement opportunities provided 
by Ford.
248
 Brennan had started with Ford in 1922 at 16 years of age, went to Dagenham 
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in 1932 where he rose to area sales manager. He returned to Cork in 1955 as general sales 
manager and became managing director in 1959.
249
  
With the rest of Europe rebuilding, Ireland was in relative decline against 
comparable states in Europe.
250
 Most of the economic problems stemmed from the failure 
of protectionism. In 1958, T. K. Whitaker‟s policy document, Economic development, 
proposed a shift from protection to free trade, while the government‟s subsequent white 
paper, the First programme for economic expansion, followed a broadly similar 
direction.
251
 In 1957 Seán Lemass, the chief economic force within the Fianna Fáil 
government, embarked on a programme to improve the ailing Irish economy. Lemass 
realised that the methods he had introduced in the 1930s had failed and he was clear that 
greater industrial efficiency was necessary. He set out to build a broad-based consensus 
of the key players including trade unions, business and farmers, in the decision-making 
process.
252
  The Committee on Industrial Organisation (CIO), was one of a number of 
organisations introduced to bring the various industrial interest groups together and into 
government structures. It was set up to examine Irish industry‟s suitability for entry into 
EEC, to investigate the difficulties facing particular industries, and to formulate measures 
for adjustment and adaptation.
253
 Membership was drawn from the Federation of Irish 
Industries, the Irish Congress of Trade Unions, the Federated Union of Employers and the 
Public Service.
254
 To carry out the detailed investigation of various industries, the 
committee appointed survey teams and when they reported in 1962, the weakness of Irish 
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industry was exposed, especially in relation to export potential.
255
 The motor industry 
was particularly vulnerable and the CIO in its report accepted the conclusion of their 
survey team „…that the motor vehicle assembly industry would have no economic 
prospects of survival under free trade conditions and that the commercial vehicle body 
building industry would be very badly hit‟.256 When asked their opinion, it was the 
„virtually unanimous view of the industry that the motor assembly in this country will 
cease under free trade‟.257 The report estimated that, in mid-October 1960, 2,500 people 
were directly employed in assembly while a further 650 were employed in supplying 
parts and they concluded that the cessation of assembly would mean that 2,450 to 2,650 
of these jobs were likely to disappear. With such a dismal prospect the only issue for 
consideration was what action should be taken to provide alternative employment for the 
displaced workers.
258
 
Because of the interrelationship of the Irish and British economies it was vital that 
Ireland join the EEC at the same time as Britain, so when Britain‟s application was 
rejected in 1963, the Irish application lapsed. This postponement provided an opportunity 
to begin negotiations with Britain which in turn led to the signing, on 14 December 1965, 
of the AIFTA, effectively ending the trade war and the protectionist policy.
259
 The 
agreement came into operation on 1 July 1966 when Britain removed virtually all 
protective duties on Irish goods, while Irish protective duties on British goods were to be 
reduced by 10 per cent per annum. Irish quantitative restrictions on motor tyres, motor 
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cars, commercial vehicles, chassis and bodies were also terminated.
260
 Special 
arrangements were agreed to ensure that the assembly of British motor cars continued. 
Under these arrangements the Minister for Industry and Commerce negotiated an 
agreement between representatives of the British motor industry and their Irish 
assemblers. In broad terms, the agreement ensured that assemblers maintained their 
existing scale of assembly while rules were agreed for new entrants to the market as well 
as non-British importers. It was also understood that these arrangements would have to be 
changed upon entry to the EEC.
261 Prior to Ireland‟s accession to the EEC, Dr Paddy 
Hillery negotiated a revised agreement which recognised that Ireland‟s small scale 
assembly was unlikely to be viable in free trade conditions. Consequently, a special 
twelve year protocol was agreed which aimed to protect the employment of workers in 
the motor car assembly industry while protective tariff duties were progressively 
eliminated. In the Dáil, Hillery said that: „The scheme at present in operation for the 
assembly and importation of motor vehicles in Ireland should be maintained after our 
accession to the Communities until 1985‟.262 Effectively, the agreement permitted a 
twelve year deferral of free trade to permit alternative employment possibilities to be 
provided for motor assembly workers.
263
  
In Europe, Ford had expanded dramatically, but despite Henry Ford II‟s post-war 
reorganisation, the company still operated in a disjointed fashion. The two major plants in 
Britain and Germany acted like rivals, overlapping in many areas, while Dagenham was 
plagued by poor industrial relations. According to Tolliday, by 1964 it was apparent to 
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Ford international planners that as British and German plants were close to their 
production limits the company would face a capacity shortage in its European plants by 
1968/1970.
264
 Senior members of Ford‟s European management were also aware that the 
EEC was becoming a reality, eliminating barriers and restrictions, though it was not yet 
clear when Britain would join. Anticipating further improvements in European trade they 
proposed to Henry Ford II in June 1965 that all of Ford‟s business in Europe should be 
brought under one European umbrella forcing Dagenham and Cologne to cooperate and 
share engineering, sales and even manufacturing. The cooperation was also expected to 
extend to the other thirty eight plants around Europe. This concept of a „Ford of Europe‟ 
took two years to bring about.
265
  
With trade liberalisation on the agenda for both Ford and Ireland, it became 
necessary that Henry Ford & Son, at a minimum, improve efficiency, quality and costs at 
the Marina in preparation for the increased competition. While Ford had a shortage of 
production capacity in Europe, Cork‟s potential contribution to any shortfall was likely to 
be small, so the company‟s decision to invest in the Marina in 1967 did not anticipate 
significantly increased output, but focussed on modernising and upgrading the plant. The 
investment involved the expenditure of £2 million in the construction of an additional 
117,000 square feet of new building space and the reorganisation of the plant 
incorporating two separate assembly lines, one for heavy commercial vehicles and the 
other for passenger and light commercial vehicles.
266
 In addition to re-equipping and 
modernising the plant a significant part of the expenditure went on improving the quality 
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control of the finished vehicles.
267
 The opening of the expanded assembly plant by Jack 
Lynch in October 1967 coincided with the company‟s fiftieth anniversary. At the time 
Henry Ford & Son employed about a thousand men, occupied 33 acres and assembled a 
range of fourteen passenger vehicles.
268
 The Examiner in its leading article saw the 
investment in a positive light and was particularly magnanimous about the example given 
by Ford. It said that: [Ford] „has identified itself with the hopes and ambitions for the 
future and by its profession of faith, as instanced by its heavy capital investment in its 
Marina factory is offering constant encouragement to other industrialists to do 
likewise‟.269 Dismissing doubts about Ireland‟s imminent membership of the EEC, the 
Examiner viewed Ford‟s investment policy as an important example to other companies, 
while their policy of sourcing parts and components in Ireland added considerably to 
local employment.
270
 Undoubtedly, the investment was a significant advance for the 
plant, improving both efficiency and quality, but the company was still producing their 
complete range of vehicles, which sometimes meant producing as few as three or four of 
a particular model per day, ensuring that no economy of scale could be achieved and 
despite the investment, the plant remained relatively inefficient and uncompetitive 
compared with the larger European plants.
271
 
Five years after the AIFTA came into effect, Booth Poole, a Dublin company 
assembling Wolseley motor cars planned to make its 140 workers redundant following a 
rationalisation of the group‟s activities. The matter was raised in the Dáil and the Minister 
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for Industry and Commerce, Patrick J. Lalor pointed out that employment in the motor 
assembly industry had risen by 300 since 1965, that „3,765 people were employed on 
assembly in 1970 as compared with 3,449 people in 1965‟.272 In addition, he stated that 
the total number of vehicles assembled by the Irish car assembly industry in 1970 had 
risen to 52,976 from 49,709 in 1965.
273
 On the face of it, it seemed that the AIFTA was 
operating successfully with little loss of jobs, despite the earlier predictions of the CIO.  
In fact the various assemblers were only maintaining the status quo, making little attempt 
to prepare for free trade. Faced with no alternative, they had set up assembly operations 
in the 1930s with considerable reluctance. Their output, limited by the size of the market, 
was small and their operations very inefficient. Jacobson stated that „the minimum size of 
plant incorporating the latest techniques in 1960 was one with the capacity to assemble 
60,000 units a year‟.274 Since no Irish assembler was required to produce more than a 
fraction of that output, there was little incentive to improve or diversify.  The smaller 
assembler‟s best hope was to await the return of free trade when they could expect to 
revert to their original role as distributor for overseas manufacturers.
275
 Even Ford, with 
an annual output of about 15,000 vehicles was far too small to support a viable plant, but 
despite its lack of long-term viability, until such time as the tariffs disappeared there 
continued to be a benefit to be derived from operating the assembly plant.
276
  
Additionally, it made economic sense to run it as efficiently as possible, so under the 
leadership of a new managing director, Paddy Hayes, the company carried out a further 
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plant rationalization in 1972. To address the inefficiency of assembling the entire range 
of cars and trucks, they converted the lines to produce only two models, the Escort and 
Cortina, which together accounted for about seventy five per cent of Ford sales in Ireland. 
The remainder of the range was now imported fully built up and a surplus output of 
Escort vans was exported to Britain, balancing imports from Britain, Holland and 
Germany.
277
  
Even as Ford was implementing its rationalisation Dr Patrick Hillery, Minister for 
External Affairs, was in Brussels negotiating the terms for Ireland‟s accession to the 
EEC. As we have seen, motor assembly was considered a sensitive industry, so an 
extended transition period was agreed for phasing out of the protective scheme applying 
to the Irish industry. The amendment was laid down in Protocol 7 which was annexed to 
Ireland‟s Treaty of Accession. The main modification was that the special provisions 
which had formerly applied to British manufacturers would apply to all EEC 
manufacturers and the scheme could remain in operation until 31 December 1984 when 
all restrictions would end.
278
  
Ireland‟s entry to the EEC on 1 January 1973 was followed by the 1973 oil crisis. 
In the subsequent recession the Irish market demand for motor vehicles declined and with 
it the number of vehicles assembled, down to 53,540 vehicles in 1974 from 61,276 in 
1973.
279
 By early 1975 Irish car assemblers were starting to close down. In the Dáil, Des 
O‟Malley of Fianna Fáil pointed out that: „There have been three closures in motor 
assembly firms in Dublin and the total number of redundant workers is between 1,300 
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and 1,400 in Brittains, McCairns and Reg Armstrong‟.280 The Minister for Industry and 
Commerce, Justin Keating, defending the situation pointed out that new manufacturing 
operations were being set up which would provide alternative employment for redundant 
assembly workers. One diversification project had already commenced production and 
was envisaged to provide 130 jobs, while another was expected, on reaching full 
production in 1977, to employ 500 people.
281
 Later Keating appeared to be holding Ford 
up as a model when he suggested that:  
On the basis of our costs, structures and skills, we have a real future on the condition that 
we get a volume larger than that directed at our home market. In other words, firms like 
Ford which are able to reach a volume that encompasses exports and, perhaps, other firms 
as well have a firm future. The other sector where there is a firm future is in components 
and, as I think the Deputy knows, we are vigorously diversifying in that direction. But 
firms doing a very small number of cars for the Irish market have unit costs so enormous 
that, after the ending of our special period, they would not be viable.
282
 
For Henry Ford & Son, as a subsidiary of a multinational corporation, the issue of 
diversifying or replacing assembly was not in its hands, but would be determined by the 
interests of Ford of Europe.
283
 The local management had little or no control over the 
direction their business would take. Given Ford‟s history of switching product lines to 
suit political and economic situations, and their long history in Cork, it seemed likely that 
they would replace car assembly with an alternative manufacturing operation. On 5 April 
1977 the New York Times reported that Ford was talking to the Irish government and the 
Industrial Development Authority (IDA) about making automobile components for Ford 
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of Europe. The report suggested that four thousand employees could be involved. 
However, a government aide described the report as „an embarrassing leak‟.284 The issue 
was followed up in the Dáil when Gene Fitzgerald of Fianna Fáil asked the Minister for 
Industry and Commerce if he could confirm that Ford had „concluded negotiations for the 
setting up of a major industry which will employ 3,000 people on an IDA site at Cork 
Harbour‟.285 The Minister declined to give any information pointing out that „negotiations 
between the IDA and industrial promoters are treated as confidential until such time as 
the promoters are prepared to release information‟.286 So, when Henry Ford II visited 
Cork in June 1977 for the company‟s sixtieth anniversary there was considerable 
expectation that he would announce a forthcoming investment by the company. 
Apparently optimistic for Cork‟s future, he described Henry Ford & Son as „a vital link in 
the Ford of Europe sales and manufacturing chain‟, he highlighted the jobs created by 
suppliers to Ford and predicted a bright future for Cork and „emphatically denied there 
was any question of phasing out car assembly at the Marina plant‟.287 He was pressed for 
details of future developments and was asked if some form of shift work was envisaged at 
the Cork plant. He agreed that this could be so and went on to say that they „hoped to 
double the present hourly paid workforce‟.288 However reassuring these comments were 
to the workforce, they ran counter to the reality of the assembly situation and ignored the 
possibility of an investment in an alternative business.  More tellingly, in his comments 
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he remarked:  „We as business people, go on business not on sentiment‟.289 By September 
the reason for Ford‟s hesitation became clear when the investment being discussed with 
the IDA went instead to Wales, despite the IDA having put together „a package worth 
around £50 million in investment grants-plus the prospect of a tax free holiday for the 
profits earned by the engine-plant until 1990‟.290 According to the National Prices 
Commission (NPC), Ford were planning to proceed with the promised rationalisation in 
1978, investing £4 to £5 million, adding another shift to create 850 new jobs 
concentrating on a single model producing 200 cars a day for export to the EEC.
291
 
Around that time the motor industry employed 2,519 people in assembly, together with 
1,496 in distribution, leading the consultants employed by the NPC to conclude that the 
industry was „rapidly becoming a distributive network‟.292  
Henry Ford II retired as chairman of the Ford Motor Company in 1980 and two 
years later paid a final courtesy visit to Cork. He was en route to England where he was 
due to be appointed an honorary knight of the British Empire by the Queen.
293
 Shortly 
beforehand, on 22 July 1982, Dagenham had discontinued production of the long-running 
Ford Cortina and adapted the line to produce its replacement, the Ford Sierra, using 
robots.
294
 Simultaneously, Ford invested about £10 million to further upgrade the Marina 
factory and convert it into a single car plant for Sierra production.
295
 Since Cork‟s volume 
did not justify the installation of robots, the process of assembly continued. Questions 
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asked in the Dáil regarding the financing of the Ford company‟s modernisation 
programme by government agencies failed to discover what monies were paid due to the 
„confidential nature‟ of such grants.296 With the end of tariffs looming and assemblers 
such Talbot Motors Limited closing down, this investment seemed foolhardy and 
unrealistic.
297
 Mechanisation, particularly the use of robots, was widespread in the motor 
industry, where it reduced labour costs and improved quality, but it was only justified in 
plants that had sufficient volume to absorb the heavy capital outlay. Cork‟s output of 
eighty cars against Dagenham‟s production of a thousand a day, was insufficient to 
justify such high investment.
298
 Even with a single line the plant was operating at a loss. 
The company later claimed to have lost £35 million in the years 1980-1984.
299
 
Meanwhile in the United States from 1980 to 1982 the Ford Motor Company was also 
losing money and unlikely to continue supporting loss-making operations.
300
  Despite 
Ford‟s long association with Cork the economics of small, inefficient assembly plants 
was no longer justified and the future of the Marina plant looked decidedly gloomy. 
On Tuesday morning, 17 January 1984 the Cork Examiner announced the closure 
of the Dagenham foundry after half a century in operation, with the comment that Ford of 
Cork would not be hit by this event.
301
 Shortly after the Marina workers had read this 
news and perhaps breathed a sigh of relief, they were called to the company canteen to be 
told that their own factory was closing down in about six months time. Paddy Hayes, 
chairman and managing director summed up the company‟s difficulties „as the 
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uncompetitiveness of a small plant located in a population backwater‟ compounded by 
the imminent removal of the remaining tariff restrictions in 1985.
302
 While the workers 
had anticipated bad news, few anticipated complete closure. Despite being aware of the 
demise of other assemblers, as well as being „conditioned‟ by management over the 
previous two years, the news came as huge shock.
303
 Small signals had been identified 
and interpreted as indicating Ford‟s declining interest in Cork. For example, the year 
before when Dunlop had ceased production and redundant workers took over the plant, 
cutting off steam supplies vital to Ford‟s painting operation, Ford management, according 
to the Examiner,  showed „no evidence of great concern,‟ which heightened the suspicion 
that the plant‟s condition was terminal and its end was near.304 
Unexpectedly, at the end of the speeches, in response to the devastating news, 
thirty or forty workers began to applaud. Union officials explained to the Examiner that 
„they were not clapping about what we had just been told, they were clapping because at 
least we had been told the news first‟. Bob Montgomery, suggests that the applause was 
„an indication of the widely-held appreciation by the workers for the efforts that had been 
made to keep the Cork plant operational in the face of huge odds, and for the efforts made 
to secure an alternative industry‟.305 Either way, the end of an era had arrived. The 
factory finally closed its doors on Friday, 13 July 1984 after 65 years of production. Less 
than six months later the tariffs and quota restrictions on fully built up vehicles finally 
ended. 
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The company run by Henry Ford before World War II had been managed 
arbitrarily at his whim, but the hard economics of a post-war world meant that a more 
professional and orderly approach was necessary. Henry Ford II had introduced more 
formal management systems. The advent of a borderless EEC and Ford of Europe 
demanded that plants be located in the most economic locations, without reference to 
national borders. Factories had grown bigger, more complex and capital intensive.  
Cork‟s dilemma was that it was located in a small market, remote from the major markets 
of Europe. Henry Ford‟s stated objective of „starting Ireland along a road to industry‟ 
never really happened, the factory in Cork ended up being used as a stopgap by the Ford 
company.
306
 Though that stopgap gave employment for sixty seven years, fifty two of 
those years can be directly attributed to the tariffs and quotas imposed by Fianna Fail in 
1932. For the workers who had lived through or heard about the changes of the 1930s and 
1940s, they would have been justified in expecting Ford to find a niche product or 
component to keep the Marina plant going. Yet Ford provided no alternative 
employment: despite the inducements of the IDA they showed no enthusiasm for 
retaining a manufacturing presence in Ireland. Two years later T.D. Frank Fahey claimed: 
„They have got away scot-free to date from providing employment to replace that which 
was lost following their withdrawal from assembly‟.307  
For the city and people of Cork the loss of their two major industries, Ford and 
Dunlop was a devastating a blow, the resultant loss of jobs and wages had an enormous 
impact on the lives and living standards of all. Yet while Ford had rejected the possibility 
of establishing a components factory in Ireland, nationally other companies were being 
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attracted by the IDA so that just over two years later the Minister for Industry and 
Commerce Noonan could report that: 
These efforts have resulted in the development and continued growth of a modern, high 
quality, automotive components industry which now employs more than the car assembly 
industry employed at its peak. At present there are over 100 companies exporting 
components worth some IR£260 million a year and employing over 7,500 people. The 
development of this industry has come about as a result of the Government's efforts to 
establish a strong automotive industry and has been achieved despite the international 
recession and pressure on the larger European auto companies to buy locally.
308 
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CHAPTER TEN  
Conclusion      
  
On 15 June 1983, Henry Ford II asked his long-time colleague and friend, Walter 
Hayes, to plan his funeral. Ford had retired from his position as chairman of the Ford 
Motor Company in 1980 and like any good manager, wanted to put his business and 
private affairs in order.
1
 In late 1983, even as Ford was making his arrangements, the fate 
of the Marina plant was being considered by senior Ford executives. Their deliberations 
culminated in the announcement, on 17 January 1984, of the company’s decision to close 
the Cork plant. The plant’s presence in Cork had spanned the same period as the life of 
Henry Ford II, grandson of its founder. Ford was born in September 1917, just months 
after building work had commenced on the Marina site and he died in late September 
1987 outlasting the plant, which had finally closed its doors on 13 July 1984, by about 
three years. Drafted in to manage the American Ford Motor Company during World War 
II, Henry Ford II had introduced modern management techniques and structures which 
were instrumental in saving the American company from collapse. Compared to the 
international challenges which he faced, the Cork plant, in the post-war era, was a 
relatively straightforward business, a virtual haven of stability and calm as it fulfilled its 
role of assembling vehicles to meet the needs of the local Irish market.  
While chapter nine of this thesis has dealt with the period from 1932, in the main 
body of the work I have concentrated on the earlier period, the era dominated by Ford’s 
colourful, larger than life grandfather, Henry Ford I. I set out to examine how the older 
Ford, the farsighted engineer and philanthropist who transformed American society with 
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his mass-produced motor car, had introduced the motor industry to his ancestral 
homeland in Ireland. I examined the operations of the industrial enterprise which resulted 
from Ford’s visit to Ireland in 1912, and which provided substantial employment at the 
Marina for close on seven decades.  
In researching the company I ascertained that Henry Ford & Son, during their 
occupancy of the Marina factory, went through two distinct phases each with markedly 
different production and management approaches. In contrast with the relative continuity 
of the half century of operations up to 1984, the earlier period, from 1917 to 1932, was 
characterised by challenges and changes, both external and internal, when production 
switched from tractors to cars and back again, causing disruption, upheaval and layoffs; 
externally the political and economic changes wrought by the War of Independence, 
followed by the Civil War and the transition to nationalist control, all combined to create 
a. remarkable set of events.  
The decision to build the Marina plant came out of Ford’s visit to Ireland during 
the summer of 1912. Travelling unnoticed with his family he encountered something of 
the plight of the Irish urban and rural poor and was stirred to seek a means to alleviate 
that poverty. As an industrialist, his impulse was to build a factory and provide regular 
employment and wages so that workers could work to advance their position and achieve 
prosperity. Ford was drawn initially to Cork harbour, conscious of the possibility of 
locating industry there. He delegated Percival Perry to carry out a thorough survey and to 
report back with an analysis of potential sites in Ireland. Perry corroborated Ford’s own 
views that Cork was the best site, but his investigations highlighted the inefficiency and 
cost penalties associated with locating a car factory in Cork, due to the small local market 
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and its remote location. Ford’s urge to build a factory was postponed for some three 
years, put off by the additional shipping costs, the decision was left in abeyance until the 
development of Ford’s tractors introduced a product which would be exported to a wider 
marketplace justifying the plant’s location in the relatively remote Cork region. 
In 1915 Henry Ford had applied his efforts to the design and development of an 
agricultural tractor. Shortly after, with World War I in progress, Britain’s need for 
tractors to support its food production programme led to Ford supplying tractors from 
Dearborn and to the decision to build the tractor factory in Cork. Since the market for 
tractors was likely to be much smaller than that for motor cars, and since no single 
market was likely to support a large factory, location was less critical. Cork-made tractors 
would have to be shipped in many directions from Ford’s purpose-built factory to supply 
orders from governments and farmers throughout Europe.  
While the decision to locate tractor production in Cork seemed more rational than 
locating car production there, nonetheless, economic logic demanded that the tractors be 
produced where the demand was greatest, and as the British market was the main outlet, 
absorbing over sixty per cent of the Marina’s output between 1919 and 1923, so the Cork 
location added unnecessary transport costs.
2
 In its decision to locate the plant in Cork the 
company ignored this reality. Since Cork offered no significant advantage over sites such 
as Southampton this decision meant that the Cork plant had an in-built economic cost 
disadvantage which undermined its long-term viability and left it vulnerable to the market 
pressures and economic downturns of the early 1920s and 1930s.  
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Ford’s decision had no firm business foundation, but was based on his emotional 
desire to bring industry to Ireland, to meet Ireland’s need, as he saw it.  As he said 
himself there was ‘some personal sentiment in it’.3 His well-intentioned action flew in the 
face of both business logic and his own philosophy. Substantial transport costs which 
could have been avoided by locating in mainland Britain represented not just wasteful 
inefficiency, but were an unnecessary burden for the business to carry. The decision also 
ran counter to normal business practice in that he identified the factory site first and 
found a suitable product line later. While Ford scorned the idea of philanthropy, William 
Greenleaf, in his work on the philanthropies of Ford up to 1936, commented that for a 
period of time after 1914 Ford’s ‘industrial program had strong overtones of altruism’.4 
His decision to locate in Ireland was plainly a philanthropic gesture which went against 
the normal decision making process. The desire to assist workers in the land of his 
ancestors seemed to dominate his thinking in this period. For example, discussing the 
shipment of coal to Ireland in 1920 Sorensen said: ‘it would do a great deal towards 
helping the Irish situation which Mr Ford always seems so keen on’.5   
Ford’s reputation as a philanthropist had grown out of the introduction of the five 
dollar day in January 1914.
6
 The original self-made man, he became one of the most 
prominent men in America and his pronouncements continually made newspaper 
headlines. By 1916 when rumours that he was about to build a factory in Ireland began to 
appear, his fame was already widespread and his apparent generosity and support of the 
ordinary man, both as an employee and as a customer, was renowned worldwide. In 
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Ireland he was eulogized by the newspapers and writers of the day as a returned 
immigrant, but while the Irish media might claim him as an Irishman, I have seen no 
record of his own view of his Irishness, nor does anything appear in the archive 
documents. He was not very outspoken on the subject and made no nationalistic claims or 
statements. Whatever his views, despite a number of opportunities and invitations he 
made only one visit to Ireland. His factory was his monument and his benevolence in 
bringing much-needed jobs to Cork city would have brought hope to its grateful 
inhabitants, but a combination of recession, tariffs and high costs left the business 
exposed to economic changes which subsequently gave rise to layoffs, insecurity of 
employment and no doubt disenchantment for its employees. 
In an era before the development of structured arrangements for attracting foreign 
investment, the British government under Lloyd George was generally supportive of the 
project, despite the antagonism of the British motor industry. The CIDA, and in particular 
its members J. L. Fawsitt and George Crosbie, acted like forerunners of the IDA and  was 
extremely proactive in promoting the Cork project, without the benefit of state support.
7
 
By late 1916, when Ford decided to locate in Cork, the company was already expanding 
overseas to meet the growing international demand for its products. Their system of car 
distribution through branch assembly plants had been developed very early in the United 
States, and even before the World War there was one located near every important city.
8
  
The Canadian plant which opened in 1905 was the first international assembly plant and 
it was upgraded into a manufacturing plant three years later. In Manchester assembly 
began in 1911 and by the time Cork came into production five other plants had begun 
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motor assembly.
9
 The problems encountered internationally were more diverse than those 
encountered in the home environment. Ford was aware of tariff issues as they related to 
Canada and Britain, where the plants had been located to avoid incurring tariff costs, but 
Ford clearly never anticipated, nor perhaps understood the situation with the Irish Free 
State government as far as the tariffs were concerned. Tariffs were only one of a number 
of problems which arose in Cork. Production output, quality, politics, logistics and even 
church attendance all created difficulties for the company in the first few years. 
Ford’s complex and dominant personality was always a factor in his relations with 
his business and employees. While he displayed extraordinary engineering genius he also 
showed lack of foresight in many of his decisions. For example, his acumen in 
developing the affordable Model T was counterbalanced by his stubborn and short-
sighted reluctance to refine and update it to keep abreast of competition. He was intuitive 
rather than logical and often offered opinions in fields where he knew little or nothing.
10
 
His success made him impervious to advice or suggestion, and he reacted angrily when 
managers offered ideas of their own. While he could show surprising philanthropy, he 
could also be a ferocious bully. His dismissal of senior managers was carried out in a 
ruthless and often bizarre manner. As a business man he was chaotic, often interfering in 
operations, unpredictably changing direction, dismissing administrators and 
administrative methods and refusing to delegate authority.
11
  
Ford’s initial display of generosity and idealism appeared to wane somewhat in 
the years after the Peace Ship episode in 1915, so that by 1922 he was openly disparaging 
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the ‘sentimental idealism’ of social reformers.12 Fortunately for the people of Cork the 
decision to locate there came before Ford’s attitude changed.  His change of heart had 
occurred in the business crisis of late 1920, so that by January 1921 many seasoned and 
idealistic executives had resigned or been removed from the company payroll.
13
 In 
Ireland, social developments such as Grace’s scheme to build housing in Cork were also 
abandoned. With the departure of the men with social vision, Ford exchanged idealism 
for efficiency. He surrounded himself with men such as Charles Sorensen, the hard-nosed 
production man who had risen to the top in this period and who had little interest in either 
philanthropy or human development; and Ernest Liebold, his secretary, who controlled 
access to Ford, largely isolating him from independent influences.
14
 Both men survived 
the many changes and purges up to the 1940s by following Ford’s instruction to the letter 
and both played key roles in managing and directing the Cork firm.  
Ford was unappreciative of his Irish management also. The group sent to Ireland 
in the early years to build and commission the new plant faced many challenges both 
within the plant, trying to locate materials, training workers while achieving production 
output and quality, but also running risks of being shot or kidnapped by the various 
protagonists in the hostilities of the period. Their efforts went largely unacknowledged. 
Moreover, the senior managers, Perry, Grace and Clarke all ended up being fired by the 
company while others, too, were poorly treated despite their dedicated efforts.  
The factory in Cork had started production in July 1919, but by the end of 1922 
tractor demand had collapsed and Cork’s high cost base meant it was cheaper to import 
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tractors to Europe from the United States. This led to the cessation of tractor production 
and the return of all tractor equipment to the United States. The plant now concentrated 
on manufacturing Model T parts for export and assembling Model Ts for the small Irish 
market. When, on 1 April 1923, the British government introduced a 22.22 per cent duty 
on Model T parts exported to Manchester from Cork, the additional costs damaged 
Cork’s role as an exporter. In turn the Irish government had introduced reciprocal tariffs 
on imported cars and car parts. Despite Henry Ford’s initial enthusiasm for the Cork 
project, his altruism proved short-lived. Perhaps irritated initially by Cork Corporation’s 
demand, in 1922, that he implement the terms of his lease and increase his workforce to 
2,000, he now became disenchanted by what he perceived as the Irish Free State 
government’s refusal to eliminate tariffs. Word came to the Cork management in mid-
1923, that the plant would cease manufacturing as soon as buildings could be erected on a 
suitable site in England.
15
 Edward Grace was given the task of locating such a site and in 
July 1923 he proposed the Dagenham location to Detroit.  The subsequent purchase of 
the Dagenham land threatened the end of the Marina plant, but it remained in production 
as a stopgap, providing parts support to Manchester until the new Dagenham works 
began production. Delays in construction of the new factory meant that no action was 
taken against Cork until 1932. While this extended reprieve benefited the Cork operation, 
within months of the first vehicle emerging from Dagenham in October 1931, Ford’s 
original aspiration of bringing industry to Ireland faced extinction as the company 
prepared to implement its decision to convert the massive Marina works into a vehicle 
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distribution centre. Finally, Henry Ford appeared to have lost interest in his Irish 
experiment. 
Cumann na nGaedheal, who governed the Irish Free State from independence to 
1932, took a very cautious approach to economic policy. Non-interventionist, their 
attitude, according to Lee, was to ‘do as little as possible’.16 Agriculture was deemed the 
most important industry and, while they did consider protection, only moderate duties 
were introduced lest they interfere with the agricultural sector by raising costs or 
provoking retaliation against Irish agricultural exports.
17
 In their dealings with Henry 
Ford & Son in the 1923/28 period they proved hesitant in approach and failed to follow 
through with any initiative. Even the tariffs introduced in April 1923 was a response to 
the British action. Grace, prior to his trip to Detroit in May 1923, made Cosgrave aware 
both of the cost of the tariffs on Ford’s exports and the likelihood of a reaction by Detroit. 
The government’s response, in October 1923, was an offer to negotiate the removal of the 
tariffs in return for an assurance that Ford would maintain a substantial manufacturing 
presence; this was declined by Ford. Ford’s refusal, followed by the announcement of the 
Dagenham project in July 1924, should have alerted Cumann na nGaedheal to the threat 
hanging over the Cork plant. While the temporary removal of the McKenna duties in 
August 1924 may have led them to believe that the problem had been solved, a change of 
government in Britain in July 1925 and the re-imposition of the tariffs prompted the Irish 
government to resurrect the previous conditional offer to negotiate the removal of the 
tariffs. Again Ford refused. Even though the government remained conscious of the tariff 
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issue, and for example, later made concessions on motor licences, these were insufficient 
to compensate Ford for the high cost of duties. 
The government were preoccupied with other issues and failed to formulate or 
follow a coherent strategy to address Ford’s tariff problems. The government could not 
accept the loss of revenue which would result from the removal of tariffs on motor 
imports, which would be necessary if the British government were to reciprocate and 
eliminate the duty which so exercised Henry Ford. For his part, Ford was unwilling to 
give the Irish government any commitment or guarantees as to the company’s future 
plans.  No doubt he was unwilling to be hampered by an agreement similar to the lease 
deal, particularly since the decision had already been made to consolidate manufacturing 
operations in Dagenham.  
Because of Ford’s personal interest, the Cork plant had advantages over other 
operations. It was the only factory outside the United States producing tractors and one of 
only a small number engaged in full manufacturing operations, specifically foundry 
work. From the beginning, Ford had supported the Marina financially, initially with 
investment in the site and plant and later, despite the cost of low sales and high tariffs, he 
had continued to invest substantial capital. Despite his obstinacy and intransigence, he 
was open and generous with his time and ideas when Irishmen called. Irish managers 
were greeted warmly, and in his dealings with Fawsitt and MacWhite he was always 
accessible and amenable.
18
 The goodwill that he showed in his dealings with the Irish 
could have been exploited by the Cumann na nGaedheal government to the benefit of the 
Irish economy. William Cosgrave’s failure to meet with Henry Ford during his trip to the 
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United States in1928 was a missed opportunity. If Cosgrave or a senior representative 
had travelled to Dearborn he probably would have got a better response from Ford and 
would perhaps have been able to agree mutually beneficial arrangements.  
Though Ford’s earlier idealism had declined and his behaviour had become 
increasingly unpredictable and he was, according to Greenleaf, ‘suspicious of advice and 
increasingly relied on his flashes of intuition’, yet he continued to be well disposed 
towards Ireland and remained generous, if approached by the right person.
19
 For example, 
when the Irish government representative, John Dulanty, met Ford in early 1928, he 
appears to have revived Ford’s philanthropic instinct and prompted him to transfer the 
idle American tractor production equipment to Cork. Ford restarted production in 1929, 
producing Fordson tractors for world-wide distribution, turning the Marina into a 
substantially larger operation than before. Thus, Dulanty demonstrated clearly that 
despite Ford’s apparent impatience with the Irish Free State government and their tariffs, 
he could still be encouraged to help the land of his forefathers. Ford’s impulsive decision 
to restart tractor production, like the original decision to build the factory was not based 
on coherent business logic, was implemented hastily, and was poorly planned. In the 
excitement of the reinstallation of tractor production these problems were not highlighted, 
instead the new development seemed to secure the Marina’s future against the massive 
new factory under construction in Dagenham. As the majority of the tractor production 
was destined for export, this time the Irish government conceded that all necessary parts 
could be imported duty free into the Free State.  
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This renewed attempt at tractor production quickly turned into another expensive 
and short-lived misadventure for the company. The initial expectation was that the 
enlarged Marina plant, supplying Ford tractors worldwide, would provide a bonanza of 
jobs and business in Cork. This hope proved ill-founded as the depression of 1929 and 
the subsequent spread of tariffs again curtailed sales, forcing the company to consolidate 
its operation in Dagenham and dispense with the Marina factory in 1932. Henry Ford’s 
elaborate tractor plant proved oversized, overambitious and impracticable and as Percival 
Perry suggested, it overextended the capabilities of all of those involved. Ford’s dramatic 
restoration of tractor production to Cork, together with the impact of this move on local 
employment, no doubt gained him praise and adulation for his efforts, but his misplaced 
generosity provided no long-term benefit to the people of Cork. Employment at the 
Marina, which numbered about seven thousand workers in early 1930 had largely 
disappeared by June. Ford incurred further excessive losses which even his generosity 
and goodwill towards Ireland could not endure. With hindsight, if Ford had behaved 
more practically, perhaps if he had felt less generous towards Cork, he might have 
provided a modest assembly plant on the lines of those operating in United States and 
Europe. Such a plant could have evolved and grown steadily in conjunction with the local 
market and could also have acted as a support plant to Manchester, but it seems that all 
through this period the Irish market was too small for such an operation. To succeed, the 
plant had to export and even exports needed to be located near their major market. The 
Marina plant was also unlucky, devastated on two occasions by international recessions 
leading to layoffs, instability, uncertainty and upset for the large numbers of employees 
involved. 
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The Cork tractor machinery, shipped out in July 1932 and relocated in Dagenham, 
was soon back in production so that the first of Ford’s new improved tractors rolled off 
the line on 19 February 1933.
20
 While sales were small initially, soon the business began 
to flourish. Tractor production grew steadily such that in 1937, 18,698 tractors were 
produced and by 1948 production exceeded fifty thousand units.
21
 Tractor production 
continued in Dagenham until 1964 when it moved to a custom-built plant in Basildon.  
So, while moving tractor production to Dagenham permitted the Cork plant to develop as 
an assembly plant, nonetheless it represented a significant loss of potential business to 
Cork. If Ford had persevered with the original 1928 plan and been prepared to cope with 
the losses in Cork for another year or so the city could have had a substantial plant, 
employing thousands of workers, but Dagenham needed the production volume and Ford 
had run out of patience with his Cork project.  
Ford’s ambition had been to present Cork with a large-scale plant, but the notion 
of a works employing ten thousand or more employees was probably out of scale in a city 
with a population of 80,000 people and might have been a disaster for Cork.
22
 Jacobson 
questioned the desirability of a single plant, a subsidiary of a multi-national corporation, 
employing such a large proportion of the industrial workforce and described the risks 
which it represented as ‘at best disproportionate and at worst dangerous’.23 Jacobson’s 
concern was valid as, despite Henry Ford’s benevolent intentions, in the space of fifteen 
years the Ford company had already acted as a typical multi-national corporation, using 
their resources and technology to move production machinery across the Atlantic and the 
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Irish Sea, with scant regard for the workers of Cork. For so many of Cork’s working 
population to have been engaged in an industry subject to such dramatic downturns in 
demand and to be employed by such a mobile company, would have lead to disruptive 
fluctuations in employment which would have created chaos with the labour market and 
social fabric of Cork city. So the failure of Ford’s magnanimous gesture was a mixed 
blessing, but out of it emerged a smaller, more secure and appropriate operation. For 
Ford, the assembly plant which began operations in 1932 was small, but in Irish terms 
employed a significant number of employees and was more appropriate to the city.   
The change from Cumann na nGaedheal to Fianna Fáil government in 1932 could 
not have been more stark, as the former’s timid policy was replaced by Fianna Fáil’s 
aggressively protectionist duties and quotas. While de Valera’s protectionism reduced 
agricultural exports, it accelerated industrialisation and employment, raising industrial 
output by forty per cent between 1931 and 1936.
24
  As Percival Perry had prepared to 
close manufacturing operations at the Marina in May 1932, he seemed to have no plan to 
set up an assembly plant, instead Ford’s choice was to convert the plant into a distribution 
centre. Though the Irish market for motor cars had grown, in Ford terms, it was still too 
small to warrant an assembly operation to meet local needs, instead Ford intended to 
import fully built up cars, providing few jobs in Cork, a reversal of the his former 
ambition. Before the decision could be implemented, fortunately for the workers and the 
city of Cork, the tariffs forced Henry Ford & Son to immediately switch to assembling 
motor cars, frustrating Perry’s escape plan. Ironically, even if Ford had departed from 
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Ireland, the government quotas would have forced them to return and set up an assembly 
if, like other motor suppliers, they wanted to do business in the Irish Free State.  
With the change to assembly, Henry Ford & Son entered the phase which lasted 
for half a century,  when rising production and steady development led to relatively stable 
employment and when, with the exception of the war period, the Marina assembly plant 
grew and flourished, providing secure employment for two generations of Cork workers. 
Once production restarted at the Marina after World War II the company quickly 
regained its status as the dominant Irish car assembler and supplier. New models 
appeared regularly, assembly lines were modernised and Ford continued to be a desirable 
company to work for. Under the leadership of Henry Ford II, the Ford Motor Company 
was restructured and developed into a modern business enterprise, no longer at the whim 
of one man, but instead, subject to coherent management strategies and the demands of 
the market place. Following Ireland’s entry into the EEC, the motor assembly industry 
which had been forced into existence in the 1930’s disappeared with the phased removal 
of tariffs. Without tariffs, even the financial inducements offered by the Irish Government 
were insufficient to convince Ford to remain in Cork. Additionally, by the 1980s the 
Marina plant was losing money. Despite Henry Ford II’s assurances, made in 1977, that 
Ford would remain in Cork, tariffs proved the key to Ford’s presence. Sentiment had long 
been replaced by business requirements and profits. The continued haemorrhage of cash 
would not be sustained. The removal of protection exposed the harsh reality that the 
Marina plant, located on the periphery of Europe without any substantial local market, 
was too far from the major markets and from the centres of mass production. The 
announcement of the closure of the Marina plant on 13 July 1984 was greeted with anger 
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and sadness by the inhabitants of Cork. It was a huge loss to the large Ford workforce and 
to the city. The company’s departure came at a time of recession, when other companies, 
such as Dunlop, were also closing and seemed to sound a death knell for Cork’s future 
industrial development.  
With the despondency of the 1980s it would have been easy for the citizens of 
Cork to be angry at the Ford Motor Company for abandoning Cork, yet the city had been 
fortunate in being endowed by one of the earliest multi-national corporations, supported 
by one of the great industrialists of the era, even if in a somewhat haphazard fashion. 
Henry Ford’s stated objective of ‘starting Ireland along a road to industry’ was probably 
never fulfilled as he had originally envisaged it; on the contrary, the factory in Cork 
ended up being used as a stopgap by the Ford company, but despite this, the company’s 
achievements were not insubstantial, providing employment for three generations of 
workers and introducing prosperity to that workforce superior to anything available 
before. 
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APPENDIX  1. 
 
Ford’s production of cars and trucks in the United States compared to 
production in the United Kingdom, 1903-1929. 
Year U.S. plants United Kingdom 
Model T output Total output 
1903 1,708 0 0 
1904 1,695 0 0 
1905 1,599 0 0 
1906 8,729 0 0 
1907 14,887 0 0 
1908 10,202 0 0 
1909 17,771 0 0 
1910 32,054 0 0 
1911 69,762 *1,485 *0 
1912 170,068 2,942 3,187 
1913 195,954 6,138 7,310 
1914 299,797 8,242 8,352 
1915 489,202 8,905 12,291 
1916 718,395 9,037 16,204 
1917 645,309 4,268 12,767 
1918 479,166 2,527 9,293 
1919 867,826 8,086 12,175 
1920 444,581 **25,666 46,362 
1921 928,750 11,603 31,955 
1922 1,237,721 11,091 27,303 
1923 1,923,360 11,507 30,596 
1924 1,797,331 8,919 27,497 
1925  1,783,625 5,086 22,271 
1926 1,457,978 4,510 21,859 
1927 359,068 1,817 12,558 
1928  719,885 0 6,685 
1929 1,717,617 0 25,756 
Sources: U.S. plant output and U.K. totals are from Wilkins and Hill, American business 
abroad, p. 436; Model T production is from Steven Tolliday, ‘The rise of Ford in 
Britain: From sales agency to market leader, 1904-1980’ in vol. 2, Bonin, Lung and 
Tolliday (eds.), Ford, 1903–2003: The European history,  p. 121. 
* Discrepancy between the two sources. 
**1920 production year contains 15 months-September 1919 to December 1920. 
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APPENDIX 2. 
 
Ford’s production of tractors in the United States compared to production in 
Ireland and United Kingdom, 1917 -1945. 
Year United States Ireland  United Kingdom  Grand 
Total. Output Total Output Total Output Total 
1917 254 254     254 
1918 34,167 34,421     34,421 
1919 56,987 91,408 303 303   91,711 
1920 67,329 158,737 3,626 3,929   162,666 
1921 35,338 194,075 *1,443 5,372   199,447 
1922 66,752 260,827 2,233 7,605   268,432 
1923 101,898 362,725     370,330 
1924 83,010 445,735     453,340 
1925 104,168 549,903     557,508 
1926 88,101 638,004     645,609 
1927 93,972 731,976     739,581 
1928 8,001 739,977     747,582 
1929   9,686 17,291   757,268 
1930   15,196 32,487   772,464 
1931   3,501 35,988   775,965 
1932   3,088 39,076   779,053 
1933     2,778 2,778 781,831 
1934     3,582 6,360 785,413 
1935     9,141 15,501 794,554 
1936     12,675 28,176 807,229 
1937     18,698 46,875 825,927 
1938     10,647 57,521 836,574 
1939 10,233 750,210   15,712 73,233 862,519 
1940 35,742 785,952   20,276 93,509 918,537 
1941 42,910 828,862   22,210 115,719 983,657 
1942 16,487 845,349   27,650 143.369 1,027,794 
1943 21,163 866,512   26,300 169,669 1,075,257 
1944 43,444 909,956   23,845 193,514 1,142,546 
1945 28,729 938,685   17,770 211,284 1,189,045 
Source: Wilkins and Hill, American business abroad, p. 438/439. 
*Wilkins and Hill text reads 1433, presumably a typographical error and corrected here 
to 1443. 
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APPENDIX 3 
 
Skilled worker’s hourly rates at Ford plant, Cork, December 1919. 
Trade 
 
Minimum 
rate 
Maximum 
rate 
Toolmaker and tool fitter. 
 
2s. 10d. 3s. 5d. 
Blacksmith.  
 
2s. 6d. 3s. 5d. 
Draughtsman. 
 
2s. 5d. 3s. 5d. 
Tool turner and tool grinder.   
 
2s. 10d. 3s. 2d. 
Ambulance attendant.  
 
2s. 7d. 3s. 0d. 
Millwright. 
 
2s. 4d. 3s. 0d. 
Joiner, pattern maker, body builder, plumber and 
engineer fitter.  
2s. 3d. 3s. 0d. 
Sheet metal worker. 
 
2s. 2d. 3s. 0d. 
Sawyer, wood machinist, saw sharpener, coach painter, 
coach trimmer, painter, polisher, bricklayer, electrician, 
electroplater, pipe fitter and fitter. 
2s. 1d. 3s. 0d. 
Source: Minutes of director’s meeting, 29 Nov. 1919 (BFRC, Acc. 328, Box 1). 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX 4. 
  
Semi-skilled worker’s hourly rates at Ford plant, Cork, December 1919. 
Positions Minimum 
 
Maximum 
 
Assembler, electric riveter, car tester, crane driver, driller, 
fender maker, press operator, radiator maker, packing 
case maker and clerk. 
2s. 1d. 2s. 9d. 
Flatter, striker, blacksmith, turret-lathe operator and 
storeman. 
2s. 2d. 2s. 9d. 
Enameler. 
 
2s. 3d. 2s. 9d. 
Source: Minutes of directors’ meeting, 29 Nov. 1919 (BFRC, Acc. 328, Box 1). 
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APPENDIX 5 
 
Women and unskilled worker’s hourly rates at Ford plant, Cork, December 
1919. 
Positions Minimum 
rate 
Maximum 
rate 
Trolley  
 
2s 3d. 2s. 6d. 
Maintenance labourers, cleaners, sweepers, stock 
pickers, stores receiving labour, packers, car washers, 
janitors, and watchmen. 
2s.1d. 2s. 6d. 
Women cleaners  
 
1s. 5d.   2s. 6d. 
Girls   
 
1s. 1d. 2s. 6d. 
Boys  
 
0s. 9d. 1s. 3d. 
Source: Minutes of directors’ meeting, 29 Nov. 1919 (BFRC, Acc. 328, Box 1). 
 
 
 
APPENDIX 6 
 
Henry Ford & Son, selected financial results, 1920-1937. 
Year 
 
Profit/Loss Source 
1920 -£107,487 BFRC, Acc. 285, Box 11.  
 
1929 £108,325 BFRC, Acc. 38, Box 3.  
 
1930 -£68,016 BFRC, Acc.38, Box 7. 
 
1931 -£129,316 BFRC, Acc. 38, Box 10. 
 
1932 -£67,379 BFRC, Acc. 38, Box 16. 
 
1933 £51,631 BFRC, Acc. 38, Box 23. 
 
1934 £66,129 BFRC, Acc.712, Box 18-1 
 
1935 £126,680 BFRC, Acc. 38, Box 34. 
 
1936 £86,025 BFRC, Acc. 38, Box 38. 
 
1937 £110,152 BFRC, Acc.38, Box 35. 
 
Source: Report of various annual general meetings.   
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APPENDIX 7 
 
 Start dates of Ford assembly plants outside the United States, 1905-1936. 
Year assembly  
started 
Country  
1905 
 
Canada. 
1911 
 
England (Manchester).  
1913 
 
France (Bordeaux). 
1916 
 
Argentina. 
1919 
 
Ireland,  
Denmark.  
1920 Uruguay, Brazil,  
Spain. 
1922 
 
Belgium,  
Italy. 
1924 
 
Chile,  
South Africa. 
1925 
 
Australia, Japan,  
Mexico 
1926 
 
Germany (Berlin), France (Asnieres), 
India, Malaya. 
1929 
 
Turkey. 
1931 
 
Germany (Cologne).  
 
1932 Holland. 
 
1936 New Zealand,  
Romania.  
Source: Wilkins and Hill, American business abroad, p. 434/5. 
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APPENDIX 8 
 
Employment figures at Ford Marina plant, Cork, including quality inspectors 
and ‘green labour’, 1929-1930. 
Date Workers  ‘Green  
Labour’ 
Quality 
Inspectors 
Total 
January 1929 1,314 Not available  13 1,327 
February 2,217 n/a 23 2,240 
 
March 2,701 n/a 36 2,737 
 
April 3,316 n/a 58 3,374 
 
May 3,454 n/a 62 3,516 
 
June 3,528 n/a 89 3,617 
 
July 3,723 n/a 103 3,826 
 
August 2,993 1,095 109 4,197 
 
September 3,159 1,099 114 4,372 
October 3,427 1,148 137 4,712 
 
November 3,432 1,259 148 4,839 
 
December 3,714 1,490 158 5,362 
 
January  1930 4,215 1,727 195 6,137 
February 4,493 2,017 202 6,712 
 
March - 2,131 
 
- - 
Source: Unsigned memo, ‘Cork factory-number of inspectors in relation to labour 
employed’, 31 Mar. 1930; ‘Green labour’ numbers, A. R. Smith to P. Perry, 25 Mar. 
1930; both at BFRC, Acc. 572, Box 17. 
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APPENDIX 9 
 
 Leasing arrangements for Marina estate, September 1930. 
Company name Period of Lease  Notes 
Texas Co (Ireland )Ltd. 21 years Land.  
National Flour Mills.  99 years. Land. 
National Grain Silos Ltd. 200 years Land.  
Metal Products Ltd. 21 years. Buildings. 
Irish Shell Ltd. - Agreement on oil storage.* 
Dunlop Rubber Co. (Irl) Ltd. 21 years Buildings at £2,000 p.a. 
Russian Oil Products.  21 years. Land.  
Eustace & Co. Monthly. Land.  
E.H. Harte.  Monthly. Land.  
P. Hyde. Annual. £24 per annum. for grazing 
land.  
Source: Manager’s quarterly report, September 1930, BFRC Acc.712, Box 18-1. 
*Terms 2s. 6d. per ton for oil received, stored and delivered into wagons plus ½ d. per 
ton per week for oil stored.   
 
APPENDIX 10 
 
Irish made materials used by Henry Ford & Son.  
Product 
 
Supplier Address 
Automobile bulbs. 
  
Solus Teoranta.  Bray, Co Wicklow.  
Batteries.  
 
Exide Batteries (Ireland) Ltd. Dublin. 
Chassis springs.  John Brockhouse & Co. (Ireland) 
Ltd. 
Wexford. 
Elastic tape.  
 
L. Jordan Ltd. Ennis, Co. Clare. 
Enamels and 
paints.  
Harrington & Goodlass Wall.  Cork.  
Sewing thread.  Irish Sewing Cotton Co. Ltd. Westport, Co. 
Mayo. 
Spark plugs.  
 
Automotive Industries Ltd. 
The Leinster Engineering Co. Ltd. 
Drogheda. 
Dublin. 
Tyres. The Irish Dunlop Co. Ltd. 
 
Cork. 
Upholstery cloth.  
 
O’Brien Bros Ltd.  Cork. 
Source: Henry Ford & Son advertisement, Irish Times, 3 January 1938.   
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APPENDIX 11 
 
Motor cars (excluding commercial vehicles) imported into Ireland, by quantity 
and source, 1927-1937.   
 
Year  
 
U.K. and 
Northern 
Ireland  
 
USA 
 
France 
 
Italy  
 
Other 
 
Total 
 
Value 
1927 
 
2,998 76 262 423 32 3,791  £621,236 
1928 
 
4,642 314 226 43 38 5,263 877,467 
1929 
 
7,045 121 329 96 36 7,627 1,174,142 
1930 
 
7,160 148 146 101 5 7,560 1,056,852 
1931 
 
6,493 113 644 80 3 7,333 974,364 
1932 
 
2,808 29 59 5 2 2,903 388,525 
1933 
 
2,418 40 37 13 0 2,508 379,153 
1934 
 
2,068 61 34 8 5 2,176 347,855 
1935 
 
375 26 5 1 19 426 81,919 
1936 
 
189 12 0 0 26 227 50,354 
1937 
 
167 13 0 0 14 194 44,525 
Source: Trade and Shipping Statistics (1927-1937), Stationery Office publications (I 75), 
NLI.           
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APPENDIX 12 
 
Car parts exported from Ireland, according to value, 1924-1938 
 
Year 
Axles. 
To U.K. and 
Northern 
Ireland 
Other motor car parts  
Total To U.K. and 
Northern 
Ireland 
Other places 
1924 0 
 
£554,685 £14,009 £568,694 
1925 £54,970 
 
383,057 3,089 441,116 
1926 51,594 
 
305,859 1,660 359,113 
1927 
 
29,454 247,051 265 276,770 
1928 
 
809 123,263 56,608 180,680 
1929 
 
1 49,120 340 49,461 
1930 
 
37 119,095 632 119,764 
1931 
 
0 215,723 5,380 221,103 
1932 
 
2 100,038 920 100,960 
1933 
 
0 1783 68 1851 
1934 
 
0 978 26 1004 
1935 
 
0 3006 0 3006 
1936 
 
0 2124 189 2313 
1937 
 
0 6545 29 6574 
1938 
 
0 8,054 17 8,071 
Source: Trade and shipping statistics (1924-1938), Stationery Office publications (I 75), 
NLI. 
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APPENDIX 13 
 
Tractor parts exported from Ireland, according to value and destination, 1929-
1934. 
Country  
 
1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 Total 
USA   
 
£392,136 £284,567 £72,324 £39,141 £5,982 £3,151 £797,301 
 
USSR 
 
200,353 363,951 1,224 0 0 0 565,528 
 
U.K. and  
N. Ireland.  
87,143 41,117 26,697 50,347 19,850 3,467 228,621 
 
Italy 
 
26,256 35,929 6,664 16,943 1,303 906 88,001 
 
Germany 
 
32,633 27,242 12,690 5,575 866 376 79,382 
 
France  
 
14,690 15,165 16,289 1,937 340 72 48,493 
 
Canada 
 
24,505 8,524 3,863 995 103 16 38,006 
 
Turkey  
 
8,146 24,820 1,957 427 429 254 36,033 
 
Denmark  
 
13,295 12,160 6,796 2,066 242 165 34,724 
 
Sweden  
 
8,341 9,550 7,762 2,904 687 296 29,540 
 
Australia  
 
8,520 11,416 2,214 2,067 1,411 14 25,642 
 
Spain  
 
5,086 12,940 2,360 1,254 111 88 21,839 
 
Belgium  
 
6,337 6,875 3,574 944 427 25 18,182 
 
Finland  
 
5,415 4,402 2,254 882 268 82 13,303 
 
Netherlands 
  
3,167 5,417 2,797 1,347 139 140 13,007 
 
New 
Zealand 
3,690 6,010 561 139 39 0 10,439 
 
Others 
 
48,413 33,667 3,888 1,114 285 188 87,555 
 
Total value:    
 
£888,126 £903,742 £173,914 £128,082 £33,482 £9,240 £2,135,596 
Source: Trade and shipping statistics (1929-1934), Stationery Office publications (I 75), 
NLI. 
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APPENDIX 14 
  
Tractors exported from Ireland, according to quantity and destination, 1929-
1932. 
Country  1929 1930 1931 1932 Total 
USA   1,409 6,809 1,800 0 10,018 
GB (inc NI)  820 1,243 333 1,585 3,981 
Australia  1,288 1,008 25 0 2,321 
Italy 1,187 665 260 0 2,112 
Germany 704 1,079 75 0 1,858 
France  501 655 327 306 1,789 
Denmark  169 457 143 133 902 
Argentina  0 891 0 0 891 
Sweden  98 435 93 192 818 
Canada 1 758 0 0 759 
Spain  272 325 25 56 678 
Belgium  221 158 65 106 550 
New Zealand 407 65 0 0 472 
Finland  137 130 85 38 390 
Netherlands  207 43 86 43 379 
Turkey  13 257 31 0 301 
North Africa  90 49 8 0 147 
Rumania  37 100 1 0 138 
USSR 50 1 0 0 51 
Other countries  899 757 28 33 1717 
Industrial tractors  87 329 225 293 934 
Total  8,597 16,214 3,610 2,785 31,206 
Value  £919,151 
 
£1,682,897 
 
£342,930 
 
£291,524 
 
£3,236,502 
 
Source: Trade and shipping statistics (1929-1932), Stationery Office publications (I 75), 
NLI. 
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APPENDIX 15 
 
 Prices of Ford motor cars in the United States, 1903-1916.   
 
Year 
 
Model type    
 
Price range:  
dollars 
1903-1904 A $850-950 
 
 
1904-1905 
 
B 2000 
C 900-1000 
F 1000 
 
1905-1906 
 
B 2000 
F 1000 
 
 
1906-1907 
 
N 600 
R 750 
S 700-750 
1907-1908 K 2800  
Oct. 1908 T 825-1000 
 
 
Oct. 1909 
 
R 750  
S 700-750 
T 900-1200  
Oct. 1910 T 680-1100 
Oct. 1911 T 590-900 
Aug. 1912 T 525-800 
Aug. 1913 T 500-750 
Aug. 1914 T 440-690 
Aug. 1915 T 390-740 
Aug. 1916 T 345-645 
Source: Nevins and Hill, Ford: the times, the man, the company, p. 646/7 
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APPENDIX 16 
 
Extract from the employment agreement between Ford Motor Company and 
Percival Perry, 1909. 
‘To employ the manager to manage the business of its London branch but 
under the direction and control of the company …’ 
Salary $125 semi-monthly, paid on the 15
th
 day and last day of the month, plus 
a bonus related to sales based on the following scale: 
Up to $100,000 sales, nil; sales from $100,000 to $125,000, 1%; from $125,000 to 
$150,000, 1.5%; from $150,000 to $175,000, 2% and sales over $175,000, 2.5%. 
‘The manager agrees to devote his entire time and attention to the interests of 
the company to the exclusion of all other business, and that he will not enter the 
employ of any person, firm, co-partnership or corporation engaged in the 
handling, selling, renting or repairing automobiles until after 30 September 
1910 and that he will not himself engage in the business of selling or dealing in 
automobiles or renting or repairing same until after 30 September 1910…’  
Source : BFRC,  Acc. 140, Box 1, 1 October 1909. 
 
 
 
APPENDIX 17 
 
Ford Motor Company plants in the United States. 
Mack Avenue plant: The original Ford Motor Company car plant operated from 
1903 to early 1905.   
 
Piquette Avenue plant: Motor car production was transferred there from the 
Mack plant in 1904/1905. The first Ford Model T cars were produced there. 
 
Highland Park plant: Located in Detroit, the plant opened on 1 January 1910. It 
was built to produce the Model T and the assembly line was developed there, it 
operated until the late 1920s when it was superseded by the Rouge. 
 
Dearborn Tractor plant: Henry Ford purchased this site on Elm Street in 
February 1913 and located his farm tractor development there soon after. 
Tractor production commenced in mid-1917 and continued until the transfer to 
the Rouge began in September 1920.  
 
River Rouge Plant (known as The Rouge): A vast integrated industrial complex 
built to replace the Highland Park Plant. Located at the confluence of the Rouge 
and Detroit rivers, the site was purchased in 1915; construction began in 1917, 
and when it was completed in 1928 it had become the largest factory in the 
world. Tractor production began there in February 1921. 
Sources: Mack and Piquette plants, see Nevins and Hill, vol. 1, pp 265/6; Dearborn 
plant, Ford R. Bryan, Beyond the Model T, p. 15 and the Rouge plant, see chapter 8, 
Nevins and Hill, vol. 2. 
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APPENDIX 18 
 
Ford’s share of private and commercial vehicle sales in Ireland for selected 
years. 
Year Total private  and 
commercial 
vehicles registered  
Ford private and 
commercial 
vehicles registered  
% 
1933 3,940 2,098 53.2 
1934 6,016 2,924 48.6 
1935 7,756 5,406 69.7 
1936 10,240 6,632 64.8 
1937 12,209 7,480 61.3 
1938 10,298 5,470 53.1 
    
1958 23,960 8,648 36.1 
1959 27,828 9,408 33.8 
1960 33,069 11,962 36.2 
1961 34,709 12,362 35.6 
    
Sources: For the period 1933-1938, total vehicle registrations were taken from Statistical 
Abstracts, Stationery Office publications (I 74), NLI. Ford registrations are from sales 
manager’s quarterly reports, BFRC Acc.712, Box 18-1. All of the registrations in the 
period 1958-1962 come from the Commission on Industrial Organisation, Report on the 
motor vehicle assembly industry, p. 97. 
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